Professional Documents
Culture Documents
: I 1 7 1 7 / 2 0 0 3
In the m a t t e r between:
and
and
JUDGMENT
VAN NIEKERK, J: The plaintiff instituted action against the defendant by way of combined s u m m
by h e r h u s b a n d , the third party, a n d a n o t h e r vehicle, driven by Mr Ben
the i s s u e of negligence.
1956).
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(4) SA 7 3 5 (ECD): Hart and Another v Santam Insurance Co. Ltd 1975 (4)
which is positioned over a riverbed. Should one continue with this road
plaintiff a n d the third party lived. On the left side (as the plaintiffs
on the right are t h e CCN offices. The road entering the intersection from
Before the intersection is reached, t h e view for a driver traveling from the
slight dip in the street, where after it goes up at a slight incline towards
C a e s a r Street.
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the following:
latter's small child. Plaintiffs h u s b a n d , the third party, drove the Caddy.
Near the CCN offices they entered the robot controlled intersection,
injured.
the intersection from M u n g u n d a Street while the robot w a s green for him
robot w a s red for him. The defendant further alleged t h a t Mr Swartz was
out as follows:
"1.1 The said Harenz Swartz entered into the intersection when it was
not safe and/or opportune to do so; and/or
1.2 The said Harenz Swartz entered into the intersection against the
red traffic light; and/or
1.3 The said Harenz Swartz entered into the intersection when he did
not have the right of way; and/or
1.4 The said Harenz Swartz did not heed the right of way which the
vehicle with registration number N99449W, driven by Mr Ben
Serogwe had; and/or
1.5 The said Harenz Swartz did not apply brakes timeously and/or at
all;
1.6 The said Harenz Swartz did not avoid the collision by exercising
reasonable care and while in a position to do so; and/or
1.7 The said Harenz Swartz was under the influence of liquor."
"Where there are two stories mutually destructive, before the onus is
discharged, the court must be satisfied upon adequate grounds that the
story of the litigant upon whom the onus rests is true and the other is
false." (National Employers' General Insurance Association v Gany 1931
AD 187 at 199).
However, in African Eagle Life Assurance Co Ltd v Cainer 1980 (2) SA 234
Gany t h a t -
" this approach to problems of proof in this type of case only applies
in cases where there are no probabilities one way or the other. Where
there are probabilities, inherent or otherwise, there is no room for this
approach. On the other hand, where there are no probabilities - where,
for instance, the factum probandum was whether a particular thing was
white or black, with not the slightest evidence as to the preponderance of
white or black things in that particular community, there are clearly no
probabilities of any sort. And, when the testimony of witnesses is in
conflict, the one merely saying the thing was white and the other black, it
does not matter logically what the measure of proof is, whether it is on a
balance of probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt. The position is
simply that there is no proof, by any criterion, unless one is satisfied that
one witness' evidence is true and that of the other is false. It is frequently
said that the dictum in the Gany case does not apply to civil cases
because of the omission of the learned Judge to have regard to the
measure of proof in civil cases being on a balance of probabilities. But
this criticism is invalid because, unless suitably qualified, it confuses
proof with the measure of proof. Where there is no probability there is
simply no proof of anything (regardless of the measure by which you
measure it) unless you believe one person and disbelieve the other. Until
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Insurance Co Ltd v Jagers 1984 (4) SA 4 3 7 (E) where the Court said (at
440E-G):
"It seems to me, with respect, that in any civil case, as in any criminal
case, the onus can ordinarily only be discharged by adducing credible
evidence to support the case of the party on whom the onus rests. In a
civil case the onus is obviously not as heavy as it is in a criminal case,
but nevertheless where the onus rests on the plaintiff as in the present
case, and where there are two mutually destructive stories, he can only
succeed if he satisfies the Court on a preponderance of probabilities that
his version is true and accurate and therefore acceptable, and that the
other version advanced by the defendant is therefore false or mistaken
and falls to be rejected. In deciding whether that evidence is true or not
the Court will weigh up and test the plaintiffs allegations against the
general probabilities. The estimate of the credibility of a witness will
therefore be inextricably bound up with a consideration of the
probabilities of the case and, if the balance of probabilities favours the
plaintiff, then the Court will accept his version as being probably true. If
however the probabilities are evenly balanced in the sense that they do
not favour the plaintiffs case any more than they do the defendant's, the
plaintiff can only succeed if the Court nevertheless believes him and is
satisfied that his evidence is true and that the defendant's version is
false."
The plaintiff did not testify in person. The witnesses who testified in her
order for t h e plaintiff a n d the third party to benefit from the h u g e settled
witnesses in various ways. The evidence presented did not j u s t cover the
u n d e r t h e influence of alcohol?
the braai they went to Swartz' h o u s e where they watched a video. They
to drink there.
Swartz immediately got off his vehicle a n d walked towards the other
to help the plaintiff, b u t somebody told him from behind t h a t she should
plaintiff kept screaming for help. Swartz said he w a s feeling very sorry
did not t u r n u p . From there they visited the plaintiff in hospital. Then
they went h o m e .
the scene of the accident. Swartz told him t h a t he w e n t to look for help.
to look for Swartz in order to a r r e s t him for not being at the scene.
Karon h a d r e t u r n e d in the m e a n t i m e .
day or two after the collision he p u t the speed at 50 kph. Later in cross
he estimated to be 50 kph.
Court all the parties pointed out the s a m e point. The sketch plan he
point where Swartz m u s t have seen Serogwe's vehicle for the first time.
I agree with Mr Muller, who appeared for the plaintiff a n d the third party,
taken home.
as being confused. He saw him walking down into the river a n d towards
notice the police searching for Swartz in the river. He did not see t h a t
another, namely t h a t Swartz decided to skip the red robot as it was late
the t r u e reason, defendant says why Swartz r a n from the scene. I prefer
from 23:00 until the collision shortly after 24:00 without any problems.
referring to Swartz.
at the scene only after Swartz h a d left the scene. No one else mentioned
a s p e c t s as false.
from Swartz' vehicle. In his testimony before this court he however said
liquor was found on or removed from the vehicles or the scene of the
t h e Caddy.
spoke to Serogwe a n d Gaseb. When he looked for Swartz they could not
Swartz was t h e driver. Gaseb also told him t h a t "they" drove "over " a red
w a s u n s t e a d y on his feet.
saw beer bottles there as well as beer bottles next to the vehicle w h e n he
vehicle.
explained that he saw beer bottles inside the Caddy where the
did not take t h e m out of the vehicle. On the left side at t h e b a c k of the
Caddy he found more t h a n one empty beer bottle on the ground. Again
d r u n k e n passenger.
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to him. He did not mention the signs which, according to Nowaseb were
light was red. If he told Nowaseb this freely, why does he not tell
formulated charges against him for leaving the scene. If Gaseb was
the next logical question would be w h e t h e r the driver m a y not have been
any police officer in his position would have specifically counted the
notes of his observations or not have left the scene until t h e investigator
also did not report his finding of the beer bottles or the d r u n k e n
collision. He also did not mention this in the occurrence book to alert
Oscarine Tenzin a n d Ella Bakhela went to the scene some time after the
board were two empty drinking glasses. She is the only person t h a t saw
this. In my view this evidence is neither here nor there. Ella Bakhela saw
where the plaintiff w a s lying a n d crying. She w a s also the only one who
Nunuheb.
The only other witness who gave evidence on the alcohol aspect is Harold
Swartz a n d he got into the front of the vehicle with three ladies in the
would not have occurred. Clemens also told him t h a t he w a s feeling bad,
t h a t if Swartz h a d not gone t h r o u g h the red robot, the accident would not
was in the vehicle for his hangover the next day. He mentioned t h a t there
truth.
down into the river bed with Clemens a n d Swartz to look for the
This witness also told the Court t h a t on 3 August 2 0 0 4 during the time
Gaseb also told the court t h a t the next day he m e t with Swartz in Port
Clemens to look for the lens of his spectacles which he lost in the river
bed the previous evening. While there, Harold Gaseb happened to come
which Harold alleged took place and his allegations relating to the
spectacles.
mind quite improbable. If Gaseb was u p s e t and felt bad about Swartz
"going t h r o u g h " the red robot, it is likely that he would he have told
afraid t h a t Swartz would pin the driving onto him, why would he then tell
story about the beers, the Richelieu and Mellow Wood, it is improbable
they inspected the vehicle. The alleged fear t h a t Swartz would pin the
Swartz was t h e driver. There were also other relatives who saw that
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Swartz drove the vehicle the previous evening before the collision.
Clemens.
Swartz, who nearly killed h i m the previous evening, r a n away and who is
Clemens t h a t Swartz would blame Clemens. He did not even ask Swartz
to assist the very offender at the scene of the crimes to retrieve his
property which was lost while fleeing from justice while knowing that an
aspects.
by the Court. However, I did not have the impression t h a t it was because
material.
One aspect which caused him difficulty was the fact t h a t he obviously
with the story told by Harold Gaseb. However, in the light of the fact t h a t
changing the event may have been, even with their lawyers. One knows
Swartz at the scene looking for his spectacle lens. Swartz m u s t have
I now t u r n to the issue of why Swartz left the scene. He says it was to
t h a t the a m b u l a n c e only left for the scene at 24:59. This is slightly less
to Swartz the m a n with the cell phone h a d left. As I said before, this
help from Haradoeb, from any of the onlookers, or at one of the nearby
know Haradoeb t h a t well a n d did not now anyone else there, except his
over the fence. There w a s some light a n d he could see, although he did
r a t h e r have chosen to take the route along the road a n d over the bridge,
of the street in which Karon lives. Swartz said t h a t he also h a d to wait for
the taxi driver to fetch a bag in the h o u s e a n d close t h e gates. This took
there is more t h a n one route t h a t a vehicle could take from the scene to
for the allegation t h a t Swartz was u n d e r the influence no-one would have
purpose.
the scene. None of the police officers have given s u c h evidence. It seems
a n d h a d to m a k e a getaway.
a n d will then deal with the first and last two factual questions posed
him. Why Makkies went along is not quite clear. Serogwe said t h a t he
Street at Ella's h o u s e the robot was already green for him. He drove
Serogwe did not see plaintiffs vehicle at all before or during the collision,
misleading. From the point pointed out it is clear t h a t it was not actually
river.)
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said t h a t he could report at the police station at 8:00. This he did, but
first, like Serogwe said t h a t the light w a s green when they drove off from
turned green when they were about 50 metres away from the
see Swartz' vehicle. Immediately after the accident he saw Swartz get out
searched for t h e other driver and even fired s h o t s in the process. There
camouflage uniform. They looked for Swarz in the river bed, b u t did not
witness who could testify t h a t Serogwe was in the right a n d Swartz in the
an a r e a where the speed limit is 60 kph. He did not keep a proper look
out or enter the intersection with the necessary care expected from a
even see plaintiffs vehicle until after the collision a n d they h a d come to a
stop. He only swerved to the left after his vehicle h a d been hit. It is clear
j u d g m e n t to date of payment.
VAN NIEKERK, J
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