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FOROFFICIALUSEONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVE
NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON
TERRORIST
ATTACKSUPON
THE
UNITED STATES
TEAM #7 WORKPLAN
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
AND
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Team
Members:
Sam
Brinkley
William
Johnstone
John Raidt
Item
1 Key Questions of the Investigation
Item
2 Suggested Readings and
BriefingsItem
3 Document RequestsItem
4
Interview Candidates
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY «COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 
FOR
OFFICIAL
USE ONLYCOMMISSION
SENSITIVE
TEAM
#7
Item
1:
Key
Questions
1.
Prior to September
11, 2001,
what did the U.S. aviation security system know
about
terrorist threats
to
civil aviation?
How did the
different
elements
of thesystem
respond
to any
such information
in
their possession?
2.
What aviation security policies
and
procedures were
in
effect
as of
September
11,2001? How did
these measures comply with relevant laws
and
regulations?
What
wasknownof the
effectiveness
ofthis system,and how wasthis measured?
3.
What tactics
and
weapons
did the
9/11 hijackers
use to
defeat
the
aviation securitysystem and procedures in place on September
11,
2001?
What was the cause of
the
security failure
or
failures
on
that date:
flaws
in the
design
of the
procedures;
in the
transmittal (includingdissemination
and
training);
in the
implementation;some combination;
or
some other
factor
or
factors?4. What were the
major
policy and budgetary priorities for civil aviation securityprior
to
9/11/01?
How was
security
prioritized
among other
aviation
policyconsiderations? Whatriskmanagement techniques were usedinmaking aviation
security
determinations?
How did the
financing
of the
aviation security systemimpact that system?
5.
What
has
changed with respect
to
civil aviation security policies
and
procedures
since
9/11/01?
What
further
improvements
are
needed (including consideration
of
arming commercial aviation
and
other pilots; "trusted
traveler"
and
"trusted
shipper"
programs; CAPPS
II and
other individual profiling
systems;
backgroundchecks
on
transportation employees; missile defense
for
civilian aircraft;
and
regulation
of
flight
schools)?
6.
Considering
all
transportation
modes,
what
risk
management
process(or
processes)is (orare) utilizedby
federal
agenciesindeterminingthepriorityof
security
vulnerabilities
and the
allocation
of
resources? What
are the
currenttransportation security budget
and
policy priorities,
and how
does this comparewith
the
results
of the risk
management
process?
What should
be the
priorities
across all transportation modes?
FOR
OFFICIAL
USE
ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVE
 
FOR
OFFICIAL
USE
ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVE
TEAM
#7
Item2:
Suggested Readings
and
Briefings
Congressional Research Service,
Terrorism
Briefing
Book Summary
on
"Aviation
Security."
March 2003,7pages.General Accounting
Office,
testimony
before
Senate Committee
on
Commerce, Science
r,
^JL
and
Transportation,
"Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and
Long-
V^
Term
Challenges,
"
July
25,
2002,
28
pages.
National
Academy
of
Sciences,
Making
the
Nation
Safer:
The
Role
of
Science
and
Technology
in Countering Terrorism.
June 2002.
See
especially, "Chapter
7:
Transportation
Systems,"
(pp. 210-237).Senate Committee
on
Governmental
Affairs
Hearing
on
"WeakLinks: How Should the
Federal
Government Manage Airline Passenger and Baggage
Screening?"
September
25,
2001, 165 pages. See especially prepared testimony of FAA (pp. 65-73); DOTInspector General (pp. 74-86);
GAO
(pp. 87-104); Robert Baker, American Airlines (pp.105-108); Paul Busick (pp.
109-114);
and
Leonard
Griggs,
Director
of
Airports
for St.Louis
(pp. 115-124).Timeline
for
9/11/01
hijackers prepared
by
Miles Kara. (For more details
see
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/
which includes hyperlinks
to
relevant media
accounts).
Final Report of White House Commission on Aviation
Safety
and Security
("Gore
Commission"),
1997.
See especially "Chapter Three: Improving Security for
Travelers"
and
"Appendix I: Commissioner
Cummock
Dissent
Letter."
Also, DOT Status Report on
White
House Commission on Aviation
Safety
and Security ("One Year
Later"),
February
1998,
11
pages.
BRIEFERS FOR
COMMISSIONERS
Secretary Norman Mineta, DOT (public briefing)Admiral James Loy, TSA (public briefing)Kenneth Mead,
DOT
Inspector General
(public
briefing)
Ray
Kelly, Customs ServiceandGore Commission member (publicorprivate briefing)
Gerald
Dillingham, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues (public or private
briefing)
Robert
Baker, American Airlines and Mineta Task Force member (public or private
briefing)
Carol
Hallett,
former
President,
ATA
(public
or
private briefing)
Stephen Flynn,
Project Director
forHart-RudmanII
(2002) (public
or
private briefing)
FOR
OFFICIAL
USE
ONLY
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
of 00

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