UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper LIX: October 6, 2008, 7:00 p.m.
Andrew J. Bacevich,
The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism
(New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2008).Dedication.
“To the memory of mybeloved son / ANDREW JOHN BACEVICH /First Lieutenant, U.S. Army / July 8, 1979-May 13, 2007” [vii].
INTRODUCTION: War without Exits.
At the end of the Cold War, the U.S.undertook responsibility for a grandproject it called “globalization,” a“euphemism for soft, or informal empire”(2; 1-3). In military terms, forceprojection had power over perimeterdefense (3). After 9/11, “war became aseemingly permanent condition”—the“Long War” (3-4). This book placesresponsibility for this war and threeattendant crises (economic-cultural,political, and military) not outside theU.S. but within, a consequence of the“heedless worship of freedom” inAmerica (4-5). Reinhold Niebuhr [thepresiding spirit of this book, whomBacevich cites twenty times and calls“our prophet” in the last paragraph]warned that this amounts to self-idolatryinstead of wise “realism and humility” (6-8). Americans’ preoccupation withconsumption and self-indulgence hasgrown and is undermining national powerby eviscerating citizenship, fostering acavalier attitude to debt and a lack of concern about resources (9-11). “A grandbazaar provides an inadequate basisupon which to erect a vast empire” (11).“[I]t is the soldier who bears the burdenof such folly” (12). But Iraq, by revealingthis folly, holds out the prospect of being“the source of our salvation” (12; theconclusion of the book is much morepessimistic, however). American citizens“need to reassert control over their owndestiny” (13).
Ch. 1: The Crisis of Profligacy.
The Jeffersonian ethic has degenerated intoan “ethic of self-gratification” (15-17).
Power and Abundance.
Tocquevilleshows such a tendency has deep roots inAmerican history (17-18). A historicalmyth of American exceptionalism hassanitized American history, which has infact been chiefly a bold and unplanneddrive toward expansion, not liberation(18-22). Expansion fueled prosperity andheightened Americans’ sense of abundance and entitlement (22-25).Freedom did advance in the 1960s,thanks to the Left, but even this wasgrounded in the American drive forexpansion (26-27).
Not Less, ButMore.
In the period 1965-1973,America’s “empire of production” yieldedto something else (26-30). The years1979-1983 were “the true pivot of contemporary American history” (30-31).Carter’s July 15, 1979, speech accuratelydiagnosed the situation (31-35). But itfailed to rally the nation (35-36).Instead, the U.S. turned to Reagan, whofostered profligacy while spoutingconservative bromides (37-39). Blamelies not with Reagan, however, but withthe American people, who got “what theywanted” (40; 39-41). Americansembraced hypocrisy, extending it alsointo the strategic realm with the StarWars project (41-43).
Taking thePlunge.
The U.S. became a debtornation (43-44). In foreign policy, the U.S.extended the “tradition of reflexiveexpansionism” in Afghanistan andCentral Asia, in the Persian Gulf (47; 44-57).
American Freedom, IraqiFreedom.
The Greater Middle Eastdemocratization project was aneoconservative extension of theseefforts (58-59). Americans wereencouraged to consume more (60-63).But Iraq turned into a disaster, and foundthe U.S. short of troops and money (63-65). The historical link of expansionismand prosperity has broken: now,
“Expansionism squanders Americanwealth and power, while putting freedomat risk” (66).
Ch. 2: The Political Crisis.
U.S.mobilization for WWII and the Cold Warended the U.S. as a republic; it is nowgoverned by an “imperial presidency”and is “a de facto one-party state” inwhich a Congress marked by pervasive“corruption” is ruled by “an Incumbents’Party” and politics is theater (67-71).And the present system “doesn’t work”(71-72).
The Ideology of NationalSecurity.
The “national security state”is marked by failures: 1) to avert 9/11; 2)to bring to justice its architects; 3) torespond appropriately to Islamicextremism; 4) in the Iraq and Afghanwars (72). Bush has not broken with pasttradition, he has affirmed a long-standingideology of national security informed byfour convictions with deep roots inAmerican history: 1) History has apurpose; 2) The U.S. embodies freedom;3) American success is guaranteed byProvidence; 4) Freedom must prevaileverywhere for the American way of lifeto endure (73-76). This highly elasticideology, now “hardwired into theAmerican psyche,” serves chiefly tolegitimate action of the Americanexecutive, as speeches by Clinton andObama suggest (77-81). The ideologyserves the “self-selecting, self-perpetuating camarilla” [i.e. cabal]—apower élite of “hawks” in control of national security policy since WWII (81-84).
State of Insecurity.
Thegargantuan national security stateshrouds itself in secrecy and lies (84-89).It has done “more harm than good” (89). The Bay of Pigs fiasco led Kennedy torealize that the system was out of controland he changed leadership, revampedinstitutions (McNamara, Bundy) andworked around the apparatus (e.g. didnot use the NSC in the Cuban missilecrisis, instead devising a small extra-constitutional group, an approach oftenreplicated since) (90-94). The actualinstitutions of the national security stateundergo perpetual reform while thosewho hold power regard them as “notpartners but competitors” and “theAmerican people remain in the dark,” theapparatus remaining in place because itprovides legitimacy for “politicalarrangements that are a source of status,influence, and considerable wealth” (95;94-96). The Bush administrationdistrusted all national security stateinstitutions (96-101).
Wise Menwithout Wisdom.
The cult of “WiseMen,” supposedly wiser than the peopleand republican institutions, hascharacterized the era of “permanentnational security crisis” (102; 101-03).Earlier Wise Men embodied the socialelite and its values; this changed onSept. 21, 1945, when Henry L. Stimsonwent home and James Forrestal stayed inWashington, D.C. (103-07). Paul Nitzesucceeded him, drafting NSC 68, a 1950classified report of fundamentalimportance that set political patternsthat molded post-WWII American life(107-14). Paul Wolfowitz is thecontemporary heir of Nitze (114-19).
War without End.
The Bush Doctrine,by embracing preventive war, is the mostmomentous national security initiativesince the Manhattan Project, but its firstapplication produced disaster (119-21).We should learn 1) “[T]he ideology of national security, Americanexceptionalism in its most baleful form,poses an insurmountable obstacle tosound policy” (121); 2) “Americans canno longer afford to underwrite agovernment that does not work” (122);3) “To attend any longer to this elitewould be madness . . . today’s Wise Men. . . have forfeited any further claim totrust” (123).
Ch. 3: The Military Crisis.
The powerof the U.S. armed forces was “wildlyoverstated,” with the army failing toaccomplish assigned mission—theelimination of the leadership of al-Qaedaand the subjugation of Iraq (124-26).
The reason is threefold: 1) the illusion of full spectrum dominance; 2) the illusionof strategic principles (the Weinberger-Powell docrine); 3) the illusion of a newcivilian-military compact (127-31). These“puerile expectations” have now beenexposed (131-33).
Learning theWrong Lessons.
Three lessons of thecurrent wars: 1) they define futurechallenges; 2) civilian interference inmilitary planning is counterproductive; 3)the civilian-military divide must behealed (139; 133-41).
“Small Wars”for Empire.
Current trends wouldendorse “imperial policing” as the U.S.military’s primary mission (141-43).
Does Knowing Douglas Feith IsStupid Make Tommy Franks Smart?
The civilian meddling represented byFeith was a problem (143-44). But themediocrity of U.S. military leadership was“consistently disappointing” (147; 145-52).
Why the Draft Is Not a GoodIdea and Won’t Happen.
Practical andpolitical obstacles make this optionimplausible (152-56).
The EnduringNature of War.
“War’s essential natureis fixed, permanent, intractable, andirrepressible” (156). The IED shows war’sunpredictability (157-60).
The LimitedUtility of Force.
Whatever its aim,reliance on the use of force is provingcounterproductive (160-63).
The Follyof Preventive War.
The doctrine of preventive war is both morally wrong andirrational (citing Niebuhr again) (163-65).
The Lost Art of Strategy.
Americanmilitary leaders, with Tommy Franks acase in point, confuse operations withstrategy, ignoring the fact that thesubordination of war to politics “lies atthe very heart of strategy” (168; 165-69).“America doesn’t need a bigger army. Itneeds a smaller—that is, more modest—foreign policy” (169).
CONCLUSION: The Limits of Power.
The presidential campaign doesn’tmatter as much as finding an approachto American politics that does notexacerbate the tendency to demanddelivery of goods, oil, and credit, andinstead comes to a “realistic appreciationof limits” (174; 170-74). In foreignpolicy, citing Niebuhr again, the U.S.should return to “enlightened realism,”with “containment” instead of aggressionas the response to Islamism (174-78).Abolishing nuclear weapons andpreserving the earth should take priorityas aims (178-81). Americans are living indenial (181). “Thus does the tragedy of our age move inexorably toward itsconclusion . . . Americans appeardetermined to affirm Niebuhr’s axiom of willful self-destruction” (182).
Notes.
12 pp.
Acknowledgments.
Index.
10 pp.[
On the Author.
Andrew J. Bacevich
was born in 1947 in Normal, Illinois. Hegraduated from West Point in 1969 andserved for a year in Vietnam (1970-1971). He retired from the U.S. Army inthe early 1990s with the rank of colonel.He holds a Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatichistory from Princeton. He has taught atWest Point and Johns Hopkins, and is nowprofessor of international relations andhistory at Boston University, where heteaches courses on “The AmericanMilitary Experience,” “American ForeignPolicy,” “Wars of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries,” “Ideas andAmerican Foreign Policy,” and “U.S.Foreign Policy since the End of the ColdWar.” His Fall 2008 office hours are11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m.to 3:30 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays;his office telephone number is 508-358-0194. He is the author of
AmericanEmpire: The Realities and Consequencesof U.S. Diplomacy
(2002) and
The New American Militarism: How Americans AreSeduced by War
(2005), and the editor of
The Imperial Tense: Problems and Prospects of American Empire
(2003) and
The Long War: A New History of U.S.
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Bacevich - The Limits of Power (2008) - Synopsis
Synopsis of Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2008). Discussed at Digging Deeper (www.ufppc.org) on October 6, 2008.
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