SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 152662

Present:

CARPIO, - versus Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ.

MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.

Promulgated: June 13, 2012

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DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari1[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision2[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3[3]
1[1] Rollo, pp. 33-66.

2[2] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 162-170. 3[3] Id. at 169.

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos

(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question

before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.

On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet. WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4[4]

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review5[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

4[4] 5[5]

Rollo, p. 133. Id. at 134-167.

In a resolution6[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to
6[6] Id. at 169.

file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court. The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed. xxx Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7[7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended. While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8[8] likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.9[9]

7[7] 8[8] 9[9]

G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277. Id. CA rollo, pp. 167-168.

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.10[10] It submits that the filing of the complaint-

affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11[11] that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,12[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.

10[10] Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure 11[11] Supra note 7 at 284-285. 12[12] Supra.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13[13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

13[13] Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, 1 October 1993, 227 SCRA 56; Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, 30 May 1983, 122 SCRA 538; Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112584, 23 May 1997, 272 SCRA 563.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)14[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.15[15] Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
14[14] Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

15[15] Section 1. Institution of criminal actions.Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows: xxx xxx

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.

respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx. SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
16[16] G.R. No. L-22465, 28 February 1967, 19 SCRA 494, 500.

the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of

Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.17[17] when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.18[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.

Dicdican,19[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20[20] Brillante v. CA,21[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 22[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al. ,23[23] the
17[17] 207 Phil 471, 477 (1983). 18[18] Supra note 7. 19[19] 328 Phil. 1272 (1996). 20[20] Supra note 13. 21[21] 483 Phil. 568 (2004) 22[22] G.R. No. 168662, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 303. 23[23] G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 354, 415-416.

Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,24[24] which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights

and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein

24[24] G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 549, 562.

respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the

Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspensi on of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,25[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
25[25] Supra note 16.

control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is The Department of Justice is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Senior Associate Justice Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Senior Associate Justice (Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The amended) Judiciary Act of 1948, as

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992 LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.: The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances. The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referralcomplaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3 The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4 In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure: Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx B. Criminal Cases: 1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; 2. Violations of rental law; 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; 4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered

cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party. She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows: Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy . Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied) Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the

Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows: Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein; b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.) Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5 In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the

complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988. That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the

submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7 Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court

of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered. Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 18. 2 Ibid. 3 Id., p. 19; Through Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr. 4 Id., p. 21 5 122 SCRA 538 6 The phrase "filed directly in court without need of prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation" was deleted under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure effective on November 15, 1991. 7 People vs. Castro, 95 Phil. 463. 8 Section 447, Local Government Code.

SECOND DIVISION

ROBERTO BRILLANTE,

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571

Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman, - versus AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. November 11, 2005 Promulgated:

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RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 25, 2004 filed by Roberto Brillante (Brillante) assailing the Decision of this Court dated October 19, 2004 which affirmed his conviction for the crime of libel but reduced the amount of moral damages he is liable to pay.

Brillante avers that his conviction, without the corresponding conviction of the writers, editors and owners of the newspapers on which the libelous materials were published, violates his right to equal protection. He also claims that he should have been convicted only of one count of libel because private respondents were not defamed separately as each publication was impelled by a single criminal intent. Finally, he claims that there is a semblance of truth to the accusations he hurled at private respondents citing several instances of alleged violent acts committed by the latter against his person.

Private respondent Jejomar Binay (Binay) filed a Comment dated March 3, 2005, maintaining that the equal protection clause does not apply because there are substantial distinctions between Brillante and his coaccused warranting dissimilar treatment. Moreover, contrar y to Brillantes

claim that he should have been convicted only of one count of libel, Binay asserts that there can be as many convictions for libel as there are persons defamed. Besides, this matter should have been raised at the time the separate complaints were filed against him and not in this motion.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment dated April 4, 2005, stating that the issues raised in Brillantes motion have already been discussed and passed upon by the Court. Hence, the motion should be denied.

Brillante filed a Consolidated Reply dated May 26, 2005 in reiteration of his arguments.

As correctly noted by the OSG, the basic issues raised in the instant motion have already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon by the Court in its Decision. For this reason, we shall no longer dwell on them.

We believe, however, that the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Brillante should be re-examined and reconsidered. Although this matter was neither raised in Brillantes petition nor in the instant motion,

we advert to the well-established rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties.[1]

In Mari v. Court of Appeals,[2] petitioner therein was found guilty of slander by deed penalized under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code (Penal Code) by either imprisonment or fine. In view of the fact that the offense was done in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court opted to impose the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.

In this case, Brillante claims that on January 6, 1988, his friends house was bombed resulting in the death of three people. This incident allegedly impelled him, out of moral and social duty, to call a press conference on January 7, 1988 with the intention of exposing what he believed were terrorist acts committed by private respondents against the electorate of Makati City.

We find that the circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on which the libelous publications were based similarly warrant the imposition of the penalty of fine only, instead of both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art. 355 of the Penal Code.[3] The intensely

feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter.

Moreover, while petitioner failed to prove all the elements of qualified privileged communication under par. 1, Art. 354 of the Penal Code, incomplete privilege should be appreciated in his favor, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them.[4]

The foregoing circumstances, in our view, justify the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment and the retention of the meted fine only.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 19, 2004 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION consisting of the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave) MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO C. PUNO Acting Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998] ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of

complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complainti[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals Office. On 13 January 1988, an informationii[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information read: The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00. That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decisioniii[3] convicting petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries, and sentencing her: [t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.iv[4] The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise: As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorios book, p. 718).v[5] As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00). Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief.vi[6] After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decisionvii[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsiderationviii[8] raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.ix[9] ... ... ...

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.x[10] In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE. A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,xi[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS

IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE. B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

C.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor. As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insis ts, do not rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months, citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,xii[12] thus: Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another

complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365). ... ... ...

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime. In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts. On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus: In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontoks motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.xiii[13] In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals,xiv[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to complex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations. To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.xv[15] The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresmaxvi[16] and Chico v. Isidro.xvii[17] In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSGs reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appealsxviii[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the complexing of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless

imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleronxix[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,xx[20] two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garciaxxi[21] would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to complex damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidroxxii[22] is likewise inapposite, for it deals with attempted ho micide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresmaxxiii[23] should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldiviaxxiv[24] favorable to her. The pleadings thus raise the following issues: I. II. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question. IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal. V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed. I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their

submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the

courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.xxv[25] As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court,

since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64. II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit ( dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.xxvi[26] As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony. On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner. III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows: ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,xxvii[27] this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus: Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513). Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365]. Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the

information.xxviii[28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.xxix[29] V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in Question. The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.xxx[30] At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Section 32(2) xxxi[31] thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof. The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,xxxii[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance. Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts. As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months. Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati. VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied) Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits.xxxiii[33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appealsxxxiv[34] and People v. Cuaresma,xxxv[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of limitations. We cannot apply Section 9xxxvi[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts. It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to

diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.xxxvii[37] Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescriptio n for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court. In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of pres cription of the offenses charged in the information in this case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919. Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

i[1] Original Record (OR), 131. ii[2] Id., 1. iii[3] Annex C of Petition, Rollo, 52-56. Per Judge Job B. Madayag. iv[4] Rollo, 56. v[5] Id. vi[6] Rollo, 35. vii[7] Annex A of Petition, Rollo, 27-49. Per Mabutas, Jr., R., J. with Elbinias, J., and Valdez, Jr., S., JJ., concurring. viii[8] Annex D of Petition, Rollo, 57-69. ix[9] Id., 58. x[10] Id., 60. xi[11] Erroneously cited by the trial court as People v. Aguiles. xii[12] 89 SCRA 632, 636 [1979]. xiii[13] 211 SCRA 277 [1992]. xiv[14] 115 SCRA 82 [1982]. xv[15] 160 SCRA 302 1988]. xvi[16] 172 SCRA 415, [1989].

xvii[17] A.M. MTJ-91-559, 13 October 1993. xviii[18] Supra note 14. xix[19] 57 SCRA 363 [1974]. xx[20] Supra note 12. xxi[21] Supra note 15. xxii[22] Supra note 17. xxiii[23] Supra note 16. xxiv[24] Supra note 14. xxv[25] Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code; People v. Leynez, 65 Phil. 608, 610-611 [1938]. xxvi[26] Article 3, Revised Penal Code. xxvii[27] Supra note 12 at 635-636. xxviii[28] Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court. xxix[29] See also People v. Conte, 247 SCRA 583 [1995]. xxx[30] People v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 [1996]. xxxi[31] This Section has been amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which was approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on 25 March 1994. As amended, the provision now reads in part as follows: Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases . -- Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial

Courts and Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. xxxii[32] 86 Phil. 617 [1950]. xxxiii[33] People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 [1967]. xxxiv[34] 122 SCRA 538 [1983]. xxxv[35] Supra note 16. xxxvi[36] Now Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, which reads in part as follows: SEC. 11. How commenced. -- The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. xxxvii[37] Zalvidia v. Reyes, supra note 13 at 284.