Herman Khan. About Doomsday machine.
(From “On thermonuclear war”), p. 144-155
Not Look or Be Too Dangerous
I would like to start this section on "not looking or being too dangerous" with somecomments on the strategic theory of three conceptualized devices, which I will call theDoomsday Machine, the Doomsday-in-a-Hurry Machine, and the Homicide Pact Machine.Discussing these idealized (almost caricaturized) devices will both focus attention on the mostspectacular and ominous possibilities and
clarify a good deal of current strategic thinking.
ADoomsday weapons system might be imaginatively (and entirely hypothetically) described asfollows: Assume that for, say, $10 billion we could build a device whose only function is todestroy all human life.
3
The device is protected from enemy action (perhaps by being putthousands of feet underground) and then connected to a computer which is in turn connected, bya reliable communication system, to hundreds of sensory devices all over the United States. Thecomputer would then be programmed so that if, say, five nuclear bombs exploded over theUnited States, the device would be triggered and the earth destroyed. Barring such things ascoding errors (an important technical consideration) the above machine would seem to be the"ideal" Type I Deterrent. If Khrushchev should order an attack, both Khrushchev and the Soviet population would be automatically and efficiently annihilated. (The emphasis is deliberate. Thisdeterrent is more efficient since in most practical cases deterrents destroy populations—notdecision makers.)Even though it is the ultimate in Type I Deterrence, the Doomsday Machine is anunsatisfactory basis for a weapon system. It is most improbable that either the Soviet or U.S.governments would ever authorize procuring such a machine. The project is expensive enough soit would be subject to a searching budgetary and operational scrutiny—a scrutiny which wouldraise questions it could never survive.Before considering these questions, let us discuss how one might adapt the DoomsdayMachine to Type II and Type III Deterrent purposes. For reasons that will become clear, I wouldlike to call this model the Doomsday-in-a-Hurry Machine. The computer would be given all thefacilities it would need to be "well informed" about world affairs. We could then unilaterallylegislate into existence a
Sovet (or Chinese) Criminal Code.
3 While I would not care to guess the exact form that a reasonably efficient Dooms-day machine would take, I would be willing to conjecture that if the project were started today and sufficiently well supported one could have such a machine by1970. I would also guess that the cost would be between 10 and 100 billion dollars. Even then it might not be possible to destroygroups of especially well-prepared people, The mechanism would use most likely not involve the breaking up of the earth, butthe creation of really large amounts of radioactivity or the causing of major climatic changes or, less likely, the extreme use of thermal effects.
This would list in great detail all the acts which the Soviets were not allowed to commit.The Soviets would then be informed that if the computer detects them in any violations it will blow up the world. The logicians (and some so-called practical men) might then believe that wehad solved all of our deterrence problems. After all, we will now have drawn a line across whichthe Soviets would not dare to cross. We could relax forever our interest in defense and turn our attention to other matters.Unfortunately, the world is not that simple. First, the Soviets would rush to build their ownmachine. There would be a rather hectic race to publish first. This race to publish first involvesmore than prestige. There almost has to be an incompatibility between the two sets of rules, since
paragraph one of each probably states that the opponent shall not build a Doomsday Machine! Tomany people, to build a Doomsday Machine would be the most provoking thing short of anattack that the opponent could do. In fact, because it may destroy so many people, some find itmore provoking than an attack. It should also be noted that even if we succeed in publishing first,and even if the Soviets believe our machine will work as advertised and are deterred from publishing, trouble is still almost certain. It will simply turn out in practice that it is impossible todraw a useful and unambiguous line for most Type III situations—it may even be difficult todraw an unambiguous line for all possible Type I and Type II situations. The first time there is adifference in interpretation, the world will be blown up.Let us examine the use of both imaginary Doomsday Machines as deterrents in moredetail. Table 29 lists some desirable characteristics of a deterrent.TABLE 29DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A DETERRENT1. Frightening2. Inexorable3. Persuasive4. Cheap
5. Nonaccident prone6. ControllableAs far as the first five characteristics are concerned, both of the Doomsday Machines arelikely to be better than any current or proposed competitor for deterrence. They are as
frightening
as anything that can be devised. They are more
inexorable
since they can be madealmost invulnerable to direct physical destruction (electromagnetic waves which would set themoff go faster than shock waves which might destroy the device); the operation is in principle sosimple and reliable that one can really believe it will work (as opposed to some complex weaponsystem which requires the split-second coordination and almost perfect operation of manycomplex parts in a strange postattack environment); and the automaticity eliminates the humanelement, including any possibility of a loss of resolve as a result of either humanitarianconsideration or threats by the enemy.The machines are certainly
persuasive.
Even an Idiot should be able to understand their capabilities. Most likely such machines would be
cheap
compared to present weaponsexpenditures.Finally, they are probably relatively
foolproof,
in the sense that the probability of anaccidental or unauthorized triggering should be low — that is, while the possibility of anunauthorized or accidental use of such a machine will, in spite of all precautions, be too high to be acceptable, it will still be lower than the probability of such an action in complicated anddispersed systems as Polaris, Minuteman, airborne alert, and so on. The Doomsday weapon sys-tem is so simple that one can see clearly most of the places where trouble can occur, and one cantake all possible precautions.The difficulties lie in item 6 of Table 29. The Doomsday Machine is not sufficiently
controllable.
Even though it maximizes the probability that deterrence will work (includingminimizing the probability of accidents or miscalculations), it is totally unsatisfactory. One muststill examine the consequences of a failure. In this case a failure kills too many people and killsthem too automatically. There is no chance of human intervention, control, and final decision.And even if we give up the computer and make the Doomsday Machine reliably controllable bythe decision makers, it is still not controllable enough. Neither NATO nor the United States, and possibly not even the Soviet Union, would be willing to spend billions of dollars to give a fewindividuals this particular kind of life and death power over the entire world.Ir one were presenting a military briefing advocating some special weapons systems as adeterrent and examined only the first five qualities on the list, the Doomsday Machine might
seem better than any alternative system. Nevertheless, the Doomsday Machine is unacceptableThis could imply that either some of the weapons systems currently being proposed are alsounacceptable, or that the way we talk about these weapons systems is wrong—very likely both.Most decision makers, if forced to choose between accommodation to the point of surrender, alarge risk of surprise attack, and buying a Doomsday Machine, would choose one of the first twoas against the last one.I have been surprised at the unanimity with which the notion of the unacceptability of aDoomsday Machine is greeted. I used to be wary of discussing the concept for fear that somecolonel would get out a General Operating Requirement or Development Planning Objective for the device, but it seems that I need not have worried. Except by some scientists and engineerswho have overemphasized the single objective of maximizing the effectiveness of deterrence, thedevice is universally rejected. It just does not look professional to senior military officers, and itlooks even worse to senior civilians. The fact that more than a few scientists and engineers doseem attracted to the idea is disquieting, but as long as the development project is expensive,even these dedicated experts are unlikely to get one under way.To the extent that the Department of Defense and the Executive Office are interested ingetting support for budgets and proposals, they should make it very clear that they are notadvocating Doomsday Machines in any form. The closer a weapons system is to a DoomsdayMachine, the less satisfactory it becomes. The military people may have hurt their case byappearing (often inadvertently) to be oblivious to the Doomsday aspect of some of the publicdiscussions of the military problem. They have also looked parochial to many observers, for some of the time they seem to advocate the most narrow and shortsighted views rather than showa concern with the over-all security of the United States or the Free World. For example, some of the talk about using "quality" weapons for occasions when they are clearly inappropriateautomatically gives an appearance of callousness to such larger issues as the importance of preserving the implicit agreement not to use nuclear weapons or the legitimate fear of escalation.(Both of these problems are discussed later.)Attempts to use the threat of all-out nuclear war to deter minor provocations are even moredisturbing, looking much like the Dooms-day-in-a-Hurry Machine. I would agree with theseobjections. Any attempts to get security cheaply by the use of even sanitized versions of theDoomsday-in-a-Hurry Machine are likely to cause more harm than good, to create moreinsecurity than security. To the extent that the appearance of a narrow professional approachimages reality, the parochialism itself is dangerous and should arouse hostile reaction. To theextent that the appearance is illusory, our military leaders are unnecessarily hurting their case. If military leaders (including senior civilians) expect to exert the influence on these issues that theyshould, they must make it clear that they are speaking from a viewpoint of over-all national andhuman interests first; and they must examine their programs from time to time from this same position. In my opinion, they do this more often than they are given credit for, but less often thanthey should.The unacceptability of the Doomsday Machine raises awkward, unpleasant, andcomplicated questions that must be considered by both policy maker and technician. If it is notacceptable to risk the lives of the three billion inhabitants of the earth in order to protectourselves from surprise attack, then
how many people would we be willing to risk?
I believe that both the United States and NATO would reluctantly be willing to envisage the
possibility
of oneor two hundred million people (i.e., about five times more than World War II deaths) dying fromthe immediate effects, even if one does not include deferred long-term effects due to radiation, if an all-out thermonuclear war results from a failure of Type I Deterrence. With somewhat morecontroversy, similar numbers would apply to Type II Deterrence. (For example, some expertswould concede the statement for an all-out Soviet nuclear attack on Europe, but not if the Sovietsrestricted themselves to the use of conventional weapons.) We are willing to live with the possibility partly because we think of it as a remote possibility. We do not expect either kind of deterrence to fail, and we do not expect the results to be that cataclysmic if deterrence does fail.
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