Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Douglas Knight
Hope is the source of the human future, and covenant is the source of
hope. Humans may hope because, having brought them into relationship
with himself, God hears them and has promised to do so always. As God
speaks to us, and hears from us, so we receive our existence and purpose.
We may live in hope and confidence as we continue to refer to his
promise.
Because they are loved and heard by God, humans are persons. The
relationship that God sustains with each and all is the basis on which each
person may be heard and received also by other persons. The love and
covenant of God for man is the medium within which man can receive
man. Within that covenant, man receives the time by which he can wait
for his fellow man, and learn how to judge and value him truly. Each
human may be known only in love and freedom, and thus with patience.
The Church confesses that God is with man, and that man is therefore a
covenantal being, a person in relationship with other persons. Enabled by
God, and within this covenant, man may be with his fellow man. The
Church is that body of people gathered to make public acknowledgement
of this covenant. The Church is the body created by Jesus Christ from the
Gentiles who look forward to reconciliation with the people of Israel as the
united people of God. The worship of the Church is the form of now taken
by the thankfulness of man, and this thanksgiving is made for the sake of
all men and the world as a whole.
The Church confesses that there is no more fundamental unit than the
individual person. It acknowledges that we are never alone, but always in
company. We must seek one another’s recognition and approval, for we
may, and must, love and wait to receive it. Man is in receipt of the act of
God, and so may look for the future and continuing acts of God. We may
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term this a metaphysics of promise and hope, an eschatological ontology.
The Church therefore speaks in hope, indeed, in faith, hope and love. If
man is a creature of covenant he is not merely an individual but also a
creature in relationship, and we may deduce, since he is not yet in
relationship with all his fellows, that relationship with them lies ahead of
him, so he is a creature with more future than past. The society that
receives the Church and receives the character that flow from this
thanksgiving, and the gifts, chief of which is self-control, that flow from it.
Any society may affirm that love and freedom, and thus also patience, is
required for knowledge of any individual person. A society can be
sustained, day-by-day and even for generations, by those who fail to treat
one another as ultimates. But over the long term, the society that refuses
to admit the possibility that man is loved and heard by God, will be unable
to comprehend and sustain the high calling of the individual human being.
Without the concept of person, there is only fate, under which the
particularity and freedom of each individual person is in doubt, and each
individual lives under threat of being absorbed into the whole, with the
result that everything they are and do is in question.
The society that does not acknowledge the covenant of God with man, and
thus does not know that it is loved and sustained by God, will suffer a
crisis of confidence that will from time to time manifest itself as crises,
which may be individually suppressed and mastered. The presence of the
Church to any society represents a gift of the hope of freedom. But the
connection between the presence of the Church and the quotient of
freedom and confident experienced by that society, is not so directly
observable that any society is obliged to recognise it. It is a matter of
faith, which this secures this freedom; nevertheless the connection is
there to be made by the society that is willing. The society that receives
some of this confidence at second-hand from the Church prospers. But
without the Christian understanding of covenant, the default position of
Western society is that man is man is on his own and so fundamentally an
isolated being, and thus one who has create his own purposes, and who
may from time to time, and perhaps also finally, tire of doing so. Only over
the very long term, societies that do not receive the confidence derived
from this covenant may give up not only hope but life, and so disappear.
Societies come and go, but the Church remains.
The Church that confesses that persons are ultimate. It tells us that we are
not alone, self-enclosed monads, but always act before other persons. We
are in company, and that as all other persons are valuable, so their
opinion is valuable too. We are embodied persons, available to one
another through the medium of materiality that creation affords us. The
Church proposes the two doctrines of creation and redemption, which tells
us that the world is created and given to us by God as gift, and as the
medium of our mutual love in freedom for humankind. It is good both in its
thereness, and because it puts us in a social and political world made up
of other people who expect good things of us. The world is a gift, from God
to man, one person to another, so that it may be the source of endless gift
from one man to another and thus the beginning and condition of a
relationship that will continue without limit.
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The Church is the assembly of those who by baptism and discipleship
learn the skills of self-judgment, which involves confession, repentance
and asking for forgiveness, by which human autonomy is established.
Society benefits from the community that can repent, receive the
cancellation of debt, and which can hear and speak the truth in critical
self-judgment: it is not enclosed in of resentment and retribution, in which
blame can only ever be given but fault never admitted.
There are therefore two ontologies to which we must refer in what we say
about ourselves. One is an ontology of nature. The world is a heavy and
unyielding place, given and non-negotiable. We are confronted by its brute
materiality, and our every encounter reflects its finitude; there is scarcity,
competition and the hardness of work. We proceed through the world by
accumulating and discarding substance; we proceed through the world by
accumulating the means of life, by arranging the creatures of the world
into nearer or more distant relationship to ourselves, exchanging he less
for the more valuable and so ordering and re-ordering creation. Moderns
regard materiality as so hard that no material thing sticks to us or leaves
any taint on us, so find it difficult to concede that the material world holds
on to us and forms the medium of our every encounter.
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can do so because he has given us his name. Our freedom to name him is
our freedom to accept or reject him. We are not confronted by him as we
are by nature and mortality. We can know him or not know him, as we
wish.
The ontology of nature helps us to talk about man by talking about his
embodiment, and his situation in a given and finite world. It helps us to
count persons and so to talk about man in terms of groups and crowds,
and therefore of quantity and number. But when the ontology of nature
and quantity is overused, we forget to talk in the ontology of charisma, in
which the view of each person must be sought, and nothing finally is what
it is until each person has in freedom named it so. All of us must seek the
approval and recognition of all other persons, and thus in which the
personhood of each of us is dependent on the personhood of us all. The
ontology of charisma enables us to talk about the quality of man, and to
insist that the depth and mystery of man is both present and future, waits
to be revealed, and that it is not entirely amenable to calculation and
cannot yet be finally accounted for. Though we find ourselves in
relationships, and are embarked on life with one another, we cannot
decide that we have finished with one another. All relationships and
human history, and within it, the history of the material world, remain
open.
In the name Jesus Christ we may worship God. We can receive this name
with gladness or we can refuse it, and withhold our worship from God by
using another name, or many other names. We may perhaps withhold our
worship from the God of Israel because we believe that some other
divinity, whose name we do not know, is God. We may believe that the
God who withholds his name, does not respond to our prayers, and so who
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remains unknown to us, is higher than the God who has given us his name
and who does hear our prayers. Perhaps we believe that the person who
conceals his identity from others is more powerful than any other, and that
the society that worships such a God or which conceals its ancestors and
origins from all others, will wield power over those other societies confess
a specific covenant with the God who gives his name.
In the Christian account, two persons may become one person, without
any diminution of their distinction and twoness. God loves man and brings
him into that communion in which man may participate in that love. In this
communion God and man are one, whilst also being two and distinct. As
God receives man he accounts him ‘one’ and whole. The love and unity of
God with each person is the basis on which that person is himself or
herself a single person; the oneness of the person is not a matter of nature
merely, but also of the free acknowledgement of all that he or she is that
selfsame person. It is in their reception by God and all humanity that the
identity and integrity of each person is affirmed and established.
Man is a creature of covenant. Man is with God. Man with God is both two
and one. God is not known without man, or apart from man, or other than
as the God who is for man and with man. God is thus both two and one
with man. As a result man is not himself without his fellow-man. He is not
first an autonomous individual, and then a social being. Man is
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simultaneously fundamentally two and one, a covenanted and coupled as
well as a single and singular being. The concepts of covenant, relationship
and of gift and its reconciliation relate to the way that man is himself.
A man and woman may desire one another, and seek and find one
another. They may do so now, and they may also hope to desire to give to
and receive from one another more and without limit. Since we may hope
to love one another more, we may welcome whatever discipline supports
our love. Love may be discipled so that our future love may be greater
than our present love. Marriage is a form of mutual self-control that
enables this self-giving that is directed to a further self-giving and
receiving and discovery. There is both a given difference between men and
women, described by the doctrine of creation, and natural law, and there
is a promised difference that relates to the redemption of men and
women, described by eschatology. It relates to what we are, so to the
present, and regards this as good, even as the gift of God. And it relates to
what we may or will be, and so the course of our formation and
transformation, and so to a future, which since it is genuinely future, we
cannot presently see.
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by which all society can receive their binding and covenant as good, also
for itself.
But what about the equality of men and women? If men are, either by
nature or by culture, members of the public economy, are woman
prevented from finding their identity in that economy? Do the demands of
equality and thus of justice not demand that the distinction between these
two economies be removed? But we do not need to say more than that
there is this asymmetry, and such asymmetry means that the present
cedes something to the future, and we have to look forward to a
redemption. In what aspects man and woman may be asymmetrical and
thus equal, or not equal, cannot decided solely by the present. When a
man and woman freely enter a covenant, in which he becomes a husband
and she becomes a wife, they covenant to become one another’s equals.
They promise to be a match for one another, in a future not entirely known
to either of them. Then we can say that the husband may aspire to be
worthy of his wife, to be her equal, and she may aspire to be his equal and
his mate. Their equality is then a matter of hope and redemption.
Marriages work when each party talks to other up, and reckons the other
more, rather than less, than him- or herself.
In freedom this husband and this wife create a new unity and duality.
While remaining two, they become one. Their oneness is the source and
possibility by which each of them may grow and discover his and her own
particularity and uniqueness. Marriage enables self-discovery: it provides
the discipline and culture by which each of us may grow in ourselves, as
we grow towards our marriage-partner. If the private economy of the
household is the sphere of the married woman, the public economy of the
market and formal economy is the sphere of the married man. The
distinction between husband and wife is analogous to the distinction
between public and private realms. Yet there is never husband without
wife nor public sphere without the inner sphere of the household. Each
economy exists only as its seeks and serves the other. The distinction
between these economies and functions continues as people are willing to
give themselves to this one other person and so become husbands and
wives, for the sake of that which they can only bring into existence
together. The public sphere may aspire to be worthy of the private sphere
of the family, and that this generation may aspire to be worthy of the
previous generation and of the next. Each party must talk up the other,
and so aspire to an ‘equality’ which hopes for redemption but which must
remain presently under-determined. Equality, like unity and reconciliation,
has an eschatological referent: it is a function of hope, which itself the
function of that covenant in which faith and love also feature.
Marriage is public. It exists also for the sake of those who remain outside
it. It creates the possibility that new such third parties may be created.
Children may come. Marriage gives the recognition that the products of
this encounter is not just the biological phenomenon of a human child, but
a person, who may expect to be brought up by the woman and man from
whose bodies they come, and hope for their love and service without time-
limit. Marriage uniquely intends to serve its offspring all the way up into
adulthood, providing these children with security in which their own
readiness to receive and enter covenants, and their own generous
individuality, may develop. In order that there be children, and that those
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children become adults, a society must value the institutions that secures
the conditions which enable children to become mature persons. For the
sake of the children who will allowed to develop into persons through it,
and therefore for the sake of the production of new generations and thus
for its own continuation generation by generation through time, society
must honour marriage.
Children must be the first product of any economy and society, and
persons brought to maturity in the virtue and industriousness that has
created that society must be the second product of that economy. This
virtue and industriousness makes each generation ready to enter those
covenants which bring a new generation into existence and then to
maturity. There is a covenant and marriage between this generation and
all possible future generations, between the present and the future, but
only those communities that understand themselves in terms of covenant
are able to say so.
Two economies
Marriage involves a distinction between those who are, and are not,
married. This distinction generates another, between the household and
the wider world. Members of households meet and enter covenants with
members of other households, so there is a world of civil society, business
and politics. There is a public and a private sphere, two sectors or two
economies. There is the economy of the household that is created by a
marriage. And there is the public economy of the market and public
square, which we know as ‘the economy’. There is the home and the
market square, the private and public spheres. Each serves the other;
neither should attempt to absorb the other or make it redundant. There is
a distinction between these two economies, the inner and outer, and a
symmetry between them. But that symmetry cannot be complete. The
tension created by their inevitable asymmetry generates the movement
from one generation to another, and so ensures the continuation of society
through time. Too much symmetry forestalls this movement by which one
generation brings another into existence.
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When society does not understand the concept of covenant, or more
generally that some things are good even though we have been given
them rather than willed them for ourselves, that society will assume that
humans are individuals rather than persons, solely single and only
occasionally and voluntarily dual and plural beings. The government of the
society without covenant will insist that we are primarily individuals, and
that its duty is to rescue us from the inevitable fallout of the covenants we
occasionally attempt for ourselves. Such governments assume that living
alone is the norm, and living with your spouse and children the exception:
their policies will moreover make this normative. But the state that tries to
take over the functions of the family takes on an impossible burden. It will
not be able to prevent itself from constructing a welfare state that
attempts that not only to compensate for the failure of family but which
ensures that families will fail.
There is a covenant and marriage between the present and the future,
between this generation and all possible future generations, but only the
communities, chiefly the Christian Church, that understand themselves in
terms of covenant are able to say so. The distinction between public and
private is analogous to the distinction between this present time and the
future. The future comes in the shape of a new generation that in the birth
of each child, and the long and costly investment in that child, which only
the private sphere of the household, recognised by marriage, is able to
make. Marriage raises public morale, and high public morale encourages
marriage. When marriage is not understood as covenant and as public
institution, cultural confidence is lost. Then singleness is promoted over
life together in the covenant which we can enter freely, and we become
dependents and employees of that other covenant that we have not
entered freely, the state. But the state cannot reproduce society and
cannot of itself motivate persons to do so either. The decline of marriage
represents a loss social capital and from this economic decline follows. We
must explore some of these trends, and relate the loss of the concept of
covenant to the society that does not know what to hope for or how to
wait for it.
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The modern economy intends to make each act and service entirely
explicit. In the modern economy we refer to work that is paid as
‘employment’; our work is instantly acknowledged and rewarded by that
currency of recognition that we know as money. But not all labour can
receive wages or any other form of public acknowledgement: not all
human effort can be denominated by money or drawn into the formal and
monetised economy. Not everything can be denominated or receive
instantaneous acknowledgement; not everything can be paid, for not
everything is recognisable for what it is now. Christians suggest that work
may be valuable regardless of whether it receives explicit, and thus
financial, reward. There is only freedom of action, initiative and risk-taking
and room for interpretation because some part of our effort does not
receive recognition and reward. There is an honour for those who, are
proved right by the long term, even if they are ignored or despised in the
short-term. Christians, not concerned by how long the long term is, are
content with this latter recognition, since they are wait until God brings
the final judgment to all history. The continuation of culture requires that
much is invested unseen and unrewarded.
Two apparently opposite movements have reduced the realm for the work
explicitly motivated by love. The monetised economy has inveigled its way
into the household and family; the realm of calculation and instant return
has squeezed the little economy of love and self-gift. The other movement
is that the realm of the household, the inner realm, has become the
discourse that dominates the public sphere. But the internal realm has
shrunk from the realm of the family to the preferences of the individual, so
becoming the discourse of individual preferences, with a consequent
relativism, so that we have no means of holding one another to account.
The modern economy tells us that we go to work because we have to. The
brutal givenness of the world necessitates work. But Christians suggest
that we also go to work because are willing to. We work in freedom, as
well as by necessity, and Christians propose, necessity is not more
fundamental than freedom. We may truthfully describe the human
economy in terms of freedom, of self-giving and love, and that this
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description is as valid as that other description, offered by modern
economics, that refers to the compulsion of nature.
The state is that set of public servants who serve society. They hope to do
so by safeguarding whatever is necessary to that society’s future. A
government exists to protect the economy of the household, which it does
by recognising marriage as that fundamental event of self-giving that
brings new households and new economies into being. Any government
wants to encourage all those initiatives that make up civil society. It may
do so when it acknowledges that persons are both intrinsically self-
governed and self-restrained persons, and both self-givers and thus public
servants. It does so when it acknowledges that persons may adopt for
themselves those forms of discipleship or formation by which they hope to
become better self-governed and better self-givers: thus the government
must acknowledge the covenants and communities, such as the Church,
that embody such a course of formation. A government is committed to
public service when it recognises these covenants pre-exist it, and thus
when it is modest and self-restrained. Marriage is the one institution that is
more basic than the state.
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Then governments do not know how to stop themselves from hearing
everything as a plea for their closer involvement. The public budget is
employed to compensate for the victims of failed marriages, but over the
long term effect such compensation leaches away at all marriages, and we
are all dependents directly of the central power.
If our leaders acknowledge no covenant, they will not know how to restrain
the claims of government. Their determination to solve our problems
drives them to do things for us and instead of us, will take away our
motivation to do things for one another or for ourselves. If it assumes that
no covenant is prior to the state, the state will insist that that every
covenant requires the sanction of the state. If our public servants fail to
sustain the self-restraint that makes for modest government, the ideology
of the group that justifies a more expanded mandate will give the state an
agenda derived from that ideology. Such a state may believes that
humanity is unisex and homogenous. It will attempt to obliterate all
differences and flatten every specific covenant, promoting singleness over
all the covenants of which society and the economy is made up. The effect
of such the mandate given by the equality agenda is to attempt to make
us one sex. If we are all a members of a single unisex human being, we
have no need or desire for any other human being. If we have no interest
in any other specific human being, we are consequently without all
motivation. The state will be unable to concede that we may love our own
family more than others, and prefer our own initiatives and enterprises
over others.
In its attempt to abolish all specific desires, such an ideology will set the
state against every particularity until it is finally at war with nature. The
state will have become a secular theocracy, a rival church. The state is no
longer the expression and limited implementation of our own public
service. Rather it is more fundamental than we. It exists before us. It
nominates and delegate our functions to us. Society is then a single
household. Each of us is then married – to the state. It is our universal
parent and partner. We exist for it. Then only the state is the only true
person, and we are all persons only as we commit ourselves to one
another through it and so derive our identity from it. By attempting to out-
source our own self-government we turn our own public service into the
state that is prior to ourselves, a power that knows no limit. Such a state is
the God that acknowledges only his own will and does not care to give any
account of himself.
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A healthy economy is embedded within, and driven by, a healthy culture
with a healthy public square. A vibrant economy is constituted by a self-
motivated population, confident in the virtues and practices which build a
common culture and economic life. But are the populations which form the
constitute the British and European economies confident? Do they regard
the histories that brought about the cultural and economic development of
that countries as a mistake and the virtues recommended by their
forebears as unnecessary for them? Are they beginning to disavow all that
they have been? Has European culture so devalued the household that
bears and brings up children that indigenous European fertility has
dropped below replacement rate and cannot rise again? Are our economic
crises the expression of a long-term decline in cultural confidence and is
this decline already reflected in a long-term crisis of demography? Is
Europe threatened by demographic winter? Is Europe losing the will to
live? Financial and economic meltdowns may indicate the cultural and
political breakdown that is both cause and consequence of a population no
longer confident enough to reproduce.
Societies come and go, but the Church, the community that witnesses to
the covenant of God, remains. The Christian proposal is that we are
primarily givers, who each have something unique to offer, something that
is intrinsic to ourselves. In each economic transaction the other party is
primarily a giver and so a free agent. Social capital is money in the bank.
It is valuable for as long as it is not cashed out. As soon as it is cashed into
explicit money to compensate for love not given or received, it is gone.
When everything is denominated in terms of money, we cannot know
whether to enter services on the debit or credit side, with the result that
money itself suffers a crisis. The social capital gathered accrued over
centuries is being lost, and no amount of welfare spending in one
generation can repair or compensate for its loss.
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at top, with a bulging layer of corporate managers and state employees,
while at the bottom there is a bulging bottom layer of dependents.
Why do the middle of ‘mature’ economies thin out? When motivation and
purposes, and thus the concepts of love and gift, are separated from work,
we no longer reckon what we do as distinctive to ourselves. As work is
detached from sets of skills and from persons and their ends, it becomes
indifferent to locations; as jobs are exported, so is the proprietorship and
social capital that makes for a confident working population. Then what do
we can very easily between done by someone else. Where savers look for
the high interest rate and withdrawal without penalty, they create a
money that will hollow their economy so that even countries with
previously developed culture of law and civil society resemble third world
economies, and the global economy begins to appear as a terrible force of
nature. The modern economy hollows out and suffers crises because
consumers, who have no motivation of their own, are less robust than an
self-givers, who do.
The over-extension of the top end of the market into a single global
economy that threatens the market in each particular place, is the result
of our own surrender of responsibility, and readiness to think of ourselves
as individual and consumer rather than as covenanted person and citizen.
The over-extension of the market into the domestic economy of the
household ultimately threatens the functioning of the market itself. The
rise of the market as colossus is the obverse of the rise of the state as
colossus. The rise of the financial market that overtops all concerted
human government and self-government is analogous to the rise of the
state beyond public service, that has arisen out of the temptation to
distance ourselves from our vocation as self-givers and intrinsic public
servants. By alienating our labour from love and the gift of person to
person, we have brought into existence another ‘person’, a state that
appears to be prior to ourselves. The state is the single unyielding given
before which we must, and to and from which we live. As the State tends
to become a ‘person’, so too the market attracts the attributes and logic of
personhood. The consequence of the modern disinclination to understand
ourselves as self-governed and self-giving public persons, is that our own
carelessly alienated personhood gathers against us in these meta-human
forms. The state and money are two facets of the temptation to which
moderns are prone, to assume that unity is more fundamental than
plurality, that the One is prior, and that persons derive life and a merely
temporary freedom from it. These two aspects of this monad reinforce the
deep fear that everything is already present to us and we may hope for
nothing that we do not already have.
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made this society good and this economy powerful and do so by not
disavowing our forebears or their virtues. But modern economics cannot
account for the motivation of man to serve a generation that does not yet
exist, and so to act for the future and the continuity of the human race.
Modern economics is valid only within an existing generation. It is the
triumph of the present over the past and so, disastrously, the triumph of
the present over the future.
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to one another, represented by culture. The economy in which we are
bodies must constantly be related to the cultural economy in which we are
persons who act towards one another in responsibility and freedom. When
this connection between the material and the cultural economies is not
made, economics separates from the whole tradition of the humanities to
become an autonomous realm.
The humanities study man, not only as object but also as the course of
formation that makes us subjects. Since they insist that man has his own
inextinguishable integrity and dignity, Christians also insist on the
wholeness and width of the humanities. They insist on the dignity of
human and they are commanded to remember the past and to pray for
the reconciliation of past, present and future, and enabled by God to do
so. Without the community that remembers the promise of God to man,
and which therefore awaits the revelation and arrival of the wholeness of
man, man is broken up. He is divided between these two ontologies, in
one of which he is a thing among things, in the other of which he is a
single voice without a company to hear or recognise him.
Our history make us what we are. We can decide to talk up certain aspects
of our history and downplay or denigrate certain other aspects. We can
emphasise either the continuity or the contrast between other ages and
our own. If we remain indifferent to history or ignorant of it, we are likely
to become captive to one undeclared conception of it. Modernity is one
undeclared historical canon. Modernity declares that history is of no
interest to us, while intimating that any interest in our history makes us
vulnerable to it so that it is able to exert some dark force over us. But we
cannot simply alter our history by grafting ourselves onto a different or
imaginary tradition. We are who we are, and are faced by a particular set
of issues because we are downstream of Abraham and Moses, Socrates
and Plato, Augustine and Descartes, Hume and Kant. If we were
downstream of Buddha or Confucius, we would ask the sort of questions
that the cultures of Asia ask, and if we were downstream of Mohammed
we might ask more plaintively about the unkindness of fate. The public
square that debates such questions in these cultures, Asian and Middle
East is a much more smaller and more timid place. The extra-large public
square of the West is the direct outcome of the long presence of the
Christian community that promotes and sustains self-examination,
buttressed by those practices of Christian discipleship that puts the
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question of truth over the question of who is in power. As western societies
dispense with the witness of the church, so their public squares shrink.
All culture is of way of paying our respects, even of paying our debts, to
our forebears. We regard some forebears as important because
instrumental in building the world we have inherited. We can name, and in
some very soft way revere, those who we particularly identify with the
political forms and freedoms we now benefit from. The more a society is
able to look with equanimity on its ancestors, the more it is able to look
forward with the same equanimity. The broader its view of its tradition,
and more forebears and their differing ways of life it is able to take
account of, the greater the resources from which it can judge how to live
well. The further back it looks, the better prepared it is to face future
challenges. The society with a rich account of its own historical journey is
better placed to sustain itself over the long term and thus live in hope of a
good future.
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argue, and so act as public beings who face one another in the public
square and articulate our differences. We have asked the discourse of
money to take away from us the need for public confrontation. Our
economy is in trouble because we have asked the discourse of economics
to do too much and not asked our culture to do enough.
The concept of ‘faith communities’ implies that one religion is very like
another, and that none of them has had constitutive impact on us. But
Christianity has had decisive impact on Europe and America. It has made
this culture and these nations what they are now: no other ‘faith
community’ has generated the freedom of the individual, property rights,
the free market and welfare state, and consequent prosperity and stability.
Moreover this culture has been exported around the world, to create what
we could call variously civil society, liberal democracy, individual freedom
and the global free market. These are aspects of European culture, and
they derive from one faith community exclusively. The equality agenda
insists that the imported cultures that now appear on our high street are
as good as the culture that built those streets and markets in the first
place. But the enforcers of this policy there this equality for any culture
that is not the inherited culture, so we may denigrate no religion except
the religion that gave rise to this freedom. Faith communities are
apparently not all the same.
The demand that we cut ourselves off from the past is also an attack on
the disciplines that make possible public reason. Modernity is a flight from
history into a forgetfulness, punctuated with moments of rage at its own
incoherence. Modernity is Manichean: the present must perpetually
struggle against the dark power of the past. Abjuration of history past has
made the commonplaces of twenty years ago controversial enough to
bring the possibility of legal action, and since legal action is costly, it is
finance, rather than debate in open court, that settles an issue. No issue is
reasoned out in public debate, therefore, for the market has always
decided and discounted everything already.
18
pagan religion of ancient Europe. Christianity has preserved some memory
of them. Warrior culture is never simply a matter of history, but is always
at least inchoately present and basic. We see warrior culture in the
confrontations in every playground, boardroom and market. Though
almost nothing is now known of the paganism that that preceded
Christianity, throughout our long history, European intellectuals have re-
imported and re-packaged Roman and Greek accounts of warrior culture,
its gods and cosmologies. We can discuss the contemporary phenomena
of pagan culture through this Greek and Roman intellectual inheritance
that describes the fatalistic worldviews represented by ancient atomism,
Epicureanism and Stoicism. These allow us to identify warrior culture and
fatalistic cosmologies in ourselves, and to identify them in the devious
because undeclared violence of modernity and modern economics.
To imagine that we could simply swap one history for another, is to suffer
a kind of auto-immune response. Whatever is good cannot derive from the
culture we have inherited. No modern believes that we have received
anything of value from the hands of our own parents: the fifth
commandment has been abrogated. But who makes the positive argument
that we could swap our history and tradition for that of, say, Saudi Arabia
and still remain recognisably British or American? Without this inherited
culture of ours, that relies on an ongoing relationship to the Christian
tradition, would we have the culture of self-examination and public
judgment that has produced the secular public square and market? Would
we find the means to challenge the discourse of economics that would
otherwise entirely dominate and substitute for the public square?
Economics is the culture that abbreviates and throttles culture, but it is not
the only culture that does so.
The question of culture, and the comparison of cultures, arises with the
movement of peoples that is part of globalisation. It does not arrive with
immigration from Asia or Africa, but specifically from South Asia and the
Middle East and thus with the arrival of Muslim culture in Western
societies. Yet in Europe there is a determination to stifle the question.
European governments do not believe that immigrants are culture-bearing
19
in any public or political sense. Each arrival from Pakistan is thought of as
an individual without history, a mere body, not a cultural or political
integer able to resist the forms that market and state would press him
into. The possibility that other cultures are political cultures, even political
cultures that do not separate religious and political, private and public,
and can defy all their attempts to impose such a separation – this is the
thought which our policy-makers cannot countenance. Their conviction
that Islam can only be a religion and therefore cannot possibly also be a
political system, let alone more robust and long-lived politics than liberal
secularist politics, is the thought that cannot be expressed in the public
square, and which therefore receives no public examination. ‘Equality’ and
‘Religious Hatred’ legislation has been making the question of culture a
punishable offence. But the culture that cannot allow such questions to be
tested has already conceded so much ground that we have to wonder
whether it can last. It cannot tolerate the thought that the little population
so recently introduced, is not collection of individuals each grateful to be
admitted and individually each ready to take the place that market and
state intend for them, but that each brings with him a thick mesh of
indivisible human relationality and an indissoluble political culture that will
in short time bite its the head off its host and eat him whole. Has
secularist liberal culture already been so comprehensively overtaken that
the moment when it could express its panicked recognition has already
been and gone? The inability of modernity to tolerate the question of the
formation of man and our the question of culture, a failure suddenly
apparent with its reaction to asking such question in this new Muslim
presence, raises the question of whether in modernity and Islam we are
dealing with two forms of the same monism and despair.
20
everything is embodied and has that outward form by which it can be
recognised for what it is. Everyone receives a body, first from their
immediate parents and then a more extended ‘body’ or presence that
accrues by a process of enculturation from wider circles of cultural
authorities. What have been given is firstly our own families, comprised
first of our parents and their generation, and then through baptism the
Church, then perhaps also children and a generation subsequent to
ourselves. Everyone is shaped and given the public form and ‘body’ made
of what they have received from some combination of the generations
that preceded them. Every form is both new and it is a bricolage of given
and existing things.
But moderns are afraid of what they have been given. On the modern
conception, not only is your own individual and culture embodiment
thought to be of no consequence, but it is thought that you should
energetically repudiate it. Nothing you are do in your body or with your
body is thought to impact on who you are, but you must distance yourself
from the world and its materiality. Moderns imagine that they are able to
dispense with every form of cultural embodiment, and exist without any
inherited form, entirely sourced from their own imagination. Modernity is
entirely unfamiliar with the thought that the past is the matrix and ‘body’
from which each present generation emerges, and is a new instantiation
of. It concedes the past nothing. Economics is the idiom of the modern
account in which it believes that we owe our predecessors nothing, and
acknowledge no debt to them.
Modernity consists in turning from the past to the future, as from the dead
to the living, and turning from the patient hearing to many voices in public
discourse to the discourse in which we buy options on all our preferences
and are obliged to no particular judgment. This apparent promotion of
future over past makes the present problematic. Our society is not happy
with itself, so is adopting Gnostic and escapist mode. The present is under-
valued, and the future is drawn forward; but over the long term this throws
the future into doubt too. If the eschaton and reconciliation of all thing is
already here, it is no longer to be hoped for and we lose the dignity of
crying for justice and waiting for true reconciliation.
21
of ours is understood to be visible to others or likely to be emulated by
them; every transaction is considered in isolation from all previous and
subsequent transactions. The inside world of the human heart is the idiom
in which we understand the public world, and the whole European tradition
of thought about being human in public is turned inside out, so we now
attempt to understand the public world only in terms of the preferences of
the individual, the man who is alone.
This promotion of one past, the early modern period, to the status of
canon makes our society brittle. We cannot resolve our present problems
only by referring to the principles articulated by the fathers of the modern
period. We do ourselves damage as long as we obey their injunction not to
enquire about the great tradition that preceded them. When times are
hard we need to take advice from all members of the family, perhaps
particularly those with the longest memories. But this canonical early
modern morning has become an article of faith. The autonomous and
disembedded economy of modernity is not a matter only of beliefs, or of
22
unarticulated deepest assumptions. It is actualised and given body in each
economic transaction.
Yet we are public beings. We watch one another, seek one another’s
respect. Our desire to be loved and admired drives all our acts. We do
things because we hope that they will get us noticed and admired by the
right people, make it easier for us to be loved by those whose love we
want most. The Church says that we have received the grace and
recognition from God by which we can give recognition and be generous to
all whom we encounter, and that we come into our own true and catholic
identities only as we receive them from all these persons.
Modernity has its own parody of this unity of persons. Indeed Modernity is
an imitation of the Christian account of the communion of persons, but
which since it is not sustained by the communion of God, is a communion
of individuals, a very paradoxical communion of monads. Modernity avers
that there may be no ultimate unity of persons; two persons may only ever
be two, never two who are also one. The modern economy is the
communion in which individuals, not persons, are united. The economic
transaction is the medium of our reconciliation and unity. Money is the
idiom by which two come together and, for a single moment, are one. Two
23
individuals come into communion and are united in an event of economic
transaction. In this transaction they are reconciled. They agree that, on
this occasion, these are goods, services and price that express their
reconciliation. The goods they bring to each other and the price they agree
on which denominates their exchange is as stochastic as the day’s date.
Every economic transaction is the event in which two humans become one
for a single instant. Each transaction represents a unity and communion,
yet without duration or public consequence.
In each transaction, one sells goods, the other pays for the goods bought:
goods and services travel one way, money the other. Ultimately we pay for
goods and services with other goods and services. But what makes these
services and goods, is that they are desired by, and acceptable to, the
other side, given and received in freedom by each of the two parties
involved. Each party judges the goodness of this service or this sum
proffered, and is able to do only by comparing it to previous and future
services and sums, that is, by measuring it against a past and future. Each
is able to desire this service, and accept and agree on the adequacy of this
service only on the basis of a history. Each transaction is an encounter
between persons: the encounter takes the idiom that relates to the ritual
built up by a culture for this purpose. This idiom and ritual has
accumulated through a history of such encounters. Each transaction is a
exchange of greetings, in which one side offers the other some
recognition, denominated and embodied by these goods and the other
replies and accepts by returning the same recognition denominated in that
ritualised form of recognition that we know as money. Money is the
medium that makes all things immediately explicit, so that nothing is
outstanding and no future settlement required.
What is this ‘one’? ‘One’ is our unit of account. It is ‘one’, whether a dollar
or a bag of salt, and it is ‘one’ even when it is four dollars, or four trillion
dollars, or the same number of cowry shells. It is ‘one’ when it is ‘enough’,
when price is agreed, deal closed and the union of two parties brought
about. What is the origin of this ‘one’, the number to which all numbers
and settlements refer? What is the true name of all the numbers which all
represent this unity? What is that oneness which is the basis of every unit,
and of every reconciliation and settlement? The union to which each ‘unit’
and each number refers is the unity of God with man. For God has joined
man to himself, and made man one with himself. Every unit refers to the
union in which man is one with God, and which with God has reconciled
and united the world in man, making creation one, and for creation’s sake,
making man the ‘other’ of God.
24
Money is an idiom of the reconciliation and unity of persons. It is the
metric by which we apportion the honour we have to give. We honour
people by introducing them to people already honoured. Other persons are
the final measure and judges of persons. No person is solitary; each is
directed to another. Each of us gives permission to others, and needs the
permission of others in order to do what we intend. Money is one means
by which we address one another and intend to be heard by one another,
and so it is a form of speech. But it is not merely speech, but acts, and
permission for future acts. Money is a series of forms, ceremonial and
ritual, by which we formally and publicly grant one another our approval
and permission.
This single global economy exists because we all insist that each human
being pay us now in hard currency for every service we offer them. No one
may ask anything of us except when they offer us this single and universal
currency which represents the ultimately fungibility of all persons and
things. The world is always made up of many local and regional
25
economies. If we insist that there is only one form of money, rather than
many different negotiable forms of money, we are enforcing this
singularity and monadism on one another, insisting all economies and all
ends and purposes can be reduced to the unity that this monad
represents, and that all things are made present to us, here and now in
this present, without loss.
Money is the metric by which we apportion our time and so distribute the
honour we bring to others. Our ability to apportion ourselves by identifying
more and smaller units of time allows us to multiply transactions and so
proliferate money. As we identify a new unit of time we use it to end one
encounter in order to initiate another. We introduce new temporal intervals
that cut existing relationships short to produce new ones in order to make
‘more’, and so to accumulate transactions and increase economic growth.
We divide and denominate the honour we pay on another by the infinitely
divisible metric that is time, and we conglomerate these units of our time
in the idiom of money. Money is human history rendered into substance,
as the relating and working of persons becomes the goods and material
environment, and then into the volatile substance of charisma and credit,
which gives us permission for new encounters and transactions. The
modern economy grows, because we divide ourselves: economic growth is
the front, of which our decreasing attention span and inability to receive
one another as persons and wholes is the back. If everything in the world
can be truly denominated in this single currency, everything may be paid
off, all debt cancelled, differences equalised and relationship ended. Then
there is no reason to look forward to any other world, or any future. We are
enforcing this singularity and monadism on one another, insisting all
economies, and all ends and purposes, can be reduced to the unity that
this monad represents, and so made immediately present, in this time.
Our version of the global economy attempts to drag the future into our
present, heaven to earth, while each of us simultaneously attempts to
leave the present, earth and embodiment in order to ascend into the
future.
26
nature man is solitary. In each such transaction we enforce on each other
the asseveration that man is alone, that all his relationships are non-
fundamental and fleeting, so each new encounter effaces each previous
encounter.
The sway of the one who does not give his name reaches evenly across
the entire world: it does not encourage us to reach out first to those who
are nearest to us in our own town, region, country. This economy rubs
away at each particular locality, as at every particularity. Each unit of
payment represents permission to participate in this economy and so
experience a momentary unity with humankind. We participate in this
household, only by providing its life, that is, as its life is extracted from us.
Our membership in it has to be instantly renewed: each transaction staves
its expiry off for a moment. Since these transactions leave no trail we are
just as much individuated individuals at the end of all transacting in the
monetised economy as we were at the beginning. The result is that we
each only exist in the moment, as we travel through these transactions,
each of which is an instant of reconciliation and unity with another person
and through them with humanity as a whole. When each is over we have
achieved no more than after the very first. This economy is not able to
point to the unity and enduring dignity of person: no human is a whole in
himself, but a fragment of a totality. The individual will be rolled up into
the whole and the titan of humankind will roll on, made up of a myriad
individual life-trajectories, all of which were directed and absorbed into the
Behemoth, ‘Man’. The monetised and global economy is affiliation to
someone who does not care to give us his name. As a result moderns have
no means of extricating themselves from this economy, and as a result
this money is bondage to an alien household and economy.
27
Western culture is baffled by the question of the permanence of the
human person. It does not recognise the fundamental given of the concept
of covenant, and acknowledge the community that names the source of
that covenant in its public worship. To the extent that our culture turns
from the resources of its long tradition these cultural problems express
themselves as economic crises. Modernity is baffled by our embodiment
and materiality because it does not have a high enough view of the earth,
for it does not see it, by faith, together with its purposes. Since they see
the world without teleology, moderns imagine that no purposes are
intrinsic to it, and thus that purposes have to be imposed upon it, and
since they acknowledge no time other than their own, they impose their
purposes on what they see as an inert world, without past or future.
The driving narrative of modernity is growth. Modernity has cast off the
thought that persons can grow and that they may freely take on any
course of formation by which they could do so. ‘Growth’ means only
‘material’ growth, a rising standard of living. But here again, how to assess
this, when we have given up the criteria by which we can decide between
differing measures by which to assess any standard of living? We are left
with GDP, which is to say, the sum of monetised transactions in any
national economy. The new discipline of the ‘economics of happiness’
suggests that more choice and greater access to material goods is as
likely to bring dissatisfaction as contentment where the economy is
entirely detached from the self-government of the particular person. In an
economy dedicated to ‘economic growth’ two factors grow. Money grows,
but it grows as debt, and so debt grows. As the economy expands, so does
the level of indebtedness and consequent fragility of each local and
national economy. The volatility of this sole medium of transaction
squeezes individual economic agents out of the economy; when money
takes flight, whole populations are left without means of economic
participation. As this form of debt-as-money grows, so does the drive to
make all our wealth explicit now, and so we press ahead to extract all
natural resources, rather than bank them for later, with environmental
consequences that are injurious to our heirs. I suggest that the idea of
growth must not be separated from the growth, or at least maintenance,
of culture, and thus to the personal formation that results in self-mastery,
by which we are able to restrain ourselves, regard resources as savings
and so avoid devastating our environment. The economy of modernity
consists in making everything immediately explicit, so in realising wealth
as present wealth, and separating the economy from the cultural
economy, capital from social capital, body from person, and separating the
immediate from the long-term that is the unity of past and future. But it is
culture that supports, or fails to support, an economy. Economics can only
ever be a shorthand that refers to a certain culture, and prosperity can
only be sustained across generations, when that culture is passed on.
28
come unforced into the freedom of his communion. This God lets us come
to him in freedom, so that in his company, we may come to all men. We
must contrast this freedom with the brute givenness represented by the
monism of any occult divinity that does not care to give us its name. So
the Church insists that there are, and must be explicitly, many currencies,
and that each of us issues our own in charity and, free from coercion has
to affirm the worth of whatever payment, and means of payment, is
offered to him.
* * *
The Christian confession is that God is with man. Man is never isolated and
alone, not by nature a singular and sole being. Rather man is singular
because he is recognised and made singular by those who receive him as
such in freedom, thus constituted so by his relationships. The covenant of
person with person is derived from this fundamental covenant of God with
man. God has ‘married’ man to himself: man is thus at once a married and
a singular being. All human encounter is founded in God who is himself, and thus
one, and who is with us, and thus two and one with us. Marriage is the
fundamental demonstration of this unity and duality, singleness and
29
togetherness, of man. Every encounter and transaction of man with man
reveals and affirms our oneness and twoness. Each encounter and
transaction is an instantiation of the covenant of man with man, that rests
on the covenant of God with man. One person to person covenant,
marriage, is intended to witness to the promise of the permanence of
man’s relationship with his fellow. This fundamental covenant of marriage,
and the household it creates, gives purpose to all other encounters and
transactions.
The covenant of God with man is primal: nothing is antecedent to it and nothing may
undo it. The source of all human oneness and unity is the covenant in which two
persons are created a single ‘person’. The covenant and single ‘person’ of two
married persons is primal and indissoluble. All other covenants, business
relationships and forms of the individual-state relationship are derivations of this
covenant; they will either acknowledge and honour it or attempt to substitute for it
and replace it. All transactions are one, only as they serve to reflect and support this
phenomenon that humans may be at once one and two, simultaneously single and
particular, and together and plural.
In this paper I have suggested that the health of a society depends on its
readiness to observe these sets of distinctions. We started with the
distinction between man and woman, from which followed the distinctions
between marriage and all other form of association, between household
and market, between civil society and charitable sector and the state, and
between market and private sector of individual initiative and the state,
understood as public service supported by national consensus. We saw
that these distinctions are based on others. One is the distinction between
God and man, which is followed by the distinction between the Church and
world. The Church is the irreducibly particular community; it cannot be
assimilated, copied or substituted for. No society can dispense with the
obligation of listening to the Church without substituting a lower account
of man for a higher one. The Church is the community that points to what
man may yet be. The state cannot dispense with the obligation of listening
30
to the Church, without turning itself into an alternative church and so
becoming totalitarian and impinging on the freedom of man. From the
distinction between world and the Church preserves comes the distinction
between the present and the reconciliation of all things in the end time,
and thus the distinction between the present and the future. The Church
stands against all inclination to confuse or merge the present and future.
We need confidence in our present, and this comes from a comprehensive
account of our origins; a healthy present lives out of a generously-
conceived past. Only the society with a certain self-confidence in its
present does not prematurely try to draw the future forward.
31
able to concede a givenness, we are also able to hope. We have said that
there is the duality of biological man, who is the product of a family, and
political man who receives his appraisal and acknowledgement in the
public arena. And we have remarked on some attempts to reduce these
dualities. We have been giving up our freedom as we have been giving up
responsibility, allowing the market to provide household service for us and
the state to carry risks and responsibilities for us, we give up our freedom
and enter a period of listlessness and fecklessness. Perhaps some
societies are no longer searching for reasons for their problems, and are
no longer able to raise their eyes to the issue of the future. The greatest
favour the Church can do any society is remain distinct from such a
society, and so preserve a duality of Church and world. Only the Church
that is absolutely sure of the covenant of God with man, secure in the love
of God and of the promise of this resurrection can look into the future
without fear and name the threats it sees. The confidence of the Church
sustains the open economy against the closed economy of paganism. To
say that we are the people summoned by God to witness to God is the
single constructive thing we can do for our society and for the human
future.
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