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Mike MackusMatthew BentonPhilosophy 220December 12
th
, 2008(Un)Naturalized EpistemologyEpistemology has found itself in search of certainty- a Cartesian certainty- since themoment Descartes put in our minds the frightful idea that an evil demon could, at present, betricking us. The skeptic was born and the epistemologist has fought a fierce battle since.Epistemology has sought a criteria on which one might be able to use the word ‘knowledge’ and be able to attribute the possession of knowledge. Thus, in essence, epistemology sets its aim toexamine if we have grounds for particular beliefs about the world and hence a foundation onwhich empirical science can stand. So if we grant that our senses are accurate then the goal of theepistemologist should be to take these senses and proceed to see if our beliefs about the worldare derivable from them.But, here, Quine interjects. He claims it is apparent that such a goal for epistemology islikely to be impossible. As support for this Quine draws from the recent failure of philosophersof mathematics to reduce all arithmetic to logic. Gödel dealt a swift blow with his twoincompleteness theorems leading many to the conclusion that there is no way to ground for mathematical knowledge and thus impossible to display mathematical certainty. If a system sosimple and so crucial to the empirical sciences cannot be
 proven
to stand on a solid foundationthen what is the hope for epistemology?Quine argues that the pitfalls of studying the foundations of mathematics are, similarly,the burdens that epistemology is faced with. The studies of mathematics can be divided evenlyamong the conceptual and the doctrinal. The conceptual studies aim to define terms and clarifythem, often in terms of one another. The doctrinal studies establish laws by proving them, some
 
derived from other laws and some derived from self-evident axioms. Thus if the mathematicalconcepts are clear enough to be translated in terms of logic then the truths of mathematics would be truths of logic. Likewise, epistemology can be seen as having a division between conceptualand doctrinal studies. If epistemology looks to ground knowledge in our sensory experience of the world then the conceptual side is explaining the physical world in sensory terms; thedoctrinal side is then the establishment of laws of knowledge- that is, using those sensory termsin order to justify knowledge of particular truths.However, we have already seen that any axiomatic system will either be incomplete or inconsistent; thus, even if we were to couch our sensory terms in logical and set-theoreticlanguage, as Quine suggests we might, this would not assure that any and all statements are provable. Given such a position, Quine recommends that epistemology
can
and
 should 
rid itself of all this “creative reconstruction” and “make-believe” (294). Quine asks, if the epistemologistis to admit that all an individual has to form his beliefs are his sensory experiences of the worldthen why not simply strive to understand
how
one moves from sensory experience to belief? Thatis, epistemology can simply consider itself a sub-branch of psychology. The goal of epistemology would be straightforward: a subject has a stimulation of his sensory receptors; thesubject, from this sensory input, then forms a belief about the external world; the epistemologistwould examine this causal relationship between the subject’s experience and his belief. Quineadmits that this transition in epistemological aims appears circular. If the goal of epistemology isto find a grounds for which one can be said ‘to know that
 p
’ from empirical evidence and thusreveal grounds for all empirical sciences then the epistemologist should not be able to use psychology, or any other empirical science for that matter, as a tool in his investigations. Quine,however, refutes any crime or wrong-doing in such circularity. Rather, he holds that this
 
circularity does not pose a problem given that epistemology is to give up on any hopes of deducing science from sensory experience and observation. The circularity would indeed be a problem for a traditional account of epistemology attempting to do what Quine holds is likely to be impossible (discover grounds for certainty). But if the goal is to instead understand howsensory stimuli lead to beliefs and how observations lead to science then, Quine argues, we areentitled to use any means available.As we have seen, Quine provides a list of reasons to propose that epistemology’straditional aim is perhaps both misdirected and futile. Quine’s proposed naturalized epistemology places epistemology under the umbrella of psychology; epistemology becomes a member of thenatural sciences. As we have also seen, this move can only be made by removing a key aspect of traditional epistemology: the normative element. Quine offers a view of epistemology thatdeletes any need for prescription: sensory stimuli in a subject result in the subject generating a belief; that causal relationship is the object of study. That is, instead of questioning how beliefs
ought 
to be formed, Quine seems to be arguing that how one does is how one should. While thisnew project Quine suggests may very well be worthy of study, he is right to believe that it is a job for the psychologist. The epistemologist cannot rid himself of the normative element for anumber of reasons. First and foremost, Quine’s naturalized epistemology is a venture to studyhow
beliefs
are formed; traditional epistemology states as its goal almost always that it issearching for how
knowledge is attained 
and what exactly can
qualify as knowledge
.Epistemology is only concerned with how beliefs are formed at a secondary level; the centralconcern is
why
such beliefs are formed and
whether or not 
such beliefs are
 justified 
. In taking upthe naturalized epistemology that Quine proposes we essentially end the quest for knowledge-we remove that which was our goal in the first place. We lose any hope of understanding
what 
of 00

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