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Muscular Tension: An Explanation from a Methodological BehaviorismAbstract
A truism in psychology is that the activity of the striated musculature is maintained or reinforced by itsconsequences, and represents operant behavior. Yet, the striated musculature is divided into two main types that aredifferent physiologically and are activated separately and not necessarily simultaneously. The question is whetherthey are different
 psychologically.
That is, are different types of the striated musculature activated by differentmotivational principles? It is argued that separate motivational principles are imputed for different muscular types because of the private nature of muscular activity that is resistant to precise observation, but disappear with theapplication of experimental instrumentalities that can render these private events and their governing contingencies
universally accessible or ‘public’
. It is concluded that striated muscular activity is uniformly and consistently operantin nature, and can be functionally analyzed through a methodological behaviorism.Operant conditioning represents a unique data language that describes the lawfulness of behavior as derived fromthe cumulative record over time
of consistent correlations between the universally observed or ‘public’ form or
topography of behavior and its consequences. Operant conditioning procedures are based upon methodologicalprinciples, wherein reliable behavior
al consistencies or ‘laws’ are
derived using a data language that precisely mapsto the universally agreed upon
 facts
of behavior. As a form of methodological behaviorism (Pavlovian or classicalconditioning is another example), the experimental methodology of operant conditioning directly measures andmanipulates only publicly observable behavior. Grasping, walking, talking, etc. are operant behaviors because theyare correlated with or are
‘reinforced’ by
specific discrete outcomes. Because these behaviors uniformly engage aspecific organelle of the body, namely the striated musculature, a common presumption is that operant conditioningprimarily reflects the conditioning of these muscles. Of course, convulsions, startle reactions, etc.
do
involve thestriated musculature and can be mediated by neurological rather than purely cognitive causes, but in generalmuscular activity is guided by its functionality as consciously perceived.It is commonly assumed that if striated muscles are activated, they are publically observed, and hence may besubsumed entire under an operant analysis. Yet only a fraction of striated muscular activity
 
is
 
observable publicly orprivately. That is, the musculature may be activated yet not result in publicly observable responses, and neither mayit be consciously or privately perceived by the individual. Ironically, the private activity of the musculature has long been made public through resolving instrumentalities (e.g., SCR, EMG) but rarely if ever has an operant analysis been employed to explain this behavior. Rather, tension has generally been construed to be an artifact of autonomicarousal that is elicited due to psycho-
social ‘demand’.
This interpretation regards muscular tension as subsumedunder different motivational principles that do not incorporate contingency, such as the reflexive or S-R responsesentailed by a fight or flight response, stress reaction, etc. (Marmot & Wilkinson, 2006). In this case, inferredmediating processes take the place of observed correlations between behavior and environmental events.However, this conclusion may remain uncontested not because the relationship between tension and its governingcontingencies is disproven, or because the relevant data are unobtainable, but because of a common misinterpretation
of the semantics of ‘demand’.
The purpose of this article is to argue that the same data and data language used toestablish the concept that tension is reflexive or is a respondent can be reinterpreted to unequivocally demonstratethat muscular tension is an instrumental or operant behavior.
 
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The Striated Musculature
Although the activity of the striated musculature comprises the majority of behavior as we understand it, itspsychophysiology is not widely known. Muscle fibers are categorized into "slow-twitch fibers" and "fast-twitchfibers" (Squire, McConnell, & Zigmund, 2003). Slow-twitch fibers (also called "Type 1 muscle fibers") activate anddeactivate slowly, but when activated they are also very slow to fatigue. Fast-twitch fibers activate and deactivaterapidly and come in two types: "Type 2A muscle fibers" which fatigue at an intermediate rate, and "Type 2B musclefibers" which fatigue rapidly. These three muscle fiber types (Types 1, 2A, and 2B) are contained in all muscles invarying amounts. Muscles that need to be activated much of the time (like postural muscles) have a greater numberof Type 1 (slow) fibers. When a muscle begins to contract, primarily Type 1 fibers are activated first, followed byType 2A, then 2B. Type 1 fibers are often monotonically activated because of
psychosocial ‘demand’
that in generaldoes not engage fast twitch fibers. For an individual, this activation is only indirectly observed when these fiberssubsequently fatigue, causing exhaustion and pain.Muscular activation also causes systemic changes in the autonomic nervous system. Sympathetic autonomic arousalis elicited through the sustained contraction of high threshold motor units (Type 2) of the striated musculature, asoccurs during running or weight training (Saito, Mano, Abe, & Iwase, 1986). But arousal may also be mediated bythe sustained contraction of small low threshold motor (Type 1) units of the striated musculature (Mcguigan, 1991),and can be measured directly through EMG (electromyogram) or through indirect measures of autonomic arousal(e.g., skin conductance response or SCR; galvanic skin response or GSR) elicited by tension induced arousal.Physiologically, the neural pathways that detail how muscular tension instigates autonomic arousal (Gellhorn, 1967,1972, Jacobson, 1970, Malmo, 1975) have been well established. Through a bi-directional connection between thereticular arousal system and muscle efferents, a dramatic decrease or increase in muscle activity throughout the bodycan respectively stimulate decreases or increases in sympathetic arousal. This striated muscle position hypothesis(McGuigan, 1993) holds that the critical controlling event for autonomic arousal is covert neuro-muscular activity,and that rapid striated muscular activity c
an ‚mediate and thereby control what has been called autonomic,cardiovascular, and electroencephalographic conditioning.‛
The question yet unanswered is how covert muscularactivity is conditioned.
Contingency and Demand
The contraction of Type 1 fibers occurs prior to and in tandem with type 2 muscular activation, and is essential tovoluntary behavior. Type 1 activation also occurs to prime an individual for action and as such is also dependentupon the anticipated results of that activity. It thus follows that Type 1 fibres are commonly activated due to responsecontingencies. However, if type 1 muscular contraction occurs without the subsequent activation of type 2musculature, then involuntary or reflexive mechanisms are generally imputed
as represented by the ‘stimulus’ of
demand. For example, a worker
who ‘multi
-tasks
’ between several tasks and is subject to the distract
ions of co-
workers, email, etc., normally attributes sustained tension and emotional exhaustion to the ‘demands’
of workingday. The metaphor of demand connotes a stimulus event that
elicits
tension rather than contrasting responsecontingencies that cause tension to be
emitted
. But does this concept of demand denote a true mechanism or is itmerely a misrepresentation of the semantics or meaning of demand?As popularly conceived, tension is a byproduct of reflexive processes (e.g. flight or fight) that are elicited by arequirement for performance represented by
threat
or
demand
. But the requirement for performance entails aconscious or non-conscious appraisal of the consequences dependent
upon
performance or non-performance and thevariability or likelihood of those outcomes. These represent future contingent outcomes. Thus demand
must
implicatecontingency. Demand also entails the conscious or non-conscious appraisal of different response options orcontingencies that lead to a similar ends. Furthermore, demand occurs in a perceptual space that involves theconcurrent consideration of alternative response contingencies that lead to dissimilar ends (e.g. distractions). In other
 
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words,
demand entails choice
. For example, a person confronting a demand to complete a project at work must choose between different response options (e.g. work faster, take short cuts), and his performance is further influenced bythe availability of alternative response options (e.g. taking a break). Hence demand cannot represent a stimulusevent that elicits behavior, but rather denotes alternative response contingencies or choices that lead to the emission
of 
behavior.Besides the cognitive element of demand, tension and associated arousal is also correlated with cognitive events thatrepresent abstract rather than normative (i.e. means-end) properties of a contingency. It has been proposed thatdiscrepant, unpredicted, or novel events directly elicit alarm or arousal states (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). A modificationof this hypothesis proposes that discrepant events first elicit affective events which
in turn
 
automatically andobligatorily elicit a somatic response
‛ (
Bechara & Damasio, 2005, Verdejo-Garcia, Perez-Garcia, & Bechara, 2006). Inshort, the
primary inducer is a stimulus in the environment (i.e. risk) that elicits an emotional response
(WellerLevin, Shiv, & Bechara, 2007). For example, a person winning the lottery or who suddenly learns he owes money onhis income tax perceives novel rewarding or aversive outcomes, and fells tense because of the unexpectedness ornovelty of the event or because of the affective events elicited by those outcomes. Nonetheless, the reflexive or
‘automatic’
link between somatic (i.e. sympathetic) arousal and unpredictable, discrepant, or risky events is notsupported by the facts. Indeed, continuous positive surprise or discrepancy (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) as evidenced increative and sporting behavior is highly correlated with profound relaxation and low autonomic arousal. Forexample, a rock climber
involved in the ‘touch and go’ behavior of climbing a difficult cliff experiences lowautonomic arousal or is ‘cool under pressure’ when his moment to moment risky behavior is successfully
accomplished. Similarly, an artist in the thrall of a creative act feels elated but relaxed during the moment to momentnovelty of inspiration. Finally, low autonomic arousal is characteristic when avoidance from surprising painful
events (e.g. bad news) is impossible, as in the case of ‘learned helplessness’ (Seligman, 1975;
Gatchel, McKinney, &Koebernick, 1977). Thus we may feel depressed and non anxious when we learn of bad news wherein there is norecourse, such as a fatal illness, natural disaster, etc. As an alternative explanation, because affective eventsintrinsically change the value of the behavior that accompanies them, this behavior may also contrast with otheralternatives that have value derived from a cognitive or rational domain. In other words, emotional value alters therelative value of alternative choices, and hence may signal the emission of covert somatic (i.e. neuro-muscular) behavior. Thus it is proposed that
discrepancy elicited affect does not directly elicit sympathetic arousal, but can indirectlyestablish a contrast between response alternatives that does
.These concepts are easily illustrated through the facts of behavior.
 
Specifically, sustained or tonic levels of musculartension are commonly produced under continuous or moment to moment alternative contingencies or choiceswherein any choice entails near equivalent feasible or avoidable losses, or dilemmas. These dilemmas may consist oftwo or more rationally comparable choices that are near equivalent (e.g. what choice to make in a card game) or twochoices that represent affective choices or affective vs. rational choices that are near equivalent in value and cannot belogically compared (Marr, 2006). An affective choice will be defined as an anticipatory emotion or more specifically, apriming effect due to the enhanced and sustained activity of mid-brain dopamine systems (Berridge, 2001) that
provide an affective value (or ‘wanting’) to
engaging in or the prospect of engaging in positive unpredicted or novelevents (e.g. checking
email) or primary drives (e.g. ‘wanting’ an ice cream cone).
1
As such this activity may occur not
1
 The neuro-modulator dopamine is implicated in all learning, and is released upon the anticipation or experience ofnovel or discrepant events wherein moment to moment outcomes differ from what is expected. Dopamine releasescales with the importance of salience of an event, and is subjectively rendered as a sense of energy, pleasure, oractivation. Thus one feels more energized or elated upon winning the lottery if the prize is large rather than small. Aprimary
role for dopamine is to change the importance or ‘incentive salience’ of
moment to moment behavior(Berridge, 2007). This momentary salience may or may not conform to the overall importance of an extended behavior sequence. For example, intermittent small wins on a slot machine increase the salience or moment tomoment importance of gambling despite the fact that the long term consequences (namely a large cumulative loss) isthe inevitable consequence
. 
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