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Mike MackusMay 8
th
, 2009Professor BoltonPhil 297Ethical Projectivism in
Treatise
Hume’s moral theory is particularly interesting because we are able to read it in so manydifferent ways. However, the various interpretations of it that we may offer become complicated by the fact that Hume did not even seem so sure himself. The
Treatise
as Hume’s science of themind gives us a picture of what we might call our natural inclinations towards certain attitudes inregards to and assessments of particular actions. In order to get a clear picture of Hume’s accountand to decide how we might want to interpret it in accordance with other elements of Hume’smore general theory of cognitive architecture we must first look to the Humean theory of motivation. Once we can understand the way Hume views motives and actions of the will we canthen see why Hume purports an ethical anti-rationalism. Yet, moreover, when we conjoin Hume’smoral theory with other aspects of his science of man we will be inclined to dismiss the title of anti-rationalism and search for a more suiting one which captures the relevance of Hume’s psychology to present day research in the cognitive sciences.For Hume, the will is simply the impression generated by the mind when one knowinglygives rise to an action. In this sense, the will is a sort of productive faculty: it can take some sortof input and as an output produce the desired action. As Hume contends, we are entirelyconscious of this impression and it is felt not only by the production of new movements in the body but also when new perceptions are
willed 
into the mind. The question for Hume then iswhat induces the will to move or what
causes
the will to perform as it does. While we havealready labeled the will a productive faculty this only sheds little light on a possible answer. Wecannot simply say that since the will has a productive ability- that is, an ability to produce
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something that was not present in the original input- that it does not require investigation; rather,Hume’s goal in exploring the will is only made slightly clearer by the analogy to a productivefaculty: it seems we already are fairly aware of the outputs of our will, or, more accurately, weare aware of the forms they usually take (i.e. the raising of an arm or a thought presented to themind); yet, on the other hand, it is not immediately clear that we understand the form of the inputrequired to produce these given outputs.Traditionally, we often think of our passions in conflict with reason; people are inclinedto say things of the sort, “I stopped eating the chocolate because it is unreasonable to eat thatmuch candy” or “I know it was a stupid thing to do but I had to listen to my heart”. Each casedisplays our inclination to explain actions in terms of a relation between desires and reasons,where in the former sentence we see “reason” trumping “desire” and vice versa in the secondcase. Obviously following from this is the idea that one should aim to be rational and found hismotives on sound reasoning. Hume, however, breaks with this view by setting forth two thesesthat he intends to prove: “
 first 
, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will;and
 secondly
, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 413). In order to prove these claims Hume sets out two arguments to show that reason is inert. Hume explains thatthe understanding has two different ways of exerting itself- through demonstrative reasoning or  probably. Taking up the first of the two, Hume has in mind logical and mathematical rules; theserules are applied on an abstract level to understand the relation between ideas but never tounderstand the relation between objects. That is, demonstrative reasoning never can make aclaim about the existence of something. In other words, in dealing with ideas, demonstrativereasoning can never provide us with a conclusion about reality. Thus, since acting involves anexistential belief about reality, demonstrative reasoning alone cannot induce the will to move.
2
 
Likewise, Hume argues, probable reasoning can never induce the will to move. Here, probable reasoning consists of our empirical knowledge about the relation of objects and eventsin the world. For the most part Hume is thinking of cause and effect: if I know that sticking myhand into a flame will burn me I will not do it. It seems like such causal reasoning can motivatemy will to put my hand elsewhere then into a flame. But Hume holds that this is not the case: “…‘tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it” (T414). Our reasoning serves to discover some particular relation, say, between an object that is hotand the pain I feel when I come into contact with it, but it is natural human inclination to avoidthings that burn. In other words, there must be some sort of attraction or aversion that the mind perceives as caused by some object such that the mind
then
becomes attracted or repelled by it infuture cases. Reason is the discoverer of this connection but were it the case that the connectiondid not have an impact on me then I would not be inclined to take any action. Hume argues thatif reason is the means by which we arrive at these relations between objects in the world then itcannot be by reason “that the objects are able to affect us” (T 414). Probable reason is a means of gaining knowledge about the world but it is only in particular cases where this knowledge has animpact on us so there must be another force by which the will is induced to move. Our understanding- the operations of demonstrative and probable reasoning- cannot cause the will tomove.Hume extends his argument against reason further by claiming “since reason alone cannever produce any action, or give rise to volition” then “the same faculty is as incapable of  preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion” (T 415). Hume believes that this is a necessary consequence of his previous argument. Taking the conclusionfrom above, that reason cannot induce the will to move, as his first premise, Hume argues that
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