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Red Lines
(Particularly sensitive questions that
shouldnot be
asked)
Diplomacy
(Albright,
Powell)
•
Private sensitive discussions with
friendly
foreign
officials
Military
(Cohen, Rumsfeld)
•
Specific capabilities
and
deployments
of
military forces
•
Current intelligence
and
military operations against
al
Qaeda
Intelligence Policy
(Tenet)
•
Open discussion
of
capture
vs.
kill authorities
•
Specific covert operations
and
their authoritiesSources and methods
National Policy Coordination
(Berger, Clarke, Armitage)
•
Private advice
to the
President (for current
officials)
•
Specific discussions
of
covert action
(per
guidelines)
 
CLANDESTINE
&
COVERT ACTION
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS
FOR
GEORGE
J.
TENET
Designated
Commissioners: Fred Fielding
&
Jamie Gorelick
1)
A
Global Strategy
of
Renditions
and
Disruptions.
The
CIA
pursued
a
global
strategy
of
renditions
anddisruptionsfor
going
after
al
Qaeda in the
period
before
9-
11.The
DCI
has
testified
that these
efforts
prevented
a
number
of
terrorist
attacks
and
saved American lives.
a.
How effective were the
CIA's
global
efforts
at disrupting al Qaeda
cells
before
9/11?b.
Given that
al
Qaeda
was
turning
out
thousands
of
operatives
from
its
trainingcamps,
how
much impact
did a
rendition strategy have
on
staunchingterrorism before
9/11?
2)
Covert Action Strategy.
The CIA
needed
a new
strategy
in
terrorist
safe-havens
such
as
Afghanistan,
where
the
U.S. government
was
unable
to
gain
the
cooperation
of
the
Taliban movement
in
arresting
or
extraditing
Bin
Ladin.
The CIA
began
employing
proxy forces
to
plan
operations against
Bin
Ladin
in
Afghanistan
as
earlyas
1997,
and
actively used them
to carry out
operations
after
August 1998.
The CIA
made
efforts
to
expand
proxy options,
and
develop more unilateral sources,
in a newoperational
strategy called "The Plan
"
introduced
in
mid-1999.
But the
proxy
strategy
continued until
9-11.
a.
Without going into specific operations, please describe
the
CIA's
overallcovert action strategy before
9/11.
b.
What
werethe
goals
of
this strategy?
c. Did the
strategy itself,
and its
goals, change
in the
years leading
up to
9/11
?d. How
effective
do you
think
the
CIA's
covert action strategy
was in
meeting
these
goals before
9/11?
In
late 2000,
the CIA
developed
an
offensive
initiative
for Afghanistan
focused more
on
eliminating
the
Afghanistan
terrorist sanctuary than
Bin
Ladin
himself.
The
Bush
administration
built
on
these plans
as
part
of
its
Afghan
policy.
e.
Without going into specific operations, were
the
CIA's
efforts
against
Bin
Ladin
and al
Qaeda
in the first 8
months
of the
Bush administration
effectively
different
than what
it had
been doing during
the
Clintonadministration?
f.
Specifically,
how
different
was the
Bush administration's covert actionstrategy developed before
9/11
from
what
the CIA had
already
been
pursuing?
-1
-
 
g. If
implemented before
9/11,
how
effective
do you
think this
strategy
wouldhave been
in
reducing
the
terrorist threat?
3) The Assassination Ban.
Senior legal advisersin theClinton administration have
toldus
that, even
before
August 1998,
they
had
determined that Executive Order12333 banning assassination
did not
apply
in the
case
of
Bin
Ladin. Killing
Bin
Ladin,
they explained,
-would
be justified in
terms
ofself-defense
according
to the law
of
armed
conflict.
How would
a
covert action designed
to
kill
Bin
Ladin,
or
which might likelyresult
in the
death
of Bin
Ladin,
be
consistent with
the
Executive Order banningassassination?
4)
Sufficient Covert Action Authority.
Some working-level
officers
in the
CIA's
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) have told
us
they never
had the
covert authority theywanted
to
effectively
go
after
Bin
Ladin
before
9/11.
a.
In
your opinion,
did the CIA
receive
appropriate
and
sufficient covert actionauthority to go
after
Bin Ladin before 9/11?
b. Did you
ever express
to the
policymakers,
at any
point before
9/11,
a
concernthatthe CIA hadinsufficient covert action authorityto go
after
BinLadin?
c. Did you
ever
ask for authorities
regarding
Bin
Ladin before
9/11
that
you did
not get?
5) CIA
Direct Action
in
Afghanistan.
Although
the CIA did
send
its
officers
onhazardous
missions
in
Afghanistan
before
9/11, it did not use its own
personnel
toactively
go
after
Bin
Ladin.
Yet
after
9/11,CIA
personnel were used
to
great
effect
inAfghanistan
against
al
Qaeda
andTaliban
forces, operating
in an
extremelydangerousenvironment.
a. Did the CIA
ever
put its own
personnel
on the
ground
in
Afghanistan
to go
after
BinLadin rather than relyingonproxy forces before
9/11?b.
If not, why not?
6) Using Proxies.
For three years, from August 1998 to 9/11, the CIA actively used
Afghan
tribal assetstogather intelligenceandcarryoutcovert actionsin
Afghanistan
against
Bin
Ladin
before
9/11.
During this period,
CIA
senior managers told
us
they
were always wary
of
the
reliability
of
the
tribals'
intelligence. Moreover,
the
tribals
do
not
appear
to have carried out a single operation against Bin Ladin or hisprincipal lieutenants
before
9-11.
a.
Without getting into specific operations, what were
the
problems
and
benefits
involvedin
working with
the
Afghan tribal
assets
in
Afghanistan before
9-11?
b. How
reliable were they
as
intelligence
reporters?c. How
confident
were you at the
time that
they
would
actually
carry
out covert
actions?
Did
this confidence increase
or
decrease
over time?
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of 00

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