1

Introduction

Africa is widely viewed by the rest of the world as a dark continent without hope or remedy
to its myriad of problems; mired by wars, conflicts, hunger and plethora of diseases. The
continent in attempt to correct this myopic view claims that it was marginalised from outset
and has no option than to be independent, even if it has to constantly seek for advice and help
in all ramifications from the Western world. Now, all the African countries have gained
independence, but most of the countries continue to experience chaos and unrests politically,
socially and economically. However, history has shown that one of two scenarios usually
happens when a country gets independence. It is either the country go on to develop and
prosper as in the instances of Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa or it under develops
further; leaving its citizens to rethink why they had to struggle so hard to get the
independence they craved for in the first place. The latter scenario is the part Nigeria has
fallen into since gaining independence in 1960 from its former metro pole, Britain.

One of the reasons Nigeria has gone backwards in economic development is because of
corruption. The reports and cases of this subject are numerous which necessitated that I
conduct the study on graft in Nigeria. I found out that one major cause of widespread level of
corruption in the country is the failure of the government institutions. The overlap between
corruption and the governing institutions is a call for concern in this country. Thus, I
hypothesise that large scale corruption in Nigeria is a manifestation of institutional failure. In
essence, corruption is the dependent “variable”1 while weak institution is the independent
variable that has exacerbated corruption. The big question to be answered in this research
essay is; how has institutional failure been experienced in Nigeria case? Other questions that I
have answered in this essay are; what institutions are mostly affected by corruption? What
countervailing institutions exist to deal with the problem of widespread corruption? Why
don’t these institutions function? As such, the main aim of this study is to find a possible
solution to the problem.

This essay has been divided into four sections; the first section deals with the provision of
some background information on Nigeria; definition of concepts; the underlying theory of
this essay as to the causes of corruption in Nigeria context; and the rationale for the research.

1
Giddens, A., “Asking and Answering Sociological Questions” in Giddens, A. (5th Edition) Sociology, Polity
Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 82.
 2

This section also talked briefly on the methodology while the second section will be a
discussion on the institutional failure in Nigeria with regards to the institutions mostly
affected; and the experiences of failure of these institutions. On the third section, the
countervailing institutions in fight against graft will be scrutinised to see whether or not they
do function appropriately. The last section will be the concluding part in which ways to
combat this problem has been suggested.

Background and Rationale

Some background information on Nigeria, definition of concepts, the underlying theory of

this essay, and the rationale for the research will be discussed in this section. I will also talk
briefly on the methodology. Nigeria has been identified to provide answers to this research
question because of the large scale practice of this social malaise in its society. In fact, it is
way of life in this most populous African Country as portrayed by its detractors and friends
alike. It is populous both for the wrong and right reasons. It is important to do a case study on
this “giant of Africa” because it is dubbed the corruption capital of the world. On the other
hand, the country is in a very unique position to show other African countries how they ought
to become a “developmental state” as least if not a developed state. With a population of
140,000,0002 and mass human and natural resources, the country has no excuse to give for
failure to progress hitherto.

Nigeria is the fourth largest producer of oil in the world and a member of the Organisation of
Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) with oil as it major export revenue of about 95%. The
country depends mainly on oil to generate government revenue with cocoa and rubber the
other sources. Despite its buoyancy from oil revenue the country has remained stagnant as its
population live on less than $1 a day. This former British colony has experienced political
instability more than any other country on planet with more than a dozen of military heads of
state so far. One of the excuses for the incessant military rule and coups is the claim to reed
the country of corruption and when the military juntas take over, they become more corrupt
than their predecessors. Currently, the country has 36 states, 1 capital territory with 6 geo-
political zones of the North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-West, South-East and
South-South3.

2
The World Factbook, Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html, 20
May 2009, p. 1.
3
Ibid. p. 1.
 3

Nigeria has been practising “democracy” for a decade now without interruptions from the
military whose wings have apparently been clipped. Its constitution ensures presidential
system of government, which has the executive, legislative and the judiciary as some of its
institutions. We shall find out how these institutions are fighting or aiding corruption in the
study with vis-à-vis their relationships and checks and balances. The country’s democracy
has been branded a “quasi-democracy” because the masses do not usually get the actual
results after elections, albeit multi-parties involvement. One party, the Peoples Democratic
Party (PDP) has dominated and become hegemonic4 in the politics of the country. Nigeria
adopted English as its official language during independence and has three other major
languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) from the major tribes, and 250 dialects from the other
minority groups5.

Different archival documents, literature, journal, documentaries, news, articles in both

electronic and print media were used in conducting this research. Nonetheless, there is more
originality in the analyses and information provided in this essay having lived and
experienced most of issue in Nigeria in earlier part of my life for over 25 years. The
analytical framework and causal links is grounded on process tracing to identify the link
between all the variables as regards the cause-effect links6. In as much as there is no literature
review in this work, these weaknesses have been taken care of through conceptual
definitions. Against the back drop of renewed preparedness of the current government of
President Umaru Yar’Adua to fight corruption through “rebranding” of Nigeria7, it is
important that people get to read and understand comprehensive information about the main
root of the problem.

Explanations have been given for most of the concepts in this paper for more understanding
of the answers to the research question. Also, it is very important that the definition of
corruption and other related words are conceptualised and provision have been made for
them. Without getting entangled with the definitions, I have kept them as simple as possible
to avoid tautology.

4
Singewood, A., “Culture and Domination: Gramsci and the Concept of Hegemony” in A Short History of
Sociological Thought, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 116-118.

5
Ibid. p. 1. 6Alexander George, “Case studies and theory development,” Unpublished Draft Paper presented to
the Department of Political Science , Stanford University, Stanford, 1996, 11.
7
Emman O., “FG approves N130m for Rebrand Nigeria project”, Vanguard Online Edition 2 April 2009.
Accessed on 5 April 2009 at http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/32618/42/.
 4

In view of the aforesaid, to say Nigeria is underdeveloped is understatement because it may

degenerate from being a “predatory state”8 to a “quasi state” if nothing is done to minimise
graft soon in that country. At the moment its peers are countries like Angola and Ghana. So,
predatory state would mean a situation where the rulers of a country use state offices for self
enrichment by illegitimate means. This is also called kleptocracy while a quasi state9 is one
that enjoys formal recognition by the international community and independence, but do not
have the capacity to govern efficiently. A good example is Somalia and consequences of this
kind of state is piracy in the international waters with recent melodrama of “operation
Phillips”10. So, one is not being hypercritical by saying that Nigeria has become a total
disappointment in terms of not providing exemplary leadership in the continent.

Still on the concepts, corruption can be “defined as a pervasion or change from good to bad
[which] involves the violation of established rules for personal gain or profit”.11 Corruption
manifests itself through different channels and no country can claim not to have practiced one
form of corruption or another. On a global level, countries often have interests abroad which
may not be secured by military means or garner support through traditional method of
diplomacy. Realists argue that the most viable means of securing those interests is through
bribery in form of foreign aid to that country where the country’s interest is. Governments
usually offer bribes to other governments for political advantage through this means12.

In order to answer the research question, I looked at some theories to explain the causes of
corruption in Nigeria. The general argument has been whether corruption increases as a result
of the culture of the society or its structure and I looked at both sides of the equation. The
causes can be scrutinised from two different views from the works of Tevfik F. Nas et al
(1986); firstly the individual characteristics and secondly the structure of Nigeria society.

8
Nel, P. and McGowan, P., “Theories of International Relations” in Nel, P. and McGowan, P. (eds.): Power,
Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa, University of Cape Town Press,
Cape Town, 2002, p. 355. 9Nel, P. and McGowan, P., Op. Cit. p. 356.

10
“Saving Captain Phillips: American alive, pirates dead, let's hope more to follow”, WSJ.COM, 13 April 2009.

Accessed on 19 April 2009. at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123958568421112479.html.

11
Dike. V. E., Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control,
http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/gen/corruptiondikehtm.html, 30 March 2009, p. 1.

12
Nel, P. and McGowan, P., Op. Cit. p. 31.
 5

The individual level explanation conceptualises corrupt practise as a result of greed or

weakness of the person concerned or inadequate officials to withstand temptations. Greed in
this case becomes a very strong motivation to engage in a deviant behaviour13. The level of
one’s corruptions is equal to the level of creed and there is a correlation between greed and
corruption.

This is linked to Durkheim’s theory of social fact in which corruption has independent
existence at the social level, which is complemented by individual behaviour. Social facts are
internalised by individuals through the socialisation process14. Meaning, people behave
depending on how they see and perceive others behave. This theory may not be too critical,
but it is important in the sense that most corrupt practices in Nigeria appear to be pathological
and innate. There is this Nigeria mentality (Nigeria factor) of “everyone is doing it”, which is
locally interpreted as “shine your eyes”. This begins even at infantry age, for instance. False
age can be given to teachers so that a child can start primary school even when the child has
not reached the required age to do so.

Also, Durkheim talked about solidarity as the level of relationships between individuals and
other groups guided by shared moral sentiments and beliefs reinforced by common emotional
experiences. Solidarity transforms from organic society to mechanical society with different
level of integration which further result into individualism. He argued that individualism
undermines the collective consciousness in any sort of solidarity and violation of collective
sentiments through deviant behaviour is punished by deterrent to future deviation to re-
establish the dividing line between socially approved and disapproved behaviour15. Today’s
society in Nigeria does not share the same common values and norms, but is rather controlled
by laws and they are not interdependent on one another obtainable in organic society because
different cultures, religion and profession now exist. Besides, there is no harsher punishment
as the case may be for those who engage in corrupt practices. Only the poor and those who
are not connected nor have contacts with those in power are punished. Ironically, the degree
of corruption involved by these poor people is infinitesimally minute compared to those who
waltz freely because they have contacts.

13
Tevfik F. Nas et al., “A Policy-Oriented Theory of Corruption”, in The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 80, No. 1, March 1986, p. 109.

14
Johnson, D. P., Sociology Theory, Macmillan, New York, 1986.

15
Ibid.
 6

Finally, Durkheim is of the view that there are conflicts in common interest as a result of loss
of identification with larger society. Individuals pursue their particular interests at the
expense of the welfare of society as a whole. Also, he maintained that one of the unfortunate
consequences of individualism is anomie or lawlessness16. Suffice to say that people seek for
employment in public or government establishments to offer their services; it is an
opportunity to squander money to satisfy their self aggrandizement. In Nigeria, it is called
“sharing of national cake” and “chop I chop”. Nigeria becomes a cake which must be shared.
While these explanations provide understanding as to why some of Nigeria officials and its
citizens are corrupt or can become corrupt, they are not enough to explain the extent of
corruption in Nigeria because of problem that has to do with generalisation17.

Not all Nigerians are corrupt as it has produced some prominent personalities who have
proved their mettles. Nigeria has produced Noble laureates in intellectual work such as Wole
Soyinka. The country has also produced some respected people like Ken Saro-Wiwa18 and
Dele Giwa19 who chose to die rather than been infiltrated. The country has also produced
someone who has been serving the country for over a decade. She seems to have a vaccine
preventing her to be hooked to the disease and that person is Professor Adora Akunyili. She
was the former Director of the dreaded National Agency for Food and Drug Administration
Control (NAFDAC) and now she is the country’s minister of Information and
Communication to rebrand the country20. These people have proven that one has that innate
ability to behave properly irrespective of temptations.

16
Ibid.

17
Ibid. p. 109.

18
Akintunde, M., “Secrets of the Grave”, in Africa Today, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 2000, pp. 24-26.

19
Soyinka, K., “How They Snuffed out His Life”, in Africa Today, Vol. 7, No. 10, October 2001, pp. 10-16.

20
Ujah, E., “Spectrum Licence scale: Akunyili Queries Ndukwe” Vanguard Online Edition, 21 May 2009.
Accessed on 21 May 2009 at
http://www.vanguardngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36287&Itemid=43.
 7

Further more, for broader level of analyses, there are two types of structural-level
explanation; organisational or bureaucratic and quality of citizen involvement. The
organisational or bureaucratic approach to corruption varies, but the most vital theme is that
impediments created by bureaucratic organisation are the failure to achieve public purposes.
This theme is labelled “bottleneck theory” or redtapism. People attempt to circumvent official
channels through bribery or other illegal means to achieve their goals21 which is ubiquitous
every where in Nigeria. Take for example in the driving licence department under the aegis of
the Federal Road Commission of Nigeria where there are usually no plates for numbering
vehicles. The usual story and claims are “there is no plate number check by next week” and
when one goes back the next week, the same story is repeated. However, offering of
something extra as bribe or “kick backs” will ensure that one gets the plate number the same
day. In essence, people result to offering bribes to get what they want rather than expending
energy and time for weeks and months without getting the desired service. Some authors like
Leff (1964), Huntington (1968) and Leys (1965) cited in Pierre-Guillaume Meon and Kkalid
Sekkat used the term “grease the wheel” and “sand the wheel” hypotheses22 to explain the
above demonstration.

Similarly, the quality of political participation in a democratic environment is a deterrent to

graft. The aim behind none partisan balloting and at-large local government elections are to
improve the level of involvement by the people and breaking electoral support for political
machines and politicians. Re-election of corrupt politician raises eye brows about the quality
of democratic participation. Inability to scrutinise officials through mass participation in
elections will encourage the politicians to pursue their parochial interests at the expense of
the public23. Again, it is very common in Nigeria that what happens is “selection” of deputies
and not election through hegemonic ideology of coercion and consent24. The electoral
officials know before hand who wins an election no matter who is the preferred candidate of
the masses. This is worst where there is an incumbent who wants to be re-elected. It is rare in
the history of Nigeria where an incumbent loses an election due to what is termed in as
“power of incumbency”.

21 22
Ibid. p. 109. Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Sekkat, K., “Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of
Growth?”, in Public Choice, Vol. 122, No. ½, January 2005, pp. 71-74.

23
Ibid. p. 109.

24
Ibid. pp. 116-118.
 8

Due to the secret balloting system of election in Nigeria, it is very difficult for the public to
measure who really won an election other than the result given by the Independent National
Election Commission (INEC). Perception and public opinion is not enough to contest the
result in the electoral tribunals for redress because they deal with the facts produced by INEC
and not the truth as long as the favoured candidate is also ready to grease the palms of the
members of the electoral tribunals. An attempt was made to eradicate electoral frauds in the
country by Professor Humphrey Nwosu, former boss of the defunct National Election
Commission (NEC) through option A4 (open-secrete ballot system) during the military
regime of Retired General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida did not understand very well how
the system works and before he could conceptualise it fully, Late Chief Moshood Abiola won
the 1993 presidential election contrary to the wishes of the military cadre25.

Option A4 ensures that election results are announced in each polling centre within a short
period of time after ballot casting in the presence of the voters and the witnesses of the
respective candidates. People were in leverage position to ask questions if conflicting results
were published later after elections. Option A4 has since died a pre-mature death in Nigeria
because the powers that be want to use the flawed usual secret ballot system that they can
easily manipulate26. The two theories discussed herein posit that corruption in Nigeria has
both cultural and structural explanations and this now leads to discussion on the institutional
failure and its experience in the country.

Institutional failure in Nigeria

This section will answer the questions of how has institutional failure been experienced in
Nigeria case and what institutions are mostly affected by corruption? All the government
institutions in Nigeria are affected by corruption, but for the purpose of this essay it is
important that I deal with just three key most affected institutions- the executive, the
legislative and the judicial arm of government. Multitudinous indiscipline and corruption in
Nigeria can best be described as a trickle down of the bad exemplary misdemeanours of its
rulers. I am of the view that an efficient institution (government) will be in good stead to
minimise corruption because good leadership provides good citizens.

25
Osoba, S.O., “Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Perspectives”, in Review of African Political Economy, Vol.
23, No. 69, September 1996, p. 383.

26
Ibid. p. 383.
 9

Both the parliamentary system of government and the presidential system have been adopted
by the country after independence and the contemporary ruler ship have been using these
three arms of government as well. Even the military rule made use of this three arms with the
difference been that in military rule, the executive and the legislative were merged into a
name called the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the Supreme Military Council as the case
may be. These various arms were meant to provide checks and balances on each other to
ensure the rule of law in the country, but neo-partrimonialism scampered the entire settings.
The executive arm has become too strong and dominant thereby creating sycophants in the
other arms of government.

During the military era, the judiciary was almost none existence because military tribunals
were created to deal with high profile cases, which the high courts and the supreme
(constitutional) court was suppose to handle. Besides, so many decrees were promulgated by
the military cabal to rule the country in parallel to the Nigerian constitution. Laws and
decisions became the prerogative of the military leaders as their words also became laws. The
notion of “other from above” and “obey the last order” means that anything the military
leaders say or want goes. Torture and mass arrests of those who dared the military personnel
ensured that any person or soldier who was the acolyte of the leaders could do anything or
loot any amount of money s/he could lay hands on. The three tiers of government (the
federal, state and local government) were controlled by the military government to the extent
that the salaries of the civilians in the civil service were no where to be found. Those in the
civil service resulted to bribery to put food on the table for their families and pay school fees
for their dependants.27

The interest of military juntas in high profile cases of corruption were only motivated if the
perpetrator is not in their caucus, thereby allowing corruption to spread in every facet of the
society. It is recalled that despite all the tranquillity and unity that existed in the military,
there were divisions and dichotomies beneath what the general public could see. This was
evidenced in the number of coups that took place in Nigeria. Apart from the civil war that
broke out in the country between 1966 through 1970 mainly because of corruption; nepotism
and patronage became the other of the day28.

27
Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 377.

28
Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 375.
 10

It was during the military regimes in Nigeria that oil was discovered. Instead of oil becoming
a blessing for the country, it tuned out to be a curse in the sense that oil wealth was
distributed disproportionately among few elites and to section of the population that supports
the military. Security and military tools were built to quash those people seen as oppositions.
As a result of this, patronage was common with political posts and employments
opportunities depending on the clique one belongs to rather than on merit. Similarly, getting a
good job in public service depended on connections/contacts rather than qualifications and
skills. The country was turned into a “rentier state” whereby earning income was according to
the level of people in government one knew or how connected and not how qualified or how
hardworking. These military activities resulted in brain drain as talented skilled professional
left the country in search of employment elsewhere. It is usually the middle class of a society
that form pressure group against a government. In Nigeria’s case not only were they
polarised, majority also left the country29.

The institutional failure during the military rule encouraged the oil companies to do as the
pleased in Nigeria. Oil companies become mechanisms of underdevelopment in the region
through lack of investment proper. Investments where possible; were done in isolated
enclaves just to expand their operations and export oil to Western (colonial) countries without
really developing the local economies of the country. Their activities generated less
employment per dollar invested and to compound issues, the top officials of the oil
conglomerates colluded with the ruling government to loot and siphon the State funds to
foreign bank accounts. These funds were in turn loaned to developing countries with high
interest repayment rates.30 For example, more than $472 billion (equivalent of six Marshall
Plans) was generated in oil revenue by the Nigerian government (both military and civilian)
between 1970 and the early 2004, but it all went into private pockets of the ruling elites31.

29
Skocpol, T.: Social revolution in modern world, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1994, p. 242. & Neuwirth,
R., Oil-From Blessing to Curse, http://www.michnews.com/cgi-bin/atman/exec/view.cgi, 28 February 2006, p.
2.

30
Graaff, J.: Poverty and Development, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2003, p. 38. & Thomson, D.:
Crime and Deviance, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2004, p. 41.

31
George B.N. Ayittey, “ Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption” Testimony before the Committee on International
Relations’ Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations House Sub-Committee
on Africa, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C, Thursday, May 18, 2006. Accessed on 5 April
2009 at http://ipn.lexi.net/images/uploaded/6-447c66ef0f2dc--Nigeria_%20Corruption_Ayittey.pdf.
 11

Yet, they were not contended with emptying the country’s treasure; but indebted the country
as more funds were sought for in forms of loan from International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
to the tune of $36 billion. An audit report by Pius Okigbo in 27 September 1994 revealed that
$12.4 billion of Nigeria’s debt was embezzled by the military rulers between 1988 and
199432.

Furthermore, the environmental degradation and pollution caused by the exploration and
spillage of oil and gas in Nigeria are very noticeable. Oil explosions either by accident or
purposely caused has resulted in loss of lives on many occasions, especially in Niger-Delta.
Attempt to challenge the activities of these oil companies led to the hanging of an
environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine others in 1995 under the leadership of Late
General Sanni Abacha. Niger-Delta has continued to burn hitherto with about 1,000 lives and
$23.7bn lost to a crisis created by rebellion of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger
Delta (MEND) as at 200833.

One of the craziest things the past military regimes did was to allow the oil refineries to
deteriorate, without servicing them and this has led to perennial fuel, diesel and paraffin
scarcity in a country that is the forth largest oil producer in the world. Instead of maintaining
the refineries, the country started importing the aforementioned products and sold at mark up
of 400%. The contracts for these importations were handled by the associates of the military
regimes34.

The lack of opposition to the military government created avenue for the various successive
governments not to embark on any meaningful development project in the country. Education
system has collapsed and will not be discussed for the purpose of this essay. The
governments prefer to handle plethora of white elephant projects, which will pave ways for
corrupt practices through over-invoicing and inflated contracts. Besides, the corrupt
government official would shift government expenditures to areas they will collect bribes
easily.

32 33
George B.N. Ayittey, 2006. Barber, J.: Mandela’s World, David Phillip Publisher, Cape Town, 2004, p.
108-109, & Robinson, S., “Nigeria’s Deadly Days”, in TIME, Vol. 167, No. 21, 22 May 2006, pp. 18-23 &
Adebayo, S and Shobiye, H., “Nigeria lost 1,000 lives, $23.7bn to N’Delta crisis in 2008 – Report”, The Punch,
10 April 2009. Accessed on 10 April 2009 at
34
http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art2009040911503357, p. 1 Ibid. p. 383.
 12

For instance, Nigeria for over a decade has embarked on becoming one of the world’s steel
producers and commissioned the Ajaokuta Steel Complex since General Ibrahim Babangida
regime. This project has become very complex in the sense that for years, 98% of the
construction has been completed, but the remaining 2% has become source of embezzlement
of funds for various governments. The project usually gets mentioned and funds allocated for
its completion in the annual budgets, but its completion remains a mirage35.

The civilian administration is no less corrupt than the past military administration because the
activities of these civilian administrations ushered in the advent of military rule in Nigeria.
For starters, Late Nnamdi Azikiwe as the then premier of Eastern Nigeria was implicated by
the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry into the African Continental Bank (ACB) to have
abused his powers and diverted huge sums of Eastern Nigerian government into his own
coffers. Similarly, the G.B.A. Coker Commission of Inquiry of 1962 into the Western Nigeria
public corporations discovered that Late Obafemi Awolowo and his idealogugues in the
leadership of the Action Group government of then Western Nigeria enriched themselves at
the expense of the Cocoa Marketing Board- property of the people of Western Nigeria. These
and other wrong signals from the civilian government such as the Action Group crisis of
1962; census crisis of 1962-63; federal election crisis of 1964; Tiv rebellion of 1964-65; and
Western Nigeria election crisis of 1965 was enough for the military to step in36.

The three arms of government in the successive “democratic” governments are in serious
marital tripartite relationship not devoid of love triangle. In Gramscian model, the political
system is winner takes all, whereby the executive arm appoints deputies in both the judiciary
and the legislative arm through political arrangement of “selection” as I have discussed on the
first section of this essay. Essentially, the three arms of government work together to clean up
the county’s treasury to themselves and leave the country to rot. The executive arm collects
all the revenue and distribute in accordance to the ruling clicks through award of inflated
contracts. Most of the government officials and senators are directors of one form of company
or another who are awardees of these contracts.

35
Isiaka, P., “Nigerians, routinely indicted abroad for corruption, are let off at home”, Businessday Online, 23
March 2009. Accessed at
http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3842:nigerians-
routinely-indicted-abroad-for-corruption-are-let-off-at-home&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18.

36Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 375.

 13

The senate is a mere meeting place to endorse what has been discussed in dinner parties and
nocturnal meetings in lieu of making laws that the should benefit the general masses. It is not
a coincidence that electricity supplies in Nigeria are almost none existent for over 2 decades
now. Also, 70% of the 34,000 kilometres of federal roads have become death traps because
they are not motorable37.

A good example of this marriage affair is cited in the probe panel instituted by the current
administration of President Umaru Yar’Adua into the embezzlement of $16 billion by the
Olusegun Obasanjo administration. The House of Representatives Ad-hoc committee chaired
by Ndudi Elumelu was empowered by the President to investigate the matter and they
discovered that the alleged money was defrauded indeed by the past administration. The
report was presented to the senate on 9 October 2008, but the members of the senate;
supposedly loyal to the past administration discarded the report claiming that such report
does not exist38. The paradox of the whole matter is that Elumelu has now been implicated as
being the one who embezzled the fund 7 months after making the investigation. He and his
Senate counterpart, Nicholas Ugbane, and eight others were on 14 May 2009 arraigned
before an Abuja High Court over this case39.

Apart from the fact that the legislatures protects the executive arm and get their rewards even
after the expiration of their two tenures through other political appointments such as
becoming Ambassadors or ministers, they also make sure that they squeeze out as much fund
as possible by demanding bribes before they can ratify laws from the executive arm. For
instance, former Education minister in Nigeria, Fabian Osuji was a law maker and conceded
the fact that bribery is a common thing and practice at all facet of government. He took a
dose of his own medicine when the successive lawmakers demanded $800,000 from him to
approve a budget in his ministry, but got caught for offering only half of the demanded sum40.

37
Edike, T., “Senate declares S-East roads worst”, Vanguard Online Edition, 4 April 2009. Accessed at
http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/32778/43/.

38Binniyat,
L., “From hero to villain: The story of the Reps Power Probe Panel”, Vanguard Online Edition, 22
March 2009. Accessed at http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/31610/122/.
39
AKINTOLA, K. & AKPE, A., “EFCC arraigns power committee chairman, others over alleged N5.2b scam”
Businessday Online, 15 May 2009. Accessed on 17 May 2009 at
http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2753:efcc-arraigns-
power-committee-chairman-others-over-alleged-n52b-scam-&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18. 40Ibid. p. 1.
 14

The judicial sector, which is the last resort for aggrieved members of the society, comprises
the magistrates, judges and the police who are collaborators to the clandestine activities of the
two already discussed arms of the government. Weak judiciary leads to breakdown of
institutionary fabric (the executive and the legislative arms). “Awaiting trial” of suspects in
Nigeria is a common thing and the meaning of “justice delayed as justice denied” is music to
the ears of the country’s judicial system. People can stay in detention for 20 years without
being taken to courts and by the time the go to court at all, they have over served the time for
their punishments if found guilty. Those who have affluence and influence are usually the
ones that get court hearings just to clear their names of any allegation and not that they will
be convicted. So, bribery and corruption among the members of the judiciary is very common
in this context as court paper works and charge sheets or docket disappear from the court
filling cabinets without trace. In 2005, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (the highest
court) of Nigeria was implicated in corruption and this tells the scope of this issue of
corruption in the judiciary41.

Police officers world wide are known to be corrupt even in countries with minimal level of
corruption. It is not flabbergasting that the Nigeria police top the rank of corruption chart of
all the government institutions according to a research conducted by the Institute for
Development Research. The case of the Nigeria police is very unbearable because unlike
other government institutions whose staffers participate in corruption secretly, the officers of
the Nigeria police do theirs openly. Illegal road blocks are avenue for the police men to extort
money from the citizen in pretext of checking for stolen vehicles. To see a detainee in a
police cell, one has to bribe. This is just to mention a few. In February 2006, Nigeria police
Chief, Inspector General Tafa Balogun was sent to early retirement having only spent two
years on the post after being implicated in money-laundering to the tune of $52 million in his
various bank accounts42. This evidence speaks volume for itself because if the police Chief
can behave this way, what moral justification does he have to tell his subordinates how to
behave responsibly? The answer is not far fetched because corruption is likely to occur
whenever an administrator transposes the expected purposes of an organisation thereby

41
Amuche, A., “How Nigeria’s weak institutions aid corruption” Businessday Online, 25 March 2009. Accessed
at http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3904:how-nigerias-
weak-institutions-aid-corruption&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18.
42
Ojo, J., “Tafa Balogun's N16bn loot missing”, The Sun News Online, 15 April 2009. Accessed on 15 April
2009 at http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2009/apr/15/national-15-04-2009-01.htm.
 15

forcing participants to follow what otherwise would be deemed unacceptable ways of doing
things. The countervailing institutions in fight against graft has been scrutinised below to see
whether or not they do function appropriately.

Nigeria’s war on corruption as bandits trying to stop gangsters from stealing

This part will answer the questions of what countervailing institutions exist to deal with the
problem of widespread corruption in Nigeria and why don’t these institutions function? The
Nigerian government has been reminded and pressured constantly to do something about
peculation in the country through such bodies as the Transparency International (TI); United
Nations (UN); World Bank (WB); Organisation of Economic Cooperation Development
(OECD); International Monetary Fund (IMF); and African Union (AU). The IMF has
reduction of corruption as one of its loan condition. Also banks are being pressured to
disclose information on suspicious huge money in private accounts in the West. However,
Asia countries have taken over money laundering activities to aid these illegal deals. WB
through its institute WBI in 1999 proposed conditionality to support reform by raising
awareness and support the civil society in anti-graft campaign43.

In Nigeria’s context, the civil society has apparently given up. This is because when
corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it, especially when those
who suppose to start the fight are themselves corrupt. Nigeria is obliged under UN
Convention against corruption, but sovereignty in the international system means no country
can be bullied into how it fights corruption, not even sanctions. TI only releases a perception
index about corruption through annual index report and some countries see it as just a mere
perception. Currently, it places Nigeria in the 121 on its list44.

On the regional level, Article 2 of the AU Convention on Corruption and Related Offences
set out the objectives to be achieved by the convention45.

43
Haarhius, C.M.K. and Leeuw, F.L., “Fighting Governmental Corruption: The New World Bank Programme
Evaluted”, in Journal of International Development, December 2004, pp. 549-550.

44
Amoda, J.M., “Transparency International’s annual corruption perception index”, Vanguard Online Edition,
30 March 2009. Accessed on 30 March 2009 at http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/33765/48/.
45
Kututwa, N.: African Anti-Corruption Commitments: A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries, African Human
Security Initiative, www.africareview.org, 2005, p. 2.
 16

AU mandates it members to adopt legislative measures to combat corruption, establishment

and strengthening of anti-corruption authorities or agencies, to ensure transparency and
accountability in the management of public affairs, and administer reforms and codes of good
practice. Again, this mandate has no effects or whatsoever as the body can only determine the
level of corruption in a country through peer review of the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), possible only when a country wants to be reviewed. Only recommendations are
made after the exercise, which carries no drastic effect on the country46.

Attempts by various governments in Nigeria to stop this menace can best be described as
charade and window dressing in the sense that there has not been the political will behind the
efforts, institutions and measures taken to stop this menace. Those in government can fight
this problem effectively if they choose to do so the same way that they ensured that there is
no president-in-self-perpetuity in Nigeria. The country has in the past created some
institutions and measures like; judicial commissions of enquiry; code of Conduct Bureau;
Public Complains Commissions; Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice and Economic
Recovery (MAMSER); National Open Apprenticeship (NOA); War Against Indiscipline
Council (WAIC)47 and none of them has made any significant impact except WAIC to some
extent, but did not last. I will come back to this.

The birth of the third republic in Nigeria one decade ego raised false hope as people thought
that the disease will be combated with section 15 (5) of the Nigerian constitution of 1999
providing for transparency, accountability and good governance. The country acknowledged
the fact that police alone cannot handle high profile corrupt cases because they may not have
the capability to unravel the entire deal and understand how the crime was committed.
Secondly, they may not have the necessary political clout to investigate those involved vis-à-
vis high ranking government officials etcetera. President Yar’Adua’s predecessor, in June
2000 signed into law the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act
2000, which established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC)48.

46
Ajulu, R., “The NEPAD: Why NEPAD must succeed”, in Foundation for Security and Development in Africa,

Accra, Ghana, 2002, P. 29.

47
Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 384.

48
Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 26.
 17

This unit was charged to enforce anti-corruption in Nigeria, which include; to investigate and
report offender and to protect whistle blowers. To ensure that the unit is controlled and not to
trample upon the shoes of the big shots in the society, its chair and members are nominated
by the president. Besides, ICPC has no power to investigate the President of the country and
his vice, and the Governors and their deputies. Rather, it can appoint independent counsel by
designating the Chief Justice (CJ) of Nigeria to do so49.

ICPC became a tooth less bull dog that can bark, but can not bite. The fact that it can only
report after investigation and cannot prosecute and also the fact the CJ will constitute another
counsel to reinvestigate a case before the CJ can prosecute makes the function of the ICPC
meaningless. In cases where the governors and president is involved, which is very rare under
ICPC they will be referred to the senate to conduct impeachment without getting jailed.
Secondly, the institute was short staffed and under funded. In 2002, only 50% of ICPC
budget was made available. In 8 years it was able to prosecute only 150 cases, averaging 20
cases annually50.

The government of Obasanjo also initiated a “Due Process” policy in October 2001 to
enforce compliance in budgeting, procurement and expenditure. This has been hampered by
Official Secrets Ordinance of 1942 in which civil servants cannot divulge official
information. So, transparency was none existent. Procurement is usually advertised in at least
two national dailies or government gazette six weeks before submission. However,
unsuccessful bidders have no law backing them to seek official review of procurement
decisions51.

It was apparent that the country was losing the battle on this front and in 2004, the Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 was made; establishing the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). It was charged with investigating, arresting and
prosecuting erring public officers (elected or appointed). To its credence, the institute dealt
with high profile cases without fear or favour such as the probing of former Vice-President
Atiku Abubakar and the former president’s daughter, a senator and other governors. There
were number of success in conviction of appointed public office holders52.

49, 50, 51
Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 57, Ojeifo, S., “Senate Seeks to Give ICPC Power to Initiate Investigation”, in
Vanguard, 3 April 2009, p. 1 and Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 73.

52
Obayiuwana, O., “Rebel with a Cause”, in NewAfrican, May 2009, p. 50.
 18

That of the former police Boss, Balogun who was sent to jail was a good example. Under the
leadership of Nuhu Ribadu, the institute had 275 convictions53. The cases of elected high
ranking officials were not successful due to the diplomatic impunity they enjoyed. Section
308 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution offers a blanket impunity to the President, the Vice-
President, the Governor and their deputies. No civil or criminal litigation should be brought
on the mentioned office holders while they are still in their offices, accordingly54. This cog
means EFCC had to wait for these politicians to be impeached before they can be tried in
courts. The delays in the processes of impeachment enable the offenders to discard as much
evidence as possible with their executive powers. For example, despite overwhelming
evidence by EFCC, diplomatic immunity prevented them from prosecuting Chief Diepreye
Alamieseigha, the former governor of Bayelsa State. He was charged in United Kingdom
(UK) for money laundering as $3.3 million was found in cash on him and bank accounts55.

The level of success on convictions by EFCC brought out the demons in the politicians and
Ribadu was not only removed from office immediately the former President left office, he
was demoted and rusticated from Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (a think
tank institute) where he enrolled. Assassination on his life was missed narrowly and he has
since fled to UK56. Fighting corruption in Nigeria is very dangerous as the corruption czar
may not only lose his job, but also his life if the case concerns the politicians. WAIC as I
mentioned earlier in this section was scrapped sooner as it was created, and the authors;
Buhari and Idiagbon overthrown from office. In Ribadu’s words; “if you go after petty
criminals, nothing will happen to you. But if you go after grand corruption, you’re taking on
the politicians and they have money, they will come after you”57. This similar view was
echoed by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda on none trivial of political will in fight
against corruption in his address to seminar of Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in
Uganda in December 1994. According to him;

53
Obayiuwana, O., Op. Cit. p. 50.

54-55
George B.N. Ayittey, 2006.

56
Obayiuwana, O., Op. Cit. p. 49.

57
Ibid. p. 50
 19

The real problem is that the guards in Africa have themselves got to be guarded and this is clearly a vicious
circle. Without moral authority in our top leadership, it is very difficult to eliminate corruption. And
unfortunately, it is at the top that the real thieves that cripple national development are to be found58.

Apart from political interference, one other problem these institutions face it that the country
has no identity card system whereby every person has identity number. It is not easy to trace
accounts of these public officers locally in the event of their inability to take their loot
abroad. So, taxation which could have helped in tracing who have which money in the bank
is very difficult. Most of the time, tracing people with large sums of money in local bank
accounts is a wide goose chase because one person can have multiple international passports
with different names.

The current government has failed to build on the success of EFCC by chasing shadows
rather than dealing with the real issue. In 2007 in Davos, Switzerland, President Umaru
Musa Yar’Adua acknowledged that something seriously has to be done to sanitize the
country as even the system that brought him to power is corrupt. He made this statement
during his discussions with representatives of multinational corporations who have organised
the Partnership Against Corruption Initiative59. Yar’Adua underscored corruption’s
dehumanizing effect aided by the immunity protection of the top office holders in the country
by stating that:

One of the raging debates in Nigeria today is the issue of constitutional immunity from prosecution conferred on
the President, Vice President, governors and deputy governors. It is a raging issue and I have confidence that the
next constitutional amendment will strip these public officials of this immunity and I am personally in support
of that60.

Rather than sponsoring a bill to change this section of the constitution, he came up with
another moribund programme; “rebranding Nigeria”. The main source of corruption is known
to all and sundry. The ailment of the sick patient has been successfully diagnosed, which
requires the correct medicine and dose. Giving the patient the wrong medicine is a ploy to
worsen the situation or cause the demise of the patient. Those in power have refused to do the
right thing and in the next section, the concluding part; I proffer some solutions despite the
fact that the problem appears unmanageable.

58
Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 13.

59-60
Dike. V.E., Op. Cit. p. 1.
 20

Guarding the guard as the key to combating corruption

I have so far looked at the way in which institutional failure has encouraged widespread
corruption in Nigeria as weak institutions lead to weak controls of agencies. The conundrum
of choosing between military or democratic rule as the best government to combat or
minimise this problem does not apply herein, in the sense that nothing separates the two types
of government in this regard. Nigerians cannot continue to hope that some government that
will eschew moral values will be available someday and proffer solution. Government
reforms and the engagement of civil society in this fight are not new, the civil society and the
media now seems to be suffering from fatigue proliferated by long years of shouting against
corruption. So they probably have to be left alone at the moment, which makes it inevitably
imperative that some amendments be made on the country’s constitution to put some sense
into the heads of those occupying positions in the executive, judiciary and legislative arm of
government.

The constitution as it is, promotes these illicit activities in the government and that is why the
efforts to reduce graft must start at the top members of the society. Getting these three arms
in order will trickle down to every facet of the society and this is the only way that the level
of corruption can be minimised. The focus should be on the government and not the citizens.
The citizens will follow the footsteps of their leaders when deem right. Therefore, I hereby
make the following recommendations:

1. The reintroduction of the Option A4 (open-secrete ballot system) in the electoral system
for the 2011 election will ensure that distinguished members of the populace are elected into
office to avoid the corrupt politicians rigging the election. There is no better person to
manage INEC at the moment other than Professor Humphrey Nwosu. The government should
reemploy him to carry out this task if they are serious in combating electoral fraud.

2. The electorates should have the power to recall any of the senators who is deemed to have
comprised his position by engaging in graft and other related offences. Leaving the senators
to finish their tenures when they misbehave give them the opportunity to gain enough
grounds and money to bribe themselves into second tenures.

3. The constitution should make provision for the appointment of the CJ by the opposition
parties and not to be appointed by the ruling government. The CJ tenure should be 8 years of
two terms so that h/she bows out when the ruling government finishes its tenure. This
 21

appointment must take place immediately after the new President is elected. The current idea
in which the President, the Governors and 2-thirds of the senate votes can remove the CJ does
not necessarily guarantee the independence of the judiciary. The ruling party is just one party
while opposition parties are many and the CJ will not be tempted into being allegiance to any
party.

4. Similar to the appointment of the CJ is the appointment of the Auditor-General of the

Federation (AGF). An independent AGF from the executive arm guarantees that he does his
job without fear or favour. It does not make sense that the AGF as currently obtainable
answers to the Presidency.

5. The anti-corruption chief should also be appointed in similar manner as in 3 and 4 above to
avoid being used by the incumbent to witch hunt opposition members or accused of being
partisan. Enough protection should be given to the person even after his tenure. The person
must not necessarily come from police background.

6. ICPC should be disbanded and all the members of staff of the unit redeployed to EFCC to
assist EFCC as it needs more human capital.

7. The national identity card scheme must be taken seriously to ensure that the citizens of the
country have national identity numbers. At birth, babies should be given Identity numbers
within 3 months of birth by the Internal Affairs Ministry. No corpse should be buried without
a death certificate. This plus and minus during birth and death will prevent duplication of
identity. The issue of taxation will be easy to handle.

8. Unsuccessful bidders have no law backing them to seek official review of procurement
decisions and this law should be enacted.

9. Section 308 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution which offers blanket impunity to the
President, the Vice-President, the Governor and their deputies should be amended so that
civil or criminal litigation should be brought on the mentioned office holders where there is
substantial evidence.
 22

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