1RUNNING HEAD: Intuitive Theists?Are Children “Intuitive Theists”?:Reasoning about Purpose and Design in NatureDeborah KelemenBoston UniversityFinal manuscript (MS 3-106REV2)Word count (main text, footnotes and acknowledgements): 5000 wordsPsychological Science (in press).Correspondence to: Deb Kelemen, Department of Psychology, Boston University, 64Cummington Street, Boston, MA 02215, URL:http://www.bu.edu/childcognition/;Email:dkelemen@bu.edu; Phone: (617) 353 – 2758; Fax: (617) 353 – 6933.

2AbstractSeparate bodies of research suggest that young children (i) have a broad tendency to reasonabout natural phenomena in terms of a purpose and (ii) an orientation towards intention-basedaccounts of natural entity origins. This article explores these results further by drawing togetherrecent findings from various areas of cognitive developmental research to address the followingquestion: Rather than being “artificialists” in Piagetian terms, are children “intuitive theists” –disposed to view natural phenomena as resulting from non-human design? A review of researchon children’s agency concepts, imaginary companions and understanding of artifacts suggeststhat, by around 5 years of age, this description may have explanatory value and practicalrelevance.(110 Words)

3Are Children “Intuitive Theists”?:Reasoning about Purpose and Design in NaturePiaget’s (1929) claim that children are “artificialists” who draw on their subjectiveintentional experience to conclude that all things are made by people for a purpose hasencountered substantial skepticism in the last few decades of cognitive developmental research.This is because, at core, Piaget’s proposal embodied more than the suggestion that childrenmisunderstand the limits of human creative power but a stronger claim about the profoundincommensurability of children’s and adults’ conceptual systems. Specifically, Piaget believedthat young children indiscriminately generate artificialist explanations because they arepsychologically incapable of conceiving of physical causes, a shortcoming that he arguedrendered them insensitive to the fundamental distinction between natural kinds and artifacts.Research since Piaget has challenged these assumptions. Not only can children reason inphysical-causal terms from infancy (e.g., Baillargeon, 1993) but they also recognize that peoplemake artifacts not natural entities (e.g., Gelman & Kremer, 1991). But while these results may putaspects of Piaget’s interpretation to rest, recent research has raised the specter of Piaget’s findingsonce more. Consistent with Piaget’s results, contemporary studies have found that, while notentirely indiscriminate, children do indeed evidence a general bias to treat objects and behaviorsas existing for a purpose (Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; but see Keil 1992) and are also broadlyinclined to view natural phenomena as intentionally created, albeit by a non-human agent (Evans,2000a, 2001; Gelman & Kremer, 1991). This paper explores these findings further by drawingthem together with other recent cognitive developmental research to ask the following question:Even if children are not artificialists, as Piaget conceived of the term, are they perhaps “intuitive