Afghanistan Dynamic Planning

Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan
Potential Fractiousness of Society
Support for Insurgency
Neutral Populace
Support for HN Government
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams
An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development. A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
Coalition Funding
Economic Investment
Economic Development
Neutral Populace
Developing and Restoring Essential Services
Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services
Satisfaction with Essential Services
Coalition Funding
Expectations for Essential Services
Economic Investment
Time to Develop Essential Services
Neutral Populace
An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
Time to Develop Governance
Coalition Funding
Economic Investment Governance
Psychological Operations Effectiveness
Neutral Populace
Perceived Security
Available Workforce External Material Support
A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.
Insurgent Acts of Violence
Coalition An appropriate force mix, and correct operational Satisfaction with Funding Time to Develop Essential Services tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance
significant impacts on
for The restoration of essential services. Economic Expectations Investment Essential Services Governance The populaces perception of security. The Governments and COIN forces credibility in Potential their communications efforts with the populace. Fractiousness Economic of Society Development
Impact of Illegitimate Actions
Neutral Populace
Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis
Perceived Security
Information
Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density
Time to Develop HN Security Forces
Insurgent to Force Density Ratio
Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures
Host Nation Security Forces
Coalition Force Density
Host Nation Force Density
Breakdown of Essential Services
Coalition Funding
Essential Services
Time to Develop Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness
Economic Investment
Governance Economic Development

Neutral Populace
Perceived Security
Information

The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
Coalition Funding
Economic Investment Governance
Neutral Populace
Perceived Security
Information
The Basic Information Ops Loop
Popular Support Sympathizers and Active Supporters
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Population Actively Supporting Govt & SF
Population Sympathizing w/ Govt
Neutral/On the Fence
Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents
Population Actively Supporting Insurgency
POPULAR SUPPORT
Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path
PA Knowledge Limited 2009
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Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Govt and CF Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent Fear of Ins. Attack, Repercussions
Relative WOM Message Amplification Govt vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement
Perception of Govt Strength and Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Govt Path Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment
Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry
Average Connectedness of Population
Perceived Security
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Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

Relative WOM Message Amplification Govt vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry
Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent
Population Actively Supporting Gov t & SF
Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions
Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent
POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT
Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path
Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Govt Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security
Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment
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Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Insurgent Damages & Casualties
Fear of Govt / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions
Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population
Territory Not Under Govt Control
Havens / Ability to 1 Operate Coordination Insurgent Insurgent Among Ins Leadership Offensives & Factions Training, Skill Presence & Exper (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding
Outside Support / Enablement of Ins.
Insurgent Terrain Advantage Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower, & ISR
Ins Provision of Govt & Services Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Govt
Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Funding & Material Support to Insurgents
Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/ Ins Support for Payment
Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels
Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and PA Knowledge Limited 2009
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Illegit Agric Production Trade & Employment
Terrain Harshness & Breadth
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Ins. Damages & Casualties
Fear of Gov t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS

Havens / Ability to Operate Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Territory Not Under Govt Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold)
Coordination Among Ins. Factions
Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience
Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population
Ins. Provision Of Govt & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov t
Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness
Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding
INSURGENTS
NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels
POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS

Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent
POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT
IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment
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Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)
Legit Agric Production
2
Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail
Fraction of Workforce and Agric. Legit vs Illegit
Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit vs Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity
Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment
Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric
1
Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
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Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition
Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.
Ins. Provision Of Govt & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Govt
INSURGENTS
NARCOTICS

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment

Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit
Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail
Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity
Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY

Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending
Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment
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Governance Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Govt Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Govt vs Ins
Central Govt Institutional & Execution Capacity Govt Funding Adequacy Govt Training, Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring
Govt Workforce Skill & Avail
Govt Integration of Local Tribal Structures
Govt / ANSF StratCom/IO
Relative Message Impact Govt vs Ins
Transparency of Govt Processes & Investments
Govt Professionalism, Policy Quality & Fairness
Govt/Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Tax Revenues
Overall Govt Reach, Execution, Capacity & Investment
Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures & Beliefs
Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as wellanother key loop)
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Governance Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population

Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment
INSURGENTS
NARCOTICS
Relative Message Quality Govt vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Relative Message Impact Govt vs Ins
Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring
OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Relative WOM Message Amplification Govt vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment
Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail
Transparency of Govt Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs
Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism
TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
Tax Revenues
Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry
Terrain Harshness & Breadth Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit
Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY

Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending
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Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

Coalition Knowledge & Understanding of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities Coalition StratComm/IO US Govt Support for Breadth of Operation Coalition & Support Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan
Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill
Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory & Aid
Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels)
Coalition Visibility to Population Western Affiliation Backlash
Coalition Dev. Ops-Govt Advisory & Aid
Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods
US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support
US Domestic/ Intl StratComm & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev. OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid
Provide Humanitarian Relief
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Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

Havens / Ability to Operate
Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation
Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity
Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities
Coalition Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Visibility to Population
Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition
INSURGENTS
NARCOTICS
Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels)
COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES

US Gov't Support for Operation
Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Govt Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid
Relative Message Quality Gov t vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO
Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Govt Processes & Investments Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail
OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY

Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias
Western Affiliation Backlash

COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition
Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs
Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid
TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE

Tax Revenues

Duration of Operation

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ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts Tactical & Institutional

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops
ISR / Open Source Ops
Total Security Force Capacity & focus ANSF Unit Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline & Morale
ANSF & Manpower Recruiting & Retention
ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity

1
Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)
ANSF Institutional & Execution Capacity
ANSF Training & Mentoring

2
ANSF Appropriate Use of Force
\
ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness
ANSF Funding Adequacy
Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention. 2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time. PA Knowledge Limited 2009
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ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts Tactical & Institutional

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties
ANSF TACTICAL
Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan
ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention
Total Security Force Capacity & Focus
ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness
OUTSIDE SUPPORT SUPPORT OUTSIDE INSURGENT TOTO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS

Havens / Ability to Operate Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Coordination Among Ins. Factions
Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops
Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities
ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring
ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population
ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism
ANSF INSTITUTIONAL
R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness
INSURGENTS
Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
NARCOTICS
Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels)
COALITION COALITION CAPACITY CAPACITY & & PRIORITIES PRIORITIES

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Govt Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity
Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment
US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support
Breadth of Coalition & Support
Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Govt Processes & Investments Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail
OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY

Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash

US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias
COALITION DOMESTIC Gov't/ Contractor SUPPORT Corruption & Coalition SUPPORT Tribal Favoritism Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid
Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs
TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE

Tax Revenues
Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation

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Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
Significant Delay
Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties
ANSF TACTICAL
Coalition Knowledge & Underst . of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Coalition Retention Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population
Total Security Force Capacity & Focus
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS

Havens / Ability to Operate Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins.
Counter - Narcotics/ Crime Ops
Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities
ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring
ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment
ANSF INSTITUTIONAL
Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition
Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding
INSURGENTS Ties to
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov t vs Insurgents Funding & Material Support to Insurgents
Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
NARCOTICS
Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels)
COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Govt Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity
Relative Message Quality Govt vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Relative Message Impact Govt vs Ins
CENTRAL Gov't GOVT Funding
OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Govt & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Govt
Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias
Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring
POPULAR SUPPORT
Population Actively Supporting Insurgency IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit
COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition
Transparency of Govt Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment
Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid
Recognition/ TRIBAL Engagement to Ethnic/Tribal Integrate Rivalry GOVERNANCE Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues
Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement
Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail
Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY

Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending
WORKING DRAFT V3
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Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)
2
ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment
Fear of Gov t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions
Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins.
ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale
ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population alition Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of ovt visory Afghan Methods Aid
Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Relative Message Quality Govt vs Ins.
Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov t & SF Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Population Sympathizing w/ Govt
Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF actively supporting the Strategic Central Gov't Commun/ Government. Institutional & IO Execution Relative WOM Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce Capacity Message Relative t Amplification insurgent ability to target and intimidate the population such Message ng Govt vs Ins Impact Govt Gov't acy that Govt sympathizers are willing to be vs active supporters. Ins Integration of Gov't Training Western Local Tribal Mentoring, HUMINT: The population will be more willing to provide intel Affiliation Structures Gov't Perception of Vetting, and Backlash Workforce Coalition Intent Hiring if they Skill do&not fear insurgent repercussions. Avail & Commitment sparency ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development Govt Gov't Overall facilitated byGov't the expansion Strength of secure regions. (ANA and of cesses & isProfessionalism Reach, Religious stments ANP Policy Quality Execution leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Tribal overrun. Investment Ability to Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
S w
Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security Services Private Workf Skill &
Reconcile
Infrastructure Dev Adequacy
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Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance
han ANSF Institutional & Execution tion Capacity OpsSF sory Aid ANSF Coalition Funding sibility to Adequacy opulation
ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism
Appropriate Use of Force
& Pakistan) Ins. Provision Of Govt & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Govt Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness
Training, Skill & Experience
Retention, Manpower & ISR
Perceived Critical for the Government to recognize and make the Gov't Damages/Use of Force by effort toSecurity engage existing tribal structures and Policy Gov t & Coalition Relative Perception of Quality & if they are to be accepted Message Insurgent Governance by the population. Investment Quality Strength & alition/Homeland Gov t vs Ins. Acceptance of Intent Ties to local governance can gain popular support and fghan Methods rapidly expand the Governments overall capacity and Gov't/ANSF Strategic reach which further increases their capacity and ability Central Gov't Commun/ Institutional & IO to engage the population. Execution Fear of Ins. Relative WOM Capacity Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Relative Message Impact Govt vs Ins Message Amplification Govt vs Ins
Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population
Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment
N &
Population Actively Supporting Govt & SF
Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Agric Production Terrain Harshness & Breadth
Illegit A Produc Trad Employ
Training oring, g, and ring
Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment
Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues
v't/ ractor ption & avoritism
Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security
Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs Rela Econo Opport
Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly
Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending
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Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics SECURITY

Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions
Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation
ANSF Capacity & Priorities
Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support
Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Govt Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Govt Processes & Investments
Relative Message Quality Gov t vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Govt vs Ins
Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Govt
Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels
Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Terrain Harshness & Breadth
Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid
Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness
Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending
WORKING DRAFT
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Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics GOVERNANCE

Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions
US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support
WORKING DRAFT
Reconciliation Effectiveness
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Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics DEVELOPMENT

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold) Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions
Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Govt Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Govt Processes & Investments Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail
US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support
Relative WOM Message Amplification Govt vs Ins
WORKING DRAFT
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Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Claim the Information Initiative

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus
Claim the Information Initiative: Message quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low average connectedness (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). Counter-WOM Narcotics/ Targeted Crime Ops Strikes tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to Ins. Damages Fear of Sweep Ops & Casualties Gov t/ANSF/ (Clear) be biased towards current sentiments. Coalition
Repercussions Havens / Ability to Support/ Western affiliation backlash may undermine Government messages if they are Operate Enablement of Ins. seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an Coordination Ins. Among Ins. Offensives & Insurgent overly Western posture Territory Not Factions Presence Terrain Ins. Insurgent Under Govt Control (Afghan & Pakistan) (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Outside
Policing & Security Ops (Hold)
Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion
Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support
Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels
Relative WOM Message Amplification Govt vs Ins
Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending
Significant Delay
WORKING DRAFT
Page 29
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Claim the Information Initiative

h n ANSF Institutional & Execution n Capacity sy ANSF alition Funding bility to Adequacy ulation on/Homeland ceptance of an Methods Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ins. Provision Of Govt & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Govt Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience
Fun Ma Sup Insu
Popu Sympa w/ Insu
Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent T Ha &
ining ng, and g
tor on & oritism
Claim the Information Initiative: Message quality and Private Sector Satisfaction availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing Workforce w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail the population. Government message quality has been Security, Services Dev. Adequacy & Employment & Sustainment Visible Gains stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not In Security, made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian Services & Employment beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message Expectations Civilia Legit Other credibility. for Security, Servic Production
Employment Healthc Non- Agric Message availability is constrained by low average Educat connectedness (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation Ability to Private Sector Capital Move WOM / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). tends to Management, People Investment & but Infr., Services, Econ. amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, & Goods Spending Policy & Execution Rapidly also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. /Perceived Fairness Services, & & Services (SWE
Western affiliation backlash may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture
Page 30
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Population Security

p cal ty ANSF Capacity & Priorities g Security Ops (Hold) p Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Outsid Suppor Enablem of Ins. ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale
ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism
ty y & ent
Relative Message Impact Govt Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions Gov't vs Ins tegration of and also perception of who will winocal over longer term: Western Tribal Affiliation Structures Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash Coalition
Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractivenes of Govt vs. Insurgent Pa Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Priv W Ski
forces impact perceived security. Insurgents rely targeted attacks on progressStrength to generate fear of and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active Religious Ideology & supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force Tribal individuals who are visibly supporting the government the Cultural fear this Structures Erosion/ Displacement generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. ecognition/ gagement to the population is In addition to near term security concerns, Ethnic/Tribal Integrate Rivalry assessing who will win over the long Tribal term by comparing tructures& perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government Beliefs strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to clear and leave operations.
Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric Ability to Move People Private Se Capita Managem Investme
I f
Page 31

Afghanistan Dynamic Planning

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Afghanistan Dynamic Planning

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Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Support for Insurgency

Support for HN Government

Support for Insurgency

Support for HN Government

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Expectations for Essential Services

Time to Develop Essential Services

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Support for Insurgency

Support for HN Government

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Time to Develop Governance

Expectations for Essential Services

Economic Investment Governance

Time to Develop Essential Services

Psychological Operations Effectiveness

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Support for Insurgency

Support for HN Government

Available Workforce External Material Support

Insurgent Acts of Violence

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Time to Develop Essential Services

Psychological Operations Effectiveness

Impact of Illegitimate Actions

Support for Insurgency

Support for HN Government

Available Workforce External Material Support

Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density

Time to Develop HN Security Forces

Insurgent to Force Density Ratio

Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures

Host Nation Security Forces

Coalition Force Density

Host Nation Force Density

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Time to Develop Governance

Expectations for Essential Services

Governance Economic Development

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Impact of Illegitimate Actions

Support for Insurgency

Available Workforce External Material Support

Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density

Time to Develop HN Security Forces

Insurgent to Force Density Ratio

Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures

Host Nation Security Forces

Coalition Force Density

The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Time to Develop Governance

Expectations for Essential Services