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This paper is published by Chatham Houseand the Institute of Iranian Studies,University of St Andrews
Preliminary Analysis of the VotingFigures in Iran’s 2009 PresidentialElection
Editor:Professor Ali Ansari, Director, Institute of Iranian Studies,University of St Andrews; Associate Fellow, Middle East andNorth Africa Programme, Chatham House; author, ‘Iran,Islam and Democracy’Research and Analysis:Daniel Berman and Thomas Rintoul, Institute of IranianStudies, University of St Andrews
21 June 2009
Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to government orto any political body. It does not hold opinions of its own; the viewsexpressed in this text are the responsibility of the authors. Thisdocument is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, theauthors and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the dateof the publication.
 
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Electionwww.chathamhouse.org.uk2
Executive Summary
Working from the province by province breakdowns of the 2009 and 2005results, released by the Iranian Ministry of Interior, and from the 2006 censusas published by the official Statistical Centre of Iran, the following observationsabout the official data and the debates surrounding it can be made.
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 In two Conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a turnout ofmore than 100% was recorded.
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 At a provincial level, there is no correlation between the increasedturnout, and the swing to Ahmadinejad. This challenges the notionthat his victory was due to the massive participation of a previouslysilent Conservative majority.
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 In a third of all provinces, the official results would require thatAhmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, and allformer centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of formerReformist voters, despite a decade of conflict between these twogroups.
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 In 2005, as in 2001 and 1997, conservative candidates, andAhmadinejad in particular, were markedly unpopular in rural areas.That the countryside always votes conservative is a myth. The claimthat this year Ahmadinejad swept the board in more rural provincesflies in the face of these trends.
 
Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Electionwww.chathamhouse.org.uk3
1. Irregularities in Voter Turnout
Two provinces show a turnout of over 100% and four more show a turnout ofover 90%. Regional variations in participation have disappeared. There is nocorrelation between the increase in participation, and the swing toAhmadinejad.
 
Firstly, there is a massive across the board increase in turnout, with severalprovinces increasing their participation rate by nearly 75%. This increaseresults in substantially less variation in turnout between provinces, with thestandard deviation amongst provincial turnouts falling by just over 23% since2005. The 2005 results show a substantial turnout gap, with seven provincesrecording turnout below 60%, and ten above 70%. In 2009, only two werebelow 70% and 24 were above 80%. In fact, 21 out of 30 provinces hadturnouts within 5% of 83%. The data seems to suggest that regional variationsin participation have suddenly disappeared.This makes the evident lack of any sort of correlation between those provincesthat saw an increase in turnout and those that saw a swing to Ahmadinejad(see Fig.1) all the more unusual. There is no significant correlation betweenthe increase in participation for a given province, and the swing toAhmadinejad (see Fig.1). This lack of correlation makes the argument thatincreased participation by a previously silent conservative majority won theelection for Ahmadinejad somewhat problematic.Furthermore, there are concerns about the numbers themselves. Twoprovinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, have results which indicate that more voteswere cast on 12 June than there were eligible voters, and that four moreprovinces had turnouts in the mid-nineties.In a country where allegations of ‘tombstone voting’ – the practice of using theidentity documents of the deceased to cast additional ballots – are both long-standing and widespread, this result is troubling but perhaps not unexpected.This problem did not start with Ahmadinejad; according to official statisticsgathered by the International institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistancein Stockholm, there were 12.9% more registered voters at the time ofMohammed Khatami’s 2001 victory than there were citizens of voting age.In conclusion, a number of aspects of the reported turnout figures areproblematic. The massive increases from 2005, the collapse of regionalvariations, and the absence of any clear correlation between increases inturnout and increased support for any candidate on their own make the resultsproblematic.
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