1.
Edilberto Noel (Pinito Mercado) as Administrator of the Intestate November 26, 1954, the petition was amended to include the estate of Hilaria
Estate of Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin, vs. Court of
Appeals and Jose Deleste.
240 SCRA 78
Grn59950 Jan.11, 1995
FACTS: (Quiason, J.)
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin (Nanaman spouses) were a childless,
legally-married couple. Gregorio, however, had a child named Virgilio Nanaman
(IC) by another woman. Since he was two years old, Virgilio was reared by
Gregorio and Hilaria. He was sent to school by the couple until he reached third
year of the law course.
During their marriage, Gregorio and Hilaria acquired certain property including a
34.7-hectare land in Tambo, Iligan City on which they planted sugarcane, corn and
bananas. They also lived there with Virgilio and 15 tenants. On October 2, 1945,
Gregorio died. Hilaria then administered the property with the help of Virgilio.
Through their tenants, Hilaria and Virgilio enjoyed the produce of the land to the
exclusion of Juan Nanaman, the brother of Gregorio, and Esperanza and Caridad
Nanaman, Gregorio's daughters by still another woman. In 1953, Virgilio (IC)
declared the property in his name for taxation purposes. On November 1, 1952,
Hilaria and Virgilio, mortgaged the 34.7-hectare land in favor of private
respondent, in consideration of the amount of P4,800.00.
On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio executed a deed of sale over the same
tract of land also in favor of private respondent in consideration of the sum of
P16,000.00. Witnesses to the sale were the wife of Virgilio, Rosita S. Nanaman,
Rufo C. Salas, the driver of private respondent, and Remedios Pilotan. The tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio was cancelled and a new tax declaration was
issued in the name of private respondent, Jose Deleste. Having discovered that
the property was in arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952, private
respondent paid the taxes for 1952, 1953 and 1954. From then on, private
respondent has paid the taxes on the property.
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. On October 27, 1954, Esperanza and Caridad
Nanaman filed intestate estate proceedings concerning the estate of their father,
Gregorio. Included in the list of property of the estate was the 34.7-hectare land.
Inasmuch as only Esperanza, Caridad and Virgilio Nanaman were named as heirs
of Gregorio in the petition, Juan Nanaman, Gregorio's brother, opposed it. On
with Alejo Tabuclin, Hilaria's brother, and Julio Tabuclin, (nephew)a son of Hilaria's
deceased brother, Jose, as additional petitioners. Having been appointed special
administrator of the estate of the Nanaman couple, Juan Nanaman included the
34.7-hectare land in the list of the assets of the estate.
Juan also reported that Virgilio took the amount of P350.00 from the produce of
the estate without prior permission and that five tenants delivered sugar and
palay to private respondent. Hence Juan prayed that the court cite private
respondent and the tenants in contempt of court. Accordingly, in its Order of
January 30, 1956, the probate court required private respondent and said tenants
to appear before it and "show cause why they should not be cited for contempt
for illegally interfering in the land" under special administration.
On June 16, 1956, when Edilberto Noel took over as regular administrator of the
estate, he was not able to take possession of the land in question because it was
in the possession of private respondent and some heirs of Hilaria. Later, Private
respondent and the heirs of the Nanaman spouses executed an amicable
settlement of the Nanaman estate. In the document, private respondent agreed
"to relinquish his rights to one-half (1/2) of the entire parcel of land in Tambo,
Iligan City, indicated in item 1 under the Estate, sold to him by Hilaria Tabuclin, in
favor of all the heirs of the abovementioned intestate [estate] for the reason that
not all of the heirs of Gregorio Nanaman have signed and agreed.” The court
approved the amicable settlement but when it was questioned by some heirs, the
court set aside its approval and declared it null and void.
Noel, as regular administrator, and as ordered by the court filed an action against
private respondent for the reversion of title over the 34.7-hectare land to the
Nanaman estate and to order private respondent to pay the rentals and attorney's
fees to the estate.
RTC: action for annulment of the deed of sale had prescribed in 1958 inasmuch as the sale was
registered in 1954 and that Gregorio's heirs had slept on their rights by allowing Hilaria to
exercise rights of ownership over Gregorio's share of the conjugal property after his death in
1945. On the issue that Hilaria had no authority to dispose of one-half of the property pertaining
to her husband, the trial court ruled: (1) that Hilaria in effect acted as administratrix over the
estate of Gregorio; (2) that she sold the 34.7- hectare land in order to pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; and (3) that out of the purchase price of P16,000.00, P4,000.00 was in
payment to private respondent (who was a doctor of medicine) for medical services rendered
and medicine administered during Gregorio's ailment and P800.00 was used to pay taxes in
arrears. Noel appealed.
CA: the transaction between Hilaria and Virgilio on one hand and private respondent on the
other, was indeed a sale. It found that no fraud, mistake or misrepresentation attended in the
execution of the deed of sale and that no proof was shown that the contract was merely a
mortgage.
The appellate court, however, agreed with Noel that Hilaria could not validly sell the 37.7-
hectare land because it was conjugal property, and Hilaria could sell only her one-half share
thereof.
On the issue of prescription, the appellate court ruled that since no fraud, mistake or
misrepresentation attended the execution of the deed of sale, the prescriptive period of ten
years had not yet elapsed when the action to recover the property was filed in 1963. Moreover,
the appellate court held that in the absence of proof of adverse possession by Hilaria, she
should be considered as holding the property pursuant to her usufructuary rights over the same
under the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the law in force at the time of the death
of Gregorio.
Finding that Noel's claim for rentals of P5,000.00 per annum from 1957 was uncontroverted, the
appellate court ruled that one-half thereof belonged to the estate of Gregorio.
CA AMENDED DECISION: affirmed its previous decision regarding the due execution of
the Deed of Sale adding that since no fraud attended its execution, there was no basis for the
action to annul the sale, and therefore there was no starting point in reckoning the prescriptive
period of four years. It reconsidered the Decision of Feb. 18, 1980 insofar as it declared Deleste
and the estate of Gregorio as co-owners of the said land.
The appellate court tacked "the physical possession of Hilaria and Virgilio to the possession of
the defendant for another nine (9) years up to the time the complaint was filed." It considered
the "change of conditions or relations" which had transpired in the case such as private
respondent's registration of his muniment of title over the property; the cancellation of Virgilio's
tax declaration and the issuance of another tax declaration in the name of private respondent;
private respondent's payment of taxes from 1952 "up to the present;" the execution of a new
tenancy agreement between private respondent and the tenants; and private respondent's
purchase of plows, a carabao and insecticides for use in the ricefield.
Stating that it was "proscribed from taking away property from the alert and the industrious and
dumping it into the hands and possession of one has previously slept on his rights," the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court in all its parts, including the award of
damages and the costs of suit.
ISSUE: W/N Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the entire property sold to private respondent
and assuming that they did not have full ownership thereof, whether the right of action to
recover the share of the collateral heirs of Gregorio had prescribed or been lost through laches.
HELD: NO. Gregorio died in 1945 long before the effectivity of the Civil Code of
the Philippines on August 30, 1950. Under Article 2263 of the said Code, "rights to
the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity
of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws,
and by the rules of Court."
Thus, succession to the estate of Gregorio was governed primarily by the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Under Article 953 thereof, a spouse
like Hilaria, who is survived by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters
of the decedent, as is obtaining in this case, was entitled to receive in usufruct
the part of the inheritance pertaining to said heirs. Hilaria, however, had full
ownership, not merely usufruct, over the undivided half of the estate (Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, Art. 493). It is only this undivided half-interest that she could
validly alienate.
On the other hand, Virgilio was not an heir of Gregorio under the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889. Although he was treated as a child by the Nanaman spouses,
illegitimate children who were not natural were disqualified to inherit under the
said Code (Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]). Article 998 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which gave an illegitimate child certain hereditary rights, could
not benefit Virgilio because the right of ownership of the collateral heirs of
Gregorio had become vested upon his death (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
2253; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530 [1953]). Therefore, Virgilio had no right at
all to transfer ownership over which he did not own.
In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he
is selling. The principal obligation of a seller is "to transfer the ownership of" the
property sold (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1458). This law stems from the
principle that nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him (Azcona v.
Reyes, 59 Phil. 446 [1934]; Coronel v. Ona, 33 Phil. 456 [1916). NEMO DAT QUAD
NON HABET .
While it cannot be said that fraud attended the sale to private respondent, clearly
there was a mistake on the part of Hilaria and Virgilio in selling an undivided
interest in the property which belonged to the collateral heirs of Gregorio.
The sale, having been made in 1954, was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Under Article 1456 of said Code, an implied trust was created on the
one-half undivided interest over the 34.7-hectare land in favor of the real owners
Under the law in force in 1945, the surviving spouse was given the management
of the conjugal property until the affairs of the conjugal partnership were
terminated. The surviving spouse became the owner of one-half interest of the
conjugal estate in his own right. He also became a trustee with respect to the
other half for the benefit of whoever may be legally entitled to inherit the said
portion. "He could therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against those
for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian his
ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of an estate. . . . The surviving
husband as the administrator and liquidator of the conjugal estate occupies the
position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold
that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law
imposes upon him duty of administration and liquidation" (Pamittan v. Lasam, 60
Phil. 908 [1934]).
The possession of Virgilio, his registration of the land in his name for tax
purposes, his hiring of tenants to till the land, and his enjoyment of the produce of
the tenants, appear more as acts done to help Hilaria in managing the conjugal
property. There is no evidence to prove indubitably that Virgilio asserted a claim
of ownership over the property in his own right and adverse to all including
Hilaria.
Amended judgment reversed and set aside, original judgment reinstated in toto.
2. Heirs of Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario, vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
300 SCRA 345
GRN 118464 Dec. 21, 1998
FACTS: (Bellosillo, J.)
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuado, were the co-
owners of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the
corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, with a house erected
thereon. On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue.
Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita
S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico
A. SAMPAYO, Carlos A. Sampayo, Gelleroso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo,
Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia. A. Sampayo, Corazon C.
Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo
acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all
claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an
action for partition and damages.
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground
that private respondents failed to produce any document to produce that they
were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died
and was substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco,
Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot,
petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosal Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo
Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares
by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario)
had been staying in the subject property since 1937. In fact, she said that her late
husband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes and spent for the necessary
repairs and improvements thereon because by agreement Lourdes would leave
her share of the property to them.
However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or
holographic, was presented by petitioners to substantiate this claim. Rosario also
disclosed that when Lourdes died her remains were taken by her-relatives from
their house. When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that
the only one she remembered was Josefina since there were many relatives who
came. When asked who Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall.
Likewise, when asked who the parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied having
ever known them.
RTC: declared private respodents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered
private respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the residential house and
lot for confirmation by the court
CA: affirmed the decision of RTC. Private respondents] were able to prove and establish by
preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore the lower court did not err in ordering private respondents and petitioners to submit a
project of partition of the residential house and lot owned in common by the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the court
citing Hernandez v. Padua and Marabilles v. Quito, a prior and separate judicial declaration of
heirship was not necessary and that private respondents became the co-owners of the portion of
the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and,
consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of
ownership as provided for by law, including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the
Civil Code, and Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death.
ISSUE: W/N a prior settlement of the estate of the deceased be first made before the heirs can
commence an action for partition.
HELD: NO. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can
commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in
Quison v. Salud- Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present
plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to
maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in
court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison; and that without such settlement, the
heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by
the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate
passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of
administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts
and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of
the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had
been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the; plaintiffs to
maintain this action is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 32
of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner,
incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the
co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition
private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct
had the action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we
were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the
summary settlement of estates of small value. But what private respondents are
pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited;
from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition
between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rules 69 of the Rules
of Court.
There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and
second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property,
i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner. 34 Thus, in this case, we must
determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have
been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral
heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew
or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well
as before respondent Court of Appeals.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by vietue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law. Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without
a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity. If there
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spuoses, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 38 It was
established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issues. Private
respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives
of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, 39 the filiation of ligitimate children shall be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the
absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in
a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's
filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 40 By analogy, this method of
proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case
Petition DENIED; judgment AFFIRMED.
3. Coronel vs. CA, Concepcio Alcaraz and Ramona Patricia Alcaraz,
assisted by Gloria Noel, as atty-in-fact
263 SCRA 15
GRN 103577 Oct. 7, 1996
FACTS: (Melo, J.)
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
On January 19, 1985, petitioners Romulo Coronel, et al. (Coronels) executed a
document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of private respondent
Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (Ramona).
The conditions appurtenant to the sale are the following:
1. Ramona will make a down payment of P50,000.00upon execution of the document;
2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the title of the property registered in
the name of their deceased father upon receipt of the P50,000.00 down payment;
3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the Coronels will execute the deed of
absolute sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the former the whole balance of
P1,190,000.00.
On the same date (January 15, 1985), private respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz
(Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of P50,000.00.
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the
Coronels' father was transferred in their names. On February 18, 1985, the
Coronels sold such property to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag
(Catalina) for P1,580,000.00 after the latter has paid P300,000.00. For this
reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing
the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific
performance against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens at the back of TCT No. 327403.
On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim
covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
subject property in favor of Catalina. On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject
property was issued in the name of Catalina under TCT No. 351582.
RTC: judgment for specific performance was rendered ordering Coronels to
execute in favor of private respondents a deed of absolute sale covering the land,
together with all the improvements existing thereon free from all liens and
encumbrances. The DoAS be immediately delivered to private respondents and
upon receipt thereof the PRs are ordered to pay petitioners the whole balance of
the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Pets’ MR DENIED.
CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
Petitioners argue that there could not have been a perfected contract on Jan. 19,
1985 because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited
property.
ISSUE: W/N the contract between petitioners and respondents had been
perfected on Jan. 19, 1985, despite that title to the land in question was not yet in
their names.
HELD: YES. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of
transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to be extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the
decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to
succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath,
petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned,
such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and
enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code;
Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared
unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were
able to effect the transfer of the title to the property from the decedent's name to
their names on February 6, 1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of
capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to
now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they entered into the
agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly
states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the
time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute
owners thereof at that time.
Petition DISMISSED; appealed judgment AFFIRMED.
4. Viardo vs. Belmonte
5 SCRA 859
GRN L-14127 Aug. 21, 1962
FACTS: (Padilla, J.)
APPEAL from a judgment of the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled Leon C.
Viardo vs. Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, a writ of execution was issued and
levy was made "upon all the rights, interest and participation which the spouses
Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or might have" in a parcel of land
covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 of the Registrar of Deeds in and for
the province of Nueva Ecija. This certificate of title covers a parcel of land (Lot No.
1, Psu-14371) in the barrios of Nieves and Santo Rosario, municipality of
Zaragoza, province of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 1,192,775 square
meters, more or less. The land is registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte,
Felisa Belmonte, Pilar Belmonte and Ines de Guzman, subject . . . to the condition
that 1/4 share [that] belongs to Ines de Guzman is usufructuary "correspondiendo
la nuda propiedad a sus tres hijas arriba citadas en participaciones iguales
quienes se consolidara el dominio despues del fallecimiento de su madre'
" (corresponding the ownership of the naked property to her three daughters
above mentioned who are in equal shares to consolidate the dominion after the
death of their mother)
On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above mentioned, the
provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija sold at public auction one-half (1/2) of the
following property:
TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZARAGOZA, PROVINCE OF NUEVA
ECIJA AND COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 OF THE LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA
ECIJA.
A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto. Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza,
Province of Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the North by property of Felisa Belmonte; on the East by Sapang
Dalagot; on the Southeast by Ines de Guzman; on the South by the property of Felisa Belmonte; and
on then West by the property of Cirilo Acosta; containing an area of THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more or
less. Declared under tax No. 11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an assessed value of
P8,400.00.

The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor, Leon C. Viardo,
who paid P2,125.64 for the interest sold and P83.15 for the land tax
corresponding to such interest. When the judgment debtors failed to redeem the
property within the statutory period of one year from the date of sale (21
February 1941), the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on 12 May 1943 a
Final Bill of Sale of the property in favor of Leon C. Viardo. On 3 May 1943 a co-
owner's copy of the certificate of title was issued to Leon C. Viardo.

On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land

Registration Case No. 918, G.L.R.O. Record No. 17910, acting upon a verified
petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue another in lieu thereof in
the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE ¼ share; FELISA
BELMONTE, ¼ share; PILAR BELMONTE, 1/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, 1/8 share;
and INES DE GUZMAN, ¼ share, upon the payment of the corresponding fees

.However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 that the above-
mentioned order was not carried out and that said original certificate of title was
not cancelled.

On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint against Leon C. Viardo praying that judgment
be rendered against the defendant:
(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question in favor of
plaintiffs herein upon payment by the latter of the lawful redemption price in
accordance with law, or the sum of P2,125.64 with interest at the rate of one per
centum (1%) per month for twelve (12) months from February 27, 1941 to
February 27, 1942.
On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte,
requested the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for
the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Nueva Ecija, affecting the undivided one-half (½) portion of the
property of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cause, situated in the Sitio of
Valdez, Barrio of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of Zaragoza, which is involved in the
said controversy against the defendant LEON C. VIARDO, and which is more
particularly described under paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs' complaint a copy of
which is hereby presented, hereunto attached.