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(|IS
 
Statement
of
Cathal
L. Flynn
Hearing on
Borders, Transportation, and Managing Risk
of the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks UpontheUnited
States.
Fifth
Panel, Aviation Securityon
9/11:
TheRegulators.January
27,
2004(Submitted January
16,
2004)
The
panel
is
asked
to
focus
on two
topics:• The
development
of the
civil aviation system that existed
on
September
11,2001.
•
Assessment
of the
performance
of the
civil aviation security systemon September
11,
2001,
and in the immediate aftermath.Having been the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Federal AviationAdministration,
from
1993 to
2000,1
canwrite knowledgeably aboutthe
first
topic.Mythoughts
on the
second topic, based
on
news coverage
of the
events
and
publishedcommentary, are necessarily speculative.Last September
9,1
had a
long interview with Commission staff members,
in
which
we
discussed these
topics
in
detail.
The
Commission having
a
record
of
that
interview, thisstatement
can be
briefer
than
it
otherwise might need
to be.
The Statement
of Ms.
Jane Garvey,
former
Administrator
of the
FAA,
to the
Commissionon
May 22,
2003,
summarized
the
development
of the
national aviation security program
from
its beginning. In his statement to the Commission on May 23, 2003, Major General
O.
K. Steele, my immediate predecessor as Assistant Administrator for Civil AviationSecurity, described
the
events
and
accomplishments
of his
time
in the
job, 1990
to
1993,particularly
the
FAA's
implementation
of the
Aviation Security Improvement
Act of
1990
and the
recommendations
of the
President's
Commission
on
Aviation Security
and
Terrorism (the
Pan Am
103Commission)
of
that year.
I
will
try to
avoid repeating theseexcellent summaries.
I
will instead emphasize developments
in the
period
from
1993
to
2000,
and
then give
my
assessment
of the
security system's performance
on and
immediatelyfollowing September11, 2001.To begin, I wish to say that I had the steady and
effective
support of the FAAAdministrators,
the
Secretaries
of
Transportation,
and the
Directors
of
TransportationIntelligence andSecuritywhoheld
office
duringmytimeat theFAA. Also during thattime,I was privileged to work with the members of the FAA security service,professionals
who
daily exhibited
a
high order
of
competence, dedication,
and
determination
to do
right.
 
United States aviation security was implemented in a regulatory framework. FederalAviation Regulations (FAR) Parts
107,108,109,
and129, whicharepublic documents,respectively appliedtoairports,aircarriers, indirectaircarriers
(freight
forwarders),and
foreign
air carriers. Detailed implementing requirements were imposed on the regulatedentities by restricted program documents: Airport Security Programs, Air CarrierStandard Security Program, IndirectAirCarrier Standard Security Program,andModelSecurityProgram (for foreign air carriers
flying
to the United States).
Any
substantial permanent additionto theregulationshad to bebrought aboutby acumbersome and time-consuming process of public rule making. Consequently, muchreliance was placed on the Administrator's emergency authority, which permitted theimposition of additional or more stringent measures by means of security directives and
emergency
program amendment documents,
often effective
immediately
on
receipt
bythe
regulated entities.
From
1993 to 2000, aviation security was implemented in an environment shaped by
several
developmentsand
events:
memoryof the Pan Am 103catastropheandnationaldetermination that nothing like it should happen again; the World Trade Center bombing
of
February 1993 and the discovery, in the post-bombing investigations, of previously un-noticed groups within
the
United States that
at
least seemed
to be
connected with MiddleEastern terrorist organizations;
the
"Manila
Conspiracy", also called
the
"Bojinka
Plot",
that aimed in early 1995 to destroy as many as twelve U.S. airliners nearlysimultaneously as they
flew from
airports in
East
Asia; growing awareness of the
al
Qaeda terrorist organization; and the crash of TWA
flight
800 on July
17,
1996,
which
initially
appeared to have been caused by an on-board bomb and thus raised nationalawareness
of a
possible terrorist threat
to
aviation within
the
United States.The investigations stemming
from
the World Trade Center attack did not reveal terroristplans or intentions to attack civil aviation in the United States. Nevertheless, because itwasbelieved that Middle East-connected terrorists might well have
a
propensity
to
attackaviation, additional security measures were imposed by security directives and programamendments, at
first
only for a time around salient events such as the sentencing of
World
Trade Center terrorists. Later in 1995, the measures were re-implemented withsome changes,
and
kept
in
effect.
_
The
Manila Conspiracy dramatically demonstrated that
the
terrorist organization that later
fj
fc
came
to be
known
as al
Qaeda
had
global reach, determination
to
commit mass murder
*
* andinflict
enormous economic damage, willingness
to
plan
and
rehearse attacks patiently
^
jV,L
over
a
period
of
months, technical ingenuity
in
bomb making,
and
adequate
financial
'
backing.
Its
defeat
also showed that U.S. government agencies directed
by the
National
«
Security Council
staff,
agencies
of
many other governments, airport authorities,
air
'
carriers
and
indirect
air
carriers
had
learned
how to
cooperate
effectively
in
circumstancesofhigh threatandtension.The
FAA's
role beganbyinvestigatingthe
bombing
of Philippine Airlines Flight 434 on December
11,
1994, which was Ramzi
Yousef
s dress rehearsal for his intended bombing of U.S. airliners.
That
investigation
of 00

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