IN THE PROBATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTYSTATE OF GEORGIA
RE: ESTATE OF GENEVA S. CAFFREY*** Probate Case No.: 2002-1161** ___________________________________________________________________________
MR. STEGEMAN’S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO MR. LILLIG’SMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENTCOMES NOW, Mr. Stegeman, and pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-56, files this Brief in Response to Mr. Lillig’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Following the filing of Objection to Mr. Lillig’s discharge, there is a six months period of Discovery. Mr. Lillighas not responded to the Objection according to paperwork filed by Mr. Turner when hefiled the Motion for Summary Judgement. The proper procedure in the State of GeorgiaProbate Courts in the State of Georgia that following a Motion such as the Motion of Objection filed by Mr. Stegeman there is a six month Discovery period. Considering theMotion objecting to Mr. Lillig’s discharge of Administration has gone unanswered, showsan admission of guilt.A genuine issue of material facts exists regarding the Objection to Mr. Lillig’sDischarge this is shown by the lack of answer to said Objection.Perjury was committed in order to keep the frivolous Superior Court lawsuitgoing. Again Mr. Turner went further on to perjure himself to Judge Hunter when heassured her that Mr. Lillig would have Letters of Testamentary within 180 days. Hecould not know that for fact as there were Two Wills. The hearing did not happenuntil two months after the 180 days and the question of the Two Wills still was notsettled even then. Not until Mr. Lillig was granted Personal Representation could Mr.Lillig be given letters of Testamentary. Therefore, the perjury committed gave theupper hand in favor of Mr. Lillig in a Superior Court suit. Fraud obviously had beencommitted.The laws governing the Probate Courts of Georgia state that if the Estate has been properly and fully administered and there are not enough funds to pay debts of the Estateto answer using 43-7-10. It is not to be used as an excuse for misappropriating funds,fraud, grand larceny, theft, etc.
53-7-10. (a) For purposes of this article, the term 'personal representative' includestemporary administrators.(b) When an action is brought against a personal representative in that person
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srepresentative capacity, the personal representative may make the following defenses:(1) That person does not occupy the position of personal representative, as alleged;(2) That no assets have come into the hands of the personal representative;
(3) That all assets coming into the hands of the personal representative have been fullyadministered;(4) That all assets coming into the hands of the personal representative have been fullyadministered except those necessary to satisfy debts of a greater priority;(5) That the personal representative has fully administered the assets that came into the personal representative
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s hands; or (6) That, pending the action, the letters testamentary or of administration have beenrevoked and the administration committed to another to whom all the assets that cameinto the personal representative
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s hands have been delivered.
The following is to be followed in the case of fraud, theft, misappropriating funds,etc.:
53-7-54.(a) If a personal representative or temporary administrator commits abreach of fiduciary duty or threatens to commit a breach of fiduciary duty, a beneficiaryof a testate estate or heir of an intestate estate shall have a cause of action:(1) To recover damages;(2) To compel the performance of the personal representative's or temporaryadministrator's duties;(3) To enjoin the commission of a breach of fiduciary duty;(4) To compel the redress of a breach of fiduciary duty by payment of money or otherwise;(5) To appoint another personal representative or temporary administrator to take possession of the estate property and administer the estate;(6) To remove the personal representative or temporary administrator; and (7) To reduce or deny compensation to the personal representative or temporaryadministrator.(b) When estate assets are misapplied and can be traced in the hands of persons affected with notice of misapplication, a trust shall attach to the assets.(c) The provision of remedies for breach of fiduciary duty by this Code section does not prevent resort to any other appropriate remedy provided by statute or common law.53-7-55. Upon the petition of any person having an interest in the estate or whenever it appears to the probate court that good cause may exist to revoke the lettersof a personal representative or impose other sanctions, the court shall cite the personal representative to answer to the charge. Upon investigation, the court may, in the court'sdiscretion:(1) Revoke the personal representative's letters;(2) Require additional security;(3) Require the personal representative to appear and submit to a settlement of accounts following the procedure set forth in Article 6 of this chapter, whether or not the personal representative has first resigned or been removed and whether or not a successor fiduciary has been appointed; or (4) Issue such other order as in the court's judgment is appropriate under thecircumstances of the case.
Mr. Lillig is not entitled to Summary Judgment. If there is a SummaryJudgement, it should be in the favor of Mr. Stegeman who has always shown good faithand even though he is representing himself is trying to follow the laws, procedures andformats of The Probate Court of DeKalb County. Mr. Stegeman honored the contractconcerning the Caveat, “Exhibit A”. Mr. Lillig had Mr. Turner inform Wachovia that theCaveat contract had been violated and not to release the account to the rightful owner(s)“Exhibit B”1. O.C.G.A. 13-5-5* assures Mr. Stegeman the right to declare the contractvoided, which he has done. Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding “ExhibitC” signed by both Ms. Williams and Mr. Turner was intentionally altered by Mr. Lilligand Mr. Turner “Exhibit C”.2. O.C.G.A. 13-4-1* assures that the alteration of the Memorandum of Understanding shows the intention of defrauding Mr. Stegeman and thereby voids thewhole contract. Using the Memorandum of Understanding’s contract of Withdrawal of Caveat after voiding the contract not only proves to be fraudulent, but Mr. Lillig and Mr.Turner have perjured themselves under Oath to the Probate Court of DeKalb County.Mr. Lillig and Mr. Turner have shown that perjury while under Oath is the norm.Beginning with the first Petitions they filed with The Probate Court perjury while under Oath has been a constant practice “Exhibit D”3. O.C.G.A. 13-6-1* allows Mr. Stegeman compensation for any injury sustained by Mr. Stegeman because of the breach of the contract by Mr. Lillig. Not only did Mr.Lillig never intend on upholding his part of the Memorandum of Understanding contract, but he committed fraud by not honoring the contract and using the Withdrawal anyway because The Memorandum of Understanding contract directly tied the Civil Suit Action No.: 02-CV-9732 to the Withdrawal of Caveat, one dependant on the other.4. O.C.G.A. 13-4-22* allows Mr. Stegeman the right to maintain an actionagainst the party that did not perform, he waited to see if Mr. Lillig would perform hisobligation under the new Consent Order that had to be drawn up by Mr. Apolinsky inwhich Mr. Lillig again breached the contract therefore Mr. Stegeman is entitled to the feecharged by Mr. Apolinsky in the sum of $5,000.00. “Exhibit E” Since TheMemorandum of Understanding contract had been breached by Mr. Lillig thus voidingthe contract, Mr. Lillig could not use the Withdrawal of Caveat. Mr. Lillig could only usethe Withdrawal of Caveat under the Consent Order contract was signed and filed withSuperior Court.Again, Mr. Lillig had agreed to help Mr. Stegeman with the Wachovia problem andfurnish all paperwork to him, this never happened and in fact ended up costing moremoney and precious time only to find out that the Wachovia accounts have been drained,thus violating that contract also.The fact is that according to Certified Bank Records, in June 2002 there was nomarginal loan against any of the holdings at Wachovia. According to Mr. Joyner’sAffidavit, there had been a balance of a credit card of $150,000. Upon obtaining theWachovia accounts, Mr. Stegeman has a $150,000 marginal debt showing and no assets backing it up. “Exhibit F”.Both contracts signed by Mr. Lillig agreed that the Estate of Jean S. Caffrey wasresponsible for all of Ms. Caffrey’s debts. Fact remains that Mr. Stegeman, co-signer of
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Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
DeKalb County Probate Court, after the fee for paying this refused to allow the filing. Mr. Fowler, Judge Rosh's law clerk told Mr. Stegeman on the phone that he would not be allowed to file anything in response to Summary Judgment or any other documents. The phone conversation is taped!
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