equally strategic initiatives of ~$60,000 billion each over the next 64-years. Either fu-ture policy initiatives will continue to be ruled by non-analytical reasoning, conven-tion (what has happened in the past serves as the primary guide to future choices;the world is ruled by stationarity), and convenient, often self-serving rhetoric, orconversely, sound analysis and considered, rational policy choices will begin to rulethe day. If the
of responsible and twenty-ﬁrst century national security initia-tives are to be addressed adequately in a timely fashion, the question on the table is:“Which shall we choose?”THE STATED OBJECT OF DETERRENCE IS TO AVERT WARDeterrence as developed through national defense strategy, despite its overt militaryfocus, touches practically everything and everyone. It’s success, or lack thereof, eitherestablishes or destroys the platform for cultural stability and human development. Itscost of implementation affects the global economy and diverts capital from otheruses. If too much capital is diverted from civilian needs, technical innovation, eco-nomic prosperity, and the means to improve general welfare of the nations will beharmed.DETERRENCE BASED ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A FOOL’S GAMENational defense in the U.S. and many other countries of the world, either directly orthrough nuclear umbrellas of nuclear states still relies on nuclear deterrence. This is based on the maintenance of large stockpiles of hydrogen-nuclear weapons andlaunchers capable of delivering a devastating counterattack against any opponentfoolish enough to launch an attack. Nuclear weapons have not been used in the 64-years since 1945 and there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war betweentwo states that possess them. Yet, there is data that nuclear weapons do not deter war between states with them and those without nuclear weapons (e.g. Korea, Vietnam,Gulf War, Iraq War, Af-Pak War).The foundational assumption of the value of nuclear deterrence was originally basedon MAD (
mutual assured destruction
), a strategy developed from economic game the-ory. This strategy assumed a Nash Equilibrium would be achieved between twoplayers. It would be in neither player’s interest to engage in a
attack, if theresult is a counterattack that destroys the attacking side. With the appearance of mul-tiple parties possessing nuclear weapons, MAD morphed into various ﬂavors of thesame game: Assured Destruction, Massive Retaliation, Minimal Deterrence, etc.A growing number of nations now believe it is beneﬁcial to possess nuclear weapons,or the capability to make them in the future, as needed, to deter aggression by adver-saries with superior forces. The resulting counterattack, although not as decisive as inthe original MAD game, would still be potentially catastrophic to the attacker.
RETHINKING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DOCTRINE
LYLE A. BRECHT 410.963.8680 DRAFT 2.4 CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH --- Sunday, January 3, 2010 Page 2 of 8