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lynoo Aiii/\ivd AiNnoo SONW FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ELENA S V E N S O N , ' Petitioner,

-againstMICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent. __

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Q3AI303d DOCKET N O . F-28901-08/10/A/B/C NOTICE OF MOTION TO HOLD IN CONTEMPT Hon. Jeanette Ruiz

COUNSELORS: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed petition of Michael Krichevsky, sworn to the 18 day of July, 2013, and upon all the pleadings and proceedings heretofore had herein, the undersigned will move this Court at Part 27, thereof, to be held at the Courthouse located at 330 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York on the 18th day of July, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard: For an order by the Court: 1. 2. adjudging the Petitioner in contempt of this Court for perjuring herself under oath; adjudging the Petitioner in contempt of this Court for maliciously prosecuting in this court false Petition to punish Michael Krichevsky in contempt of court based on John Fasone's void order and without probable cause causing Michael Krichevsky to suffer stroke; 3. 4. referring this matter to district attorney for criminal prosecution. declaring that support order against respondent dated February 3, 2010 by magistrate John Fasone of Kings County Family Court is VOID on the grounds that it was obtained by Petitioner's actual fraud, fraud upon the court, perjury, attorney's misconduct, misrepresentation, witness-tempering, obstruction of justice and in absence of due process pursuant to CPLR 2002, R5015(a) (3),(4), R5012, and 5019 (a).

TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to Section 2214(b) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, all answering papers, if any, shall be served at least seven (7) days before the return date of this motion.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 18, 2013 Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se 4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224 (718) 687-2300 ELENA SVENSON 2620 Ocean Pkwy, Apt 3K Brooklyn, NY 11223

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ELENA SVENSON, Petitioner(s), -againstMICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent. PETITION TO HOLD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT ' DOCKET NO. F-28901-08/10A/B/C

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS

ss.:

MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. I am the Respondent in the action herein. 2. I have first-hand knowledge regarding facts set forth below and is competent to testify. 3. On April 27, 2012 Petitioner (SVENSON) filed for bankruptcy. In her bankruptcy petition she revealed for the first time that on or about April 2009 she was working at the home health care agency, exhibit A. 4. While working at that agency, on August 6, 2009 at the hearing for child support in this court, SVENSON testified under oath that she is not working, but looking for work. The hearing was adjourned due to her testimony that in 2 months she will find some work. 5. After about 2 months, during November 2009 hearing in this court SVENSON testified under oath that she is not employed, was not looking for work, but instead she is going to medical school to become a nurse. She testified that she would graduate in 2012. 6. From April of 2009 until July 18, 2013 SVENSON and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, deliberately concealed from the court and KRICHEVSKY material fact that she was

working all this time while claiming that her income is zero and she is going to medical school, when she did not. 7. During child support proceedings from 2008 until 2013 hearing officer John Fasone was and is involved in covering up that fraud. 8. KRICHEVSKY was ordered to pay SVENSON $31,599.42 rn arrears, petitioner's attorney fees, about $700 per month for parties' child health plan to pay to his employer in addition to $2045 in monthly child support while getting gross income of $4000 per month. 9. That order was impossible to comply with because after incomplete deduction of some taxes respondent would have no more $3694 per month in disposable income. If he would try to deduct from that amount $3067.50 plus $700 for child health care it would be more (3067.50 + $700 = 3767.50) than $3694 of respondent's disposable income, not to mention that respondent had basic human needs too and no more than 65% would be possible legally to deduct pursuant to Consumer Credit Protection Act Limitations on Withholdings for Support (15 U.S.C. 1673 (b)) 10. This child support order and others were issued by Mr. Fasone in deliberate disregard to KRICHEVSKY's human needs, because after KRICHEVSKY was fired, his unemployment insurance benefits were plundered by child support collection unit and he was left with $150 per week not counting his housing expenses, utilities, car expenses, etc. 11. This order was issued in violation of Bill of Bights and FDCPA. 12. SVENSON and her attorneys, Yoram Nakhimovsky, Michael Biancanello, and Yonatan Levoritz, in the name of the parties' child welfare in concert engaged in malicious

prosecution terrorizing respondent "as hired hit men." 13. It started in 2008 with petitioner, at the advice of her attorney, Yoram Nakhimovsky, stealing respondent's personal records, files, documents and electronic backup media, not to mention her attempts to provoke violence by, inter alia, looting respondent's apartment on 4336 Manhattan Avenue in Brooklyn. 14. It continued with Family Offence Petition falsely reporting family offence, child abuse and request for child support and ex parte order of protection on October 27, 2008. 15. By the end of that day after petitioner obtained this order of protection, she brought parties' child at respondent's place of work. They were so afraid of respondent that they started badmouthing respondent and harassing his employer, Harlan Wittenstein, Esq., by demanding that he fires respondent. 16. Petitioner falsified facts in her petition for order of protection and, during hearing, this petition was withdrawn by her before the court had any opportunity to rule. 17. Mr. Levoritz and S YENS ON committed fraud upon the court by filing fraudulent financial disclosure affidavits with the court. For example, in her family offence petition she stated that due to Mr. Krichevky's offence she and the child "temporary living in apartment her parents own" at 2620 Ocean Parkway in Brooklyn. She intentionally concealed from the court that her parents are decedents and she owns this apartment so that she could "show the court how miserable they are and how atrocious Mr. Krichevsky is." To be consistent in her statements she and her attorney Mr. Levoritz intentionally and consistently with her prior statement did not list her 2620 Ocean Parkway cooperative apartment as "Other real estate owned" under H ASSETS: e) of post-father financial disclosure affidavit, and lists

parties 120 Oceana condominium as "Residence owned" under d). During child support hearing, she admitted that she does not live therein Oceana, but collects $2825 in rent. She kept perjuring herself by continuing falsely testifying in court "She and child live in her parent's apartment" rent-free. 18. Testifying in Court that she is getting cash support from her sister from Germany is another perjury as her sister, Larissa Gaber, is on public assistance there. 19. Her attorney, Mr. Levoritz, obstructed justice through witness tampering by making her sister not to appear in court on January 6, 2010 after she was served with subpoena. 20. In post-father financial affidavit, petitioner and her attorney state that with ZIR.O assets her income is $2850 per month while expenses are over $4000. This fact was pointed out to magistrate John Fasone, but he "turned a blind eye to this fact." 21. Mr. Levoritz and petitioner spoiled evidence by destroying and/or concealing (it is unknown which) unfavorable to them evidence. 22. Petitioner and her attorney did not deny the fact that Svenson stole these documents and electronic media from respondent. 23. E3UCHEVSKY reserves his right to supplement this petition with memorandum of law, supplemental affidavit, and exhibits. WHEJ^EFOPvE, respondent respectfully moves this Court to grant this motion in its entirety, including all costs in these court's proceedings.

X MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, under duress

Sworn to before me this 18th day of July, 2013_

YELENARUVINSKAYA Notary Public, State of New York No.01RU6138024 J Qualified in Kings County / Commisaion Expires December 12,2Q__

NOTARY

EXHIBIT A

Case 1-12-43050-ess Doci

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B6I (Official Form 61) (12/07)

In re

Elena Svenson Debtors)

Case No.

SCHEDULE I - CURRENT INCOME OF INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR(S)


The column labeled "Spouse" must be completed in all cases filed by joint debtors and by every married debtor, whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spotlses are separated and a joint petition is not filed. Do not state the name of any minor child. The average monthly income calculated on this form may differ from the current monthly income calculated on Form 22A, 22B, or 22C. Debtor's Marital Status: Single Employment: Occupation Name of Employer How long employed Address of Employer RELATIONSHIP(S): Son . DEPENDENTS OF DEBTOR. AM) SPOUSE AGE(S): 17 years SPOUSE

DEBTOR Home Attendant Association for Services for the Aged 3 years 36-36 33rd Street Astoria, -NY 11106

INCOME: (Estimate of average or projected monthly income at time case filed) 1. Monthly gross wages, salary, and commissions (Prorate if not paid monthly) 2. Estimate monthly overtime 3. SUBTOTAL 4.'LESS PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS . a. Payroll taxes and social security b. Insurance c. Union dues d. Other (Specify): '

$ $ s s $ s s s
S $ $ $ $

DEBTOR 1,924.65 0.00 1,924.65

SPOUSE N/A
N/A

N/A

321.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 321.40 1,603.25


0.00 0.00 0.00
400.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

S $

$ $

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A


N/A N/A N/A

5. SUBTOTAL OF PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS 6. TOTAL NET MONTHLY TAKE HOMEPAY 7. Regular income from operation of business or profession or farm (Attach detailed statement) 8. Income from real property 9. Interest and dividends 10. Alimony, maintenance or support payments payable to the debtor for the debtor1 s use or that of dependents listed above 11. Social security or government assistance (Specify): ; .. 12. Pension or retirement income 13. Other monthly income (Specify): '

$
$ $

'

N/A N/A N/A N/A


N/A N/A N/A N/A

'$' $ $

0.00 0.00

14. SUBTOTAL OF LINES 7 THROUGH 13 15. AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME (Add amounts shown on lines 6 and 14) 16. COMBINED AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME: (Combine column totals from line 15)

400.00 .2,003.25
S

.$ S

N/A N/A

2,003.25

(Report also on Summary of Schedules and, if applicable, on Statistical Summary of Certain Liabilities and Related Data) 17 Describe any increase or decrease in income reasonably anticipated to occur within the year following the filing of this document

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS KINGS COUNTY SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT OF KINGS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COCIAL SERVICES on behalf of ELENA SVENSON, Petitioners, JUDICIAL NOTICE -againstA _ _ . 1_T _.TOTTr^ r CT rxr MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Hon-

DOCKET NO. F-28901-08/10

leanette Ruiz

Respondent.

Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se, (Hereinafter "Respondent") hereby respectfully moves this Court to take JUDICIAL NOTICE: The Courts have long held that Pro Se pleadings are to be read liberally and if there is relief available that they have failed to request, the Courts should be lenient and the Pro Se litigant should be afforded that available relief. Moore v.Florida. 703 F.2d 516 (llth Cir. 1983) Reversed and Remanded which held: "[26] 'a court should be particularly careful to ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant.' Herron v. Beck. 693 F.2d at 127. See also Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1129 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding district court abused its discretion...failing to afford to a pro se civil rights litigant..." "[37] The pleadings of pro se litigants... subject to less stringent rules. '..., however rnartfully drafted, must be held to less rigorous standards than.. .by lawyers.5 Woodall v. Fotl 651 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); see Richardson V.Fleming. 651 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1981)." F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assoc.. 66 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 1995) "reiterating general rule and outlining exception for pro se litigants..." "We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally." Tannenbaum v. United States. 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (llth Cir. 1998) We give a "liberal" reading to pro se filings because those litigants lack formal legal training. See GJR Invs.. 132 F.3d at 1369 ("Courts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.").

In Gravdenv. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (llth Cir. 09/17/2003) the Court held: "The law does not entertain the legal fiction that every individual has achieved a state of legal omniscience; ... there is no presumption that all of the citizens actually know all of the law all of the time. Practically speaking, citizens must educate themselves about the law" See West Covina. 525 U.S. at 241, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that an individual "can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him"); id. at 242, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that a citizen "could not reasonably be expected to educate himself about the procedures available to protect his interests"); United States v. Locke. 471 U.S. 84, 108, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1799-1800 (1985)" Mr. Krichevsky, representing himself, invokes the doctrine of staire decisis and the United States Supreme Court's Rulings and Rulings of other Appellate and Civil Courts concerning Pro Se pleadings and requests this Honorable Court take Judicial Notice: "Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers." Jenkins v. McKeithen. 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 151 Fed 2nd 240: Pucket v. Cox. 456 2nd 233 "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers, which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment." Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.. 303 U.S. 197 (1938) "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiffs Pleadings without regard to technicalities." Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway. 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals "Pro Se parties have the right to Appeal, and submit their briefs on appeal even though they may be inartfully drawn", see Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998), "Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigant's consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result." U. S. v. Sanchez. 88 F.3d 1243 (B.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine

if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis. 526 E2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) quoting Bramletv. Wilson 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1971). The history of bias and prejudice against pro se litigants within the Courts is long. Stephen Elias who had been with Nolo Press, the nation's leading publisher of self-help law books, back in 1997, in an article Bias Against Pro Per Litigants... stated: "From the moment they first contact the court system, most people who want to represent themselves, without a lawyer, encounter tremendous resistance. Within the closed universe of the courts, this bias is as pernicious as that based on race, ethnic origins or sex." "People who cannot afford a lawyer are a rebuke to the organized bar's monopoly..., because that monopoly is morally-if not legally-justified... the ABA has admitted that 100 million Americans can't afford lawyers." "... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws." Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905 "We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See Dioguardi v. Burning, 139 F.2D 774 (CA2 1944)." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519. JUDICIAL NOTICE IN REGARD TO RESPONDENT'S CASE NEW YORK CPLR Rule 4514. Impeachment of witness by prior inconsistent statement: "In addition to impeachment in the manner permitted by common law, any party may introduce proof that any witness has made a prior statement inconsistent with his testimony if the statement was made in a writing subscribed by him or was made under oath. In this case, Petitioner's statement on Family Offence Petition and two financial disclosure affidavits, as well as her testimony during hearing are inconsistent and misleading: a) On post-father disclosure affidavit petitioner claims zero cash and income of $2825 per month versus $4245 expense per month.

b) During hearing she testified that in 2009 she borrowed $10,000 from her sister, Larissa Gaber to pay her lawyers, and paid $5000 each to her attorneys Levoritz and Biancanello, while omitting the fact that before them she paid attorney Yoram Nakhimovsky who worked on her three different lawsuits against respondent for about six month. Respondent served petitioner's sister, Larissa Gaber, with witness subpoena. No excuse and/or notice was given to respondent by adverse party regarding unavailability of her for trial - missing witness charge and ground for MISTRIAL.

Petitioner's attorney made the following statement on Page 70 (Exhibit A) line 2-7 of October 8, 2009 hearing: "Your Honor, unfortunately, in certain communities it does happen where nonlawyers actually own law firms, and it's a lawyer that's used as a front". This is defamatory and racially discriminatory statement designed to influence bias and prejudice of court against respondent and the ground for MISTRIAL.

Hearing was forced before discovery completed, while motion was pending and respondent did not get his chance to depose petitioner. Violation of due process law, Constitution and ground for MISTRIAL

Supreme Court Decisions on Void Orders - Rulings made in violation of Due Process are void. A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also Restatements,

Judgments ' 4(b). Prather v Lloyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910. The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. ... It is not entitled to enforcement ... All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur Judgments " 44, 45. It is a fundamental doctrine of law that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. CONCLUSION Respondent is invoking his Rights and Immunities guaranteed him by both the State of New York Constitution and The Constitution of The United States of America, and respectfully moves the Court to take Judicial Notice of staire decisis when ruling on respondent's pro se pleadings. Respectfully submitted, this 18th day of July, 2013, Brooklyn, New York Michel Kiichevsky, PRO SE.

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