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UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: August 28, 2006, 7:00 p.m.
Peter W. Galbraith,
The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created aWar Without End 
(New York, London, Toronto, & Sydney: Simon &Schuster, 2006).
“This is a book about the peoples of Iraq drawing on my personal experienceover twenty-five years” (246).Epigraphs: W. Somerset Maugham,“Death Speaks”; George W. Bush, “Bringthem on.” ([vii]).
Ch. 1: The Appointment in Samarra.
Feb. 22, 2006, bombing of Askariyashrine in Samarra set off outright Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq (1-3). Iraq’s“caretaker government” ineffectual (3).“In Iraq’s civil war, the United States is inthe middle” (3). U.S. denials of civil warare “wishful thinking” (4-5; this is theU.S.’s “main error” in Iraq [12]). The Iraqwar consolidated Kurdistan’s viritualindependence and thus righted anhistoric wrong (5-6). Iran is the strategicwinner of the war (6-7). Lack of planningand mismanagement marked the war’saftermath (7-8). U.S. has failed to meetits goals; the war is “a major strategicsetback” (9-11). Dismisses question of whether the U.S. should have gone towar as not very relevant now (12).
Ch. 2: Appeasement.
The U.S.courted Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war (13-20). Author’s reminiscencesof work in Iraq in 1984 as member of 5-man staff delegation from the SenateForeign Relations Committee (20-22).
Ch. 3: He Gassed His Own People.
U.S. tilts to Iran in 1985, then Iraq in1987 (24-26). Galbraith visited Kurdistanin Sept. 1987, and unwittingly witnessedSaddam’s “
 Anfal
, the military campaignto destroy rural life in Iraqi Kurdistan,”which eradicated several cities and 4,000of 4,500 villages (26-7). The gassing of Halabja (28). End of Iran-Iraq war (29).In fall 1988, Galbraith gets Sen. Pell’ssupport, writes the Prevenvion of Genocide Act of 1988 in an hour (passedthe next day), then goes to eastern Turkey to find evidence to bolster thebill’s chances in the House and keepReagan from vetoing (29-33). Butbusiness pressure killed the bill in theHouse (33-35).
Ch. 4: The Uprising.
Iraq invadesKuwait in 1990 (36-39). Galbraithcoordinated Jalal Talabani’s Aug. 1990visit to Washington lobbying for theKurds, but a contretemps results in a “no-contacts policy with regard to the Iraqiopposition” (40-41). The Gulf War (41-43). Bush’s ad lib statementencouraging uprising (43-45). Galbraithwas courting Kurds (and vice versa)during the war, but the U.S. State Deptgave them the cold shoulder (45-46).Saddam killed “as many as 300,000Shiites” in the period Mar.-Sept. 1991 insuppressing the post-war revolt” (46-49).Galbraith played an important role ingetting out news of Iraq’s attack on Kurdsin Mar. 1991, which led to theestablishment of the no-fly zone (49-56).Discussion of U.S. policy, dictated bygeopolitical considerations (57-60). InSept. 1991, Talabani confers on Galbraitha trove of Iraqi documents seized bypeshmerga in local offices of Iraqigovernment and Ba’ath Party offices,which end up in National Archives as“legislataive files of the [Senate] ForeignRelations Committee” (60-66). Galbraithdisengaged from Iraq in 1993-2001because of diplomatic assignments(Croatia and East Timor) (67). “[T]heClinton Administration containmentpolicy served the United States well”(68). But not Iraqis (68-69).
 
Ch. 5: Arrogance and Ignorance.
George W. Bush’s Jan. 29, 2002, “axis of evil” speech showed an inability to thinkstrategically (70-74). It ended U.S.-Irancooperation (74-76). It weakenedinternational non-proliferation efforts (76-79). It weakened the war on terror (79-81). The U.S. did not seriously work toadvance democracy in Iraq (81-83).Americans evinced a “culture of arrogance” but defends Ahmad Chalabiat some length (“I count myself as one of his friends” [85]) (83-89). Examples of arrogance and ignorance (89-98). Belief that Iraqis desire the unity of Iraq is theBush administration’s “most durablepreconception” (98-101).
Ch. 6: Aftermath.
Failure to securedeadly materials in April 2003 (102-05).Failure to foresee and stop the looting of Baghdad, which the author witnessed(105-13).
Ch. 7: Can’t Provide Anything.
Garner: well-meaning but incompetent(114-17). Bremer replaces him; his lackof preparation (117-19). Bremer’s de-Baathification order and disbanding of the army (119-22). His failed politicalmaneuvering (123-25). His neoliberaleconomic plan (125-32). U.S. planningfor an “Iraqi” army suffered from aconceptual flaw: none of Iraq’scommunities were committed to thenational command authority, or wantedto support an American occupation army(132-36).Bremer used the TransitionalAdministrative Law (TAL) to preempt theelected constitutional assembly uponwhich Sistani insisted (136-46).
Ch. 8: Kurdistan.
Nixon & Kissinger’sabandonment of the Kurds in Mar. 1975(147-48). 30m Kurds: the world’s mostnumerous stateless people (148-49).Losers in the post-WWI settlements (149-51). Kurdish history from WWI to 1980;Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)founded in 1946 by Mullh MustafaBarzani; Jalal Talabani broke away andfounded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan(PUK) in 1975 (151-53). Iraqi Kurds up to1991 (153-54). Galbraith keeps PUK-KDPrivalry (each has its own “primeminister”) and conflict from costing IraqiKurds U.S. support (155-56). Progressunder U.S.-U.K. protection (157). StrongU.S. allies in the Iraq war (157-58). “TheIraq War produced the best possibleoutcome for the Kurds” (158). Galbraith,discussing future with Kurds (MassoudBarzani and Jalal Talabani, but especially,on strategy, with Barham Salih andNechirvan Barzani), advocates Kurdishconstitution with a claim to sovereignty,not a demand for autonomy, as lessdestabilizing than maintaining Iraq’sunity (158-62). Because this is stronglyat variance from U.S. policy, Galbraithends 24-year career with federalgovernment in Oct. 2003 (162).Galbraith advised Kurds in theirnegotiations with Americans, before andafter the Feb. 1, 2004 bombing in Erbilkilled 101, including the chief KDPnegotiator (164-68). In the constitutionadopted in the Oct. 2005 referendum,the Kurdistan Region is recognized asIraq’s first federal region, Kurdistancontrols future oilfields and sharesexisting ones, and defers to the centralgovernment in only a few areas (168-69).Bremer’s ineptitude led Kurds to getmore independence than they wouldhave otherwise (170). Galbraithsuggesed the unofficial referendum thattook place alongside the Jan. 2005elections, in which 98% supportedindependence (170-71).
Ch. 9: Civil War.
While Iraqi Shiitesdefine themselves politically by religionand regard Iran as a friend; thepredominance of these notions isunacceptable to “almost all” Sunnis (172-74). Civil war probably began in late2003 or early 2004; “[c]ertainly the civilwar was well under way by the middle of 2004”; the war is being fought in areaswhere “Iraq’s three communities mix”—
 
Babil Governorate, south of Baghdad;Diyala Governorate, east of Baghdad;Nineveh (Mosul); Kirkuk; and Baghdad(175-78). Sunni insurgency’s “Baathistand al-Qaeda wings” analyzed (178-82).“The Kurds have largely been on thesidelines” (182). Tensions in Mosul (182-83). It is remarkable the Kirkuk has notyet “exploded” (183-85). Kurds see civilwar as advancing the cause of theirindependence (185-86). Bush’s “As theIraqis stand up, we will stand down”strategy is not credible (186-87). The2005 provisional government resultedfrom a Shiite-Kurdish coalition (187-90).“The Americans were still thinking interms of Iraqis [in July 2005]. OfficialWashington was clueless as to how littlethe Kurds, the Shiites, and the SunniArabs had in common” (190).
Ch. 10: The Three State Solution.
 The Iraqi constitution was ineptlybrokered by Khalilzad between Shiitesand Kurds; respecting the Aug. 2005deadline trumped substantive issues(191-200). “Kurdistan left Iraq in 1991,and is not coming back” (200). Theconstitution’s “great virtues” are that itpermits Shiites & Sunni Arabs to “formtheir own institutions of self-government,” and offers a formula toresolve contentious issues (200-01).Especially: Kirkuk (201-02), oil revenues(202-03), and the central government(203). But the problem of Baghdad isunresolved (203). The Oct. 15, 2005,referendum: “each of three purelyKurdish governorates approved theconstitution with 99 percent voting yes. The yeas vote in the nine southern Shiitegovernorates ranged from 95-98 percent.By contrast, the overwhelmingly SunniArab Salahaddin Governorate voted 81percent against and the entirely SunniArab Anbar Province voted 97 percentagainst. The constitution was approvedbecause the Sunni Arab majority inNineveh Province (which includes Mosul)is only about 60 percent. Ninevehrejected the constitution with a 54percent no vote, less than the two-thirdsneeded for the Sunni Arabs to defeat theconstitution altogether. In the DecemberCouncil of Representative election, fewerthan 2 percent of Iraq’s Kurds voted fornon-Kurdish parties while fewer than 15percent of Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites votedfor nonsectarian parties” (204). A three-state solution is possible under theconstitution, and may be the last chanceto hold Iraq together (not that thedisapperance of Iraq would be somethingto mourn: “If the price of a unified Iraq isanother dictatorship, that is too high aprice to pay” (205-07).
Ch. 11: How to Get Out of Iraq.
Rumsfeld is wrong: the Baathists haveno chance of returning to power in Iraq(206-07). “There is no good solution tothe mess in Iraq. The country has brokenup and is in the throes of civil war. TheUnited States cannot put the countryback together and it cannot stop the civilwar” (209). Better to focus on “Iran’sdrive for nuclear weapons” and al-Qaedathan on trying to save Iraq (209). Howthe so-called “national unitygovernment” was formed (209-12). Itholds sway in no part of Iraq (212-13).U.S. needs a reality-based strategy inIraq (214). Kurdistan should bestrengthened; U.S. has a “moral debt” tothe Kurds (215-16). Turkey’s oppositionto Kurdish independence has lessened(216-18). Iran opposes a separateKurdistan, but its focus is on exploitingthe opportunities for Shiite nationalismthe Iraq war has created (218-19). TheU.S. could have “good relations with asouthern Iraqi Shiite theocracy” butwithdrawal of troops is needed (and isalso needed to be able to confront Iran’snuclear program) (220). Disengagingfrom Sunni Arab governorates in Iraq willbe difficult (220-21). Accepting partitionis the best approach for the U.S., thoughit does not resolve the problem of Baghdad and mixed regions, which is “atragedy,” but “there is no good solution”(222-24). “No purpose is served by a
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