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T7 B20 Timelines 9-11 2 of 2 Fdr- 1-25-04 Team 7 Presentation to Commissioners- 4 Flights and Airlines Situational Awareness

T7 B20 Timelines 9-11 2 of 2 Fdr- 1-25-04 Team 7 Presentation to Commissioners- 4 Flights and Airlines Situational Awareness

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05/11/2014

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TEAM 7 PRESENTATION TO COMMISSIONERS January 25, 2004
FOUR
FLIGHTS AND AIRLINES'SITUATIONALAWARENESS
NOTE:
The
following
is
meant
for
Commissioners'
use in
evaluating
testimony
and
in
formulating questions for Panels Six (the airlines) and Seven (Nydia Gonzalez).It is partial and preliminary.
Furthermore,
you
will
recall that
a
future Commission
hearing has
been
set to
focus
specifically
on the
situational
awareness
of
the Air
Traffic
Control
(ATC)
and
national
defense
(especially
NORAD)
systems'
9/11
situational
awareness.
For the
current hearing,
it
would
be
appropriate
to
question
theairline
personnel about their situational awareness.
1.
American Airlines Flight
11
A.
Takeoff at 7:59
B.
Last routine ATC communication at 8:13
C.
#11 unresponsive to ATC query at8:14D. Likely takeover between
8:14-8:18
E. Betty Ong call to AA began at
8:18,
Gonzalez on by 8:20 (stabbing of twoflight attendants and passenger; hijackers in cockpit; passengers moved out ofFirst Class; plane
flying
erratically; knives; mace)
F. AA HQ
aware that
Air
Traffic
Control trying
to
reach
#
11
at
8:20
G.
AA HQ aware of serious problem on
#11
by 8:22
H.
Cockpit communication transmitted from
#11
at 8:24 ("We have some planes.Just stay quietandyou'llbeokay.We arereturningto theairport." Testimony
from
controller
is
that
he did not
initially understand
first
sentence
- "we
havesome
planes."
He
heard
a
suspicious
"Arab voice"
and put the frequency on
for
others
to
hear subsequent transmissions.)
[NOTE:
The
spring
hearing
will
consider
this communication,
and
the
question
of
when
the
ATC was
fully
aware
of
its
contents.]
I.
ATC heard cockpit communication from
#11
at 8:25
("("Nobody
move.Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves you'll endangeryourself
and the
airplane. Just stay
quiet.")
[NOTE:
The
spring
hearing
will
consider
this communication]
J.
Madeline "Amy" Sweeney call
to AA
began
at
8:25 (stabbing
of two
flight
attendantsandpassenger; three hijackersofMiddle Eastern originincockpit;knives; bomb; plane
flying
erratically)
K.
ATC heard cockpit communication from #11 at 8:34
("Nobody
move please.We are going back to the airport.
Don't
make any stupid
moves.")
[NOTE:
The
spring hearing
will
consider this
communication.]
L.
AA HQ locked out
#11
at 8:38M. AA HQmade awareby ATC ofsome
#11
cockpit communicationsataround
8:40
(but
not
reference
to
"planes")
N. Crash into North Tower of WTC at 8:46
O.
ATCawareofearlier #11 transmission"Wehave some
planes"
by notlaterthan 9:05.P. AAconfirmed #11hit WTC notlater than 9:30.
 
2.
United Airlines Flight
175A.
Takeoff
at 8:14
B. At
8:41
#175
reported
to ATC
overhearing earlier suspicious cockpittransmission
from
another
flight
(subsequently discovered
to
have been
#11)
C. Last routine ATC communication at 8:42D.Likely Takeover between
8:42-8:46
E.
#175 transponder code changed twice within
a
minute beginning
at
8:46
F.
Peter Hanson calls began around 8:52 (cockpit takeover; stabbing
of FA;
someone else may have been killed; erratic
flying;
knives; mace; bomb claim;intendto crash into building)G. Robert Fangman call to UAL began at approximately 8:55
(hijacking;
pilotskilled; flight attendant stabbed;
hijackers
flying plane)H. Brian Sweeney calls began at around 8:58 (hijacking; passengers thinking ofstorming cockpit)
I.
UAHQaware
of
#175 hijacking
at
9:00J. Crash into South Tower of WTC at 9:03K. UAHQ aware of #175 crash
at
9:20
3.
American Airlines Flight 77
A.Takeoff
at 8:20
B.
Last
routine
ATC
communication
at 8:51
C. Likely takeover between 8:51-8:56D. Slight deviation
from
course at 8:54
E. #77
didn't
respond
to ATC and had
transponder signal lost
at
8:56
F. AA HQ
aware
of
communications problem with
#77 at
8:58G. AA HQ aware of #77
hijack
by 9:05 (lockout of
aircraft)
H. AA HQthought#77 hit WTC at9:08
I.
Rene
May
call began
at
9:12
(hijacked
by 6
individuals; passengers and/or
crew
moved
to
back)
J.
Barbara Olson calls began
at
9:18(hijacked; box-cutters; knives; passengersmoved
to
back;
"Captain"
announced hijacking)K. AA HQ still thought #77 hit WTC at 9:34
L.
Crash into Pentagon
at
9:38
M. AA HQ
aware
#77 hit
Pentagon
by no
later than
10:30.
4. United Airlines Flight
93
A.
Takeoffat8:42
B. UA HQ
ACARS message
to
"beware cockpit
intrusion"
sent
at
9:24C. ATC heard cockpit transmission
from
#93 at 9:28 (possible screaming; "Getout
of
here.")
D. Likely takeover at around 9:29
E. UA HQ
aware
of
serious problem with
#93 by
9:30
 
F.
Todd Beamer call began around 9:32 (knives; bomb; two hijackers enteredcockpit and took over, and one stayed behind in cabin with bomb; passengersplanning to storm cockpit)G.
UA HQ
ACARS message
to
"secure
cockpit"
sent
at
9:33
H.
Sandy Bradshaw call to UA began at around 9:35 (knives; three hijackerswearing red headbands; passengers in back; passengers planning to stormcockpit)
I.
UA HQ aware of #93 hijacking at around 9:36J. Crash in Pennsylvania at 10:03.
5.
POINTS
FOR
CONSIDERATION
A.
Prior to #175 takeover (8:45) and #77 takeover (8:54), AA was
informed
of
hijacker
tactics
(from
Betty Ong around
8:20).
B. Just
after
#77 takeover (8:51-8:56) and
before
#93 takeover (9:29), the abovewas still true and ATC was aware of several suspicious cockpitcommunications
from
#11 (including awareness of reference to
"planes"
bynotlater than 9:05).
C.
Priorto #93takeover
(9:29),
all of theabovewastrueaswellasoccurrenceof
two WTC
crashes (8:46
and
9:03), three known hijackings
(AA
aware
of
#77
hijacking
not
later than
9:05),
and
United being aware
of
#175 hijacking
and
crash (9:20)
6.
INHIBITIONS ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
A.
Mindset against domestic hijacking (AA HQ at time of Ong call around 8:20)B.Mindset against multiple
hijackings
(displayedbyboth airlines between
A
Alockout of
#11
at 8:38 and UA awareness of #175 hijacking around 9:00)
C.
Mindset against suicide hijacking (AA HQ between awareness of
first
crash at8:48
and
confirmation of
#11
as
aircraft
-
sometime
before
9:30)D. Lack of clear communications
from
ATC (neither airline was reportedly madeaware of reference to
"planes;"
UA not made aware of 8:41 communication
from
#175 about #11)E. Lackofclear communication between airlines (lagin AAawareness that#77hadnot hit theWTC)F.Confusion; large numberoferroneous reports.

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