FO B6 Public Hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 Fdr- Tab 6 Table of Contents and Tab 6-15- Suggested Questions for FAA Panel 707

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IMPROVISING AHOMELAND DEFENSEPANEL: FAA RESPONSE ON 9/1111:30 a.m.

-1:00

p.m., Thursday, June

17

Designated

Commissioners: Ben-Veniste

and

Gorton

15

-

Suggested Questions

for

FAA

Panel

16

-

Monte Belger

•

Biography

•

MFR

•

Prepared Testimony

•

Invitation Letter

17-Jeff

Griffith

•

Biography

•

MFR

•

Prepared Testimony

•

Invitation Letter

18

-

BenedictSliney

•

Biography

•

MFR

•

Prepared Testimony

•

Invitation Letter

19-John

White

•

Biography

•

MFR•

Prepared Testimony

•

Invitation Letter

DAY

OF9/11

Suggested Hearing QuestionsIII. FAA WitnessesMonte Belger:

FAA Deputy Administrator on

9/11

(retired from FAA). Mr.Belger was the second in command on

9/11

and led the FAA response to the

hijackings

from the crisis center on the

10

th

floor of FAA headquarters. He alsoparticipated in the White House SVTS on the morning of

9/11.

Prior to assumingthe position of Deputy Administrator, Mr. Belger served in theFAA'sSecurity Division.

JeffGriffith:

Deputy Director

of Air

Traffic

on 9/11

(retired

from

FAA).

Mr.

Griffith

was the

senior

air

traffic

representative

at

headquarters

on 9/11

(BillPeacock,

the

Director

of the Air

Traffic

Division,

was out of

state

on

business).

Mr.

Griffith

participated

in

coordinating

the

response

to the

hijacking events

fromthe

crisis center

on the

10

th

floor

of

headquarters.

He

also participated

in the

White House SVTS. He is trained and spent most of his career as an air

traffic

controller.

John White:

Manager

of

Administrative

Affairs

for the FAA

Command Center

facility

in Herndon, Virginia on

9/11

(retired

from FAA). Mr. White assumed the

responsibility

of facility

operations manager

at the Command

Center

on

9/11

andmaintained

an

open line

of

communications with

Jeff

Griffith

and

other

FAA air

traffic

representatives

at

headquarters.

Ben

Sliney:

National Operations Manager

("NOM")

at the

Herndon CommandCenter

on

9/11.

Mr.

Sliney

is

currently

the

manager

of the New

York Traconfacility. September 11

th

was Mr.

Sliney's

first day as the Command

Center

NOM.

As

NOM,

Mr.

Sliney

was

responsible

for the

oversight

of all FAA

operations

within

the National Airspace System. He exhibited excellent judgment and

initiative

when

hedecided (1)to

ground

all

aircraft departures nationwide,

and

(2) to

ground

all

airborne

aircraft

after

the

Pentagon

was

attacked.

He was

chastised

by FAA

Headquarters

on 9/11 for

grounding

all

airborne

aircraft

without headquartersapproval.

1.

Coordination Between

FAA and NORAD

pre-9/11:

Prior

to

9/11 there

was

an

exchange program between

the FAA and

NORAD, whereby

military

liaisons

were

detailed

to

serve

at

FAA,

and FAA

liaisons

were

detailed

to

serve

at

NORAD.

These

individuals

coordinated

the

day-to-day

activities between

the

agencies

—

the

sharing

of

airspace

for

training exercises

and

movement

of

troops.

These

liaisons were

not

trained

or

assigned

any

role

in a

crisis situation,

such

as a

hijacking.

However, their presence

on

9/11

led

many

to

"assume"

they

were the

ones coordinating

the

military

response.

(a)

What

was the

interaction

of FAA and

NORAD

prior

to

9/11

? How

familiarweretheagencies with each other? Whatwas thecontextinwhichtheagenciesinteracted? [Belger

or

Griffith]

(b)

Prior

to

9/11, were some Centers more familiar than others with

the

military

and

specifically NORAD? For example, on 9/11 why do you think Bostonreached out so quickly to Otis Air Force Base? [Griffith]

(c)

Prior

to9/11, werethe FAAliaisonsto

NORAD

assigned

any

role

in the

protocols related

to hijacking

response?

Why

not?

After

9/11, did the FAA

modify

the

role

of

these liaisons

to

include responsibilities relevant

to

hijackings?[Belger

or

Griffith]

(d)On 9/11, did you

believe these

liaisons

were coordinating

the

militaryresponse?

If so,

why? [Belger

or

Griffith]

2. FAA Awareness of Increased Threat to

U.S.

During Spring/Summer of

2001.

(a)

Were

you or

your

staff

made aware

of the

fact

that

the

intelligencecommunity believed there was a heightened threat to U.S. security due to anincreased level of

"chatter"

by terrorist groups during the spring and summer of2001? [Belger]

(b)

Specifically,

did you or

your staff receive

any

intelligence information during

the

spring

or

summer

of

2001 regarding

an

increased

risk of

terrorist activity?

Any

information specifically regarding hijackings?

Any

information regarding

hijackings in the

United States?

If so,

what precautions

did you

take

to

mitigate

the

threat?

[Belger]

3.

Pre-9/11 Training

and

Exercises Regarding Hijackings.

Most

managers

at

FAA

Headquarters

had

little

or no

recollection

of

the

protocols

in

place

on

9/11

regarding their roles

and

responsibilities

in a

hijacking.

With

the exception

of

a

few

individuals

from the

Security

Division, there

appeared

to be

little

or notraining

at FAA Headquarters or

Command Center regarding

hijacking

procedures.

Indeed,

when asked

to

identify

who the

hijack

coordinator

was on

9/11,

it was

difficult

to find two

witnesses

who

identified

the

same individual.

At the

Command Center,

no one

could remember

any

training

or

exercises

regarding

the

role

the

Command Center

would

play

in a

hijacking.

(a)

Prior

to

9/11,

why was

there

a

lack

of

training

at FAA

Headquartersconcerning the roles of management in response to a hijacking? Did the lack of

hijack

training at headquarters

contribute

to the confusion on the 10

th

floor of

FAA

headquarters that morning? [Belger

or

Griffith]

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