Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy ResponsesCongressional Research Service
A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran. Well before Iran’s nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S.concerns about Iran in 2003, the United States had seen Iran’s support for militant groups—mostof them Shiite Muslim—in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to undermine U.S.interests and allies. U.S. officials also assert that Iran is providing arms and advice to help Syria’sleadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there. Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest regionalally and Hezbollah not only is providing fighters to help the Syrian regime, but it also hasallegedly been responsible for a number of acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and interestsover the past two years.The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to tryto compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program isfor purely peaceful purposes. Five rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 and 2013 yieldedno breakthroughs but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enrichinguranium to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modestsanctions relief. Iran’s Supreme Leader has not taken up U.S. offers to engage in the direct bilateral talks that many experts believe are required to produce a breakthrough. And, there has been a consensus that international sanctions—although severely harming Iran’s economy—havenot pressured the regime to the point at which it is compelled to compromise. However, the June14, 2013, first round election victory of a relative moderate, Hassan Rouhani, might reflect popular Iranian sentiment for a negotiated nuclear settlement that produces an easing of international sanctions. It is possible that the United States and partners will not impose anyadditional sanctions against Iran until the effect on Iranian decisionmaking of Rouhani’s presidency, if any, becomes clear.The government of Israel asserts that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran’s program advances to the point where Iran could produce a nuclear weaponrelatively quickly. President Obama says the option of U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities remains open, but he has asserted that there is still time—although increasinglylimited—for diplomacy. The election of Rouhani is likely to forestall, at least in the short term,further U.S. discussion of military options against Iran.The victory of Rouhani could enhance the popularity of Iran’s regime, particularly if Rouhani isable to implement campaign pledges to ease repression and social restrictions. His unexpectedelection win—a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the2009 election results—appeared to counter the views of many experts who assessed the domesticreform movement as cowed by regime suppression and inactive. The Rouhani victory wasunexpected because the favored candidates in the contest were Khamene’i loyalists.The 112
Congress enacted additional economic sanctions against Iran, including a FY2013defense authorization act (P.L. 112-239) that expanded sanctions against companies that conductenergy, industrial, and financial and precious metals transactions with Iran. Bills that wouldexpand sanctions further, such as H.R. 850, are in varying stages of consideration in the 113
Congress. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871,
, by KennethKatzman; and CRS Report R40094,
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
, by Paul K. Kerr.