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Please print or type Ecrtre en iettres moulees ou dactylographier Full Name of Author Nom complet de I'auteur RO.SS EDWARD GRANT UPSHUR; Philosophy Date of Birth Date de naissance June 3 0 , 1958 & ~~ Permanent Address Residence fixe " ^ .... 141 King Street* East Apartment 18 Kingston, Ontario . . K7L 2Z9 Title of Thesis Titre de la these Prejudice and Understanding: A Study of HansGeorg Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics. Country of Birth Lieu de naissance Canada

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Erejudlce and Understanding: A study of Hans-Georgf Gadamer s Philosophical Hermeneutics

By Ross Upshur

A Thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy in conformity with the requirements .for the degree of Master of Arts.

Queen s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada February, 1983

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Copyright C

Ross Upshur, 1983

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Table of Contents

Abstract'

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Acknowledgements Introduction ' * I Preliminary Remarks

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II The.Hermeneutical Aporia III Objectives ' Chapter One Chapter Two

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I Methodological versus Ontological Conceptions of Hermeneutics . .II The Social Scientific Dimension of Hermeneutics The Problem of.Ideology and Understanding "III Tradition and.its Relevance to Philosophy. Conclusion Notes Bibliography
Vita .

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Abstract

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Hermeneutics has recently attracted scholarly attention amongst Anglo-American philosophersT

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One of the

pivotal figures in the rise of hermeneutics is the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. , In the introduction to this thesis, I sjLtuate Gadamer's work in the context of
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modern hermeneutical dVbate.

In the first chapter, several

key elements of Gadamer's doctrine of hermeneutical under"standing are explicated. In particular,. Gadamer's claims

f . o r the historical, linguistic,, and-prejudicial aspects of understanding are discussed.. ' The second chapter consists of an evaluation of Gadamer's ideas in the light of two' major debates his ideas have stimulated.. It is argued' that

Eric Hitsch's methodological conception of hermeneutics is not antithetical to Gadamer's ontological conception of hermeneutics. Secondly, it is- argued that the criticisms

of Jurgen Habermas force Gadamer to make explicit the practical dimension of hermeneutics that is hinted at, but not 'fully articulated in Truth and Method. The second

chapter conclud-es by considering the merits that Gadamer's view of tradition possesses. In the conclusion, it is

atgued that one of the great merits of Gadamer's philosophy is his view that understanding is productive rather than reproductive. "

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Acknowledgements

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I wish to thank the faculty -.members and secretaries of" the. Department of Philosophy for providing a congenial'*" ~ " and encouraging .environment in which to work.
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like also to thank my'fellow students for their unsurpassable friendship and Iwarmth. In particular, I owe a

debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. A.P. Fell, for giving me the freedom to lexplore all possible'avenues .

I to examine, and. to of the subject matter I chose'

Mr. Doug Williams for directing me to references and
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providin-g me with books and articles which I could, not find or had overlooked.

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Introduction

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Introductory Remarks Hermeneutics has long been an accepted feature of the

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European philosophical tradition.

Originally understood as the

' study of t,he procedures involved, in the interpretation of Biblical and other texts, hermeneutics has -undergone many tran.sform' " ' . ' ' I

"...ations of character- in the Twentieth century.

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Recently it has

bean brought into the forefront of Anglo-American philosophical

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concern/.

The reasons behind the. move towards a hermeneutical

approach in #philosophy are varied and-s.tem from problems faced' .in contemporary philosophical research, most notably in aesthetics, ep-^temology, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of the social sciences. As a preface to the ^discussion of the nature of hermeneutics, the reasons behind the move towards a hermeneutical approach will be discussed in three, selected fields,
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In the philosophy of social sciences, the introduction of the methods of the natural sciences into the human sciences, most notably through positivism and behaviourism, has brought about awareness of an inter pretive element in the social sciences. The fact that

the interpreter of the data gathered is, at- timers, constitutive of the data interpreted has given rise to the * problems of value neutrality in the interpretations given.-of social phenomena. The rele-vance of hermeneutics

to the philosophy of social .sciences consists chiefly in opening up a dialogue on the methodological presuppositions underlying the enterprise. Since, from a hermen-

eutical point of view, the straightforward -app tific methodology to social fheory is regarded as problematic, hermeneutlcs provides a context for the critical examination and 2 appraisal of the discipline as a whole. This critical function is supplemented by positive, recommendations offered for procedures to be used in interpreting social-phenomena. Consequently,

considerable thought has been devoted to the types of interpretation to be preferred in the social sciences, and to the thorough examination of the validity and "objectivity of these interpretations. ' ;

The. concern for the objectivity and validity of interpretations is by no means limited to the" social sciences. Prior to

the emergence of hermeneutical reflection upon social phenomena stands a long and rich tradition of textual hermeneutics.. This tradition has its origins in theological and juridical textual exegesis. In the late nineteenth and.early ,twentieth centuries,

this reflection was extended to encompass all forms of textual expression. One of the most important and influential figures

in the expansion of hermeneutics was WilheLm Dilthey, who sought to move hermeneutics- beyond the concern for texts of specific disciplines and make it, instead, the foundation of the human sciences. However, Dilthey by no means resolved all the prob- - ;

leras of hermeneutics and certainly did not succeed completely in his.universal methodological program. Dilthey.s work did^though,

set the context within which a substantial amount of the modern hermeneutical debate emerged.

"After Dilthey, the hermeneutical tradition split rather' cleanly into two schools. On fehe one hand stand the heirs

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to Schlelermacher and Dilthey: and their followers. methodology.

Emilio Betti, Eric Hirsch Jr s ,

Their-view of. hermeneutics stresses

This is typified, by the search for canons, rules. The end

and norms to guide the process of* interpretation.

sought by methodologically oriented hermeneutics is valid and objective jULt_erpr*etations of all fypes. of texts. Where a j ,{
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precise, or uniquely valid interpretation of a t'ext cannot be a'ttained, advocates of the methodological approach argue .

that an optimally objective and valid interpretation can be 4 secured within a community of informed interpreter's. On the other hand, contrasting with Betel's and Hirsch's methodologically oriented hermeneutics are Martin Heidegger and his followers, the most-important of whom is Hans-Georg Gadamer.
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Rather than pursuing methodology, they employ pheno-

'menological concepts in order to explicate the "hermeneutics

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of facticity".-

Interpretation and understanding are not

viewed as separate cognitive functions, but are viewed instead as ontological constituents of human Dasein. In more access-

ible language,' this means that interpretation,, in particular,

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and. understanding, are not, incidental features of human life, occasioned by failures in the coherence of expedience, but are rather essential .features of human experience in the -jtorld. The existential 'orientation' of'Heidegger and Gadamer shifts the focus of hermeneutics from a concern with methodology to an , examination of the possibilities of understanding from within a

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finite historical context.

Textual interpretation, to be sure,

falls.under their .purview and indeed plays a central role in Gadaraer s thought. The introduction of an existential dimension 7 into hermeneutics creates tensions wtrh-the"methodtfl-ogtc^l-school

It seems," to the methodologically committed, to imply abandoning the pursuit of valid and objective interpretations in favour of 8 either subjectivism, or some form of radical historicism. Thirdly, a forceful plea for the importance of hermeneutics has been provided by Richard. Rorty in his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Perceiving a failure on the part of traditional '

philosophy in"its attempts to.ground epistemology in order to'provide an efficacious framework from within which to adjudicate all
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cultural practices, Rorty calls for the end of this traditional pursuit and advocates instead a concern for hermeneutics in the context of a conversation.. .Hermeneutics, as Rorty conceives of it, does not strive for the ultimate commensuratibn of all disor

courses with each other, but recognizes the incommensurable,

abnormal nature of the many different discourses and practices of the modern world. Instead of' being concerned with establishing

foundations of truth claims for disparate disciplines, as episteraology traditionally has*, hermeneutics proceeds in an ad hoc, non-. systematic manner. Its aim is education in the variety of experi-

ences offered by modern'intellectual and aesthetic culture. Rorty s understanding of hermeneutics'is. radical in that it calls for abandoning many of the pursuits' that constitute the
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self-image of twentieth century professional philosophers. His,

claims have stirred much .controversy and he has successfully brought hermeneutics to the attention of many North American philosophers. These preliminary reflections serve as an appropriate, but superficial overview.of -some of the important issues in contemporary hermeneutics. Wiat is required, and what we shall turn to now, is- a more precise and systematic consideration of- the nature of hermeneutics.

II

The Hermeneutical Aporia The considerations above give but a,partial, view of.the nature of hermeneutics. The major problem in coming to grips with hermsome sense to the scope and meaning of Pragmatism, a

eneutics is finding ' . the terra itself.

Richard.Rortyj in an essay entitled

Relativism and Irrationalism , says of pragmatism that it is

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vague, ambiguous and overworked word. hermeneutics.

Much the same is true of lists

Richard Palmer, in his book Hermeneutics, They are as follows:

six definitions of hermeneutics. 1) 2) 3) 4)

The theory of biblical exegesis. General philological methodology. The science of all linguistic understanding* The methodological foundation of the Geistes^jwissenschaften.

5)

Phenomenology of existence and of existential understanding. _ -,

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The systems & interpretation, both recollective and iconoclastic, used by man to reach the meaning behind

myths and symbols,'"

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At least two morsripf<n* M o n s c.nn h ( ?a r i r i f i d to this list:' 7) 8) Hermeneutics as the critique of ideology.

Richard Rorty s above noted understanding as an attitude which implies an abjuration of the Kantian notion'that

there is something called a ^structure of rationality which the philosopher discovers and within which we have a moral duty to remain...". ^ -

Given "the. remarkable diversity of definitions of hermeneutics and the methods and ways of proceeding .that each particular definition^entails, the question arises as to the value -eS^he

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term itseLfT

Eqr .example,', in the characterization of the split

in modern'hermeneutics, discussed above, Betti and Hirsch .could be interpreted as supporting a view that embraces definitions 2 ' and 4. Heidegger can be seen to support definitions 5 and 8.

Gadaraer, in turn,"could be viewed as advocating definitions 5, 7. and 8. The significance of these differences should not be over-

looked' or downplayed since they are related to determining precisely the nature of hermeneutics. It seems that each of the

conceptions of hermeneutics is coherent and provides a compre-^ hensive program for research. However, each position seems to

exclude the possibility of mediation with the* rival position. Betti s and Hirsch s more systematic conception of, hermeneutics .cannot easily be reconciled, with Heidegger s and Gadamer s more

historical approach.

The problem of reconciling.these conflict-

ing views constitutes a major problem in coming to a clear view of hermeneutics., It seems one must choose, between either a . A -13 systematic or historical view of the.enterprise. - ^wA second, and* related difficulty emerges fpm problems in
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sources.

Hermeneutics has'^een associated with many specific

disciplines, but as "yet, no comprehensive approach has been forged. lem. Richard falmer is particularly sensitive to this prob-

In a recent article he writes: .. f c i . t becomes? exceedingly difficult to get hold of the.subject of hermeneut'ics in a. comprehensive waythat is, in a way that transcends the' limits of such ' disciplines as theology, literary criticism, legale hermeneutics., or myth and dream interpretation...

PalmerRecounts for this obstacle in the following manner:

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,The student of hermeneutics finds it difficult to compare various modes of textual interpretation and to evaluate the presuppositions* of his "own , contemporary mode in the light of an inclusive historical context.. Furthermore, hermeneutics . does not wear one label but many, so its.source materials'are all over the library. Often out of' print, presenting itself in a variety of . languages, hermeneutics constitutes a frustratingly amorphous body of materials. . The problems of both the definition of hermeneutics and of choosing some standpoint or approach from which to commence can < * , ..... be~diminished substantially by adopting a specific perspective within which to work.- To this end, this thesis will be concerned with an exposition and critical examination of some of the central concepts.to be found in the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The work of Gadamer'is..important for several reasons. Not

only does it represen^an original contribution to. the tradition .

of hermeneutics, it is also a distinctively philosophical contribution. . His work is of interest and importance to philosophers involved in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy of history, philosophy of language, and the history of philosophy. His af-

filiation with existential phenomenology should not deter philosophers of the Anglo-American tradition from considering him, since one -of th,e major thrusts of his work is to break down such philosophical barriers., Gadamer,'s scope, depth and attention to detail in matters philosophical arid historical are sufficient to warrant serious scholarly appraisal. It is the aim of this thesis,

to attempt to contribute to such an appraisal.

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Objectives .,

Since Gadamer s scope'of thought is vast, and, as notedj-contributing to a variety of philosophical topics, it is necessary * to limit the scope of the enquiry to keep It manageable. To this end, the thesis is divided into two major parts, the first an exi

position of Gadamer s central hermeneutical doctrines, the second a critical examination of these doctrines. by a short conclusion. The exposition will focus largely upon Gadamer s conception of hermeneutical understanding. In particular, emphasis will be This will be followed

placed upon what he calls the historical, prejudicial and linguistic nature of understanding. This disqussion will be supplemented

by an examination of the hermeneutical circleand what Gadamer terms the universality of hermeneutical reflection. The purpose'

of this part of the thesis

will be to state clearly the salient

features of Gadaraer s position and to discuss the grounds upon which they rest. ,

* Gadamer s views have stimulated many interesting criticisms. The second part of the thesis will be devoted to examining some of these criticisms. The first of these, already alluded to Jr..

above, involves the views of Emilio Betti and Eric Hirach

As noted, their criticism of Gadamer hinges upon two major issues. Firstly, should hermeneutics be considered as a methodological discipline, and, if so, should the author s intention servfc as # the norm for determining the validity and objectivity of an interpretation. Although Hirsch's and Betti's position seems to

be antithetical to Gadamer s, it will be argued that their positions are not so antithetical, and that both positions can accommodated within a comprehensive hermeneutic. The second set of criticisms emerges from the exchange between Gadamer and the German philosopher, Jiirgen Habermas. Their exchange is interesting because both share, to a large extent, * a common philosophical tradition, and each has great sympathy for the other s position. Habermas s claim that Gadamer s herraeneutic be

is not sufficiently guarded against the possible ideological and dominating facets of tradition and its transmitter, language, will be examined as well as Gadamer s response to this claim. It will

be argued that Habermas s concerns are justified and that Gadamer can answer Habermas s criticism only through an amendment to some of the concepts presented in Truth and Method.

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' The second part of the thesis will conclude with a contrast of Gadamer1s"view of tradition with that of Habermas Richard Rorty. -and

Although Habermas and Rorty present conflicting

views on the nature of philosophical enterprise, they are both in agreement about the need to overcome the philosophical treatment. It will be argued here that Gadamer s conception of trad-

ition has virtues that both Rorty's and Habermas's lack. As a short thesis, this work omits much that would need to be dealt with in a more comprehensive treatment of the subject. . A large and -important segment of Gadamer s work will not receive thorough consideration. Also, the original contributions of It is hoped, however, that despite

Paul Ricoeur are neglected.

the selectivity of this work, the importance of Gadamer's work is demonstrated.

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CHAPTER ONE

An Exposition of Gadaraer s Doctrine of Understanding

12. The title of Gadamer"s major work Truth and Method could be perhaps better' expressed in the form of a disjunctive question Truth or Method? and Method. In the forward to' the second edition of Truth,

Gadamer states clearly that his concern is not to

elaborate a system of rules to describe, let alone direct, the methodological procedure of the human sciences." Rather, ,

Gadamer is concerned with a type of knowing that he considers to have been neglected by the rise to prominence.of methodology in ' contemporary intellectual-practice.
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The upshot of Gadamer s claim

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is that method alone is not sufficient to guarantee all truth. What Gadamer means by method and truth is in need of brLef elaboration because the conception he has of both is related to the doctrine of hermeneutical understanding that he intends to provide. ' Gadamer equates method exclusive.l-y with the ways of proceeding particular.to the model prpvided;by the natural sciences. The increasing reliance upon scientific methodology in the human sciences has led, in Gadamer s view, to problems in the under' . ' ' ' > 3

standing and. appreciation of Art and History.. The'experience of Art and the study, of History Have been devalued since both proye recalcitrant to the quantificational procedures that typify scientific investigation. Gadamer s understanding of method may be coloured by the rise of positivism in the Twentieth Century. Recent research

in the philosophy of science has indicated that the methodology ' employed by the natural sciences does not constitute the unified

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edifice that Gadamer-regards it to be.

However, whether there

is, or/inot, a unified methodology in the natural science^, and for that matter, the social sciences, scholarly activity has been focused largely upon methodological
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problems.
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What Gadamer means by method, therefore, is relatively clear. 6 ' \ However, his conception of truth is markedly problematic. Gadamer often speaks of the. experience of truth. His project, ,

as stated in the introduction; to Truth and Method, is concerned to s'eek that experience of truth that transcends the sphere of the control of scientific method wherever it is found, and to enquire into its legitimacy.' (T.M. xii) It cannot be inferred

from, this that Gadamer is trying to deny the legitimacy of the truths accumulated by science. He does, in fact, make it quite 7 - 1 Gadamer s conception of truth

clear that this is not the case.

is, in part, indebted to Heidegger s.conception of truth'as aletheia, or disclosedness. Consequently', it can be understood as a rejection of correspondence theories of truth, or any theory 8 of truth based upon the verification principle. For the time beingj however, we will set aside Gadamer s conception of truth, and instead turn to the doctrine of understanding. Once the doc-

trine of understanding has been outlined, the concept of truth can be addressed more adequately, Gadamer_s doctrine of understanding

is complex and is constituted by several related ideas. The best means of ingress to Gadamer s view is by commencing with, a discussion of the historicality of understanding.* . r-~

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* The historicality of understanding marks a radical re-orientation for Western thilosophy.. Rather than affirming the pursuit of eternal, immutable truths as the aim of philosophy, his.torit

cality seems to imply that this task is misconceived from the beginning. Reality cannot be seen, as Spinoza" so desiredv sub One can understand the world only by start-

specie aeternitatis.

ing from the perspective that one inherits., However, this does not entail that one is totally determined .by it. Historicality emphasizes the temporal and situational dimen \

sions of understanding.

The contrast with understanding the world

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sub specie aeternltatis is instructive here:

To understand the,

world sub specie aeternltatis is to eliminate all elements of history and culture as constituents of understanding. Historicality

affirms that it is precisely the historical and cultural determinqnts of human life that comprise the productive ground from which understanding emerges. To understand the world sub specie aeter-

nltatis is to understand the world from a context less framework that never requires alteration and revision. is a transparent totality. In a senses the world

Historicality maintains that understand-

ing is always rooted in a framework, provided by culture and.history. This framework cannot present a transparent totality and must be "revised through human experience. . Gadamer's view of historicality owes much to Heidegger s thought in Being and Time, ism. as well as to Nietzsche s perspectiv4

However, Gadamer is not concerned with merely reiterating

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their views. He seeks to extend their insights by supplementing

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them with principles and arguments through which he attempts to Show that the historically of understanding does not entail a pernicious form of relativism. Gadamer seeks to establish the historically of understanding by countering two aspects of the Germa-n Idealist tradition. first is the-=deRiaJ. of Hegel s absolute spirit, The

and the second Hegel s concept

is the denial of the idea of a universal history..

of absolute spirit asserts an.identity between thought and the world. In essence, everything can be known truly and completely,

because there exists nothing outside the domain of thought. Reason thus permeates the world; and the absolute mind possesses absolute knowledge. Against the notion of the Absolute, Gadamer,r following Heidegger, emphasizes human finitude and human situatedness. Humans

come to awareness of the world only within an historical context. The finitude of human experience places limitations upon the possibilities of their understanding of the world. It bars, for

example, complete self-knowledge, as well as absolute knowledge 9 of the natural world. What had .sustained such ideas as these, according to Gadameri was a belief in the "infinite intellect as a means of securing their possibility. Gadamer writes: What I believe to have understood-through'Heidegger ...is, above all, that philosophy must learrr to do without the idea of an infinite Intellect. Abandoning the idea of the infinite intellect leaves philosophy with the task of explicating the conditions of understanding in a specific historical context. Also, without the idea of the In a letter to Leo .Strauss,

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Hegelian absolute, there is no telos or final end to which human knowing can aspire. In short, the task of" human thinking is con-

tinuous and in need of ,constant attention and renewal. The idea of a universal history is also part of the Hegelian legacy. Though the' Historical School' in Germany, represented

by Von Ranke and Droysen, dispensed with the speculative and a prioristic dimensions.: of Hegelian historiography, they nevertheless proceeded with the aim of constructing a universal, history.

Universal history is concerned with relating the, whole and the part of the historical record. Simply put, the research of a

historian into a particular aspect of the past must somehow be placed within a context that accommodates the whole of the past. The German historical school, though professing.an antimeta-

physical approach, retained a great deal of metaphysics i , n their view of history. Forfthe idea of a universal history is pre-

missed upon the assumption that history-can'be grasped as a cohera r t totality. The empirical orientation of the "historical school" As Gadamer puts it:

made this an acute problem.

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Universal history is not a mere marginal and residual problem of historical investig- . ation, but 'its very heart. Even the historical school knew that fundamentally there can be n j o other history than universal history, because the unique significance of the detail can be determined only from the':-whole. How can the empirical researcher, to whom the whole can never be given, manage, without " closing his rights to the philosopher andh'is , a priori arbitrariness? (T.M. pp.175-176). Gadamer outlines the various attempts made by historians to Ultimately, with Dilthey, historicism becomes

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solve this problem.

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1 1 increasingly more prominent.^ If one rejects the idea of a

universal history, and instead insists upon the fact that history is a process within which the historian must exist to conduct his/ her research, then historicism, and with it relativism, seem to be the eventual results. Gadamer argues that historicism and

relativism are problems in this context only if one desires a universal history in the first place. Historicality implies'

that the attempt to construct a; universal history is bound to fail. However, although historicality implies skepticism with *

respect to complete historical knowledge, this skepticism is mitigated in that it does not deny the possibility of accurate historical ^kjiowledge. enabling principle. historicality Historicality, in Gadamer s view, is an

This means that Gadamer wants to emphasize

so that the importance of one s historical situ-

ation is recognized as an integral and indispensible factor in human understanding. . .

The historicality of understanding has implications for the . interpretation of texts, Gadamer argues against the view of

Schleiermacher and the tradition of romantic hermeneutics, that the interpreter should extinguish all aspects of his/her own present situation''in order to approach the text as it is in itself. The process of removing all aspects constitutive of the interpreter s self.-understanding was thought to be the best way of ensuring objectivity in interpretation.' If the interpreter, by following canons and rules, could bracket the ideas and mores of his/her own day, then the text could be understood, in its own right. Gadamer contends that this is a false ideal. Historicality implies

that an interpreter cannot possibly throw off all of the ideas

that constitute his/her self-understanding in order to approach the text as a pure object. The desire to bracket the interpret-

er s subjectivity is problematic because it-creates difficulties for an interpreter in transposing his/her understanding into the past. The temporal gap between the interpreter and the world of

the text becomes an insuperable barrier requiring an act of imagination t ' o enter into the methodological procedure of inter. pretation. >

Gadamer contends that this leads to an unacceptable The historicality of understanding does

form of psycholog ism.

not require the total bracketing of the interpreters present. Consequently the ideas the interpreter possesses constitute the productive ground from which both understanding and interpretation commence.

The historicality of understanding is one of the pivotal concepts in Gadamer s philosophy^ trine of understanding.' Heidegger s re-orientation of philosophy is crucial to comprehending Gadamer, but a rejection of Heidegger s views does not 13 imply a rejection of Gadamer. From historicality, Gadamer derives, independently of Heidegger, the ideas of prejudice, application, and historically-effective consciousness. Historicality is closely related to the idea of prejudice. The phenomenological character of Gadamer s approach to hermeneu-. tics, manifests itself in the way he seeks to demonstrate how historicality and prejudice function as existential conditions of understanding. Historicality and prejudice are conditions , It is the linch-pin of his doc-

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not the total determinations, of understanding.

They are necessary

in that without them, understanding would exist in a vacuum." As Gadamer puts it: '

* Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self^. evident way in the family, society and state in which we live....The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, fox more than his judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being. (.TJL p \ 245) Gadamer's assertion that prejudices, not judgements, are , constitutive of human understanding no doubt seems odd to most modern readers. Is it not the task of the sciences, and indeed

the legacy of the,Enlightenment that prejudices be systematically abolished, and"the pursuit of knowledge be.conducted with as few pre-suppositions as possible? In fact, this is the case, and it

is the very prejudice against prejudices that Gadamer wishes to take issue with. _ Part of Gadamer's hermeneutical practice consists of the detailed examination of the history of specific concepts .relevant to the humanities. Truth and Method commences with a disConcepts such as '

cussion of "leading humanist concepts."

"taste", "judgement", and "culture" etc., are shown to have long and variegated histories of employment in the Western tradition.What marks all of these concepts, and thus grants them similarity, is that in post-Enlightenment thought, their significance has slowly diminished. Thus "taste", for example, became increasingly This is perhaps.

associated with matters of subjective preference.

best illustrated by the familiar modern rejoinder that some differ-

ences between two persons on aesthetic issues, for instance, are all "a matter of taste", meaning that there exists no objective means' of adjudicating these differenced. Gadamer shows that and judge

prior to the Enlightenment, concepts such as "taste

ment" were not charged with such subjective conno.tations, but instead formed integral concepts in the humanities^ The question

Gadamer raises is whether these concepts have been discredited in a convincing manner. their rehabilitation. Finding that they have not, he calls for Gadamer intends to do much the same with Against the Enlightenment, he'calls for

the concept of prejudice.

the rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and inserts it into his hermeneutical theory as one of the integral^conditions of understanding. The term prejudice is itself in need of some elaboration. The recent history of the term has given it a distinctively emotional and controversial connotations because of its close affiliation with bigotry and racism. It is not "in this sense tha$/the

terra is used by Gadamer, though these affiliations can legitimate-

it
ly be included in the scope of the term. Prejudice means a pre-

judgement, a prior attitude or predisposition towards a subject matter, person or thing before embarking upon an examination of the subject matter, person, or thing. A prejudice can range anticipation of

from an-expectation, or as Gadamer terras it, an

meaning", to a more hardened attitude such as a racial belief. That persons have prejudices of elther'T:ype cannot be denied, particularly from the point of view of lived experience.

21

The crucial question, and the one Cadamer poses and attempts.to . answer, is whether legitimate prejudices, that is, those.which are productive for understanding, can be distinguished from unproductive and limiting ones. The question of prejudice is particularly relevSnT-for the interpretation of texts (and to no'lesser degree'y the rnterpretation of'primitive or foreign cultures). Gadamer confines his -

utention to texts, particularly "those separated by a temporal . '

-i

gap.

Here the.question of prejudice comes to the forefront.

How

are texts, employing or examining outmoded or,discredited ideas and concepts to be understood? How'does one seriously countenance,

for example, a text that claims;the reali.ty of phlogiston, or the beneficial-qualities of tarwater? It is'easy to dismiss some

texts on the basis of the knowledge"provided by modern science, and this move is not always unwarranted. However, some texts, in

particular.religious, philosophical and literary texts, are much more difficult to dismiss on such.grounds. Aristotle s Physics may be regarded as a quaint reminder of a once powerful world view. However, The Nichomachean- Ethics, although rooted in this world view is not quaint in quite thesame way. The claims Aristotle

makes in The Nichomachean Ethics -cannot be as easily dismissed by appeal to the power of.modern science, as can the claims made in The Physics. .*''.'

Gadamer thinks that not all claims from-the past transmitted through texts can be so easily dismissed. The encounter with an

historic'al text is an encounter with something alien, belonging to

22 a world not quite our ownWe may reject the idea of the bene-

ficial nature of tarwater," but working through Berkeley s reasoning will no. doubt bring forth concealed elements of our own selfunderstanding. Whenever we react.to the text by claiming that, its Con-

content is,false, the question is immediately raised, why?

sequently, Gadamer claims that "the hefmeneutical task becomes automatically a questioning of things and is always in part, determined, by this," (T.M. p: . 238). This questioning is by no means one

way.. Not only is the text "in question, but also the prejudices of the one encountering the text.
A _

Gadamer's position may not elicit sympathy from those who maintain that/ideas which have been discredited or refuted, by whatever means, need no longer claim our attention. However, it

is this very way of viewing history, and the written tradition, that Gadamer seeks to question, Gadamer argues that the hermeneu-

tically. trained mind should be sensitive-to the potential quality of newness contained in any text, lie writes: The important thing is to be aware of one s bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness, and thus be able to assert its own truth against one s own fore-meanings. (T.M. p . 238) According to Gadamer, hermeneutical activity serves the critical function of educing prejudices. The temporal gap between

a text and our historical epoch is the chi-ef means of bringing forth prejudices for reflective consideration. a text provokes the prejudices that lie ing. An encounter with

dormant in our understand-

The process of the provocation and eliciting of prejudices Gadamer thus models hermeneutics

is dialectical in its structure.

on the logic of question and answer as demonstrated in the Platonic

'

2 \

3 19

'
'
18

'

.. ' f

"

dialogues.

The process of question and answer lacks finality.

It is conditioned by where the questioner stands in history and what questions an era leads one to aslc of a text. Yet, it is precisely one s position in history and the prejudices that this position in history creates, that allows for a productive encounter with tradition and history. Interpretation,

for Gadamer, is always productive rather than reproductive. This means that rather than working, backwards through history to recreate the historical situation within which the text was written, (in a sense inverting the process of creatiolff which was the task of hermeneutics for Schleiermacher, and to a lesser degree Dilthey), one questions the texts seeking some means of applying what was written to one s own historical situation.
i,
*

Gadamer calls this the '

t

n20

reflective appropriation of tradition.

The twin ideas of appropriation and application mark Gadamer s most original contribution to hermeneutics. By way of appropriat-

ion, the philosophical tradition becomes a constant source of^m.at^ erial for interpretation. Gadamer thus advocates viewing the trad- ' 21 ition as a partner in an ongoing conversation. Through appli- ,:, cation, the significance or relevance of that which was written becomes integrated into' the interpreter s own historical situation. By virtue of appropriation and application, the prejudices of the interpreter are. clarified. In a sense, the security of his/her self-understanding is risked in the confrontation with the tradit22 ion. However, the process i . s never completely one sided. The appropriation of the tradition does not mean that the past becomes

'

commensurate with the present, or the present reduced to the , terms of the past. What Gadamer means by the concept of the 'fus-

ion of horizons , iJs precisely that some of the interpreter s present self-understanding is surrendered in order to open up and admit some claim for the truth of the, past. The fusion^of horiz-

ons allows for the overcoming of the narrowness of the interpreter s horizon as well as supplementing the short-comings of the horizon of the text. ' .

Perhaps what makes. Gadamer s views about interpretation and understanding difficult to accept is the apparent lack of criteria to adjudicate a variety of different interpretations of texts. Gadamer is quite emphatic about the fact that there is no single correct interpretation of a text. He writes:' "in view of-the

finite nature of our historical existence there is, it would seem, something absurd aboujt the whole idea of a uniquely correct interpretationV (T.M."p . 107). Gadamer s reasoning to support this Since

claim is tied, obviously, to the concept of historically.

history has no telos, there is no way to predict or .dictate where " human understandingvwi11 migrate. * What is of concern to an age

develops through the encounter each age has with its world and the exigencies that this encounter presents. This encounter establish-

es the context from which understanding emerges and sets the hor-' izon within which questions towards the texts of the tradition will be addressed. A problem that arises with regard to this matter is the problem of anachronism. Surely one cannot ask of Plato, for example,

' enlightenment on issues not within his own historical.horizon. It would- be unfair to accuse Gadamer of such a position.

25

Gadamer

is quite clear that^ a meaning cannot be arbitrarily affixed to a 7 text. By extension, any question cannot be asked of a;text. 23 .

The task of understanding does consist in the first step of grasping the text in its original horizon. go beyond romantic However, Gadamer wants to

hermeneutics by insisting that a text s sigjf

nificance can go beyond its own horizon.

Thus, the aim of hermen-

eutics, for Gadamer, is to locate that significance and bring it forth for consideration and integration into the interpreter s own horizon. , The integration of a te"xt s horizon into the interpreter s 1 horizon is aided by what Gadamer calls the principle of effective history. The principle of effective history is Gadamer s way of Since understanding is

sidestepping the problems of historicism.

conditioned by both history and prejudice, there is a sense in which history is operative in the manner.by which humans come to a more fully articulated understanding of their wdrld. Yet under-

standing is not limited to the particular historical world that persons come to awareness within. The past, or the tradition, is

not a self-sufficient and complete entity, to be understood in its. own terms, or disregarded as antiquated or of little value,' Gadamer perceives a tendency in many thinkers to view the past in precisely fhis way. that Hence, he .asserts, somewhat enigmatically,

understanding.'v7==1?s-always the fusion of these horizons Cof

past and present) which we imagine to exist by themselves. '. (TaM. p . 273).

26

This fusion is always a living process undertaken by persons in a concrete historical situation, possessed of a horizon, however ill-specified or sketchily defined, seeking to understand both their own horizon and the horizon of the past. The idea of the fusion of .horizons is an appropriate metaphor to characterize Gadamer s view-of herraeneutics. ing and interpretation are two Understand-

aspects of the same fluid process. Since self-under-

The flu-idity of the process must be stressed.

standing can never be total, the process of working out one s horizoru is continuous with one s life practice. It is for this reafor texts,

son that Gadamer "emphasizes its dialectical character;

as noted, this is best illustrated by the process of question and answer. Thus Gadamer claims: Every age has,to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text is part of the whole of tradition in-which the age takes an objective interest and in which it seeks to , understand itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the contingencies of the author and whom he originally wrote for. It is certainly not identical with them, for it is always partly determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and hence by the objective course of history. (T.M. p , . 263)

That every agg==must understand a text in its own way is the key to understanding the ontological dimension of Gadamer s hermeneutics. The ontological dimension of understanding means that it

belongs to the nature of human endeavour to interpret and understand the world that humans inherit. Part of this task consists

in the re-working of texts that tradition presents them with. Interpretation^ and understanding, rather than being conceived

- /

27

of as incidental human activities, aire seen.by Gadamer as funda I . . 25 mental and inevitable activities of human being-in-the-world. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics seeks' to' refine the experience of interpretation such that it incorporates the aesthetic and historical dimensions of tradition which have been neglected due. to a concern with method and correct procedure in interpretation. According to Gadamer, 'there is no precise method or

jprocedure by means of which this experience can.be determined. He writes: ' ' .The hermeneutical experience is concerned with what has been transmitted in tradition. This is what has to be experienced. But tradition is not simply a process that we' learn to know and be in command.of through experience, it is language, i.e., it expresses itself like a Thou . A .Thou' is not an object, but stands in a relationship.with us. 7;.For tradition, is a genuine partner in communication, with which we have a fellowship as does the 1 with the Thou . (T.M. p... 321) It is. the "Thou"-like quality of the experience of tradition that denies the security of method in approaching the tradition. Since, in Gadamer's view, the tradition is not an object, but a constitutive relationship, what characterizes hermeneutics is not method, but openess to participation in communication: The

hermeneutical consciousness has its fulfilment, not in its method- . ological sureness of itself, but in'the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced man by comparison with the man captivated by dogma. (T.M. pj . 325).

Gadamer's view that tradition expresses itself through language as a "Thou", indicates a quite different" view of language from the one expressed by mafet Anglo-American philosophers. Gadamer

does not focus on the taxonomy of speech acts, problems of reference or cataloguing the various uses of ordinary language. His concern is for the world-disclosing nature of Language, and how language relates to community, life practice and understanding. t The relationship between language and tradition is of importance because, as Gadamer puts it: ...it is the nature of traditf

ion to exist in the medium of language, so that the preferred object of interpretation is a linguistic one." .(T.M. p . *357). It -. is important to note that the,emphasis is upon linguistic entities as preferred; objects of interpretation, and not the soLe object. This is an important point because ultimately, the interpretation of tradition must extend to the plastic and visual arts, as well as to architecture-and any other manifestation of human activity. Gadamer stresses the linguistic aspect of tradition because written texts are perhaps the most amenable to being understood, or because understanding is .best demonstrated through the comprehen- ,
" \ '
V

' '

"

"

"

sion of texts.

, t

Gadamer demonstrates the close relationship between language nd^world views. The-language that one inherits Cor frs possessed by , in a more Heideggerean fashion} is intimately woven with the way in which one comes to view and experience the worfd. Gadamer, following the later work of Heidegger, stresses that - . ' \' ' - ' language is not a tool. Language is not something that one can
\
x . \

i
. i
i

'

pick up and use for whatever purpose and discard

when one is

finished with it. His objections to the instrumental view of language makes him hesitate to accept formal languages as true

\ \

29

27 languages. Language, for Gadamer, is constituted by its rei .

lation to community and communication.

As Gadamer puts it:

All.-forms of human community of life are forms.o of linguistic community: even more, they constitute language. For language, in its nature, is the language of conversation, but it acquires, its reality only in the process of communicating.''' (T.M.p.404). The communicative and world constitutive aspects of Lang-'' uage are of importance for Gadamer because* this in principle allows for the possibility of'the fusion of two disparate and distinct world views: , ',

It 'is true that the historical worlds that succeed one-another and in the course of history are different from one another and from the world j. of today; but it is always in whatever .tradition we consi3er it, a human, i.e., a linguistically i constituted world that presents itseLf to us. Every such world, as linguistically constituted, is.always open of itself, to every possible insight and hence for every expansion of its own world-picture, and accordingly available to ' others. (T.M. p . ' 405),. It is important to be clear upon what exactly-Gadamer is asserting by these statements. The world he speaks of as linguistic-

ally constituted refers to the world of human practice and selfunderstanding. He is not so much advocating a species of linguist-

ic idealism, but*trying to point out that philosophical hermeneutics

(

is concerned with the way humans-understand the world through lang.28 uage.
.

" . " " ' , Further,v the world views that are presented by language
* ' .

do not form impenetrable wholes.

Gadamer asserts that the pers-

pectives articulated in linguistically constituted worlds can be extended into each other,. eutical mediation. Hence perspectives are open to hermen-

Thus Gadamer s view is not perniciously relat-

30

ivistic. Since all perspectives are open to mediation and extension, it cannot be asserted that any one perspective occupies a privileged position immune from mediation. Gadamer, though, does

admit a limited form of relativity in that each perspective has its-own existence, and, so to speak, integrity. The aim of her-

meneutics is not to violate, the integrity of the disparate pers pectives, but rather to let them bloom in an expanded horizon. However, although Gadamer asserts that it is the nature of language that permits the expansion of horizons, he is emphatic on the point that this-process is always bound to a-concrete historical situation. Understanding cannot completely transcend This entails, though, that there is

either language or history.

no single criterion by which one can measure or adjudicate the claims- of each perspective. As Gadamer phrases it:

The criterion for the continuing expansion of our own world picture is hot given by a world in itself that lies beyond all language. Rather, the infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world means that, whatever language we use, we never achieve anything but an ever more extended aspect,'a ~ view of the world. These views of the world are not relative in the sense that one could set them against the world in itself , as if the right view from some possible position outside the human', linguistic world, could discover it in its being in itself.-. (T.M. p .'405) Gadamer may well be correct- that there is no world in itself by

which one can determine the adequacy or inadequacy of views of the world. If this is so, it would certainly not be a consolation to.T However, it could be asked how it

those of a realist persuasion.

is determined whether the "view" of the world is expanded, if we have no idea of what would constitute an expansion. The answer

31

to this query introduces the two final elements of Gadaraer s thought that require discussion: the hermeneutical circle and

the universality of the hermeneutical problem.' The discussion, thus far, could*be regarded as preparatory to the introduction of the hermeneutical circle. . Gadaraer s view of the hermeneutical circle is not taken directly from Schleiermacher s concerns with relating the part to the whole in the interpretation of texts. Rather, following again from the thought

of Heidegger, it is a phenomenological account of the actual process of understanding. Prejudices naturally play an important role in the hermeneutical circle since they are the productive ground from which interpretation and understanding emerge. The hermeneutical circle describes the movement from prejudice, through the questioning of the text, to the amendment of prejudice by virtue It is a provisional process that

of the encounter with the text.

involves the testing of one, s prejudices against the view present : ''*

ed by the text, and relinquishing those prejudices that cannot be squared with the text or do not yield an understanding of the . . text. Since prejudices are not merely negative, that Is, they are

not simply wrong or unfounded,' working through a text can. reveal the positd-ve prejudices that can lead to genuine understanding of
i

a text.

However,Hwithout this .critical encounter, prejudices can-

not be brought forth and be reflectively examined.

i

It may be asked, what is so circular about this?

Does not _ ^ _

the encounter with a text yield something solid and founded,'namely a. judgement? If judgements, that is, apodictic knowledge, can

32

be attained does this not break the shack les-acnf the herjneneutical circle? The answer to these questions is no. The historically

of understanding places limitations on the number of judgements available to any epoch." Judgements may be arrived at through the encounter with a text, but they would be limited in scope and could not form a totality which would render the tasks of interpretation and understanding unnecessary. Self and world are

never completely transparent to the intellect and hence interpretation and understanding are always required, . Thus the process is

s til? circular. The consideration of the hermeneutical circle provides the answer to the question posed above concerning how it is determined whether one s horizon has been expanded- and extended through an encounter with a text. Quite simply, by the working out of

the positive and negative qualities of prejudices through the encounter with'the text, the negative and limiting prejudices fall away, and the positive and enabling ones are revealed in their productivity. judgement. A productive prejudice may turn out to be a

The crucial point that Gadamer wishes to emphasize is

that the understanding achieved through the hermeneutical circle is one of agreement, or as Gadamer terms it, , finding a common ..29 ' . . , \ language . (T.M.p. , 349) This common language corresponds

neither to that of the text, nor that of the interpreter, but is something wider in scope than either. . It is in this way that horizons are expanded and extended, and the criterion, to determinesuch an expansion and extension is revealed reflectively through

33

the greater understanding that has been secured. The hermeneutical circle aptly illustrates the experiential nature of hermeneutics that Gadamer wishes to illuminate. The

hermeneutical circle is, irtgHeideggerean terms,-an ontological aspect of human existence. As,such,.it is something that cannot

be avoided, and granted the productive possibilities that it contains, should not be be avoided. The scope of the hermeneutical

circle is not limited to texts, although Gadamer uses texts as an exemplar of the process. The hermeneutical circle illustrates As Gadamer

the non-systematic nature of Gadamer s hermeneutics. notes, on e cannot tell a priori and which are not:

which 'prejudices are productive

the prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstanding. (T.M. p ; . 263)

>

The important point that Gadamer wishes to insist upon is that one not deny the presence of prejudice by ./concealing it hind the security of methodologically guaranteed objectivity. return to Gadamer: A person who imagines that,he is free of prejudices, basing his knowledge on the objectivity of t\is procedures and denying that he is himself influenced by historical circumstancesj experiences the power of the prejudices that unconsciously dominate him as a vis a tergo. A person who does not'accept that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see what is shown by their light. (T.M. p . 324). Thus, the hermeneutical problem is universal in its scope because of the omnipresence of prejudice. The linguistic nature of beTo

34

understanding, though, opens up the possibility of mediation and hence the supergession of prejudice. Herm^neutical reflection is
\

thus universal in the' sense that it can be extended into all

Ns.
forms of linguistic expression. be qualified.

This form of universality should

It does, not mean that any one individual can gain Any individual is, of course, limited

access to every horizon.

by his/her historicality. As Gadamer puts it: If we start from the linguistic nature of understanding weiare emphasizing, on the contrary, the finiteness of the linguistic event, in which . understanding Is constantly concretized." * t'lsM. p . 443)

The universal aspect of hermeneutics consists in the way j , n which language presents being so that it"'scan be understood: "For man's relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally linguistic in nature, and hence -intelligible." " , (T.M. p.. 432).

The task of hermeneutics is to reveal the structure of "understanding; to describe and highlight its process so that the experience In this way,

of the world as presented through language is valued.

the encounter with tradition, through art, history, literature, or philosophy is an encounter that is productive, rather than reproductive, integrating rather, than distancing; it expands one s ,

horizon rather than confirming one s historical superiority; y% * Understanding, then,, does not consist in "H" tech nical virtuousity of every thi-rfg.written. Rather it is. a genuine experience, i^e'. , an encounter with something that ,.asserts itself as truth. ;j ,^ 1TM. p - 445)- ' This l'ast ^quotation brings us/back to the unresolved problem of Gadamer s conception of truth.

Having examined hi's doctrine of

35

understanding, the nature of truth should be more amenable to analysis. It should be kept in. mind that the truth G'adamer is con-

cerned with is the truth that exists outside the domain of science. Heri'C'e, truth is- somewhat like language in*"that it is not some.thing that one can use^as an implement. Rather, truth is some-

thing experienced " b y passing through the hermeneutical circle and. ... * the encounte'r with tradition. It is notssomething handed to us dogmatically through tradition, but is instead something critic ' . . . ' '"30 ' -

ally appropriated from tradition.

Hermeneutics, which.starts,

for Gadamer,-' from a concrete historical situation, must critically engage the texts it seeks to understand. It must bring them

under close scrutiny and yet; be ready to acknowledge the quality of'newness contained therein. In an essay entitled The Problem

of^Historical Consciousness,' Gadamer writes: In truth,, the confrontation of our historic tradition is always a critical, challenge of this tradition....".Because every experience sets something new against something old and in every carse\ it is open in princ' iple whether-^thenew will:prevail - that is, will truly become experience,. - or whether the old, accustomed, predictable will be- . " > confirmed in the end.
*

* .

It is.because, it is 'open in principle

whether the new or

the old will prevail that Gadamer affirms the experiential charactrer of truth. As such, Gadamer s conception of truth is strikingHis emphasis

ly different from most Anglo-American conceptions.

upon experience may lead one to think that it is a form of subjective truth that Gadamer is advocating. This is -not the case because Since Language is

of the* linguisticality. of understanding.

>
36

social and communal in nature, and since truth must, in Gadamer s view, be expressed in language, then it cannot be the private possession of any individual. Truth must be an open horizon =

jithin the grasp of any member of a linguistic community. Our exposition of Gadamer has been cursory . views of Gadamer have been presented uncritically. mean that his thought is unproblematical; contains many tensions and obscurities. Thus -far, the

This does not

On the contrary., it

Gadamer s mode of ex-

pression* often indebted to Heidegger> *spmetimes resists easy comprehension. This observation, asserted bluntly, does not consti

tute a damaging criticism.

However^ we will turn now to consider

some of the criticisms advanced against Gadamer -and evaluate. , whether his views withstand these criticisms, and if ik&j'4o not,

whether there are aspects of his thought that should be retained.

" \

CHAPTER TWO

Critical

Examination

' /

"T-

**Vt ' ; - <.

38

Methodological versus Ontological Conceptions of Hermeneuti.es

As noted in the introduction, Heidegger s and Gadaraer s ontological conception of hermeneutics has caused tension with those who conceive of hermeneutics asya methodological discir '. pline. Gadamer, in particular, is aware of the difference be-

tween his version of hermeneutics and those of the methodological school. Method In a supplement to the second edition of Truth and

entitled Hermeneutics and Historicism ', Gadamer, respond-

ing to the criticisms of Erail'io Betti, claims that his hermeneu- . tics is descriptive, that is., it is a recognition of what is1,

. instead of starting from what ought"to be, or could be. (T.M. p .466) Betti argues that this entails answering only the quaestio facti instead of the more important quaestio juris. The difference be-

tween the quaestio-facti and quaestio juris is an important one / because the choice of which question .is addressed directs the way ,in which a hermeneuticist will conduct his or her activity. sequently the question should be asked: Con-

Are the two ways of pro-,

ceeding mutually exclusive, or can they somehow be brought toge- . ' ther as mutually complementary and supplementary ways of practicing hermeneutics? By examining the differences between*Betti;and

in particular Hirsch,. and Gadamer, it is hoped that the latter\ position can be established. The differences between Hirsch and Betti, and Gadamer involve more than the difference between the quaestio facti and the

39
r

quaestio juris. Ultimately it focuses upon the nature of interpretation itself. Is interpretation something incidental, re-

quired only for the .determination of meaning of texts, or is interpretation ontological, with texts being an exemplar of the The differing epistemological commit..! ments of Gadamer, and Hirsch and Betti account for thi* reluctance both sides have to countenance.a mediation between their positions. The difference is demonstrated most clearly in Gadanf2 er s insistence upon the historicity of understanding. To Betti process of interpretation?

and Hirsch, this implies a denial of the possibility of objective and valid interpretations because it entails a denial of the efficacy of the norm they wish to uphold for determining the validity and objectivity of interpretations: the author s intention.

It,is important, then, that Gadamer s view of how the historicity of understanding relates to the authors intention be examined.

Once it is clear how Gadamer views the role of authorial intention for the process of interpretation, his view can be contrasted with Hirsch s. Once this has' been achieved, it ca,n be determined if

there is an irreconcilable difference between Gadamer and Hirsch. The historicity of understanding permits Gadamer not to emphasize the role of the author s intention in,the determination of textual meaning. Since the integration and application of the

content of a text to the interpreter s historical situation is of central importance for Gadamer, the re-construction of the text s priginal meaning is of subordinate importance. Gadamer states:

... a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as the reconstruct-

ion of the> original would be no more than the discovery of a dead meaning. ' (T.M, p , . 149) struction is unnecessary. This Is not to say that recon-

As noted in the previous chapter,' the Hence,

integrity of the horizon of the text must" be maintained.

Gadamer can be.seen as suggesting that reconstruction of mean1rng=__ is the first step in hermeneutics. However, for hcrmeneutics to

be of value, interpretation must go beyond reconstruction.and the concern with dead" meanings and seek application in the context

of the interpreter s own horizon. With this in mind, Gadamer s view of the author s intention can be put into perspective. What Gadamer seeks to avoid by mak-

ing claims such as "Not occasionally only, but always, the "meaning of a text goes beyond its author. (T.M. p.264) is a-re-

gression to Schieiermacher s view that the key to understanding a text is to penetrate the author s subjective point of view by virtue of a divinatory act, able form of subjectivism. Gadamer thinks this implies an unacceptTo avoid subjectivism he maintains

that the focus of interpretation should be on the subject matter addressed by the text. (Thus Gadamer advocates trying to determine the question to which the text Ls an answer. Consequently, rather

than locating the subjectivity of the author, on-e tries to determine the perspective of the text. This, Gadamer argues,- means

simply that we try to accept the validity of what he (the author) is saying." (T.M. p.259). Thus Gadamer does not wish to banish

the intention of the author, but wishes to place it in a subordin/\

ate role to the task of application. /

Hirscfi s and Betti's under-

41

standing of the role of ent.

the author s intention is quite differ-

For the purposes of this argument, attention,will be reto the arguments of Hirsch.

stricted

Hirsch, in his book Validity in Interpretation, presents a systematically developed terpretations of texts. methodology for the validation of inHis theory includes ton account of types,

genres and other concepts"that aid the classification and categorization of texts. Central to his theory is the distinction betThe task of interpretation is to This is supplemented by critic-

ween meaning and significance.

determine the meaning of a text.

ism which is^ebneerhed with how a text is valued by a society of readers. The author's intention is crucial to the determination Hirsch perceives certain dangers in abandoning the

of meaning,

author s intention from the determination of the meaning of a text. He writes: "To banish the original author as the determin-

er of meaning is] to reject the only compelling normative principle that could lead'to an interpretation. (V.1.1, p. 5 ) .

Hirsch claims that Gadamer is guilty of such banishment and consequently Gadamer fails to distinguish between meaning and significance. For Hirsch, meaning is an affair of .consciousness, not ething that is willed by a

words. ' (V.1.1. p. 4 ) . Meaning is

person, and with texts, the meaning is willed by the author who 2 commits a set of linguistic signs to paper. identical and persist through time. Meanings are self-

Hence they are capable of

being recognized through the passage of time and reconstructed in a public context. Interpretation, then, copftists of a relation-

ship between the author, the text, and the public context of understanding. The aim^of interpretation is to recover the text s as the author willed it. To attain this mean-

original meaning

ing, Hirsch provides a logic of validation that owes much to the work of Keynes and topper. Significance, on- the other hand, concerns the relationship between the text and the series of readers that consider the text__^ through the passage of time. In Hirsch s words: Significance...

names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or indeed anything imaginable. (V. T. 1. p. 8). Hirsch,-,

describes the relationship between meaning and succinctly:

significance quite

Significance always implies a relationship, and one

constant unchanging pole of that relationship is 'what the text means." (V.I.1. p.8) The upshot of the distinction is that a text Hermen-

always has one meaning but many different significances.

euticists, like Gadamer, whom~Hirsch claims are' ignorant of this fundamental distinction, have thus, confused the distinction between interpretation,- the goal of which is to determine the orig- inal meaning of the text, and criticism, which is concerned with determining .rfie significance of a text to an age. It is not d e a r that Gadamer is as unaware of this distinction 3 as Hirsch would like to think. For, as it has been shown, Gadamer His con-

does allow for the recognition of the author s meaning.

ception of hermeneutics requires both recognition, through appropriation, and integration, or criticism, through'application. It could be argued, then, that Gadamer is in fact concerned with the

43

significance of texts.y and that discerning the significance of a text is the aim of hermeneutics. For, as-Gadamer argued:

Is it not true of every text, i.e. that it. must be understood in terms of what it says? Does this not mean that it must always be restated? And does not this restatement always take place through its being related to . the present. In as much as the object of historical understanding is not events, but their significance , it is clearly not'a correct description of this understanding to speak of an object existing in itself, and the approach of the subject to it. f ' (T.M, p.293) Clearly, therefore, Gadamer recognizes the distinction be--, tween meaning and significance. The differences between Gadamer

and Hirsch could be resolved neatly, by giving each their domain of concern. Consequently, Hirsch s technique for discerning mean-

ing could be useoVto supplement Gadamer s hermeneutical requirement of application. Unfortunately, the differences are not that

easily resolved, and further steps must be taken for a proper mediation of their positions, to be attained.
.o. . ; . . . . .. ' '

In the first place, it is not clear that Gadamer and Hirsch are concerned with the same thing in their discussions of authorial intention. For Gadamer, authorial intention is related to Gadaraer subordinates authorial intent-

the author s subjectivity.

ion to the subject matter of the .text in order to avoid psychoiogism. Hirsch would like to avoid psychologism as well. For

Hirsch, authorial intention serves as a discriminating norra for the determination of textual meaning. However, this is attained

'at the cost of giving a stipulative definition of meaning, i.e. something'that is willed^ Hirsch s contention that meaning is ah

44

affair of consciousness, which is also determinate, self-identicali through ;time, and publicly accessible, may be applauded by Platonists, but it boils down to more of an exhortation than an argument. Whether this account of meaning can be squared with his logic of validation is a crucial question, and one that will be addressed below. It seems that the question of authorial intention is not what truly separates Gadamer and Hirsch. The crux of their dif-

ferences can " b e found in Hirsch s rejection of historicism. Hirsch writes, no doubt with'Gadamer in mind; The historicity of

interpretation is quite distinct from the timelessness of understanding. (V.I.I. p. 137). Hirsch, thus admits that historical

considerations are of importance for interpretation,, particularly with respect to the data available to a group of interpreters. This helps to account for the diversity of interpretations within any given time. However, Hirsch considers Gadamer a radical his-

toricist', and argues that this commits Gadamer to a position that entail&^ekepticism with respect to determining the text s original meaning. According to Hirsch, Gadamer s position entails assert-

ing that the only meaning a text can have is the meaning an interpreter gives it. Hirsch writes: He (Gadamer) cannot say that

the interpreter understands the original sense of the text, since that would be to. disregard the historicity of. understanding. (V.I.I, p. 253) Hirsch, in this passage, is being uncharitable towards Gadamer, and too selective in his reading. As has been shown in the prev-

ious chapter,, the purpose of the principle of effective history

45

and the fusion of horizons is to avoid the problem of the interpreter being locked into his or her own historical age. Hirsch

is aware of the concept of the fusion of horizons, and.states: For once it is admitted that the 'interpreter can adopt a fused perspective different from his own 'contemporary one, then it is admitped in principle that he can break out of his own perspective. If that is possible, the primary assumption of the theory is shattered. W.I.I, p. 254) Indeed Gadamer admits that one can break out of one s perspective. However, rather than shattering the theory, it confirms precisely what it is supposed to do. Historicity is/a problem for Hirsch because he inflates and distorts its role in Gadamer s thought. As has been shown,

Gadamer is not a radical historicist, and to depict him as one, as Hirsch does, is to misinterpret him. Historicity, for Gadamer,

is a condition that enables one to begin the process of understanding. If it were the case.that historicity was an obstacle to un-

derstanding, then one could not make sense of Gadamer s appreciat7 ion of the hermeneutical relevance of Aristotle. Therefore, for Hirsch to write that "The doctrine of radical historicity is ultimately a dogma, an idea of reason, an act of faith."(V.I,I.p.256-7) is to engage in polemics with a straw man. '

It is apparent, then, that the different ontological comraitments of both Gadamer and Hirsch prevent an easy reconciliation of their views. However, there is a way by which the two opposing The key to this reconciliation
r

positions can be brought together.

is provided by Hirsch s process of validation conjoined with a re-

orientation of Gadamer s claims for the historicity . . . o f understanding. By softening some of the Intransigence on both sides, If the

it can be shown that the two projects are complementary.

methodological conception of hermeneutics and the ontological conception of hermeneutics are shown to be complementary, then the necessity for a fundamental choice between the two, noted i n the introduction, is unnecessary, and a more comprehensive view of hermeneutics emerges. Hirsch is skeptical of the possibility of determining with certainty the meaning of a text. Since genuine certainty is imhermeneutics^ must be to
, -

possible, the aim of the discipline (i.e.

?

reach consensus, on .the basis of what is known, that correct understanding, has been achieved . (V.I.I. p. 17). The fact that genuine certainty cannot be attained leads Hirsch to claim that

the aim of interpretation is validity not verification: To'verify is to show that a conclusion is true; to validate is to show

that a conclusion is probably true on the basis of what is known. (V. 12..' p. 171).. Although some logicians would be puzzled by Hirsch definitions of validity and verification, he makes a plausible case for his usage. Validation, since it secures a probable meaning

given the "evidence at the disposal of an interpreter, is.thus a provisional process.* Hirsch recommends a "survival of est the fitt-

model for the process of advancing,critizing and rejecting, Hence, the process of. adjudicating interpret-

interpretations.

ations is similar to the adversary system in law: !

v '

* *
'

<r

,A

,'

-;

. /!

The advocates have' the task of bringing forward -evidence favorable to their side and unfavorable to their opponents. In doing so, they may bring to light evidence which a judge might not have thought to consider. But without a judgeall those relevant pieces of knowledge float'uselessly..... However, unless advocates sometimes serve as T . judges, none of this activity will actually contribute to knowledge. (V. I.I, p. 197) ..

Two important points emerge from Hirsch s view of validation.. Firstly, since the process of validation is carried out-in the social context of a community of interpreters, the hypotheses that interpreters put forward will be determined-in part by the questions they ask of the text, and hence, to some extent,: guided by their historicity. Hirsch concedes as much, but thinks that

through the test of the survival of the fittest, the best possible reading will emerge. However, this suggests that the best poss-

ible reading is liable, to alter if further evidence emerges that warrants the rejection of the previously established best reading. Hirsch would argue that this is the manner by which the growth of knowledge is secured. It is important to note that this idea of

growth .bears similarities with Gadamer s view of the extension of horizons. What separates Gadamer and Hirsch 6n this point i ^ not

so much their" views on either historicity or validity, but Hirsch s unstated belief that there is an ultimate standard to which a valid interpretation should correspond. Although Certainty cannot be Gadamer, by deny-

attained, it is an ideal that should be sought.

ing the existence of a world in itself, and by extension, a text in itself, denies such a possibility. These considerations lead to the second major' point,.

48

-which is the tension-between Hirsch s doctrine of validation and his conception of the author.s intention. - It seems that on the adversary/ model of the adjudication of interpretations the author s intention could not play as crucial role as Hirsch would like. Either each rival interpretation has captured the author s

intention, and thus the meaning of the text, or it could-not count, on Hirschs criteria, ,as a possible interpretation. If

an interpretation is ruled out on the basis of not" capturing the

t

author s intention-; then, accordingly, one of its rivals must have captured the author s intention. However, if the author s

intention has been adequately.determined, it would seem that a certain understanding of the text has been attained," and not merely a probable one; 'on the other_hand, if it is shown, by whatever means, that each of a set of conflicting interpretations has a claim to grasping authorial- intention, then the judgement of validity cannot be adjudicated" by appeal to the author s intention,
t

but must instead be adjudicated by some other criterion.

A Like-

ly candidate,-in this case, would be the significances or applications the interpretation may uncover. Therefore, interpretation

cannot, as Hirsch thinks, be divorced from criticism, and further, the.distinction between meaning and significance is not absolute,
* .

It seems,, then, that Hirsch s conception of authorial intent.'" ion functions more as a regulative ideal than^an actual discrim-^

. r
8 inating norm. Since certainty cannot be attained authorial intention can be used to rule out only some, interpretations, but cannot serve to adjudicate all interpretations, as Hirsch set out

/'

49

to demonstrate.

However, Hirsch, by leaving, open the possibility

of fallibility in the process of interpretation,- has set the context within which his view of hermeneutics can be reconciled with
' ' .

Gadamer s.

There are some implicit dangers in Gadamer s position. -Without certain doctrines being qualified, his position could be con-. sidered untenable. It is never quite clear, when.he speaks of the

experience of truth and tradition.whether he is referring to an individual or an historical age. Since Gadamer wishes to avoid

subjectivism , the hermeneutical task of appropriating tradition .must be carried out and expressed in some form of community or social context. However, whereas Hirsch is quite clear on how

various understandings and interpretations are put forth for con-, sideration, acceptance or rejection within a community of interel-

preters, Gadamer is not.

The model of dialogue and conversation,

the aim of which is agreement upon the subject matter of the text, is. the closest Gadamer comes to providing, an account of how ac'ceptance of an interpretation is attained. Gadamer seems to be shackHowever,

' ' V

led by his desire to be descriptive and phenomenologi'cal.

for;his claims of the experience of'truth'to be tenable, and indeed,

t t

for the process of appropriation and application not to be construed as a subjective and arbitrary undertaking-, some further account.must be given stating how certain interpretations are accepted> ... - : . The recourse to the. communal nature of langu-

age does not suffice because even if an interpretation 6f a text

* . . ' y

'is

publicly accessible, it does not guarantee an interpretations

50

acceptance by the community, or even its productivity for illuminating tradition. . Richard Bernstein, in a sensitive treatment of Gadamer's position in an -article entitled "From Hermeneutics to Praxis," is aware of this* problem. Bernstein attempts to pull together

the ideas of historicity and truth so that they v form a coherent whole. Bernstein argues that if historicity is taken seriously,

then validation beco-mes paramount: For when it- comes to the -validation of claims to-truth and the correct interpretation oftexts, then the essential issue concerns reasons.and arguments which.are, of course, fallible, and are anticipatory in the sense that they can be challenged and criticized b y ^ u t u r e argumentation. In ef.fect, I am. suggesting that* what Gadamer himself is -app'ealihg . to is '/ a concept of truth which comes down to what can be argumentatively val-idated by the com- / munity of interpreters who open themselves up to what tradition says to us. This does not " mean that there is some transcendental of . ah^Lstorical perspective from which we can evaluate 'competing'claims to 'truth. We judge .and evaluate such claims by the standards and . practices that have been hammered out in the course of- history.. 9 . ' ,

.^

Bernstein's' argument shows that the differences between*,

Hirsch's "Platonism".and.Gadamer's^"historicism" are nat that great. Though both use different concepts and employ w.hat at
' i ' " -

times seem lijce different languages, both ar.e emphatic that consensus or agreement is the'aim of Interpretation. Although Gadamer wishes to escape the thrall of methodology, it is apparent that if he desires the encounter with tradition to be both productive and non-subjective, some argument for how the claims of, tradition are adjudicated must be advanced. Hirsch seeks to provide a method by

51

which the.claims of tradition can be adjudicated, but, as has been shown, his end is-similar to Gadaraer s. Consequently, re- .

gardless of whether one s view of hermeneutics 'is. methodological > or ontological, the interpretations offered are subject to the
i/

changing standards of history.

Gadamer s strength rests in his

candid acceptance and thorough explication of the nature of historicity, but his desire to avoid methodology could leave him impotent when it comes to giving reasons why an interpretation merits consideration.
f

In a sense, Gadamer must try to give some

answer to the quaestro juris.

If Gadamer s resistance to methodology is softened, along with a mitigation of Hirsch s anti-historicism, it is possible to wed ontology and methodology in hermeneutics. Betti, who is

more thorough.on this point, and Hirsch are correct to insist that some philological technique is required in order to attain a plausible reading of a text of any complexity. Gadamer is also correct to insist that method is not., a surefire way to ensure understanding of texts. The insistenceof

both Gadamer and Hirsch upon the social aspect of interpretation suggests~that neither method nor dialectic should reign supreme. Perhaps Gadamer's polemics againstraethodo'logismare premissed on a perception that method is securing hegemony in contemporary interpretive practice.. However, if methodological hermeneutics can-, not guarantee -certainty, and is subject to its own historicity, then Gadaraer s fears may be somewhat unfounded.. Onthe other hand,

if the criterion for the consideration of an interpretation is the presence of some demonstrable method,.then Gadamer s fears are warranted, and his hermeneutics of importance as a corrective to the narrowing of interpretative possibilities.- Gadamer s strength * * is precisely his desire to remain.open to the possibility of understanding a text in a manner that might be lost if one proceeds unwary of one s bias and prejudice rooted in historicity. Hirsch,

because of his trust in methodology, seems to think it is possible to.interpret in a pre-suppositionless manner. Gadamer s thought

is of value because i t can serve as a way of curtailing the claims o . f methodology and ensure that method, if employed, is employed circumspectly.

r\

II
The Social-Scientific Dimension of Hermeneutics: The Problem of Ideology and Understanding

The introduction of the idea of a community of interpreters within which' the process of, adjudicating the rival claims of interpretations takes place serves as an apposite stepping stone for a movement to the consideration of the relevance of hermeneutics for t^ie social sciences. The move from the interpretat-

ion of texts to t h \ interpretation of social phenomenon involves a shift in subject matter, but does not necessarily entail a shift in the problematic. es, In the philosophy of the social scienc-

the dispute between methodological, and antimethodological

approaches to social phenomena has persisted for some. time,. Various approaches and schools of thought have emerged, and the dispute has not abated to this day. However, for our purposes, Rather than focusing

the problem under consideration will shift.

specifically upon the problem of whether there is an interpretive aspect inherent in the social sciences, the concern will be for the scope of tiermeneutical reflection in the domain of the social sciences. More precisely, the claim to universality of hermeneut(that is, that Gadamer has

ica'l understanding that Gadamer makes

described how understanding always occurs) wilT~Se~brought under critical consideration. To this end, the dispute between Gadamer

54

and Jurgcn Habermas will be examined. The writings of Habermas, like those of" Gadamer, arc complex and stem from the fusion of many diverse philosophical traditions, Habermas s doctrines are' spread through many works, and

encompass a large number pi. problems in social and political philosophy. The program that Habermas has set for himself, most

notably in his book'Knowledge and Human Interests, has undergone many transformations, Chough his core idea, Che idea of a critical philosophy of ideology and domination, has persisted through these many transformations. Owing to the complexity of Habermas s thought (particularly his recent studies in universal pragmatics)

iC is necessary to limit the number of Habermas s ideas to be considered. Therefore, for the purposes of the following argumenC,

the'investigation will be limited to those of Habermas s writings that directly concern Gadamer s position. Habermas is sympathetic to Gadamer s arguments against the exclusive concern ..for methodology. Both Habermas and Gadamer

attribute this, in part, to the pernicious influence of positiv ism. However, although both are in agreement about the nee-d to

answer positivism, the motivating interests behind the need to answer positivism differ. There are also significant differences

with respect to what both Habermas and Gadamer consider the end to be achieved by the .denial of positivism. The differences be'tween

these two thinkers contribute interesting insights to the nature of hermeneutics. Habermas s thought continues the tradition that has come to

.55

be known under the rubric of Critical Theory.

Critical Theory is

a neo-Marxist movement,. initiated in Frankfurt under the guidance of T.W. Adorno and Max Horkhcimer. One of its chief con-

cerns is examining and criticizing cultural activity on the bas- is of a Marxist critique of ideology, supplemented by the thought of Nietzsche and other major intellectual figures.
*

Since the.
ii

ii

critical theorists are strongly suspicious of

scientism , their

approach to social phenomena can be regarded as broadly hermeneutical. Rather than pursuing a reductive analysis.of culture'by

locating its origin solely in the organization of productive -forces and relations, they seet to explain culture in a more dialectical fashion, by considering the way in which culture and product ion are mutually tied. Habermas follows the path of the

critical theorists in their concern for ideology, but seeks instead to find a more general theoretical structure within which the critique of ideologies can proceed.
f t

Habermas is led to a con-

sideration 6f hermeneutics, and to Gadamer s theory in particular, by his desire to construct such a theoretical structure, the aim of which is to guide humans through the distorting mirror of ideology to liberation. Habermas s criticisms constitute a rejection of two of. Gadamer' s centr-al tenets: firstly, the universality of herraeneutical

reflection, and secondly, Gadamer s close association of tradition and language. Interests In an appendix to his book Knowledge and Human

entitled "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General

Perspective", Habermas argues that what he terms the historical-

56

hermeneutic

sciences are limited in their domain to the interThey are, as Habermas states:
9
II

pretation of cultural artifacts.

concerned with the sphere of transitory things and mere opinion... Since the aim of hermeneutics is .o understand "and interpret the" activity of past cultures as documented by texts, hermeneutics must, to some degree, be uncritical in its acceptance of what is handed down through tradition. Gadamer, although presenting a

herent and well argued theory, of hermeneutical understanding, has not sufficiently safeguarded his theory against the possibility of ideologically influenced doctrines. "In particular, Gadamer s insistence on the productive potential of the encounter with tradition is uncritical in its view of the authority of tradition. As Habermas puts it: There- is...reason to assume that the

background consensus of established traditions and language games may be a forced consensus which resulted from pseudo-communicat: " * ' ' , ion.... Habermas s suspicions about the authority of tradition , . * are premissed -upon his acceptance.of Marx s and Freud s accounts

ij

of how a person s or society s self-understanding may not be commensurate to their objective conditions of existence. Habermas .

is concerned w'ith the distortion of communication which has its roots socially in the domination and coercion exercized by those .4 in control of a society. Distorted communication can be diagnos-

ed only ~rnthe context of an overarching theory of communicative competence. Hermeneutics, as conceived by Gadamer, is insufficient ... in the case of systemhere the

to the task., for, as Habermas argues:

atically distorted communication, incomprehensibility is

n5 result of a defective organization of speech itself. - Gadamer, because of hfs claims for the linguisticality of understanding, cannot penAferate behind language to examine the social context

7
within whidh communication, throughlanguage, takes place. Thus,. Gadame.r fails to take into account the concrete context wherein both communication through language, and its distortion, originates. Consequently Habermas argues that Gadamer s hermeneutics,

because it fails to take into account.these concrete conditions, is essentially a form of linguistic idealism. Habermas considers Gadamer s hermeneutics as subordinate to a form of "depth hermeneutics", which seeks, on a global scale, the/interpretation of social action on "a model closely resembling psychoanalysis. The psychoanalyst, in diagnosing the pathologic-

al behaviour of a patient, must possess a regulative standard of

< " ' . . .

normal.behaviour with whi*ch to contrast the abnormal behaviour of the patient in question. By employing this regulative standard,

supplemented with the techniques of analysis, the psychoanalyst hopes to be able to bring the patient to a critical self-realization of the origins of y\~i$(htr abnormal behaviour, and thus free the patient from its thrall. Habermas argues that on a social

level, a depth hermeneutic <an provide a similar form of critical reflection on the origins of communication distortions in a manner that parallels the way a psychoanalyst diagnoses the origin of the distortion of individual experience. The.regulative standard for Briefly stated,

Habermas is called an ideal speech situation.

an ideal speech situation is a social context in which communic-

58

ation is free from domination and coercion.

The, absence of dom-

ination prevents the distortion of communication and consequently - anything communicated is freely appropriated by the members -of - 'the social group without duress. the ideal speech situation It is'important to note tSat

is,for. Habermas, a theoretical con-.

, struct. . It is presupposed by a depth hermeneutic in order to diagnose communication distortion. This, Habermas argues, gives

his position explanatory superiority to Gadanier s because it takes into account the concrete social conditions which deter-t mine language use, rather than accepting, as Habermas argues Gadanier does, language as the determining factor of social life. It also provides a.means of distinguishing the ideological contents of, tradition from those aspects of tradition which contribute to liberation in our present social condition. Gadamer s linguistic idealism, with his claims for the authority of tradition, lead Habermas to claim that not only is Gadamer essentially conservative, but his hermeneutics function in such a way as to deny the efficacy of- critical' reflection: Gadamer fails to appreciate the power of reflection that is developed in understanding. This type of Reflection is no longer blinded by the illusion of an absolute, self-grounded autonomy and does not detach itself.from the soil of contingency on which it finds itself. But in grasping th<r^genesis of the tradition from- which it proceeds and in which it turns back, reflection shakes the dogmatism of life practices." . .
f

Related to the criticisms of

Gadamer s acceptance of tradi-

tion, are Habermas s criticisms of Gadamer s concept of the pre-

59

judicial, nature of understanding*.

If tradition is accepted blind-

ly, and if tradition is; the ground from which prejudices grow, then ' it would imply that one CQuld never completely dispel prejudice.
A*

Habermas seems to think that Gadamer s distinction between productive and non-productive prejudices is specious. He argues that if a prejudice leads to genuine understanding it cannot be a prejudice. Further, if critical reflection is developed, certain In either case,

prejudices will be shown invalid and cast aside.

as Habermas argues: . "A structure of pre-understanding or pre .

judgement that has been rendered transparent can no longer iunc9

' "

tion as a prejudice.

Habermas s criticisms of Gadamer s view of prejudice and tra- ' . ' dition are premissed upon his desire to establish the power of critical reflection as a potent and valuable form of knowledge. Critical reflection, for Habermas, has the transcendent power to. survey the history' of traditions and dissolve the false ideas that traditions accumulate through time. In a sense/ critical reflect-

ion has the power to move outside" the hermeneutical circle of understanding. A quotation from Habermas illustrates this point: Gadamer's prejudice for the rights of prejudices denies the power of reflection. The latter proves itself, however, in being able to reject " ^ . . . . the claim of tradition.. Reflection-dissolves substantiality because it not only confirms,t'+ breaks up, dogmatic forces. Authority and knowledge do not converge. To be sure knowledge is rooted in-actual tradition; it remains bound to contingent conditions. But * reflection does not wrestle with the facticity of transmitted norms without leaving a trace. It is condemned to be after the factj but in glancing back it develops retro-active power. We can turn back upon internalized norms only after we have first learned, .

60

under externally'imposed force, to follow them blindly. . Reflection recalls the path'of authority along which the grammars of language games were dogmatically inculcated as rules for interpreting the world and for action.- In this process the element of authority that was -simply domination can be stripped away and dissolved into the less coercive constraint of insight and rational decision,','-' The upshot of Habermas s argument against Gadamer is to deny
v

Gadamer s claim for the universal scope of hermeneutical reflection. One way of viewing i.abermas s criticisms is to see him as

claiming that Gadamer has not satisfactorily answered the quaestio facti. Since Gadamer is claiming to give an ontological account

of the nature of understanding, he should be able to provide, on Habermas s view, some account 4of How non-linguistic determinants such as domination and social organization affect the process of understanding. By failing to do.so, Gadamer s hermeneutical con-

. ception of understanding fails to account fully for.what happens in the process of understanding. it: As Habermas trenchantly phrases

Social actions can only be comprehended in an objective

framework that is constituted conjointly, by language, labour, and

" - .-. -nil domination.
*

Gadamer attempts to rebut the central positive claims of Habermas s conception of emancipatory, reflection. v^ . does not.think that an ideal speech situation, modelled upon psychoanalysis is a viable move in the interpretation of,'social phenomena. Gadamer, by denying the positive recommendations of Habermas, Secondly, he

hopes to show that his claims for the universality of hermeneutics have not been damaged. > . .

6J.

Gadamer's argument against Habermas's view of emancipatory reflection consists of casting doubt upon Habermas's ability to escape ideology himself. Gadamer succinctly states his-

argument in an essay entitled "Hermeneutics and Social Science'1; My objection is that the critique of ideology. '. overestimates, the competence of reason and reflection. Inasmuch as it seek's to penetrate the masked interests which infect public, opinion, it -implies its own freedom from ideology; and that means in , tttrn that it enthrones its own norms and ideals as self-evident and absolute... "One should, it is true, be aware ,that there are always pre-conditions built i-nto our social practice and organization that enable or hinder us in understanding one another. And this is precisely the noble task of hermeneutics: to make expressly conscious/what separates us as well as what brings us together..12 ^ . ' -

"^

Gadamer's argument is essentially a tu quoque argument. However, it is effective in that it points out a problem for Habermas. How is it that finally a transcendental,point can

be attained that is free from ideological taint?

The regulative

ideal of the ideal speech situation cannot secur'e this because it is a theoretical presupposition, and not an actual situation. Practically, and existentially viewed, interpretation and understanding are always undertaken in a concrete situation in which prejudices cannot be easily recognised in a systematic way; Consequently, it is not quite so easy to move out . "^

of the hermeneutical circle. . Habermas's attempt to move out * of the hermeneutical circle falters when it is pointed out that he has not urovided a means to secure his own freedom from prejudice and ideology at the level' of emancipatory "reflection. ' -

62

These considerations lead to Gadamer s second criticism of Habermas. Gadamer denies that one can transpose psychoanalysis

from the individual to the social level. Aside from the problems of .establishing such concepts, as normal and'-abnormal communication at the social level, Gadamer is also incredulous about the concept of communication distortion per se. 13 Gadamer claims

that Habermas s. arguments rest upon a misunderstanding pf the nature of language in general, and of Gadamer s view isticality of understanding in particular. ' Gadamer abjures the label of linguistic . ideaMLst . He is', of the lingu-

not, as Habermas thinks, ignoring the non-linguistic determinants

; " '

of human social action. Method

In the'^second supplenjidnt to Truth and

-ft '

- '

I*

entitled 'To What Extent Does^Language.Preform Thought,^ '

he writes.* *\ . : " . It would be totally abstract to consider that it was not through and in the concrete experiences of our human existence, in domination and in work, and only here, that our human understanding of ourselves, our evaluations,, our conversations with j^urselves, find their fulfilment and exercise, their critical func' tion. 14 ' *r ' ' ' ; Gadamer is willing to accept the facjt that ideology may be
' /' [ -

-i'/

'

transmitted by language, but this does not entail that language is itself ideological. 'A critical stance towards ideology is premissed upon its beingj%>th linguistically understood and expressed:
,**
. * r
' * > ' ' <

But our human experience of the world, for which we rely on our faculty of judgement consists precisely* in the possibility of taking a critical stance with regard to every convention. In reality, we owe thisto the linguistic virtuality of our reason/, and language does not therefore present ar obstacle to reason.

V,

63

Gadamer argues that these considerations are sufficient to re-establish his claims for the universality of hermeneutical reflection. Since tradition vis nqt a fixed absolute entity, and_

since language is not a closed, self-contained edifice, hermeneut-ical reflection is always viable in that it focuses.upon language, tradition and understanding as they emerge in a social context. However, e.ven though Gadamet can answer Habermas s critic-,

isms-, it is not the case that his views remain fundamentally the same. Habermas has correctly pointed out that Gadamer s . view, as,.\

delineated in Truth and Method, accepts somewhat uncritically the authority of tradition.

Gadamer, in his desire to salvage the

" " ,

richness of tradition, did. not place sufficient emphasis upon the

' . " . ^

role of criticism in the appropriation of tradition.

h

For Gadamer to meet Habermas s criticism requires that he shif,t his emphasis from the eventlike nature of understanding its critical function. The shift is most markedly shown if one' as a desto

contrasts his view of hermeneu-fcics in Truth and Method cription of what happens to us over and above our

wanting and

doing". (T.M. p. XVI) to his cla^.ra at the end of the essay. Hermeneutics and Social Science", that hermeneutic philosophy is the This

heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy.

shift is important befeause if Gadaraer wishes to remain in the realms of phenomenology and ontology alone, then; in Lawrence Hinman s ','" ' . , ' 17 words, 'hermeneutics consigns itself to an odd kind of irrelevance.
*
+

"

'

This' is so, because- if hermeneutics is only a description of what happens when one understands, then it cannot serve the critical

function of distinguishing the elements of trad.ition that should be taken 'seriously.. However, Habermas s criticisms are important precisely because, it forces Gadaraer to emphasize the fact that the encounter with tradition is not one wherein tradition'is accepted passively. The practical task of hermeneut.icsy"then,

becomes finding the way to 'actualize what has 'been appropriated from tradition in a social context,- -Hermeneutics, then, cannot remain solely in the realm of phenomenology and ontology. If

* .

hermeneutics.is to be the heir to the older tradition of practical philosophy, it must specify, in a . . m o r e concrete manner, how ' the encounter with tradition can bear f*ruit in a contemporary ' context. . *-

111

Tradition.and its Relevance to Philosophy

Habermas s criticisms of Gadamer s conception of tradition clearly elicits the problem of tradition for consideration. To!

conclude this chapter, it would be instructive to examine Gadamer s view of tradition in the light of a contrast between Habermas, whose views we have examined, and Richard Rorty, whose contribution to hermeneutics was mentioned briefly in the introduction. The intention here is not to "develop the views of either

Habermas or Rorty, but rather to characterize their views of the relationship between hermeneutics and tradition and show how Gadamer s position has strengths that neither Rorty can accommodate.. Rorty and Habermas are of interest because they represent
I
' ' "

Habermas nor.

'

'

'

two diametrically opposed views on- the nature of philosophical.

I
''/:'

activity.

Habermas is unabashedly transcendental in his approach, Habermas can . . ' .

whereas Rorty is pointedly anti-transcendental.

accept a hermeneutical point of view only if it is embedded within a transcendental structure which permits a depth-hermeneutical analysis:iof communication distortion. Rorty, on the other

hand, rejects the need for any such transcendental guarantees. For Rorty, hermeneutics is a process.of becoming familiar with something that is strange; e.p. > when one meets something

V6

(a text, or culture) that cannot be readily accommodated to an

'

...

I-

accepted language or social practice.

n

Hermeneutics, according
" * '

to Rorty, is . the attempt to make sense of what is going on at a stage where we are too unsure about it to describe it, and thereby give an epistemol.ogical account of it, Rorty, like Gadamer,

stresses the conversational nature of hermeneutics, as opposed to Habermas, who'sees this as a block to the.development^f critical reflection. However, although Rorty s view of hermeneutics is

sympathetic, and in, part indebted to Gadamer, he shares a common element with .Habermas that separates him from Gadamer. "Both Haber-

mas and Rorty, unlike Gadamer, share a negative judgement of trad-. ition. Habermas, as we have seen., thinks it conceals the root's-'-of The thrust of Rorty s argument in Philosophy and the seems to be that the tradition of philosophy, .

domination.

Mirror of Nature

at least as understood and practiced in contemporary professional philosophy, has run its course, and should be abandoned. . These differences in the views of tradition are important. Gadamer s project can be s'een as a redemption of tradition, and in particular, the tradition of the humanities. tics Gadamer s hermeneu-

intends more than casting around for a vocabulary with which Rather, the up-

to describe some novel experience or phenomena.

shot of Gadamer s hermeneutics, and what makes it a distinctively philosophical enterprise, is its concern with the variety ,of i thought and experience that tradition presents. His >viev of ef-

fective history urges that we do not turn deaf ears to the "great dead philosophers' because they were either mistaken, or because

they expressed the views of the ruling class or dogmas of their ^ day. According to Gadamer, there is no other way in which the

tradition can be seen as valuable save by the consciousness of effective history. If we view the tradition as moribund, as a well

without water, then the opportunity is lost to derive something of value from the encounter with tradition. Gadamer s claims for the productivity of tradition do not entail that one must continually ask the questions which philosophers in the past have asked and folkpw their arduous paths to an unsatis^ factory conclusion. The critical function of hermeneutics is to

recognize the nature of the questions, and the answers, but moreover to see what is still valid and has applications today J The

dialectical relationship between the past and present, between question and answer, suggests that we recognize ourselves as constitutive of the growth of tradition. save the expansion of one s horizon. Gadamer recognizes the difficulty of trying to sustain such a conception of tradition. He could not, for example, convince This growth has no aim

. Heidegger that Heidegger s deconstruction of metaphysics was built upon such a view of tradition. For Rorty and Habermas, this

view of tradition/demonstrates either conservatism, or a desire to keep alive aspirations that should be displaced. However, reading

Truth and Method, with the painstaking historical re-constructions that Gadamer presents, one sees how hermeneutics can validly rehabilitate concepts and ideas that have been cast aside through the passage of time. One. may disagree with .Gadamer s view of

prejudice, but it is more difficult to find fault with his arguments for taking Aristotle s concept of phronesis seriously. Consequently, although Gadamer s hermeneutics is not transcendental , it seeks to preserve a connection with tradition that neither Rorty nor Habermas would accept. . This does.not mean that tradition stifles or blocks the development of thought. it gives thought a focus and a point of departureRather,

Even when the

tradition is overcome, in a manner similar to Heidegger s, this * does not mean that tradition is forgotten. A lengthy quotation Speaking of

from Gadamer eloquently expresses this sentiment.

Heidegger s project of overcoming metaphysics, Gadamer writes:

J

... overcoming meta physics can be no mere putting it behind us, no mere divorcing of ourselves from the older tradition, of metaphysical thought. On the contrary, "overcoming implies, as Heidegger-s inimitable way with language and thinking, brings out, "getting over , in the sense of coming to grips with . That which we get over , or come to grips with ' is not simply" past and forgotten. Getting over a loss, for example, consists not merely in our gradually forgetting it and "taking it". Or better, let. us say we do in fact take it , but in the sense that the pain is dealt with rather than it gradually lets up. And' far from being g<3lewithout a trace, the pain in our conscious achievement of enduring it, lastingly and irrevocably determines our own being, We stay with , it, as it were, even when we have gotten over it.

It is precisely the sense of how tradition determines being that distinguishes Gadamer from Habermas and Rorty. Neither .Hab-

ermas nor Rorty will countenance the strong relationship between thought and tradition that Gadamer permits. Gadamer's point is Self-understand-

that tradition is related to self-understanding.

ing is dialectically related to tradition, in that they mutually

69

constitute each other. most like the

For Habermas and Rorty, tradition is alThou as it is for Gadamer.

other , rather than a otherness

Gadamer recognizes the overcome a strictly ing tradition a Thou

of tradition, but wishes to By mak-

other

relationship with tradition.

in a conversation, Gadamer hopes to preAs noted, this relationship,

serve its richness and variety.

must be supplemented by procedures of criticism so that tradition is not blindly'followed. However, we may find ourselves in agree-

ment with Gadamer, that to deny the relationship between thought and tradition is to invoke closure on conversation, and to forsake the possibility of an understanding hitherto undisclosed.

Conclusion

Taken together, the criticism of Hirsch and Habermas indicate that Gadamer s theory of hermeneuticai understanding has answered neither the quaestio juris nor the quaestio facti. Their How. '

criticisms, as has been shown, are not without spme force.

ever, common to both Hirsch and Habermas is a view .of understanding that is reconstructive. In Hirsch s case, to understand a

text entails reconstructing or restoring a text to its status as it existed when it was first created. In Habermas s case under-

standing reconstructs the social context wherein communication distortion' originates. Thus, in both cases understanding is a The problem

moment that grasps something' as it was in itself.

this poses is that interpretation and critical reflection become divorced from the process of understanding. The historical con-

ditions which govern understanding and interpretation are glossed ove by Hirsch and Habermas because both think that historical conditions threaten either objectivity or efficacious criticism.
i

Gadamer seems to wave-r on the quaestio juris and quaestio facti issue bee a w e he desires to develop a view of understanding that is productive. It is to Gadamer s credit that he realizes

..

the importance of historical conditions for understanding and outlines their theoretical implications. Rather than viewing history

as an obstacle to some purer form of understanding, he views it as . the condition from which all forms of understanding emanate."

71

Gadamer s productive conception of understanding can provide an account of novelty of interpretation and growth of tradition that neither Hirseh nor Habermas can provide. The fusion of horizons

and- the movement of understanding through the hermeneutical circle seek to account for how this novelty and growth take.place. If understanding is strictly separated from both interpretation and criticism, and the crucial contribution of history to understanding is glossed over, then It becomes difficult to account for the generation of new interpretations. The importance of this view of understanding has already If

been noted in the consideration of the nature of tradition.

.one views tradition as an object, and conceives of understanding as grasping facets of tradition as objects, then finding an appli-

rv.

cation of an element of tradition to one s historical situation becomes extremely difficult. Gadamer, because of his view of

tradition as. a partner in conversation;' can accommodate both novelty in understanding and applications of past ideas to the present. Although there are problems with the account Gadamer

gives of application, it is a concept that all forms of hermeneutics should give serious consideration. Gadamer s account of hermeneutical understanding, then, could help dissolve the hermeneutical aporia noted in the introduction.

Gadamer does not advocate the elimination of methodological approaches to texts or social phenomena, but rather seeks to cultivate- a sensitivity to the context from which these methods originate and to which they will be applied. In essence, the conception

>

"

'

'

of hermeneutical understanding Gadamer presents is capable of em- . bracing all the varied definitions of hermeneutics outlined in the introduction. The point of Gadamer*s hermeneutics is to re-

s i s t the temptation, to hide behind t t y e security provided by effective methods of textual or social" analysis and point to the horizons.that become obscured when one succumbs to this temptation. Gadamer admirably summarizes this point in his concluding words in Truth and Method.:
1

... \TJhere is' undoubtedly no understanding that is-free of all prejudices; however much the will of our knowledge must be directed towards escaping their thrall.- It has emerged... that the" certainty imparted by the use of scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. This is so especially of the human sciences, but this does not mean a diminution of their scientific quality, but, on the contrary', the justification of the claim to special humane significance that they have always made. The fact that in the knowing involved in them the knower s:own. being is involved marks, certainly, the limitation of method , but not that of science. Rather, what the tool of method does not achieve must - and effectively can-" be achieved by a discipline of questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth. (T.M. pp. 446-447)

73

Notes: I n t r o d u c t i o n
i '

i
;

See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) Part IIIJ,, and ' Charles Taylor, ' Interpretation and the Sciences of Men1' in F. DalImage and T. McCarthy, eds. Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). 2 See the.work of Taylor,, Gadaraer, Richard Bernstein and Jurgen Habermas.

"

i i '

'

See his essay,

The Rise of Hermeneutics , trans." Fredric Volume 3, Number 2, Winter 1972,

Jameson, Mew Literary History pp. 230-244. ' . . .

4 -'.. ,

. _

'

..

See Eric Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation

(New Haven

and London: Yale University Press, 1967) Chapter 5, sections A and B and in particular pages 170-172. in greater detail below. . Note:- here after, this text will be referred to as V.I.I-.
. 5 " ' '

This issue shall be discussed

Martin Heidegger. Row, 1962) pp. 101-107.

Being and Time

(New York: Harper and

Also see the essay by Hans-Georg Gadaraer

entitled M The Heritage of Hegel ' in Reason in the Age of Science (Cambridge Mass:' The M.I.T. Press, 1982) pp. 40-42.
. 6 ' ' -

This is a most complex issue involving several Heideggerean

74

themes.

The best short explanation of it is found in Gadamer s

H

essay "The Heritage of Hegel",) The issues.are dealt with at length in Gadamer s' book 'Truth-wind- Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975) pp. 214-234c

'
-

'' * '
.

7. .This will be taken up in part I I below.

8

. - '
,i

"

See Hirsch V. 1.1. , Appendix. II, and E. Betti "Herrneneiitics as: the General Methodology of . the Geisteswissenschaf teii J. Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics Kegan Paul-, 19.93). 9' Richard Rorty. Consequences of Pragmatism University of Minnesota Press, 1982) p.160. 10 . ' , . . . ' in

(London: Rout ledge and -

(Minneapolis: '

Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University - Press, 1969) p.33. U " '

See, in particular, The work of Jurgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur s reflections on ideology are spread throughoJt

many works as are Habermas. J. Thompson has recently published a book entitled Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas Press, 1981). (New York: Cambridge University

It is the most extensive treatment to be found in

English on the topic of herraeneutics as the Critique of Ideologies. 12 ' ' . ' in The Re.

Richard Rorty, "A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor

view of Metaphysics., Volume XXXIV, Number 1, September 1980, p.39.

13

./

- - . . . ; . ' obviously1, a basic choice

Palmer in Hermeneutics, writes:

must ultimately be made between a realistic and a phenomenologi. / cal perspective; nevertheless it can.be admitted.that for her-

' meneutics as a whole, both' philosophical positions yield import. nnt approaches to the hermeneuticaJL problem, , p.60. In a more'

recent article entitled 'Allegorical, Philological and Ph.ilos- -aphical Hermeneutics" in The University of Ottawa Quarterly, . Volume 50,' Number 3, 1980/, he recasts'this division, as I have, as between systematic and historical, hermeneutics. Paul Ricoeur,

in,his book Main Trends in Philosophy (New York: Holmes and Meier
is

Publishers, Inc. , 1979), identifies the positions as methodological, ontological and. his own synthetic position, methodical/ hermeneutics. 14 see pp. 265-270. ' *

Richard Palmer, "Allegorical, Philological and Philosophical Hermeneutics , p.345. 15 Richard Palmer, "Allegorical, Philological and Philosophic-

al Hermeneutics,; p.345.

* _ /

. / . '

^vs

Notes Chapter 1

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans, ed., Garrett Harden and John Cumming, (London: Sh'ced and Ward, 1975) p; , XVt. Note: All further references to this work will
/

be identified in the body of > . t h e text as T.M. , followed by the page reference.

See the introduction to Truth and Method . p. xii.' See, for example, Gadamer s essay "The Vniversality of -the Herraeneutical Problem in Philosophical Hermeneutics,

David Linge. trans, ed. "(Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1976) p.4 in particular.

The work of Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend are important in _ , this respect. \ See, for example. Innocentius Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought,- trans. \Eeter Caws (New York: Harper and Row,! 1968).

As Richard Bernstein writes in a recent article -entitled From Hermeneutics to Praxis,": "Truth is not only basic

for the entire-project of philosophical hermeneutics, but it turns out to be one of the most elusive concepts in Gadamer/." Review of Metaphysics, Volume XXXVI, Number 4,

(June 1982) p.834.

. !

77

see Gadamer, 'The Universality of the Bermeneutical Problem in Philosophical Hermeneutics, p.5.
V

* '-..
' . "''>-,'

"

''.-

V,

For a further discussion' on Gadamer s concept of truth see Richard Bernstein, "From Hermeneutics to_rraxis", in Review of Metaphysics, pp. 839 &\ See Gadamer s essay'Hermeneutits as Practical.Philosophy, in Reason in'.the Age of Science, trans. Frederick G ' . Lawrence '(Cambridge-Mass.> The M.l.T. Press, 1981) pp:88-112. 10/ ' " ' '
^

Hans-Gedrg Gadamer and Leo Strauss, "Correspondence concerning Wahrheit und Methode. in Independent Journal .of Philos-

ophy. Number 2, (1978) p . ' 10. 11 . . . *See Truth and Method. Second Part, Section I, "Rejection of the Ideal of Universal History," pp. 173^178. 12 . . . . " . ' See supplement I of Truth' and Method e.ntitled ' Hermeneutics atid Hi.storicism,"
*

particularly pp. 479-4'80. Also1 see Truth

^ i. '. *

"

'

' "

ir

and Method, Second Part, Section 3, The-Overcoming of the .Episteraological Problem through Phenpmenological Research,
^ *
'. V". ' . . ':*'' . . , ' . .

Section 5,t "Heidegger* s Project of a Hermeneutic.ai Phenomeno, ' ' ' . ' ' ' " '

logy," pp.: 225-234. '-.

. " V
' ,

. '

'

:
'
' '

: " ' ; . . /
'
. *

"
*

It is'not so much that,the problem of historicism disappears,

.***i/

but rather,' if one accepts Heidegger, the problem is trans.-' i . ' *

formed.

It would entail a lengthy digression into"-the. orig-

ins of phenomenologjr t " o . make^his point clear. -A quotation

& *

. < *

,' ea>

:.

'- -'
'-i,

"
r

'''.

'u
'

' ' '

. . ' '

' ' . "

from Truth and Method -.puts the matter succirtcfely i

'

Against the background of this kind of existential'analysis of*there-being ' [Pa'sein^ , with-all its . ' . . ' > , far-feachdng consequences for metaphysics, the problems of a hermeneutics of the human sciences
* $ : -

s.
* -

>

&
>

!<

.look very different. The present work is de"vo~ted to this new aspect of the hermen.eutical problem. In reviving the question of being, and the moving.beyond all previous metaphysics - and not just-its . climax in the Cartesianism of modern1 science and transcendental philosophy-.. Heidegger attained a fundamentally new position in regard to the problems of historicism. The concept of understanding is ho' longer a methodological con. cept as.with Droysen. -Nor, as in Dilthey s > attempt to provide a hermeneutical ground for the human sciences, is the process of understanding an inverse operation that simply, follows behind life s tendency__to ideality. Understanding is the original character of the being of human life itself." (p.239).
F i

13 ' . Indeed, the two-have 'their differences on many important issues. See Correspondence concerning Wahreit and Methode.'p.9 and Gadamer s essay The Heritage of Hegel" in Reason in the Age of Science,-, particu. la.rly. the footnotes, pp. 63-68," that hlgh. * light these differences through quotations from correspondence with Heidegger. 14 . . See Truth and Method

pp. 10-39.

15

.
pp.. 241-253.

See Truth and Method

* -See Dieter Misgeld, "On Gadamer, s tjermeneutics, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. ,- - Volume 9i Number 2, (June 1979) p. 220, note \ 2, for a further elaboration with respect to the use of prejudice as an English translation for the German word Vorurteil'. , , . . _ . 17 " Gadamer s, .insights have been used in the philosophy of Social Sciences by Charles Taylor. See his essay "interpretation and the Sciences of Man,' in.Understanding and Social % Inquiry, ed. .Fred-R. Dallmayer and-Thomas A. ; . McCarthy, (Notre Dame: University of Notre

79.

3
Darae Press, 1977) pp. 101-131, and " Explanation and the Geisteswissenschaften, unpublished paper.delivered at The University of Iceland, Reykjavik, 1980. 18 ' See Truth and Method pp. 325-345^ 19 In the correspondence between Strauss and Gadamer, this becomes a point of debate. Strauss refers to a commentary on 1 Goethe by a man named Reinhardt which Strauss feels makes explicit what Goe the was doipg in sucha way that a reader,, can understand!Goethe.. . Strauss writes: The interpreter must make explicit what the author merely presupposes, especially if it is something we dolnot pre-' suppose. But in doing this the interpreter "does not understand the- author better than the author understood himself, if the presupposition in. question can be shown \to have been generally known at his time\or if accepting the presupposition in, question in question is wiser than not accepting i\t... (Correspondence concerning Wahrheit und Methode, p.6t) " \ Gadamer s response aptly .captures the nature of his thinking:, "Reinhardt s interpretation has still another side.., '. In 50'years jane will see clearer than today what this other side'is-. Why he commented on this and not that, so and not otherwise.- What .he neglected, what-he over emphasized. Just such an excellent "praiseworthy" interpretation, which you and I .'g'ratefully receive instruction from, expresses ourselves with it. C.p.9) 20 ^" . . ' , See Gadamer s essay
' '

"

I*,

^jjL The Scope and Function of

II"

i>

Hermene'utical. Reflection, Hermeneutics. p. 27.

/ ' * * r '

in Philosophical '''..
' *

21 . : ' ' See "The Logic of Questioniand Answer, in Truth arid Method pp. 331-341. ." 22 , . . ' _. A quotation from Gadamer's essay JIThe Problem .'of Historical consciousness," will be-helpful here: EveryDen"counter with, others therefore ,y&$$&Ps th<2'. suspension of one s prejudices,
J

80 whether this involves another p'erson through ' whom one learns one' s own nature and limits-., ' , ' or an encounter with . a work of art::.:' i ' or -a"'_' text: always something more is demanded than to -understand the other' , , that; is to seek and'''acknowledge the immanent' coherence' contained within the meaning claim, of the \ other.-" in Interpretive Social/Science: A ' ' , ' Reader, ed. Paul Ro,binow and :Wili:i%m' Sullivan','' (Berkeley:: The University of "California Press, .19,79) .p.- 10-8.. . '-'.''.'' 9 Z3: . .:*."'"' S e e T r u t h and Method p p . * 2 36-23 9.. ''
* ** ' .*

:S ;"

24 -, . . .. See Truth and Method, First Part, Section II, for Gadamer's treatment of aesthetics in this manner.
25

See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), particularly Section V, "Being-in as. Such," pp. 182-202. 26 " ' " In this respect Gadamer is very close to Nietzsche's, views of language in The Twiligh-tof the Idols arid" The Will to Power, and more recently Benjamin Whorf in his book Language Thought and Reality. 27 . Gadamer objects to the tool-like nature' of formal languages, that is, their distance from human community and their purely conventional structure. -In this respect,' I ' think "Gadamer. is wrong. Certainly formal languages have a-conventional dimension, but they most certainly do have a relationship to a community of living beings. Indeed, formal language is .constitutive of. what we recognize* to be a scientific community, and as sujch, it shares common cha-~L \ , racteristics with ordinary language.. Se.ejTp^^ for example, Thomas Kuhn, "Second Thoughts .on Paradigms," in The Essential Tension (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977) PP. 296-298. -

28 .Thus, Gadamer writes: No one questions the world can exist without.man and will perhaps" do so." (Truth and Method, p.406)
v .
"~ _

29Another quotation will help clarify this point: 'We have seen that the goal of all , c communications and understanding is agreement concerning the object. H.ence the task of herraeneutics has always been to establish' agreement where it. failed to come about or been dis-torted in some way." Truth and Method p.260. This view of hermeneutics as the pursuit of agreement is in contrast to that of Richard Rorty in his book Philosophy and the M'irror of Mature. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).- Rorty writes: * it r.Herraeneutics sees the relations between Various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which prestipposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers.but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation, lasts: This hope is not a hope for the discovery%of antecedently existing common grourfd, but simply hope for agreement, or at leas, exoi.ting and fruitful disagreement. ' . (p. 318).
' ' : ' " ' - )

30 : . ' . This analysis of Gadamer s conception of truth is indebted to Richard Bernstein s article From Hermeneutics to Praxi-s. 31 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," in Interpretive Social. Science: A Reader, pp. 108-109.

V .

32

Notes: Chapter 2

Section 1

1 See Truth and Method pp.259 f. 2 " ' ' Eric Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation p. 8. 3 see Appendix II, Validity in Interpretation, ' . Chapter 2, Section B. ' 4 See Validity in Interpretation. Chapter 2, Section B. 5 See Validity in Interpretation, pp. 136-137.
6

. See Validity in Interpretation, p.259.

*.

- See Truth and,Method, pp. 278-289. Also see Richard Bernstein s perceptive- comments on Gadamer s understanding of Aristotle in his essay 'From Hermeneutics to Praxes", pp.836842.
8

I owe this insight to David C. Hay s book The Critical Circle: Literature and History in Contemporary Hermeneutics. (Berkeley: The University of California.Press, 1978)

Richard Bernstein, From Hermeneutics to 'Praxis", p.838.

10

See Lawrence Hinmanj Quid Fact! or Quid Juris? The Fundamental Ambiguity of Gadamer s"Understanding of Herraeneutics, {in Philosophy and Ehenomenoloeical Research. Volume 40, 1979-1980, pp. 512-535) for a penetrating and thorough analysis of this problem.

33

Notes:

Chapter 2 Section II-

1 " : See Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer Dialectic of Enlightment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1972) 2 Jurgen Haberraas, Knowledge and Human Interests. trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,1972) p.303.)
'3

'

'

Jurgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in Joseph Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method. Philo, sophy and Critique (London: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). p. 208'. Hereafter cited as.H.C.U.

.4. ' . ' Haberraas, H.C.U., p p. 181-182.

5. f
i '

'.;-.".

'
- .

.-v:.

''.t

Haberraas, H^CJJ. , p. 191*

6

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.-;

..

Habermas, H.C.U. . pp. 194-195. 7 HaberSas, H.C.U.. p . 1 9 5 .

>

'"

'

.. . ' -V';?,. ' ; . Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadkmer' s truth and Method.' in Understanding and Social Inquiry, ed. Fred R. DalImayerrand Thomas A. McCarthy, . (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Fress,, 1977) p. 357.. Hereafter cited as R.G.T.My
" .

"

'

'

'

'

'

Habermas.- R.G.T.M. , p. 358/

10

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; i .

'

Habermas.' R.G.T.M. , p.358.

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.11 . " Habermasy R.G.T.M., p.361. .

/' .

4 12 Hans-Georg-Gadamer, Hermeneutics and Social. Science, i ' n Cultural Hermeneutics. volume 2. (Feb. 1975), p.315. . Hereafter cited as H.S.S.
13 -" '

See Gadamer On the Scope and Function, of . Hermeneutical Reflection,, in Philosophical Hermeneutics pp. 29-32. Also see David Hoy, . The Critical Circle 'pp. 125-126. . 14 ' Gadamer, -Truth and Method, p. 495. 15 \ ;-' Gadamer, p.496. Gadamer Truth | | and Method, also writes: . ...Habermas sees the critique of ideologies as the means of unmasking, the deceptions of language. But this critique * of course, is itself a linguistic act of reflection. The Scope and Function of Hermeneut-ical Reflection- (p.30). 16 Gadamer, H.S.S.-, p. 316. .
17

' ' - . , ' ' " ' ' Lawrence Hinman, Quid Facti or Ouid Juris? The Fundamental Ambiguity of.Gadamer s Understanding of Hermeneutics , in'Philosophy and Phenomenalogical Research, p.534.

See Bernstein s comments in From Hermeneutics to Praxis", pp. 830-845. Also no,te Gadamer s emphasis upon the practical aspect of hermeneutics in his recent book Reason in the Age of Science, notably 'what is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason , 'Herraeneuj^ tics as Practical Philosophy , and, Hermeneu-"* . tics as a Theoretical and Practical Task". ' Section III
1 '
." *'

. . .
. " '
'

See Rorty s comraents on Habermas in Philosophy . a ' n d the Mirror of Mature p. 379-382. Hereafter cited as P.MrN. ' ' .
f
i'

2 - ' > " , ^ R o r t y . P.M.N.. p . 3 2 1 . '

. . . .

s?> . '

1 3 5

3 .

Rorty.P.H.N. p.320-321.
4 '
;

< ; .

See Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science,and Social Hope," in Consequences of Pr afloat ism .(Minneapolis; The University, of Minnesota Press, 1982) pp.'195-198. There are s o i t i e pS:ob(iems and ambiguities Trr-R-orty' s conception of tradition and historfy. , 1 dp not mean to suggest that he is insensitive or unaware of the importance of history and- tradition for philosophy. My point is, that unKkc Gadamer, Rorty is more inclined to focus upon "edification", rather than focussing upon those aspects of the philosophical tradition that can be redeemed, 5 ' See note 13; Chapter 1.

'

'

Hans-Geor'g Gadamer,"Hegel and Heiddeger, "in Hegel' s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical S tudies , trans . ' P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale,University Press,1976) pp;100-101. ''",- ,

< 3 >

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor, and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. John Cumming. Hew York: Seabury Press,' 1972. Bernstein, Richard. From Hermeneutics to Praxis. Metaphysics XXXV. No. 7 (June 1982), 823-845. Review of

Bleicher, Joseph. Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method. Philosophy and Critique. London: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. Bochenski, .Innocentius. The Methods of Contemporary Thought. Trans. Peter Caws. Ney York: Harper and Row, 1968. Dallmayer, Fred., and Thomas McCarthy ed., Understanding and Social Inquiry. Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. . Dilthey, Wilhelm. "The Rise of Hermeneutics." Trans., Frederic Jameson. New Literary History> Volume 3, Number 2 (Winter 1972), 230-244., Dreyfus, Hubert. "Hermeneutics and Holism." Review of Metaphysics, volume XXXIV, No.l. (September,1980) 3-23. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Hegel s Dialectic: Five Herrrieneutical Studies. Trails. "P. Christopher Smith: New Haven: Yale University Press, i976. ' , . - . Philosophical Hermeneutics-. Trans. David , Linge., et al, ed. David Linge.a Berkeley: The University df California Press, 1976. ' , . "Hermeneutics and Social Science. Cultural Hermeneutics. (Feb. 1975) 307-316. . , "The Power of Reason.' Volume 3. Number 1, (1970) 5-15.. Man and World.

. "The Problem of Historical Consciousness. . Graduate Faculty Journal. Trans. Hans Fantel. Volume 5, -Number 1 (Fall 1975. 2-52. Rpt. in Interpretive Social , Science: A Reader, ed- Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan.. " Berkeley: The University of California Press', 1979. pp. 103-160. - Reason in the Age of Science. Trans. Frederick G. Lawrence.., Cambridge, Mass.: TheM.I.T. Press, 1981. .'
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__ Tguth and Method. Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming London: Sheed and Ward, 1975*

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Haberma's, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston Press, 1972. , . < . . ' " ' " jThe Hermeneutic Claim to Universality." in Joseph Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. 181-210.' . A Review of Gadamer s Truth.and Method." in. ed. Fred Dallraayr and Thomas. McCarthy.. Understanding and Social In- . quiry. Notre DamefThe University of Notre Dame tress-,19,77. 335-363. ^

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York. Harper and Row,-1962. . On the Way to Language. Trans. P.D, Hertz. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Hinman, Lawrence, 'Quid Facti or Quid. Juris1? The Fundamental Ambiguity of Gadamer s Understanding of Hermeneutics.
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" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research . . 1980) 512-535.

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Hirsch Jr., Eric Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics. New Liter1 ary History. Volume 3, Number 2 (Winter.1972) 245-261. _^. Validity qn Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. -Hogan, John. Gadamer and the Hermeneutical Experience. Philosophy Today. (Spring 1976) 3-12. Howard, Roy J., Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding. Berkeley: The University . of California Press, 1982. Hoy, David C ' . The Critical Circle: Literature and History in . Contemporary Hermeneutics. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1978. Kiesel, Theodore. "The Happening of Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger. Man and World. Volume 2J Number 3 (1969) 358-385. / Misgeld, Dieter. "Critical Theory-and Hermeneutics: The Debate Between Habermas. and Gadamer." in On Critical Theory ^ e " d , . . ( John 0'Neil. New York: The. Seatfi-xy Press, 1976.164-1(83. . ' "Discourse and Conversation:'The Theory of Communicative.Competence in the Light of the Debate Between Habermas and Gadamer." Cultural Herra'eneutitcs. Volume 4 (1977) 321-344.' ' ;

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. On Gadaraer s Hermeneutics. Philosophy "of-the. ' Social Sciences. Volume 9, Number.2 (June 1979) 221-239, Palmer, Richard. "Allegorical, Philological' and Philosophical Hermeneutics: Three Modes in a Complex Heritage." The University of Ottawa Quarterly. Volume 50, Number 3 .(1980') 338-355. . Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey. Heidegger and Gadamer. Svanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Ricoeur, Paul The Conflict of InterpretationffiCssays in Hermeneutics. ed. Dan ihde. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. . "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue: ' Philosophy Today. Volume,XVil, Number 2 (Summer 1973) 153165. " "' "Explanation and Understanding." The University of Ottawa Quarterly. Volume 50, Number 3 (1980) 361-373." 2; . Main Trends in Philosophy. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979. .' . The Task of Hermeneutics.. Philosophy Today. Volume XV11, Number 2 (Summer 1973) 113-128. Rorty, Richard. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press1, 1982. . .Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University tress, 1979. '
"

. "A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor." Review of Metaphysics. volume XXXIV, Number 1 (September 1980) 39-46., Strauss,Leo and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Correspondence concerning Wahrheit and Methode." Independent Journal of Philosophy. * . 2 (1978) 5-12. -; Taylor, Charles., "interpretation and the Sciences of Man. Review of Metaphysics. Volume XXV (1971)'3-51. Rpt.in Understanding and .Social Inquiry; ed,_ Fred Dallmayr andThomas McCarthy. Notre Dame: University- of Notre Dame,Press, 1977. 101-131. - _ _ il^j 'Explanation and the Geisteswissenschaften . Unpublished Paper delivered at The University of Iceland. 1980.' " / . , . : '.'..

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__. Understanding in Human Science. Review of Metaphv sics; Volume 34},Number 1 (September* 1980) 25-38, Thompson, John, Critical Herraeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas.. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. -

VITA Name;
/

Ross Edward Grant Upshur '

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Place and Year of Birth: Brandon, Manitoba. June'30, .1958. Education: Queen's University.. 1976-3,977 " " . ' " University of Winnipeg -1976-1981. B.A. Honours 1981 Queen's University, 1981-1983 ' _

Experience: Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, 1979-1981 . Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Queen's University, 1981-1983. Awards: . " *

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Peat Goodridge Prize in Political Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, 1979. . Sydney'Gallis Memorial Scholarshipin Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, 1980. v The Professor Phillip Wright Memorial Prize in Plato, ' University of Winnipeg, 1981. " '. University of Winnipeg Board of Regents General Proficiency Scholarship,* 1980 and 1981. The University-Gold Medal .in Philosophy (Honours" Course) * ' . University of Winnipeg, 1982 " ,, -* . . R. Samuel-McLaughlin Fellowship, Queen s University,1981 Ontario Graduate Scholarship, 1982.". A.R.C. Duncan Award, Queen-' s University,- 1982. , . '

-'>Y

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