loophole in 1970 which would have led to a repeat of the elections, to enable Alessandri
sre-election. Alessandri refused to participate (Clough, K., 2012.)
system of food production led to “… theconcentration of 80 per cent of the land in 7.5 per cent of the properties … Some 70 percent of Chile
s peasant families earned less than $100 U.S. annually …” (Winn, P. & Kay,C., 1974, p.135.) High unemployment and low income for peasants meant that they wereunable to engage with the Chilean market as consumers, contributing to the stagnatingindustry (Winn, P. & Kay, C., 1974.) The P.D.C. encouraged activism and unionismamongst peasants, promising land reforms which Frei Montalva (elected on a P.D.C.ticket) proved unable to deliver. Instead, Frei Montalva
s land reforms created a hierarchyof peasants which beneﬁted those with permanent employment on certain estates whichwere expropriated, only 21 thousand of the 2.5 million Chilean peasants (Alemán, E.,2009, and Winn, P. & Kay, C., 1974.) At the same time Frei Montalva was removingpowers for legislators to amend bills, restricting their ability to achieve funding, centralisingpower to the presidency, and breaking down networks of inﬂuence and cooperation(Alemán, E., 2009.)
(U.P.) inherited this situation in 1970. Both the judiciaryand legislature were controlled by the opposition, unlike Frei Montalva
s presidency (Winn,P. & Kay, C., 1974.) The U.P.
s policy on greater land reforms, grounded in an ideology that“problems of the peasantry could not be solved in isolation, but only within the context of asocietal reform … The peasantry was to be integrated into the nation, but as a class, notas consumers or individuals.” (Winn, P. & Kay, C., 1974, p. 140) gave conﬁdence forpeasants to seize land themselves, beginning with the Mapuche (indigenous population) tothe south and spreading upwards. However, without strong inﬂuence outside of the