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Complicating the situation is that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad seems to welcome theprospect of an attack on Iran as a means to rekindle the lost fervor of the early revolutionary days.
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 IRAN’S MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMYPatrick Clawson
Statement for Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 17, 2006 HearingIf Iran saw its nuclear program as essential to defending the country’s very existence – the way Israeland Pakistan view their nuclear programs – then economic considerations would make littledifference to Iran’s calculations. But defense is not the principal factor behind the Iranian nuclearprogram. Rather, Iran’s principal motives for its nuclear program are the pursuit of prestige andinfluence. Iranian leaders consistently present the nuclear program as an accomplishment of Iranianscience and as evidence that Iran is an advanced modern industrial power. They also argue thatWestern opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions are an effort to keep Iran down, to prevent thecountry from assuming its rightful place as a leader in the region and the broader Muslim world.They play to Iranians’ national pride, to their sense that Iran is naturally a great power – not to anysense that Iran is so threatened that it must take desperate steps to defend itself.The challenge for the West is to persuade Iran’s power-holders that the nuclear program will notadvance Iran’s prestige and influence. Economic instruments can play a role in this regard, thoughthey are most unlikely to be sufficient by themselves.
Iranian Self-Assurance
 Unfortunately, the West’s ability to press Iran has eroded in recent years. Iran’s leaders are nowremarkably self-assured, given the conjunction of favorable circumstances, including the end tothreats to Iran from Iraq and Afghanistan; the United States being tied down in Iraq; and victories bypro-Iranian forces in Iraqi and Palestinian elections. Economic factors play no small part in this self-assurance, as documented by the recent International Monetary Fund report (the source of all theeconomic figures I cite, unless otherwise noted). Oil and gas exports have shot up from $23 billion in2002/03 to $55 billion this year, driven entirely by higher prices (Iran got $23 per barrel in 2002/03and will get $55 this year). The oil exports have swelled government coffers allowing an explosionof off-budget spending that has sent economic growth shooting up to an average of 6.2 percent a year(discounting for inflation) from 2002/03 to this year. Foreign exchange reserves have shot up to $47billion, more than twice the size of all foreign debt, and are expected to rise further to $62 billion bythe end of this year.In light of the favorable strategic situation, many in the Iranian leadership are no longer convincedthat it must maintain strong ties with Russia and Europe, nor do they think that these relationshipshave brought Iran any benefits to date. To the extent that this self-reliant attitude prevails, it will beharder to persuade Iran to cooperate with the international community. However, if the great powerscan remind Iran about the true danger of isolation, the terms of the nuclear debate in Iran will change.Conceding will be difficult for Iran, but the Islamic Republic has in the past made difficultcompromises with its revolutionary principles, such as ending the Iran-Iraq War.
 
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Given that inappropriate government policies are already making the Iranian business communitynervous, international pressure on the economy could have a major impact on business confidence.
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While he represents a dangerous and growing element in the Iranian elite, the real power holder hasbeen the Supreme Leader (who is exactly what the title suggests), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. For thelast 18 years, Khamenei has preferred low-level confrontation with the West -- just enough to keepthe revolutionary spirit alive, but not enough to risk open hostilities. For now, Khamenei seems tothink that the West, despite its tough rhetoric, will do nothing to stop Ahmadinezhad, so why not lethim push ahead.
Economic Vulnerability
 Having pegged his reputation on his ability to help the ordinary man, Ahmadinezhad faces seriousproblems: the economy is a mess, his policies are disastrous, and Iranians’ expectations are sky-high.The World Bank’s 2003 report about Iran noted, “Despite the growth in the 1990s, GDP per capita in2000 is still 30 percent below what it was in the mid 1970s, compared with a near doubling for therest of the world.” Iranians are galled to find that their country has slipped badly behind the Arabs onthe south side of the Persian Gulf, whom they traditionally have regarded as their social inferiors.Thanks to the tens of thousands of Iranians living in Dubai, Iranians know full well that Dubai isbooming because it has embraced globalization, while their country falls ever farther behind, trappedby its suspicion of the West.Ahmadinezhad’s policy is based on producing everything at home and creating barriers to trade – hehas no use for globalization. His government has been discouraging foreign investors, for instance,refusing to allow Renault to use the billion-dollar facility it built in Iran to build an inexpensive carfor the Asian market. The recent Iranian boom has been based almost entirely on profligategovernment spending which cannot last forever. Despite the flood of oil money, government policiesare such that the IMF warns the budget will fall back into deficit again within two years even if oilprices remain sky-high.The recent massive government spending has led to several years of solid growth, yet it has barelydented the country’s long-term economic problems. While reported unemployment fell to an eight-year low of 10.3 percent last year, job creation remains insufficient to absorb the 700,000 youngpeople entering the job market each year. The IMF forecasts that even if oil prices remain at theirpresent high level, unemployment will steadily increase in years to come. In its 2003 report, theusually sober and understated World Bank summed up the “daunting unemployment challenge” withstrong words: “Unless the country moves quickly to a faster path of growth with employment,discontent and disenchantment could threaten its economic, social, and political system.”Economic and political frustration is feeding social problems. One is chronic drug problem, with theIranian government acknowledging that two million people use narcotics, mainly opium; otherestimates are higher. Divorce is on the rise; one study found that 30 percent of newlyweds gotdivorced within three years. Another is increasing prostitution; the official estimate is 300,000prostitutes. There have been a number of corruption scandals involving judges and government socialworkers involved in prostituting young girls. Instead of making reforms that would allowentrepreneurs to create jobs, the political elite is more comfortable with the “solution” of risingemigration rates, especially among the well educated. In sum, many of Iran’s best and brightest areleaving the country, and a growing number of those remaining are at risk of becoming an underclass.
Business Confidence: The Achilles’ Heel
 
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“The [Tehran] stock market has shown to be hypersensitive to political issues (such as the course of the nuclear enrichment negotiations), as well as domestic economic policy uncertainties,” writes thestate-owned Karafarin Bank in its
Survey of the Iranian Economy
for October-December 2005. In2005, the stock market index fell 26%. At the same time, the banking system was hit by a crisis fromdishonored promissory notes, primarily by big firms unable to pay their debts.With even Iranian firms nervous about business conditions, there are excellent opportunities to pressforeign firms to reduce their presence in Iran. There have already been some notable successes in thisregard. Strict U.S. Treasury application of existing rules about fund transfers – such as those toprevent transfer of funds to terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators – led thetwo largest Swiss banks (UBS and Credit Swiss) and a large British bank (HSBC) to decide recentlythat Iran was not an attractive place to do business, so they stopped taking new business. The impactthat this is having was well described by the state-owned Karafarin Bank in its
Survey of the Iranian Economy
for October-December 2005:“Most probably, the fear of imposition of sanctions by the UN against Iran, inconnection with the nuclear enrichment issue, has reduced the reliability of Iranianbanks as international trading partners. In other words, despite [an] importantbalance of payments surplus, Iranian banks have been facing difficulties dealing withtheir otherwise cooperative correspondents. This may prove to be for the banks andthe country as a whole, [sic] one of the most important obstacles to hurdle in themonths to come.”There is much scope for working with U.S. allies to more vigorously apply restrictions on financialtransactions and trade with Iran. UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 call on countriesto adopt and enforce effective controls on funds and services that would contribute to terrorism andWMD proliferation respectively. The United States and its allies can approach countries to ask whatare they doing to implement these resolutions regarding Iran, especially in light of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decisions finding Iran has violated its safeguards agreements withthe IAEA. Industrial firms can be warned about the many items which could be diverted from theirdeclared peaceful intentions to be used instead in the nuclear program. Banks can be cautioned aboutthe negative publicity as well as regulatory complications if they were found to be facillitating shadybusinesses. European governments excel at using such quiet warnings, which can be very effectiveat persuading firms that the Iran market is not worth the risks; indeed, a number of Europeangovernments seem already to be passing such warnings. The U.S. Treasury has a well-oiledmachinery for implementing restrictions, and its warnings to banks can be particularly effective sincefew banks in the world are willing to risk being cut off from dealings with the U.S. financial system.That same machinery could be extended to press firms considering investments in the Iranian oil andgas industry.Tighter restrictions are “de facto sanctions” which have many advantages over formal sanctionsimposed by the UN Security Council. Russia and China have no veto over tightening restrictions. Inthe best of cases, obtaining Security Council consensus for action takes a long time, whereastightening restrictions can be done much more quickly. Action by the Security Council providesAhmadinezhad with a banner around which he can rally nationalist reaction, claiming that thecountry is under attack. By contrast, tighter restrictions operate under the public’s radar screen, whiletheir impact is fully felt by the business community – which in Iran means first and foremost the
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