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Cooper/Fechtel: CTR 1AC 
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CTR 1AC
 Hillary Cooper and John Fechtel 
After the catastrophic events of September 11
th
, the 9/11 Commission was formed to determine how our negligence allowed such a heinous act of terrorism on our soil. One of the Commission’s recommendations for the future started with a grim warning: “The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United Stateswill materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.” One of the United States’ largest and closest allies, India, has a large nuclear arsenal, but its nuclear weapons andmaterials are not secure from theft by terrorists. Because United States policy toward India does nothing tocounter this global threat, my partner Hillary and I are convinced that
the United States Federal Government  should significantly change its policy toward India.
Definitions of key terms in the resolution will beoperationally defined by the way they are used in the case.I’d first like to show you why our policy toward India fails to address the grave— 
Observation 1: Harm: A high threat of nuclear terrorism in India
India is a state with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. Keeping nuclear weapons safe and secure fromtheft is extremely important in the fight to stop terrorism. One would think that India, a large and powerfulcountry, would have secured its many nuclear weapons carefully. But— 
A. India’s nuclear security is insufficient
According to
Matthew Bunn, a Professor at Harvard,
in
November 2008
,
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“Indian experts report that India does perform systematic vulnerability assessments in designing physical protection systems for nuclear facilities and does use some modern security technologies, including accesscontrols and various types of intrusion detectors.
Resources available for physical protection appear to be limited,
however,
and in some cases physical protection systems are aging and have some important weaknesses.”
The
Stimson Center
reported in
2004
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 that in the past few years, twenty-five cases of lost and stolenradioactive materials have occurred within India. Most of these were never recovered, leaving radioactivematerial still unaccounted for in India.
B. Terrorists want nuclear weapons
It’s clear that to terrorists, nuclear weapons are a prime target. Consider this report from the
Journal onScience and World Affairs
in
2006
3
:
“The probability of a nuclear terrorist attack has increased in the aftermath of 9/11. Security experts agreethat although unlikely, a nuclear terrorist attack is possible.
Several episodes in the contemporary history of nuclear proliferationunveil 
 , in particular,
al-Qaeda’s clandestine efforts to get the bomb.
 As early as December 1998, Bin Laden showed great desires to acquirenuclear weapons for the mass killing of so-called ‘infidels’. Bin Laden believes, it is said, that it is a religious duty to possess nuclear weapons and that were he not to follow this duty, he would be committing a sin [17]. Bin Laden tried to acquire nuclear materials as far back as in 1992 when he sought to forge relations with South Africa. Bin Laden was also alleged to have sought a deal with Chechen rebels in Russia to buy a nuclear war head [18]. The fact that, until now, Bin Laden’s network has not recurred to a nuclear attack does not mean that such attack will not occur.
 Evidence shows that there is an important probability of a large-scale terrorist attack involving the use of nuclear weapons.”
Writing specifically about India, the
Journal of Physical Security
said in
2004
4
:
“Given the widespread evidence of Islamic extremists in South Asia, the cause for concern is strong. Immediately after the September 11 attacks,
Sheikh Jamilur Rehman, leader of the Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen,
[the leader of a jihadist group within India] explicitly
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Matthew Bunn [Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, previously served as an adviser to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, where he played a major role in U.S. policies related to the control and disposition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the United States and the former Soviet Union, and directed a secret study for President Clinton on security for nuclear materials in Russia. winner of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for “outstanding contributions in helping to formulate policies to decrease the risks of theft of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials,” and the Federation of American Scientists’ Hans Bethe Award for “science in service to a more secure world,” and is an elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. holds doctorate in technology, management, and policy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology] November 2008, “Securing The Bomb2008,” PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, HARVARDUNIVERSITY, COMMISSIONED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/e_research/Securing_the_bomb08.pdf LPN 
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 Kishore Kuchibhotla, Matthew McKinzie, “Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Accidents in South Asia,” Henry L. Stimson Center, January 2004,http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/reducingnukes-section5.pdf  (“...India has reported several cases of stolen, and lost sources over the last few years. There havebeen twenty-five reported cases of missing radioactive materials. Of these, thirteen have never been recovered and 52 percent have occurred by theft.”)
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Sarah Bokhari [Centennial College, Toronto] “The United States dealings with nuclear terrorism: cooperation from prevention,” Journal on Science and World  Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006 29-41, http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol2No1_Bokhari.pdf   JF 
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The Journal of Physical Security, 2004, Rajesh M. Basrur [Director, Centre for Global Studies], & Friedrich Steinhäusler [Professor, Institute of Physics and  Biophysics University of Salzburg] “NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREATS FOR INDIA: RISK POTENTIAL AND COUNTERMEASURES,” Iss.1, Vol. 1, http://jps.lanl.gov/vol1_iss1/3-Threats_for_India.pdf LPN 
 
 
Cooper/Fechtel: CTR 1AC 
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threatened to target Indian nuclear facilities
(Pandit, 2001).
 
While this may have been mere rhetoric, there is a real fear arising from Al Qaeda’sknown interest in acquiring nuclear capability.
 
Qualified personnel are also available in the region. At least two Pakistani nuclear scientists were approached byOsama bin Laden for help in making a bomb (Albright, 2002). While none of this is strong evidence of the advent of nuclear terrorism to South Asia, it does paint adisturbing picture of a potential threat that cannot be ignored.
After September 11, 2001, the realm of the possible has been greatlyexpanded.
Why are Hillary and I so concerned about the possibility that terrorists could use
nuclear 
weapons? It is because nuclear terrorism would be far more devastating than even September 11
th
. We hear about terrorismevery day. The most deadly manifestation of a terror threat would occur if a terrorist organization was able to gonuclear.
C/Impact: Nuclear attacks are deadlyMatthew Bunn
from
Harvard
said in
2003
5
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“If detonated in a major city, a terrorist nuclear bombcould wreak almost unimaginable carnage. A
10-kiloton
bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economicdamage. America and its way of life would be changed forever." 
Observation 2: Plan
It’s apparent that nuclear terrorism is a serious problem that threatens the world with nuclear disaster. Tocounter this threat, we propose the following plan. Our— 
Mandates— 1. Establish Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, with the Republic of India.
The United States Federal Government shall make Materials & Weapons Protection, Control, and Accountingsecurity equipment and technology available to the Indian government. Materials Protection, Control, andAccounting can be outlined as follows:
Materials Protection
is directed at keeping thieves out of a facility;
it is aimed primarily at facility outsiders. (It might also beused against facility insiders attempting to break into a part of the facility that they are not authorized to enter.)
Material Control is
,
in contrast, fundamentally
directed at keeping material inside a facility;
its job is primarily to prevent theft by facility insiders. To be sure, no bright line divides physical protection and materials control – for example, the same guards might keep thieves out of a facility(physical protection) and keep insiders trying to smuggle nuclear material from leaving the facility (materials control). In contrast to these prongs,
Materials Accounting
 
does not involve actively and directly controlling nuclear materials. Instead it
is used to observe the state of materials stocks in order to determine if materials have been removed without authorization.
To be useful, it must be totrigger further actions – “follow-up investigations of irregularities” and, if those confirm that materials have been stolen, pursuit of thieves. Those follow-up actions falloutside the scope of MPC&A."
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2. Exceptions to the CTR Program
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting shall forego(1) any weapon upgrades that exceed legitimate security requirements(2) the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction(3) the elimination of current weapons of mass destruction
Agency and Enforcement— 
Any necessary federal agency.
Funding— 
 Normal means.
Addendum— 
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MATTHEW BUNN [Senior Research Associate of the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government], ANTHONY WIER, JOHN P. HOLDREN “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, A Report Card and  Action Plan” PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, COMMISSIONED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, MARCH 2003, www.nti.org/cnwm STM 
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Michael Levi, PhD [Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations; expertise in WMDs, arms control and proliferation, technology and  foreign policy, science and technology in the Islamic world, and other energy issues; PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, where he was the Social Scienceand Humanities Research Council of Canada William E Taylor fellow], On Nuclear Terrorism [book published by Harvard University press], Ch 2: Security at theSource, pg. 17, © 2007 
 
 
Cooper/Fechtel: CTR 1AC 
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This plan takes effect immediately upon passage. The affirmative claims the right to clarify this plan during theround. 
Observation 3. Solvency
How will the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program work? In other words, how will this plan
 solve
for the threat of nuclear terror?
1. CTR worked in Russia
The CTR program was first implemented in Russia shortly following the end of the Cold War and thecollapse of the Soviet Union.
Maryann Love, Ph.D
, said in
2007
7
:
“Over 75 percent of Russian nuclear  warhead sites have been secured to date, and 160 buildings housing hundreds of tons of nuclear materials havebeen secured.
Cold war biological and chemical weapons production facilities in Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been safely dismantled.”
 It is clear that CTR, while not yet complete in Russia, has secured most of Russia’s weaponssuccessfully.
2. CTR recommended for India
What are CTR’s potential applications in India?
Matthew Bunn
said in
2002
8
:
“The MPC&A program itself is now seeking to expand beyond the former Soviet Union, to provide help with needed security and accounting upgrades in other countries
. Senior [CTR] program officials have publicly identified Pakistan, India, and China as countries that they would like to cooperate with in upgrading security and accounting for nuclear material  ,
[1] and have had discussions with the IAEA about cooperating more broadly in the implementation of the IAEA's Action Plan to combat nuclear terrorism (discussed below).”
3. India is willing to establish CTR 
Furthermore, India is expected to agree to nuclear security cooperation, as indicated by
StephenBurgess, Ph.D
., in
2004
9
: 
“When it comes to bilateral US-India agreements, nuclear 
and missile
 
 safety issues may see some movement. The US Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission have visited India,and there could be cooperative threat reduction efforts.
 India cannot agree to anything that hampers its nuclear weapons and missile programs and has not signed any treaties prohibiting such. However,
 India is willing to work on nuclear safety and mutual cooperation
and collaboration regarding safety as
 
a precursor to more cooperation in the future.”
The CTR program is a time-tested, effective bilateral policy that will benefit security from a nuclear attack.
Observation 5: Advantage: Greater nuclear security
 Now that we have seen how there is a great need for the Cooperative Threat Reduction plan and howthis program would work in India, what benefits would this policy have? The advantage to the affirmative planis greater nuclear security, which we can see by examining the benefits for the United States, India, and theworld at large.
1. Greater security for the US
First, it is in US security interests to expand CTR. As Joseph Benkert, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Department of Defense said in 2008
10
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“Mr. Chairman, the committee is well acquainted with the history and activities of the CTR Program.
The national security of the United States has been enhanced by the [CTR] Program`s efforts over the years to
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Maryann Cusimano Love, PhD [professor of international relations at The Catholic University of America and the Pentagon, where she teaches graduate and undergrad courses in globalization, terrorism, security, non-state actors, ethics, and US foreign policy; author of the books Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global  Agenda and Morality Matters: Ethics and the War on Terrorism; advisor to the US, Canadian, and Caribbean govts and private sector leaders since 1998 as part of CFR; PhD in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University], “A Postwar Program That Worked: Can this success story be repeated?”, America [ ], Vol. 197  Issue 8, p9, Sept 24, 2007, accessed via Galileo, AMH 
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Matthew Bunn [Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His current research interests include nuclear theft and terrorism; nuclear proliferation and measures to control it; and the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle. He is the winner of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for “outstanding contributions in helping to formulate policies to decrease the risks of theft of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials” and the Federation of American Scientists’ Hans Bethe Award for “science in service to a more secure world,” and is an elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Before coming to Harvard, Bunn served as an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as a study director at the National Academy of Sciences, and as editor of Arms Control Today], October 29, 2002, “Securing Nuclear Warheads and MaterialsInternational  Nuclear Material Security Upgrades,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University,http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/secure.asp LPN 
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Stephen F. Burgess, Ph.D [Deputy Chair and Professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security, US Air War College and an Associate of the U.S. Air  Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC)], “India’s Emerging Security Strategy, Missile Defense, and Arms Control,” USAF Institute for National Security Studies, INSS Occasional Paper 54, June 2004, http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/OCP54.pdf   JF 
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 Joseph A Benkert [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Dept of Defense], “FISCAL 2009 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION: NONPROLIFERATION  PROGRAMS”, FDCH Congressional Testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2008, accession number: 32Y4040064223, accessed viaGalileo, AMH 
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