“We will complete a nuclear posture review that opens the door to deeper cuts and reduces the role of nuclear weapons.”-President Obama to United Nations, Wednesday, September 23, 2009

IS DETERRENCE, EVEN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, A ZOMBIESITUATION?Herman Kahn used to argue that there were three kinds of problems in the world: (1)those that are insoluble by human intervention; (2) those that are made worse byhuman intervention; and (3) those that are solvable by timely and sufﬁcient humanintervention.My argument is that the

problem

of how to achieve nuclear nonproliferation and nu-clear disarmament is an insoluble problem as long as nuclear deterrence continues toprovide the basis for military defense. Military defense as the primary means of achieving national security is also expensive (~$60,000 billion in current U.S. dollarsconsumed over the past 64-years). Essentially, we are playing a game of nuclear de-terrence rationalized as a means of military defense that may represent a zombiesituation (i.e. the game is unwinnable). Thus, if this is so, it is not only expensive tocontinue playing this game for capital might be allocated more productively to otheractivities for national security, it may be highly risky to continue with a nuclear pos-ture that is no longer of strategic value.For example, what if, unlike the game of nuclear deterrence as a means for nationaldefense that may no longer be considered of strategic value for national security, the

problem

of mitigating global warming was considered of strategic value for nationalsecurity? That one engages in the enterprise of allocating capital to mitigate climatechange does not depend whether it is a resultant of either natural or man-madeforces. It is occurring. It is happening with great rapidity. It is unbelievably expensivein its impact on the world's economies. Signiﬁcant reallocation of capital is requiredto adequately address this problem adequately in a timely fashion. The consequentialsystemic risk is very, very large. I would argue that a responsible calculation of thissystemic risk (probabilistic forecast of occurrence and consequences, reduced to anestimated economic value) would be greater than that risk associated with either fu-ture conventional wars or potential unconventional (e.g. terrorist) violence (i.e. thesupposed

raison d'être

national defense

)Thus, from a systemic risk perspective, if we are willing to support policies that re-sult in the expenditure of ~$60,000 billion over the next 64-years for

military defense

aspresently constellated (this

the present trajectory!), might we also be willing tosupport an equal or greater allocation of capital for the amelioration and mitigationof thevery real, economic costs of global warming?This, of course, serves to illuminate the faulty thinking of some present national se-curity policies. It is highly unlikely that the world’s economy is able to support two

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equally strategic initiatives of ~$60,000 billion each over the next 64-years. Either fu-ture policy initiatives will continue to be ruled by non-analytical reasoning, conven-tion (what has happened in the past serves as the primary guide to future choices;the world is ruled by stationarity), and convenient, often self-serving rhetoric, orconversely, sound analysis and considered, rational policy choices will begin to rulethe day. If the

problem

of responsible and twenty-ﬁrst century national security initia-tives are to be addressed adequately in a timely fashion, the question on the table is:“Which shall we choose?”THE STATED OBJECT OF DETERRENCE IS TO AVERT WARDeterrence as developed through national defense strategy, despite its overt militaryfocus, touches practically everything and everyone. It’s success, or lack thereof, eitherestablishes or destroys the platform for cultural stability and human development. Itscost of implementation affects the global economy and diverts capital from otheruses. If too much capital is diverted from civilian needs, technical innovation, eco-nomic prosperity, and the means to improve general welfare of the nations will beharmed.DETERRENCE BASED ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A FOOL’S GAMENational defense in the U.S. and many other countries of the world, either directly orthrough nuclear umbrellas of nuclear states still relies on nuclear deterrence. This is based on the maintenance of large stockpiles of hydrogen-nuclear weapons andlaunchers capable of delivering a devastating counterattack against any opponentfoolish enough to launch an attack. Nuclear weapons have not been used in the 64-years since 1945 and there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war betweentwo states that possess them. Yet, there is data that nuclear weapons do not deter war between states with them and those without nuclear weapons (e.g. Korea, Vietnam,Gulf War, Iraq War, Af-Pak War).The foundational assumption of the value of nuclear deterrence was originally basedon MAD (

mutual assured destruction

), a strategy developed from economic game the-ory. This strategy assumed a Nash Equilibrium would be achieved between twoplayers. It would be in neither player’s interest to engage in a

First Use

attack, if theresult is a counterattack that destroys the attacking side. With the appearance of mul-tiple parties possessing nuclear weapons, MAD morphed into various ﬂavors of thesame game: Assured Destruction, Massive Retaliation, Minimal Deterrence, etc.A growing number of nations now believe it is beneﬁcial to possess nuclear weapons,or the capability to make them in the future, as needed, to deter aggression by adver-saries with superior forces. The resulting counterattack, although not as decisive as inthe original MAD game, would still be potentially catastrophic to the attacker.

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Thus, nuclear deterrence provides an impetus for nuclear proliferation, potentially amore volatile brinksmanship deﬁned decision-space, and the ever increasing possi- bility that nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists who may have noth-ing to lose by

First Use

, as no credible counterattack could be launched against them.The problem with much of the thinking concerning nuclear deterrence is that it is based on

technological positivism and the logical fallacy of retrospective determin-ism. It also presumes stationarity - past history is a guide to the future.

QUESTIONING THE BASIS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCETechnological positivism presumes that the

correct number

of nuclear weapons ana-lytically derived will achieve deterrence and extended deterrence objectives. The fal-lacy of retrospective determinism attributes nuclear deterrence,

post ipso facto,

as thesole or primary cause for no nuclear exchanges between nuclear powers over the past64-years. The assumption of stationarity imagines that along with the other assump-tions of nuclear deterrence: (1)approximate parity so that neither side has an advan-tage for

First Use

, (2) both sides have enough information that they can make in-formed, rational decisions as the game progresses, and (3) the players are rational(subscribe to rational choice theory), that (4) this strategy (of nuclear deterrence) can be employed indeﬁnitely through time, into the indeterminate future.

Has nuclear deterrence encouraged an

arms race

in conventional weaponry andpreparations for national defense? Must a state develop ever more lethal weapons sothat a state doesn’t have to use the nuclear option? Has nuclear deterrence been par-tially responsible for nations collectively spending $60,000 billion on national defenseover the past 64-years, and spending $1,500 billion additionally each year? Does thismassive diversion of capital to military-based defense merely divert scarce capitalfrom human development and economic growth? Does this diversion of capital makeaggression

probable, rather than less so?Other question that need answering include: Is nuclear deterrence, and its overde-termined extended deterrence, a risk factor in economic recovery, addressing climatechange, protecting cyberspace, and succeeding at disarmament and nonproliferationefforts? Have nuclear weapons, collectively along with nuclear deterrence doctrine, become a doomsday machine it is long past time to unplug?For example, if a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the continued use of the nu-clear deterrence was performed,

would these be the outcomes:

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The Economic Games Behind Nuclear Deterrencehttp://www.scribd.com/doc/20228926/.

robabilistic Risk Assessment

(

PRA

) is an analytical process that begins with two system de-sign counterfactuals: (1) the magnitude (severity) of the potential adverse consequences of system failures; and (2) the likelihood (probability) of the occurrence of each potential conse-quence.