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TSA(ACS-90)
493-5091
June
27,2002
Mohamed
Atta
Incident
at
Miami
International
Airport
(MIA)
..-;/''
*'
//
Working-level
,
/
Employee
Background:
• On
December
26,
2000,
a
Piper Cherokee
(PA-28151),
registration number N5
54HA,
was
abandoned
on the
ramp
leading
to the
taxiway
at MIA due to a
stalled
engine
that would
not
restart. This is a small, single engine four-seater aircraft, typically used for private pilot andinstrument rating training. The pilot made a telephone call from
the^
Fixed Based Operator
(FBO),
Signature Aircraft, to
Huffman
Aviation
(H32S).ahd
advised
that the
aircraft
was
inoperative.
Huffman
Aviation is a flight school based in Venice,
Florida
and was thecompany that rented the
aircraft
to the pilot. The pilot and
nils
passenger then rented a car
and
drove back
to
Venice.
The
aircraft
was
towed
to
Signature
and
later repaired.
• An
article
in the New
York Times dated October
17,2001,
reports that Mohamed Atta
wasthe
pilot that abandoned aircraft.
The .article
also reports that
a
Federal
Aviation
Official
placed anangry callonDecember27,2000,to
Huffman
Aviation requestingtheenginerecords on the aircraft. Research indicates that
ari
inspector from the Miami
FSDO-19
didcall
Huffman
Aviation and requested engine records for the aircraft. The Miami FSDO
inspector.1
Isaid thattocharacterizehiscallas an
"angry call"
wasincorrect.
He
simply called and requested the required records. The records were not sent due to thecompany having
the
wrong
fax number.,
• On
October
29,200
1
1
fof the
Tampa FSDO responded
to a
request
to do a
records check of this same Piper Cherokee
(N554HA).
He reported that the aircraft wasinvolved in a similar engine stoppage occurrence at the Venice, Florida airport onJune
12,
2001.
When attempts were made to restart the engine, a fire started and the
aircraft
sustained substantial damage.
Discussion:
• The MIA
FSDO
did not
receive
any
official
notification
from Air
Traffic
at the
time
of the
incident.
After
the October17,2001, New York Times article appeared, FAA SouthernRegion asked the MIA FSDO to look into the event. The FSDO contacted
Huffinan
Aviation. What they learned is that the
aircraft
was not on a taxiway but on an
apron/ramp
leading to a taxiway. In
Huffman's
opinion, the pilots had let the engine idle too long,
causing
it to run rough. The pilots had then shut the engine down at that location and went to
an
FBO to call
Huffman.
The pilots were told that
Huffman
personnel could not come to get
the
airplane right away, so the pilots
left
in a rental car.
Huffinan
personnel later retrievedthe
aircraft,
changedthespark plugs,andreturnedit toservice.At notime whileit was
parked
on the apron/ramp did the
aircraft interfere
withanymovementon theairport.
Q
C
• FAA
Flight Standards note: This type
of
incident occurs very
frequently
(probably daily)
at
many
airports
and is not
considered
a
significant event.
• The
event described
in the New
York Times article
and by the MIA
FSDO does
not
meet
the
definition
of an
accident
in
NTSB Part
830
(i.e.,
no
damage,
no
injuries); therefore,
no
immediate notification
was
necessary. Immediate notification
to the
NTSB
is
required
for an
accident
or the
following
incidents:
>
Flight control system
malfunction
>
Incapacitation
of
flight
crewmember
>
Failure
of
structural components
>
In-flight
fire
>
Mid-air collision
>
Damage
to
property other than
the
aircraft
>
For
large, multi-engine
aircraft
>
In-flight failure
of
electrical systems
>
In-flight failure
of
hydraulic systems
>
Sustained loss
of
power
in two or
more engines
>
Emergency evacuation
> An
overdue
aircraft
believed
to
have been involved
in an
accident
•
NTSB Part
830
defines
an
incident
as,
"...an
occurrence other than
an
accident, associatedwith
the
operation
of an aircraft,
which
affects
or
could
affect
the
safety
of
operations."
For
an
event
to
meet this definition,
the
Miami FSDO would have
had to
receive
an
official
notification
from Air
Traffic
either
by
telephone call
or by FAA
Form 8020-9.
No
such
notification
was
made.
If a
FSDO were
notified
of an
incident
by
receipt
of a FAA
Form 8020-9, they would open
an
investigation.
•
There
is no
NTSB record
of an
accident
for
that date
for
that location
•
There
is no
accident/incident
history
in
either
Atta's or al-Shehhi's
airmen
records,
suggesting that
the
December
26,2000,
event
was not
reported
as an
incident
•
FAA
Flight Standards notes:
>
Pilots
are
trained that
after
an
abnormal occurrence, i.e., engine failure
or
other engine
problem
on the
ground, they should exit
the
aircraft
and
remain clear
in
case
of fire.
Pilots
are
also taught
the
definition
of an
accident, which requires immediate notification.
The
pilot could determine that
the
incident
did not
qualify
as an
accident
and
then report
it
only
to the
aircraft
operator without being
in
violation
of any
regulations.
>
However, pilots
are
also taught that while
on an
airport with
an
operating control tower,
they
must communicate with
the
tower
at all
times.
If an
airplane
has a
problem
on a
towered
airport,
and the
airplane's radios
are not
working,
the
pilots should telephone
the
tower.
iWorking-level
Employee
Both Atta and al-Shehhi, as certificated pilots, could operate into towered airports
(i.is.,
nosuch restriction appearsontheir certificates),and the
.aircraft
must
have
beenequipped
for
two-way radio communications.Aflight school
.or
FBO
can setrestrictjbnsonpilots
from
operating
aircraft
into certain airports
for
any
number- of
reasons..
Softie
busy
j
airports can restrict student pilots from operating into their airspace, aiid they can requestthat
flight
schools limit low-timepilots
.from
doing
the
same. .However,,
if a
pilot
is j
appropriately certificated
and
current
and the
aircraft
is
properly equipped,
the
pilot
pan
operate into
an
airport with
an
operating control tower
after
receiving,clearance
front Air
Traffic
Control.
The
airport could
refuse
any
general aviation aircraft flying under visual
flight
rules (VFR)
on
thet>asis
of
workload,
but
there would be/ho
>vay
for the
controller
to
determine
a
pilqt's
flight
experience
and use
that
as a
basis
for
exclusion.
j
MIA
FSDQ
Inspector! Jsupervisor.l
I
advises that neither he
nori
I
Ifecall
how they learned of the December
26,2QQQ,
event or when
[
requestedthemaintenance recordson the
aircraft.
I
tsueeests
that therewas apossibilitythat
I
I
was
doing ramp .checks
and saw the
aircraft
parked
in an
unusual
spot and
asked about
it.
When
he was
told
the
situation,
he
might have contacted
Huffman
Aviation and
asked
for the
maintenance records.
• FAA
Flight Standards note: There
is a
tremendous amount
of
general aviation
traffic
in
Florida, and inspectors there conduct ramp checks on hundreds of aircraft a year.Accordingly,
it
would
be
very.difficult
for a
FSDO
Inspector
to
remember
a
ramp checkmonths
later
on a
specific
aircraft,
particularly one in which there was no accident or
violation
involved.•
After
the MIA FSDQ
requested,
but did not
receive,
the maintenance
records
on
aircraft
N554HAJ
Ifaelieves
that
he
andl
Iprobablv
came
to the
conclusion thatpersonnel
at
Huffman
simply incorrectly copied
the
FSDO's
fax
number. Since
Huffman
Aviation's
certificate
is the responsibility of the Tampa rather than MIA FSDO and
since
there was no accident or violation involved and no FAA Form 8020.9 from Air
Traffic
on the
event,
there
was no
further
follow
up by the MIA
FSDO.
•
Flight Standards note: This approach
by the MIA
FSDO
is not
unusual. Workloadconsiderations prevent
significant
attention to
what
are essentially low-impact events. Every
day
throughout the United States, a general aviation
aircraft
has trouble on an airport and is
parkedand
left
for a
flight
school
to
collect. There
was
nothing about this event
at the
time
that
would have
crossed
the threshold of concern by FAA inspectors.
Conclusion:
• The FAA has no
independent verification
that
Atta
and
Al-Shehhi were
the
pilots
for the
aircraft
involved in the December
26,2000,
event. The only information the FAA has isfrom
Huffman
Aviation who,
after
September
11,2001,
advised the MIA FSDO that theyrecognized
the
names
of
Atta
and
Al-Shehhi
as the two who had
left
this
aircraft
on the
apron
in
Miami.
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