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THE
WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
RECEVED
June
11,
2003
JUN 1 ]
2003
Daniel Marcus, Esq.General CounselNationalCommission
on
Terrorist Attacks Upon
the
United States2100KStreetN.W.Washington,D.C. 20037Dear
Mr. Marcus:
As
you know, the President has clearly stated a policy of support for the work of theNational Commission
on
Terrorist Attacks Upon
the
United
States
("Commission").
Consistent
with
that policy, and as a matter of comity between the legislative and executive branches, we
previously
provided
a set of
documents,
as
pages numbered
1-572,
in
response
to the
Commission's
"EOF
Document Request
No. 1,"
dated
May 13,
2003 (the
"Request").
Subsequently, at your request, we provided an opportunity for you and Mr. Philip Zelikow toreview the
full,
un-redacted textof thedocuments
we^
provided
in
response
to theRequest,
including
all portions
which
had been marked as
"non-responsive."
Following
your
review,
you
requested that
we
provide certain additional portions
of
these documents
to the
Commission. While
we do not
concede that
the
enclosed materials
are
responsive to the Request or relevant to the Commission's inquiry, we are providing them as anaccommodation.
_
The enclosed documents comprise additional portions of: (i) one transcript of an
interview
conducted by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of the Washington Post with President
Bush;
(ii) two transcripts of interviews conducted by Woodward with National Security Advisor
Cond'oleezza
Rice; and (iii) one transcript of interviews conducted by Woodward and Balz with
Deputy
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.
These
pages are numbered as in the originalset of documents provided in response to the Request, so that the pages can be substituted forthosein the original response. Also enclosed is the transcript of a press conference held by Dr.
Rice
on May
16, 2002, which
is
publicly available, including
on the
White
House
web
site.
These materialsare
furnished
pursuantto alltermsandconditions statedin the May 21,
2003
letterto you
from
theCounselto thePresidentand in my May 23,2003 lettertoyou.Sincerely yours,David
G.
LeitchDeputy Counsel to the President
 
J^ational
Security Advisor
Holds
Press
Briefing Page
1 of 9
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l
(
President George
W.
Bush
HIM
1 1
?flfn
For
Immediate
Release
uun
 
LUU.J
Office
ol
the
Press Secretary
May
16,
2002
National
Commission
on
National Security
Advisor
Holds Press
Briefing
Terrorist
Attacks
Press
Briefing
by
National Security Advisor
Dr.
Condoleezza Rice
The
James
S.
Brady Briefing Room
4:1
0P.M.
EOT
DR.
RICE: Good afternoon. I'm going to give you a chronology of the events that occurred during the spring andsummer
of
2001
 
But I
want
to
start with
a
little definitional
work.
Whenwe
talk about
threats,
they
come
in
many
varieties.
Very
often we have uncorroborated information; sometimes we have corroborated but very generalinformation. But I can tell you that it is almost never the case that we have information that is specific as to time,place,ormethodof
attack.
In
the
period starting
in
December 2000,
the
intelligence community started reporting increase
in
traffic
_
concerningterrorist activities.In theApril-May time frame, therewasspecific threat reporting aboutalQaeda
attacks
against U.S. targets or interest that might be in the works.
Now,
there was a clear concern that something was up, that something was coming, but it was principally focused
overseas.
Theareasofthose concern weretheMiddle East,theArabian Peninsula,andEurope.
In
the June time frame, arrests for the
Mllennium
plot, there was testimony by the participants in the Millenniumplot that Abu Zabeda had said that there might be interest in attacking the United States. And this comes out of
testimony
that
was
there
as a
result
of the
Millennium plot.
And
then
in
June
- on
June 26th, there
was a
threatspike, and as a result, again focusing overseas, the State Department issued a worldwide caution. Again, that
was
June
26th, and
youjjrobably
remember that
caution.
Now,
the FAA wasalso concernedofthreatstoU.S. citizens suchasairline hijackings,andtherefore, issuedan
information
circular
-
and an
information circular goes
out the
private carriers from
law
enforcement
--
saying that
we
have a concern. That was a June 22nd information circular.
At
the end of
June, there
was a
status
of
threat
and
action meeting that
the --
what
we
call
the
Counterterrorism
Security
Group
-- it is a
group that
is
interagency that meets
on the
direction
of an NSC
Special Assistant, DickClarke
at
that
time.
There
was a
meeting
of
that,
and
Dick
Clarke
reported
to me
that
steps
were
being
taken
by
the CSG.
OnJuly 2nd, as a result of some of that work, the FBI released
a
message saying
that
there are threats to be
worried
about overseas,but wecannot--whilewecannot foresee attacks domestically,wecannot rule them out.
This
is an inlet, and again, an inlet goes out to law enforcement from the FBI.
On
July 2nd,
the FAA
issued another
1C,
saying that Ressam
--
again
associated with
the
Millennium plot
-
saidthat there
was an
intention
of
using
explosives
in an
airport
terminal.
This
was a
very
specific
1C.
On
July 5th, the threat reporting had become sufficiently robust, though not, again, very specific, but sufficiently
robust,
there was a lot of chatter in the system, that in his morning meeting the President asked me to go back
and
to see what was being done about all of the chatter that was there. Andy Card and I met that afternoon with
Dick Clarke,
and Dick Clarke informed us that he had already had a meeting of the CSG core group and that he
was
holding another meeting that afternoon that would be focused on threats, and that would bring the domestic
agencies
intotheCSG.
On
July 6th,the CSGcore playersmetagain because therewasconcern about--very high concern about
000573
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/print/20020516-13.html
6/11/2003
 
THE
PRESIDENT:No,before,
the
night before.
Oh,afterwards,
yes, yes,
yes.
MS.
HUGHES:
The
smaller
NSC
meeting after
the
first broaderNSC meeting.
Q
That's right, there were
two.MS.
HUGHES:
He says,
we've
got five questions: Who are the
targets?
How
much evidence
do we
need?
How
soon
do we
act?
The
sooner
we
act,
the
more public support we'll have
if there'scollateral
damage, but some major strikes could take up to 60
days
to put
together.
Four,
are
there
any
targets that
are off
limits?
Five,
do we
include
the
allies. Last,
we
have
to setdeclaratory
policy announced to the world what
we're
doing.THE PRESIDENT: Let me say -- this gives me a chance to stepback. We've got a fabulous team. Really. All of whom are
working
together,
all of
whom
I
hope
feel like
-- I
know
they've
got
their
say.
But one of the
thing~s
I
wanted them
to
know,
rightoff the
bat, was, this
is the
main focus
of
this
administration.
This
is"
it,
this
is our
moment
to
show
the
American
people we can lead and win this
war.
I
don't
think
there's any
doubt
in any of
their minds.
Q But on the
12th, Wednesday,
the
discussion
of the
military,did
"the
notion
of,
we're
not
going
to
do"a pin-prick
strike
--
THE
PRESIDENT:
Probably.
Listen,
I was -- I
can't
remember
specifically,
but I do
know
that_the
entire time
I
kept talking
about,
I
expect there
to be
justice,
I
said, this
is
going
to
take
along time.I
knew
thatone of my
jobs
was toexplainto
the
American people how
we're
going to fight and win this war,
thatit
required
a
great deal
of
patience; that this
was
going
to
take a lot
longer.
NON-RESPONSIVE
MATERIAL
I was in a
hurry
to get a
strategy.
I
wanted
the
military
to
move
as
quickly
as
possible.
It
became
clear the
military
wasn't.
But,
Bob, right off from the get-go, I said,
1
want to be as
fierce
andtoughas
possible. Because
I
understand
this,
that
2.52.
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