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UNCLASSIFIED
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
TEAM
7
DRAFT MONOGRAPHonCIVIL AVIATION
AND
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Sam
Brinkley
William
Johnstone
John Raidt
 
Q
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CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY: PRELUDETO
9-11
ExecutiveSummary
The story of how terrorists on September 11, 2001 were able to hijack
four
U.S. civilian
jetliners
and use
them
as
weapons
of
mass destruction
against
the
American homelandbegins with fundamental questions about
the
status
of the
civil aviation security systemthat
was
supposed
to
stop them.
How did the
U.S. civil aviation security system evolve
to
achieve
its
status
as of
September
11,2001?
Who was
responsible
for
setting, implementing
and
enforcing aviation securitypolicies and procedures?
What
did
civil aviation authorities perceive
to be the
security threat
to
commercialaviation, its vulnerabilities to terrorism and the consequences of a successfulattack? And what did they do about it?
Precisely what security measures were
the
hijackers required
to
defeat
in
order
to
execute their crime on September 11,2001?
Pivotal
Incidentsand
Aviation
Security
From
the
inception
of the
U.S.
civil aviation system
in the
1920's
up to the
modern era,
two
forms
of
attack
against
U.S.
commercial aircraft have remained
the
most urgent
and
consequential
air
piracy, most commonly referred
to as
hijacking,
and
sabotage,primarily in the
form
of bombing.Thenational systemforprotecting passengers,
aircraft
andairports
from
attackwasneither created
nor
developed
by
policy
makers
in
anticipation
ofcriminaland
terrorist
intentions,
but
rather
in
reaction
to
major
incidents—a
phenomenon observed
by
numerous public aviation commissions
and
commentators over
the
past
25
years.
As
threats manifested
themselves
through successful
attacks,
including
headline,
watersheddisasters,
new
defensive measures
and
approaches were implemented
by
policy makersseeking
to
solve
the
prevailing
"security
problem"
of the time.
• The
1955 bombing
of a
United
flight for the
purpose
of
insurance
fraud
The
sabotage
of
this flight
after
take-off
from
Denver,
Colorado,
killing
44,
gave
rise to
limits
on the
value
of
passenger insurance policies.
The
attack
was
followed three yearslater
by the
hijacking
of a
Cuban
airliner
en
route
from
Havana
to
Miami
1
and a
series
of
midair
collisions."
2
These incidents together with "the approaching introduction of
jet
airliners spurred Congress
to
create
an
independent Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA),
extending
the agency power to oversee
both
the
"safety
and
security"
of
civilianaviation, as well as to
"promote"
the aviation industry.
3
Li
these
early years, the primary
focus
of air commerce regulators was on issues of "operational safety," while the thrustDRAFT FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY DRAFT
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of
security policy
was on
enforcing
generally applicable
statutes against
fraud, theft
and
assault.
• The
rash
of
aircraft hijackings
to
Cuba between 1968
and
1972Theindustry'sage ofrelative innocencewasshatteredby anepidemicofhijackingbetween 1968 and 1972. Congress responded by passing
major
new aviation securitylaws, the centerpiece of which was a requirement that air carriers submit their passengers
to
pre-boardingcheckpoint screening
in
order
to
enforce
prohibitions
on the
possession
of
"deadly weapons, explosives and incendiaries" aboard commercial
aircraft.
The new
bodyof law
created
a
federal
regulatory
system
in
which
the FAA was
responsible
for
establishing
and
enforcing
security policies
and
standards, while commercial
air
carriers
and
airports were responsible
for
carrying them out. During this period political
and
religious
conflict
in the
Middle East created
a
breeding ground
for
terrorist activity, some
of
whichin theyearstofollowwasaimedat theUnited States overitspoliciesin theregion.
• The
1988 downing
of Pan Am 103 by a
terrorist
bomb
The Pan Am
103
disaster
shifted
the
security
focus
from
hijacking
to the
sabotage threatas authorities endeavored to develop the technological means to detect improvisedexplosive devices
(lED'S).
Laws passedinresponseto theincident creatednewpositions within the FAA to oversee security, and required the FBI and FAA to
formally
assess the contemporary aviation threat posed by rogue states and terrorist movements,and to evaluate systemic vulnerabilities to their tactics.
• Thedestructionof TWA 800
over
the
Atlantic
Oceanin
1996This tragedy reinforced aircraft sabotage as the
major
security concern, as
hijacking
wasperceivedto be incheck.Theheightened concern over bombs, prompteda
major
pushtoincrease the screening of checked baggage for explosives
(even
though the federalinvestigation intothe
disaster
eventually concluded thatthecauseof thecrashwas not an
explosive).
The
incident occurred
at a
time when both
the
domestic aviation securitysystemand
U.S.
national security complexatlarge perceiveda risingthreatfrom theproliferationof highly capable terrorist groups willing to target and maximize casualtiesamong civilian populations in pursuit of extreme political or
religious
aims—a trendillustratedby the 1993bombingof theWorld Trade Center,the
1997
bombingof the
Federal
building in Oklahoma City, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Africa
and the
foiled
1995
Bojinka
plot
by
Ramzi Yousef,
an
Al
Qaeda
affiliate,
to
destroy
12
U.S. airliners simultaneously through coordinatedbombings.
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