UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) — Digging Deeper LXXXIV June 15, 2009, 7:00 p.m.

William Greider,

Come Home, America: The Rise and Fall (and RedeemingPromise) of Our Country

(New York: Rodale, March 2009). [On Jun. 14,2009 #9,712 on Amazon.com]

[

Thesis.

Americans are in dire straitsand must change how they live, but theirleaders are not telling them what theyneed to know. As one Americanaddressing ordinary Americans in whomhe has a deep and abiding faith, BillGreider tells us we should grow up, getengaged in a “third front of mobilizedcitizens,” and rethink how we live.Greider would like to see a five-yearnational austerity plan that turns thecountry inward and returns it to its corevalues, best represented in the AfricanAmerican experience.]

Ch. 1: Fair Warning.

The country is introuble and people must change (1). Theevasiveness of American politicians is“merely one symptom of the deep decayin America’s representative democracy”(3; 2-4). But Americans have seen worseand can pull through (5-6). We can“redeem ourselves” (7; 6-9).

Ch. 2: The Other America.

Greidergrew up optimistic on farms in Ohio andwestern Pennsylvania; is Scotch-Irish onhis mother’s side (10-11). He has faith in“ordinary Americans,”but not in “thegoverning classes” (12-14).

Ch. 3: The Walls Closing In.

Americanculture is too self-congratulatory andtriumphalist (15-16). Five “hard facts”degrade prospects for Americans: (1)Globalization (16-18); (2) Militarism (18-19); (3) Free-market fundamentalism (19-20); (4) Peak Oil and the “ecologicalcrisis” (20-21); (5) Paralysis of politicalreform (22). These will breed “classconflict” (24; 23-24).

Ch. 4: The “Winner’s Complex.”

Ourleaders embrace a triumphalist view of U.S. history casting the nation in the roleof “[l]eader, architect, supervisor,benefactor, protector, and enforcer” (27;25-27). But the U.S. has lost the capacityand the right to these roles (27-29). “Weare governed now by many expressionsof crackpot thinking” (28). Economicpower is moving to Asia and Europe (29-31). U.S. politics defines “nationalinterests” in terms of corporate interestsrather than citizens’ interest; this isanother aspect of the “winner’s complex”(31-33). The U.S. should shrink itsmilitary (33). This book’s title comesGeorge McGovern’s 1972 presidentialcampaign (34). “It was never America’sdestiny to run the world” (35). Thecountry should grow up and turn inward(35-36).

Ch. 5: The Politics of “Hard Money.”

The 2008 financial crisis epitomizes ourquandary, effecting a reduced role forthe U.S. globally (37-39). “‘Normal’ life isnot going to resume” (39). An account of the financial crisis (39-41). Its causes arein the fundamentals, not tacticalmistakes (41-43). Financial interestshave been demanding a greater andgreater economic slice; the FederalReserve has been the chief agent of thisshift and its power continues to grow (43-45). Americans were once engaged onthese issues but with the creation of theFed in 1913 lost their “voice” in “themoney debate” (45). In the late 1970sthe Fed “effectively took control of government economic policy” throughmonetary policy (46; 46-48). The Fedtamed inflation “by targeting the wagesof working people” (48). Paul Volckerantagonized Republicans and wasreplaced by Alan Greenspan, who“restored the system that had failed

some seventy years before” (51; 49-55). The Fed needs to be reformed; instead itis being given new powers, raising theprospect of “the formation of a corporatestate” while the public is “treated likechildren” (59; 55-60). The Fed should bestripped of its independence and madeanswerable to the president and subjectto congressional oversight (60-61).

Ch. 6: Blinded by Faith.

The“perverse symbiosis” of the U.S. andChina, in which a rich country borrowsfrom a poor country to sustain a highstandard of living (62-63). Demonizationof China is just a rationalizing excuse (63-65). The U.S. is wasting awayeconomically in a process that derivesfrom Cold War arrangements, nationalarrogance, and simplistic policy analysis(65-69). The élites are pursuingglobalization while 80% of Americans areconvinced that this is jeopardizing thesituation of working families (69-74). Theeconomic theory of globalization doesnot correspond to the reality, which isdriven by state-capitalist deals and notby abstract “market forces” (74-76).1980s IBM vice president for science andtechnology Ralph E. Gomory is a hereticalcapitalist critic of globalization, arguingthat it is weakening the nation (76-79).William J. Baumol co-wrote

Global Tradeand Conflicting National Interests

(2001)with him, arguing that the cheap goodsthat globalization gave to Americans willsoon disappear (79-81). European andAsian policymakers value society morethan Americans (82-83). East Asia (83-84). Japan (84-87). Germany (87-90).China (90-92).

Ch. 7: Second Thoughts.

The “globaltrading system” is more fragile thangenerally imagined (93-94). U.S. élites(Robert Rubin, Alan Blinder, LawrenceSummers, Paul Krugman) are havingdoubts about globalization (95-102).U.S. claims to global leadership areimpeding adjustment to the reality of thesituation (102-03). The U.S. should captrade deficits, tax U.S. multinationals andinvestment capital firms, and rebuild thenational economy (103-09). But it ismoral for the U.S. to defend its citizens’interests in a world marked by acuteglobal poverty and inequity only if “international labor rights” are alsopursued (112; 109-16).

Ch. 8: The Next War.

“The U.S. military. . . has itself become the gravest threatto our peace and security” because of the globally aggressive “Long War”strategy described in the 2006

Quadrennial Defense Review Report

(117; 117-20). It’s really about our oilsupply (120). At the end of the Cold War,the U.S., in thrall to its “winner’scomplex,” tragically and unnecessarilypursued a strategy that abandonedrealism (i.e. the view that nations pursuetheir own interests in internationalaffairs) (120-26). Greider’s own militaryexperience (in the early 1960s?) leadshim to praise the military as aninstitution (126-29). Covering themilitary as a reporter during the Vietnamera (129-32). The military in the 1990s(132-33). “The armed services, in myexperience, is possibly the Americaninstitution that most effectively advancesequal opportunity. . . . [T]he people inuniform have a lot to teach the rest of society” (133). But trying to maintaindominance is, inevitably, a losingstrategy (134-37). Present policiesencourage nuclear proliferation, if onlyfor self-defense (137-39).Counterinsurgency strategies promise tobe counterproductive (139-43). Oil-motivated U.S. militarism is pushingadversaries together, e.g. China andRussia (143-49).

Ch. 9: Why Not Victory?

Four yearsinto the Iraq war, Jeff Stein of

Congressional Quarterly

found that high-ranking American officials were unable tostate the difference between Sunni andShiite Muslims (150-51). “Ignorancemakes it easier to go to war” (151). The

Korean war was the result of ignorance(152). So was the Vietnam war (152-53). The U.S. is still a democracy; it has

not

evolved into an imperial state—we have“changed as a people” and no longerdesire imperium, though our élites stillpursue this (154-58). “If governmentofficials privately consider themselves incharge of an empire, they had better nottell the people” (156). Anyway, no greatpower can set itself imperial objectivesnowadays (158-62). “Wars should not befought at all unless they absolutely mustbe, and if they are fought, they must bewon. . . . I am not a pacifist”; it follows,though, that humanitarian wars are to berejected (163; 162-64). There has beenopposition to the Iraq war inside themilitary (164-65). A “‘popular formation’of citizens dedicated to confrontingmilitarism” is a possibility (166-67).Andrew Bacevich’s

The New AmericanMilitarism

provides a platform “forthinking about reform” (167; 167-69). The U.S. is “losing the arms race withitself: The sole superpower is compelledto spend more and more each year, notbecause of its imagined opponents, butthanks to its own plans and projects”(170). “The cost of war making hasnever become a potent issue in USpolitics” but “an independent formationof well-prepared citizens could make areal difference” (171).

Ch. 10: The End of the ConservativeEra.

The current crisis is good news inthat it enables Americans to think anewfor the first time since the 1970s (173-74). But “no coherent alternativepresently exists” (174). “Politics ismuddled for the moment” (175).Unsound “supply-side” free-marketpolicies of recent decades have produced“billionaires and borrowing” (176; 176-81). As Republicans became profligatespenders, Democrats at the behest of Wall Street embraced fiscal discipline andbecame a party of capital (181-84).Inequality is bad for the economy (185-87). It has damaged the “moral fabric of the country,” as we see in a betrayal of pension commitments that amounts tostealing (187-91). We will be forced tochange, and technologies exist toaccomplish systemic changes, but “[t]hehard part is the politics” (193; 192-194).Can we Americans learn to be mature? Yes, though not painlessly. (194-95).

Ch. 11: America the Possible.

Americans should know they have torethink their bedrock faith in economicgrowth, since it has been failing to helpworking people for some time (197-201). The failure of growth poses an acutepolitical problem (201-03). The growthengine also “actively damages anythingit does not itself value,” including theenvironment and morality (204; 203-07).Herman Daly’s

Steady-State Economics

offers an alternative model (207-08). Siximperatives can guide socialtransformation; these involve anexpanded government role, a reinventionof capitalism (socializing corporations inways that are vaguely presented), and“thickening” democracy (208-13). TheU.S. is rich and can afford it (213-18).

Ch. 12: Machine Politics.

Corporatepower is a central feature of oursocioeconomic system, yet mostpoliticians will not talk about it (219-20).Corporations today are most artful inavoiding taxes and fostering forms of corporate welfare (220-23). Deregulation(224). Public outrage (224-25).Corporations prey on government (225-26). Not all corporations actirresponsibly (227-28). The corruptedvalues of government “probably hadtheir origins in the great liberal reformsof the New Deal” (228; 228-33).Corporations have broken “the socialcontract” and the “business-governmentpartnership” needs to be “broken” if problems like health care, pensions, andglobal warming are to be solved (234-41). A “performance tax” and othermeans can be used to reform