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Intelligence Community Reform Proposal
A.
Introduction
and
Overview
The
following
sections outline
problems
in the
intelligence
community
and
remedies proposed in the accompanying legislative
reform
package. Some of theproblems have been recognized for many years. Others have been revealed only recentlyby such events as September 11
th
and the mistaken estimates of Iraq's weapons of massdestruction capabilities. The
reform
proposal also is intended to address the
rise
ofhomeland security intelligence requirements. As we approach the third anniversary ofSeptember
11
th
,
while the Defense Department by bulk and variety remains by far thelargest consumer of intelligence, homeland security intelligence support requirements are
growing
substantially,
and the
consumer base
for
national intelligence
in the
Department
of
Homeland Security, national and local law enforcement, and emergency responsecommunities couldintimerivalthatof themilitary. Thesenewconsumers needaseatatthe table, they need the concerted attention of the DCI, and they need strong support
from
the
national collection and analysis agencies, including those within the DefenseDepartment.The DCImust devote more timeandattentiontohelpingtheDepartmentofHomeland Security, the FBI, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to master the art
of
intelligence collection
and
analysis
as
rapidly
as
possible.The
reform
proposal needs to be evaluated in its totality, since most individualelements are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The
reform
proposal's
major
elements include establishing a Director of National Intelligence who would not also
serve
asDirectorof theCentral Intelligence Agency;
"dual-hatting"
theUnder Secretaryof Defense for Intelligence as the senior Deputy Director of National Intelligence;restricting the role of several of the intelligence agency directors to
"organizing,
training,
and
equipping"
their agencies,
as the
Goldwater-Nichols
Act did for the
chiefs
of
staff
of
the military
services;
in another parallel to Goldwater-Nichols, creating a Deputy Directorof National Intelligence for Operations in charge of a large joint tasking organization,
with a
senior deputy
from
aDefense
Department combatant command; establishing
an
Senior Advisor
for
Homeland Security; requiring personnel rotations
as a
condition
for
promotion, modeled
after
the Goldwater-Nichols Act personnel
reforms;
creating otherjoint organizationsandprocessestoprovidethe DNIimproved capabilitiestomonitortheexpenditure
of
funds,
reprogram
funds,
and
oversee
major
procurements within
the
intelligence
agencies;
mandating a single, streamlined security clearance
process
for allintelligence community personnel,
and
decisively
shifting
authority
for
classifying
information
and deciding who gets access to
information
from
the agencies that collectintelligence to the DNI, to
facilitate information
sharing; and directing that the DNI, theSecretaryofDefense,and theSecretaryofHomeland Security jointly apply modern
information
technologyandbusiness practicestonetworktheintelligence communityandits customers, including state and local
officials
who are essential to homeland security,
to
fully
share
information,
and to
vastly improve
the
community's agility
and efficiency.
"1
Theproposed legislation also would requirethePresidenttoestablish policy regarding
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the use of advanced "data mining" tools on government and private-sector databases toensure that American
citizens'
privacy is protected as the government works to betterprotect
the
country
from
terrorism. More detailed explanations
of
selected
reform
initiatives
follow
this overview
and
introduction.
DC1Authorities
and
Relationship
to the
Secretary
of
Defense
The
National Security
Act of
1947
as
originally
enacted
intended
the DCI to be a
coordinator
and
arbiter
of
intelligence produced
by the
cabinet departments
and to
provide independent assessments to the President. Over time, the DCI has accumulated
considerably
more authority
and
more
responsibility
for
managing
the
intelligence
organizations established within the cabinet departments and under the authority ofcabinet
secretaries.
Under any circumstances, such an inelegant managementarrangement
-
shared executive power
and
dual reporting chains
-
presents dauntingproblems.
These
challenges are especially acute in the case of the Defense Department.Most of the resources that the DCI relies upon to produce intelligence products that areconsidered to have national-level significance are the same as those that the Secretary ofDefenseneeds
to
prepare
for and to
conduct military operations.
As a
former
Director
of
the NROobserves,if thenational
foreign
intelligence communitydid notexist,theSecretary of
Defense
would immediately create almost all of it.A unique and complex power-sharing arrangement has grown up on an ad hoc basisbetween the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense.
By executive order and statute, the DCI isassigned tasking authority over national intelligence,and isresponsibleforproducing
assessments
for the
President
and
National Security Council.
The DCI has the
authority
to
build
the
budget
for
national intelligence
and to
transfer
and
reprogram
funds.
The
Secretary of Defense, by executive order and statute, is the President's executive agent for
signals intelligence,
executes
appropriated
funds
for
most
of the
intelligence
budget,
and
has the predominant role in selecting the directors of NSA, NRO,
NGA,
and
DIA.
Inaddition, NSA, NGA, and DIA are designated as combat support agencies under the
Goldwater-Nichols
Act, which among other things means that they are subject to
periodic
inspectionby theChairmanof theJoint
Chiefs
toassess their readinesstosupport combatoperations.
In
the last several decades, there have been many proposals and attempts to strengthenthe ability of the DCI to manage the intelligence community. Usually,
reform
advocateshave proposed
to
increase
the
authority
of the DCI by
shifting
authority
from
the
Secretary of Defense. However, these proposals typically run into problems because thereality
is
that both
officials
have legitimate
claims
to
authority over
the
same intelligence
/
resources.What
is
interesting
is
that
the
seniorleadership
in the
Defense Department
sincerely
believes that the Defense Department is severely disadvantaged with respect tointelligence matters, at the mercy of the DCI, while the perception of the DCI and his
staff
is
that they have
a
hard time controlling
the
defense
intelligence agencies
and
that
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the
Defense Department
too
often
holds sway
in
conflicts
between
the
DCI
and the
Secretary
of
Defense.
Can
both
be
right?
To an
extent, yes: sometimes
one
side prevails,
and
sometimes
the
other,
in
serious disputes.
But it is
also
the
case that with
two
"bosses",
the
intelligence agencies
often
either escape control
or are
subjected
to
competing direction.
The two
opposing
staffs
in
many instances
and in
various areasnegate
or
neutralize
one
another,
and the
agencies
are
adept
at
playing
one
against
the
other
to
maintain their autonomy. Having
two
bosses,
in
other words, sometimes
canmean
having none.
One
example that illustrates this phenomenon: neither
the
DCI's
staff
nor
that
of the
Secretary
of
Defense
has
access
to
budget execution data
from
the
defense
intelligence agencies.
The DoD
Comptroller
has
been barred
from
year-of-excecution
inspections,
and the
agencies
will
not
report such data
to the
Community Management
Staff
either.
It
is of
course preferable
to
have clean lines
of
authority,
and
many have argued that
the DCI
cannot
effectively
manage national intelligence without having
full
control over
the
intelligence community,
but
there
are
reasons
why
Congress
and the
President haveshared power betweenthe DCI and theSecretaryofDefense,and
politically
it isunlikely
that the
balance
of
power between them
can be
changed
in any
event. Shared power
andmutual
dependence
is a
reality,
and the
staffs
of
both
officials
must accept that
and
learn
to
make
the
best
of it. In
fact,
there
are
ways
to
encourage
the DCI and the
Secretary
and
their
staffs
to
cooperate rather than
confront
one
another,
and
through cooperation both
officials
canincrease
their
real
power over
theintelligence agencies.
That
is to
say,
the
relationship between
the DCI and the
Secretary
of
Defense
need
not be a
"zero-sumgame,"
where
any
accretion
of
power
by one can
only come
at the
expense
of the
other.
The
Roman Republic
for
centuries governed through
two
Consuls
who
could either veto
one
another
or
work together
to get
something accomplished. Likewise,
the
Goldwater-NicholsAct has
succeeded
intamingthe
intense
rivalry of themilitary
services.
Itought
tobe
possible, too,
to
create
a
culture
of
"jointness"
between
the DCI and the
Secretary
ofDefense
-
indeed between
the DCI and all the
cabinet secretaries involved
in
nationalintelligence.Theproposed legislation wouldnotsignificantly altertherelationshipordistribution
of
power between
the
intelligence community director
and the
Secretary
of
Defense,
butwould
clarify
the
respective authorities
and
significantly enhance
the
DNI's ability
to
manage
the
intelligence community
and
make
it
more
effective.
In the
spirit
of
Goldwater-Nichols,
the
proposed legislation would create several joint organizations
and
processes that would give both
the
DNI
and the
Secretary
of
Defense,
for the first
time,
full
insight
and
control over defense intelligence agency expenditures
and
acquisitionprograms. The proposed legislation also would "dual hat" the Under Secretary of
Defense
for
Intelligence
as the
DNI's senior Deputy Director, which will ensure that
DoD
interests
are
fully
respected within
the
intelligence community, assist
the DNI in
enforcing
decisions,
and
help
to
ensure that national
and
tactical
DoD
intelligence
programs and
capabilities
are
properly coordinated.
In a
close
parallel
to
Goldwater-
Nichols,as
described below
in
this section,
the
authority
of the DNI
(and indirectly
theSecretary of
Defense) would also
be
significantly enhanced
by
creating
a
joint tasking
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