• How did
Al
Qaeda generally raise
and
move
funds
to
support itself
as an
institution?
For example, how did it raise money to pay for training camps and
bring
recruits
to
Afghanistan
for
training?
4. Does
the
fact that
the
9/11 hijackers were able
to evade
detection
and
disruption
tell
us
anything about
the
system
in
place
at the
time?
•
Were
the
various anti-money laundering controls
in
place
sufficient
to
detect
the
types
of
movement
of
money involved here?
Why or why
not?
Was the
existingsystem simply not designed to detect the type of transactions engaged in by the
9/11
terrorists?
• Was
there
any concerted
effort
to
track contemporaneously known terrorists
cells
through
their
financial
transactions? Did the government have the technicalabilityto do so? What would such a system look like?
•
What were
the
other deficiencies with
the pre
9/11
system?
For
example, werethere shortcomingsin
efforts
topreventtheabuseofcharities, regulate informal
money
transmitters,
identify
illegal trade-based money movements? Did we
effectively
engage key
foreign
governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, to assist?
5. What
are we
currently doing,
and
have
these
efforts
eliminated
the
deficienciespresent before
9/11?
• The
U.S. government
has
devoted substantial resources since
9/11,
includingenacting significant
new
regulations,
in an
effort
to
disrupt
and
curtail
the
funding
of
terrorist organizations. What were those changes?Arethey
effective?
Are the
deficiencies
that may have contributed to the
9/11
failures still present?
6.What specific, actionable policy
recommendations
can be
made
to
improve
the
current efforts
in
light
of the
lessons
of
9/11?
10
•
Should
the
goals
of the
efforts
regarding terrorist
financing
be
changed?
If so,
how?
• Is the
government effectively
organized
to
provide
for
adequate coordinationamong
the
various agencies
and
actors involved
in the
effort?
If
not,
how
could
the
structure be improved?
• How
has,
and how
will,
the
raising
and
movement
of
money
for
terroristoperationschange in response to government actions? Is there a move away
from
formalfinancial
systems into something more
difficult
to
detect?
Can thegovernment
recognizeandquickly adapttothose changes?
•
What
is the
best approach
to
increase
the
ability
and the
willingness
of key
foreign
states to track and disrupt terrorist financing?
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