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Screened
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE
RECORD
Event:
Interview with
Claudio
Manno, 'ISA
Deputy
Administrator forIntelligenceDate:
October
L 2003
Special
Access
Issues:
NonePrepared by:
John
Raidt
"ream
Number: 7
Location:
Commission
Office
Participants
--NonCommission:
Claudio Manno; Brandon Strauss,
TSA CounselParticipants
—
Commission:
Bill
John
stone.
Sam
Brinklcy, and John Raidt
Current
Job
and
work
history
The
interviewee
currently
serves
as the Deputy
Administrator
for Intelligence at theTransportation Security
Administration
(TSA). Prior to assuming his current
position,
Manno served
in the
following capacities
(from
earliest
to
most
recent):
-Nine
years
as a
SpecialAgent
lor
the
USAF
Office
of Special
Investigations where
he
worked on criminal
investigations,
terrorism
issues,
counter intelligence and counterespionage.-
lie
went to work for
the
1'AA in
1987
as an analyst in the
agency's
intelligence
division,The
division
was under the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and had 5
or
6 staff members, (Manno noted that before
1986,
FA
A had noahilityto
receive,
analy/e or
disseminate
intelligence
and
relied exclusively
on
other
agencies
for
threat
intelligence.)
Me helped the agency build a
SCIF,
train air
marshals,
and establish
liaison
wilh
other
agencies.
-In
1990,
he
managed
an
FAA
security
field office
in
Rome,
Italy
that predominantlyconducted
foreign
airport assessments,
-In
1992, he became Manager
of the FAAIntelligence
Operations Division working
on
"indications and
warnings."
He managed
the
Watch, handled
liaison
with CIA, Slate,
later
FRI
?
and
much later NSA.
- In 1995,hebecame
Deputy
to the Directorof the
Office
of
CivilAviation
Intelligence
(ACI)
(Pat
McDonnell).
He served inthatcapacity
until
August
of
2001
when
hebecame
the
Director
of
ACL- His
office
was
transferred
to the
authority
of the
TSA
whenthe agency
was
created
in
November.
2001.
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
 
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
Origins
of
ACI
The
FAA Intelligence
division
was established pursuant to the recommendations
of
a
commission
headed
by
Vice President Bush
on
the
issue
of
anti-terrorism.
The
office
was
tasked
with setting up Intelligence
requirements and following-up
on issues bearing on
threats
to
civil
aviation.
Intelligence
Collection
Goals
Manno
was
asked
what the aviation
collection requirements were beginning
in the
early
1990's
for
ACI. Manno reported that
ACI
asked
the
Intelligence Community
for
assessments
of the
threat
from
terrorists,
and
information
about
terrorist groups
who had
a demonstrated
an
interest in targeting aviation, such as
Hezbollah,
Abu Nidal and
Palestinian
groups.
ACI
tasked
the TC to
look
for
capabilities
and
intentions
to
target civil
aviation.
Manno slated that
more
specifically
ACT asked
for
information
on
how these
groups weretraining,
what
devices
they
were
making,
and how were
they
positioning and equipping
themselves,
The
requirements were
transmitted
to the 1C,
particularly
the FBI and
CIA,
in
writing.
In
these communications
ACI
indicated what
the
categories of material
they
wanted madepart
of
their "reading
list."
ACI
Liaisons
to the
1CFollowing
the Pan Am 103
disaster,
ACI
established liaisons with State Department
in
1990
and the CIA
sometime shortly
thereafter--he
thought perhaps
199!,
Liaison
was
established
wilh
theFBI in
1996
and
then with
the NSA
sometime
after
that.
The CIA
liaison
was
established
in
the
"Reporting"
section
of the CTC
under
the
auspices of the
Director
oI'
Operations
where
information
from
the
agency's
collectionspoints came into
the
CIA
Headquarters. Manno indicated that
he and
his
colleagues
surmised
they
weren't
getting everything that
the 1C has so they
(HELP?)
The
liaison
officers
reviewed
the
reporting that
flowed
into
theCIA;
advocated
for FAA
to
receive
the
information they desired,
and
worked
the
"learline"
to
develop
unclassified
information thai
the federal
government
could share with
die
industry about threats to
civil
aviation,
The CIA
liaison
received
a
full
background check
and was
fully
integrated
into
the
CTC,
While
priority one
for
the
L.O.
was to
work
on FAA
issues,
any
leftover
lime could
beusedto
work
on
issues
for theCIA.
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
 
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
While
FAA
paid for the
billet,
Manno remembers
that
CIA
was
attempting
to
reimburse
FA
A for the
cost,
but
this
effort
was
scrubbed because
of
budge
I/administrative
reasons,
The
FBI L.O.
was
assigned
to
Ihe Counter-Terrorism
unit
at FBI
Headquarters.
Manno said
that
while
the CIA liaison was
able
to
review
a
steady stream
of
intelligence
,
data flowing
intu
the
CIA,
the
1-TJI
did NOT have any stream of reporting that
wenj-ein'to
the
various
agencies.
^
,---''
..
*
 
s*
1
-'
Manno mentioned the ''splintering-' and "compartmentalizatiorT that
made
liaison with
the
FBI
problematic. The
FBI
liaison was not a
fulj,-i>nie
"billet
at first. The liaisonworked at FBI two or three times a week.
TChe-job
was
made
full
time
after
1996.
Asforthcliaisonwilh
the
State
Department,
DoS has
automatic
"slugging"
[^^^^^^^^^^J
which assured that reports with particular headings were sent
to
ACI.
Manno stressed that the liaisons were high
quality
personnel,
chin;
was the L,O,
with
CIA and was himself a
former
CIA
officer,
liaison to
CT
A leading up to and on
9-11}.
ho
ed as the
fuelling"
of
last
name)is the TSA
liaison
to CIA
today.
Manno
stressed there
were some
cases
where he's sure that
if the
h'AA
L.O.
was not
present
the
FAA
wouldn't
have
received the
information
il
needed
in
the
timely fashion.He cited the
Bojinka
case during which
the
L.O. atCIA/CTCwas able to
give
the
l-'AA
an early heads-up. This
informalion
allowed a
U.S.
carrier to take
extra precaution
at
the
airport in
Bangkok
whichscared off the
would-be
bomher.
Manno
saidhecommunicated withthe
L.O.'s
via.
a
STU
3
telephone.
During these
calls,.
1
they
would formulate questions
and
task
the CIA or FBI
In
do
particular follow-up,Manno
found the
CT
A
to
be
very
responsive.
Manno
indicated
that
AC!
had
been "pests;
for
information."
;9/11
'Classified
Information
/9/11
/Closed
byStatute
IITC
;
Manno
mentioned
theInteragcncy
Intelligence
Committee
on Terrorism
which
was
a;
forum
for
the
1C
and
non-TC
agencies
to
meet
and
share
information
and
assessments;
The
TITC
did
produce
written
threat
assessments.
Manno
mentioned
thai
the
IITC
hadbeen
folded
into
the
TTTC,
and
tl
CIA would
be
familiar
with
theirworkings.
tthc
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