• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
Thinking the Unthinkable II: Three Scenarios forBiochemical Warfare in 2020 - Characteristics,Concepts, and Policy Proposals
byThomas Preston Washington State UniversityAnd Malcolm Dando Bradford University
*Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association inNew York City, 15-19 February 2009.
Thinking the Unthinkable: Three Scenarios For Biochemical Warfare in 2020 –Characteristics, Concepts and Policy Proposals
"People don't realize biological weapons could be the most sophisticatedweapons. Biological weapons could be used covertly. There are a lot of differentdeployment scenarios. There are a lot of different techniques to manufacturebiological weapons. And a lot of different agents could be used in biologicalweapons." [Ken Alibek, 2001]1
I.) Introduction
In the years since the September 11th terror attacks, and the nation’s first real experiencewith bioterrorism during the postal anthrax attacks, policy makers have remaineddangerously inconsistent and unfocused in their policy responses.While scholars, and many internal government analysts, have warned about the ‘tickingtime-bomb’ potential of bio-chemical terrorism, and the need to adopt strongerpreventative measures now, generally this has not resulted in significant or appropriateactions.And scholarship that has warned of broader changes in existing interstate securityrelationships likely to be produced by the rapid proliferation of biochemical weaponsknowledge and technology – as well as the potential these hold for non-state, terror actors– has yet to be acted upon by policy makers (e.g., Alibek 1999; Dando 2001; Whitby2002; Preston 2007).
 
 For example, funds were allocated to prepare First-Responders better for bio-chemicalattacks, allowing local law enforcement, fire services, and others to upgrade theirequipment and engage in training. Yet, as critics would later note, often enough, thesefunds would end up not being focused on the big (and realistic) targets, such as Seattle,Chicago, New York, etc., but upon small rural communities across the country (Preston2007).And while it is certainly true that these local first responders needed new equipment andbenefitted from the expenditures – the purpose was to reduce the areas of greatest U.S.vulnerability to a future bioterror attack, not provide an exercise in ‘pork-barrel’ spendingfor members of Congress.So, funds were diluted by being spread too thinly across the entire country. PresidentBush offered ‘window-dressing’ solutions, such as the initiative to vaccinate largesegments of our first-responder, medical community (along with the military) againstsmallpox – a program which in the end was implemented with but a fraction of thenumbers originally proposed (Preston 2007).Similarly, initiatives were announced to greatly enhance the U.S. drug/medical stockpileto ward against bio-terror attacks in 2002, yet these have remained underfunded and donot even (as of 2009) hold adequate respiratory masks to deal with an avian flu outbreak or enough anti-biotics/anti-viral drugs to cope with an attack on the public of anysignificant magnitude (Preston 2007).The Bush administration’s Project Bioshield, which was only funded at $5.6 billion overten years to provide incentives for drug companies to develop new drugs, vaccines,diagnostic devices, and medical treatments for countering potential bio-attacks, despitethe fact that it takes the pharmaceutical industry somewhere between $500 to $800million, and anywhere from 10 to 15 years, to bring a new drug or vaccine onto themarket.2And the counterproliferation efforts of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat ReductionProgram have consistently been underfunded by the previous administration, with but afraction of limited funds going to counter-CBW efforts (Smithson 1999, 2000; Preston2007).In terms of upgrading security or border controls, the record of the past eight years hasbeen equally dismal. For example, of the 3.7 million shipments of imported food arrivinginto the U.S. each year, only 1 percent are inspected by the U.S. Food and DrugAdministration (FDA), a miniscule number of inspections similar to the percentageimposed on domestically produced or processed foods!3The American airline industry boards 1.5 million passengers a day (and has had $11billion spent since 9/11 to improve security), but this is but a fraction of the 3.8 million
 
passengers a day (boarding at 468 stations) who ride the New York subway system wherelittle has been spent to improve security.4An analysis by the EPA warns at least 123 plants in the U.S. contain amounts of toxicchemical that would put 1 million people at risk if released in a catastrophic accident.5Another 700 plants could threaten 100,000 nearby residents, and more than 3,000facilities pose a serious risk to at least 10,000 people in the surrounding area.6But, rather than provide funding to upgrade security, the policy solution adopted was to‘remove’ the list of plants from the EPA website and restrict the information to reducethe risk of identifying valuable targets for terrorists. The U.S. Customs Service reportsover 500 ships carrying 600,000 cargo containers enter one of the nation's 361 seaportsdaily, of which Customs inspects barely 2 percent (and often not until they reach theirfinal destinations).7Not only does the U.S. Coast Guard patrol 95,000 miles of shoreline, plus 3.36 millionsquare miles of the U.S. “Exclusive Economic Zone” (that extends 200 miles offshore),they do so with a fleet of antiquated ships and aircraft using a work force the same size asthe New York City police department.8And, while international trade has doubled since 1995, the number of Customs inspectorshas remained constant, despite the fact seaports handle 95 percent of the cargo enteringthe U.S. from locations other than Canada and Mexico.9Along the 4,000 mile northern border with Canada, 6.5 million commercial trucks enterthe U.S. annually, the vast majority of which go uninspected to any significant degree.10In this paper, we will touch on the nature of the bio-chemical threat we now face, andhow this might translate into a variety of threat scenarios over the coming decadesinvolving both state and non-state actors.More importantly, rather than merely raise the alarm (hopefully) about the potentialdangers this proliferation poses, we will also suggest for policy makers a number of practical policy implications of these current dynamics and propose some policyrecommendations to better prepare ourselves against his threat.In the concluding chapter of their book, Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since1945, Wheelis, Rosza, and Dando (2006) attempt to answer three questions that havebeen considered to be central in the history of offensive biological weapons (BW)programmes:(1) Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring BW?(2) Why have states terminated BW programs?
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...