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Nye Jr., Joseph S. (2011) The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a Post-American World. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00698.x 2011 International Studies Association
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An area where I agree with Layne is the shift of wealth from West to East. In The Future of Power, I identify that transition as one of the two great power shifts of this century (the other is the power diffusion from states to nonstate actors, about which Layne is silent). In inter-state politics, the most important factor will be the continuing return of Asia. In 1800, Asia had more than half of the world population and the worlds product. By 1900, after the industrial revolution in Europe and America, Asias share shrank to one-fth of the world product. By 2040, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share. The rise in the power of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem with precedents, and we can learn from history about how our strategies can affect the outcome. It is a mistake, however, to exaggerate Chinese power. For more than a decade, many have viewed China as the most likely contender to balance American power, or surpass it. Some draw analogies to the challenge imperial Germany posed to Britain at the beginning of the last century, though Germany surpassed Britain in 1900, and China has a long way to go to equal the power resources of the United States. Even when the overall Chinese GDP passes that of the United States, the two economies will be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still have a vast, underdeveloped countryside, and it will begin to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child-per-couple policy. As the Chinese say, they fear the country will grow old before it grows rich. Per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy. China will probably not equal the United States in per capita income until sometime near the middle of the century. In other words, Chinas impressive growth rate combined with the size of its population will likely lead it to pass the American economy in total size, but that is not the same as equality. Moreover, linear projections can be misleading, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. Chinas authoritarian political system has thus far shown an impressive power conversion capability, but whether China can maintain that capability over the longer term is a mystery both to outsiders and to Chinese leaders. Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income. Whether China can develop a formula that can manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, and resentment among ethnic minorities remains to be seen. On American power relative to China, much will depend on the often underestimated uncertainties of future political change in China. Chinas size and high rate of economic growth will bring it closer to the United States in power resources, and this can be described as a relative decline of American power
compared to China, but that does not necessarily mean that China will surpass the United States as the most powerful country. Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections are based simply on GDP growth. They ignore US military and soft-power advantages, as well as Chinas geopolitical disadvantages. As Japan, India, and others try to balance Chinese power, they welcome an American presence. It is as if Mexico and Canada sought a Chinese alliance to balance the United States in North America. The fact that Chinese power in Asia is contested both by India and Japan (as well as other states) provides a major power advantage to the United States. The USJapan alliance and the improvement in USIndian relations mean that China cannot easily expel the Americans. From that position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can work to engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as Chinas power grows. In other words, it will be possible to use our power to shape the environment in which China denes its national interests as it grows. This is a more complex process than the institutional lock-in negotiations that Layne caricatures and then asks whats in it for China. Layne sees the current nancial situation of the United States as proof of declineeven though the 2011 downgrading of Americas credit rating by Standard and Poors led to an increase rather than a decrease in bondholders desire to purchase US treasury bonds. Similarly, Layne refers to Chinas vote of no condence in the dollars future, but there is a gap between Chinese declaratory and practical policy. Despite its various declarations, China continues to hold dollars and is a long way from internationalization of the renminbi. The United States has very real problems and certainly needs to deal with its debt and decit problems, but the American economy remains highly productive. America remains rst in total R&D expenditures, rst in university rankings, rst in Nobel prizes, rst on indices of entrepreneurship, and according to the World Economic Forum, the fth most competitive economy in the world (China ranks 26th). Moreover, the United States remains at the forefront of such cutting-edge technologies as bio-tech and nano-technology. This is hardly a picture of absolute economic decline such as in ancient Rome. Some observers worry that America will become sclerotic like Britain at the peak of its power a century ago. But American culture is far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than was that of Britain where the sons of industrial entrepreneurs sought aristocratic titles and honors in London. And despite recurrent historical bouts of concern, immigration helps keep America exible. In 2005, foreign-born immigrants had participated in one of every four technology start-ups in the previous decade. As Lee Kwan Yew once told me, China can draw on a talent
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pool of 1.3 billion people, while the United States can not only draw on a pool of 7 billion people, but can also recombine them in a diverse culture that enhances creativity in a way that ethnic Han nationalism cannot. Many commentators worry about the inefcient American political system. It is true that the founding fathers created a system of checks and balances to preserve liberties at the price of efciency. Moreover, the United States is now going through a period where party politics have become very polarized, but nasty politics is nothing new; it goes all the way back to the founding fathers. American government and politics have always had problemsand, though it is hard to remember in light of the current melodramas, sometimes worse than today. The United States faces serious problems regarding debt, secondary education, and political gridlock, but one should remember that they are only part of the picture. In principle, and over a longer term, there are solutions to current American problems. Of course, such solutions may forever remain out of reach. But it is worth distinguishing situations where there are no solutions from those which could in principle be solved. Where I suspect that Layne and I might agree is on the need for a new American strategy in a world marked by the rise of the rest. We should learn from the prudence of Dwight Eisenhower. The number-one power does not have to man every boundary and be strong everywhere. The attempt to do so would violate Ikes prudence in resisting direct intervention on the side of the French in Vietnam in 1954. Also relevant today is Ikes conviction that it is essential to preserve the strength of the American economy to undergird our military strength. Applied to todays world, an Ike-like strategy would avoid involvement of ground forces in major wars on the Asian continent, even if there was not a scal decit.
Counterinsurgency is attractive as a military doctrine in the way that it pays careful attention to the tactical balancing of hard and soft power, but in a strategic sense, it should not lead us into imperial occupation of weak states and nation building in places that are beyond our limits. The maxim of avoiding major land wars in Asia or other poor countries does not mean withdrawing a forward military presence from places like Japan and Korea, or ending military assistance of various types to countries like Pakistan or Egypt. Some analysts call this a strategy of off-shore balancing, but that term must mean more than just naval and air force activity. An American land presence that is welcome and supported by allies should not be ruled out by a slogan. Eisenhower also understood the limits of what is possible in terms of American domestic institutions and public attitudes. The British historian Niall Ferguson, an enthusiast for empire, lamented at the time of the Iraq War that the United States lacked the capacity for empire because of three domestic decits: manpower (not enough boots on the ground); attention (not enough public support for long-term occupation); and nancial (not enough savings and not enough taxation relative to public expenditure). He was correct. A stomach for empire or colonial occupation is one of the important ways in which American political culture differs from that of imperial Britain. Whether worthy of applause or lament, such are our domestic limits. At the same time, universalistic values are also in the nature of our political culture, but we often promote these values best by being what Ronald Reagan called a shining city on a hill. The global information age of the twenty-rst century will be different from the past century and will require a better strategy than America used in the past decade, but it will not be a post-American world.