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New Findings on the 1956Hungarian Revolution
By Csaba Békés
Since the revolutionary changes in 1989 and the 1990 freeelections in Hungary, the majority of archival sources in Hungaryon the 1956 Hungarian Revolution have become available toscholars. Similarly, a number of Polish, Czechoslovak andYugoslav archival documents have been discovered and released.Although the Sovietsources, which are of ut-most importance, are stilllargely unavailable, somehelpful clues to Soviet de-cision-making and actionshave been provided througharticles published in theformer Soviet Union in thelast few months.As a result of declassi-fication trends in East-Cen-tral Europe, as well as therelease of numerous West-ern sources on 1956 duringthe latter part of the 1980s,members of the Institutefor the History of the 1956Hungarian Revolution andother scholars in Hungaryand abroad have alreadyproduced articles present-ing hitherto unknown data,important evidence andnew interpretations. Thisarticle will summarizesome of the most significant findings of scholars concerning 1956.*
Internal Aspects of the Revolution
Many authors in recent years have at-tempted to define the
character 
of the revolt.These studies were recently enhanced by theresearch of Dr. György Litván, director of the Institute for the History of the 1956Hungarian Revolution Budapest, who has
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New Sources on the 1968Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia
By Mark Kramer
(First of two parts)
Few events in the 74-year history of Soviet foreign policy havebeen subjected to as much scrutiny as the invasion of Czechoslova-kia in August 1968. Countless books, monographs, and articlesabout the invasion (and the events preceding and following it) haveappeared in the West.
1
Some authors, such as H. Gordon Skilling,have put together massivestudies of the whole PragueSpring, the crisis in the War-saw Pact, and the Soviet-ledinvasion.
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Other scholarshave chosen to focus on spe-cific aspects of the eventswithin Czechoslovakia, suchas the role of Slovak nation-alism in the reform move-ment.
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Still others, includ-ing Karen Dawisha, JiriValenta, and CondoleezzaRice, have written lengthyanalyses of the SovietUnion’s response to the Pra-gue Spring.
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Amidst thisvoluminous literature, onemight justifiably ask whetherthere is much new that canbe learned about the 1968crisis and invasion.Until the late 1980s,most of what was knownabout the events surround-ing the Prague Spring, espe-cially about the Soviet Union’s role, camefrom official and unofficial materials pub-lished either before the invasion or shortlythereafter. By the time Skilling and Dawishacompleted their authoritative studies (in 1976and 1984, respectively), there seemed littleprospect of coming up with many additionalinsights unless Western scholars could gainaccess to Soviet and East European archives.Whether those archives would ever be acces-sible was a matter of doubt, however. In-
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The Official (West) German Report:
Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe:Revelations From the East German Archives
[Editor 
’
s note: Following the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the Federal Republic moved swiftly to take possession of the records of the East German NationalPeople
’
s Army (NVA). Last February, after its staff had time to review those archives,the German Defense Ministry released an official report on its findings, entitled,
“
 Military Planning of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe: A Study.
”
The report isreprinted in full, with permission, along with a foreword by the Federal Defense Minister. It has been annotated and translated by
Mark Kramer
,
a researchassociate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University and the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University. (Footnotes in the original text aremarked by superscripted numbers; translator 
’
s notes are indicated by the alphabeti-cal superscript.)]
FOREWORDDespite the destruction of many documents from the files of the formerNVA before German reunification, some 25,000 documents on the strategicand operational war planning of the former Warsaw Pact came into the
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Inside the SED Archives20The East German Archives20Revisiting the Berlin Crisis21Documentation:In Re: Alger Hiss33FRUS Publication Schedule34A Letter to Brezhnev35Update36
 
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identified four basic political trends whichemerged during the revolution: (1) thereform socialism trend, represented prima-rily by Imre Nagy and his followers andshared by many intellectuals, students, andworkers; (2) the national democratic trend,represented by the non-communist politi-cians of the 1945-48 coalition period (in-cluding István Bibó) who participated inNagy’s last government and who were com-mitted to some kind of a reformed socialistsystem; (3) the Christian-Conservative trend,based on private ownership of property, ledby Cardinal Josef Mindszenty and followedby many insurgents; and (4) an extremeright-wing political trend, which was presentmostly on the streets among the fighters.Another area in which significant dis-coveries have been made concerns the eventswhich took place in the countryside outsideof Budapest during the revolution. To com-pensate for the dearth of research in thisarea, an extensive research project waslaunched last year with the participation of archivists from all county archives. Al-though the project is in its preliminary stages,a clearer picture of the revolution in thecountryside can now be drawn. For ex-ample, it recently became known that thefirst demonstration of students took placeon October 23 in the eastern Hungarian cityof Debrecen, several hours before the well-known demonstration in Budapest. Theproject also produced evidence that beforethe fighting began in Budapest, there werealready casualties in Debrecen during anexchange of fighting in front of the localsecret police building.The countryside project has also madeclear that the revolutionary events in thecountryside were much more extensive thanpreviously thought, contrary to the propa-ganda of the Kadar government, which em-phasized the relative calm of the country-side during 1956. While it is true that therewere few casualties and little fighting out-side of the capital, a revolutionary—albeitpeaceful—transformation began to occur inmost towns and villages following the Octo-ber 23 events in Budapest. After localdemonstrations, most symbols of theStalinist regime were removed, the politicaland administrative leaders of the localitywere replaced without substantial resistancein most cases, and new revolutionary bodieswere set up with the participation of uncompromised and reliable local personali-ties. The new “revolutionary” or “national”councils then organized and directed thelocality peacefully, without sparking anybloodshed. In many cases, the local revolu-tionary leaders established agreements of non-intervention with Soviet commanders;as a result, the Soviets did not intervene in thecountryside before November 4.Scholars researching the events of 1956have thus far been unable to obtain exact dataon the number of active participants in therevolution. Yet the new evidence allowsresearchers to confirm that there were 2,100workers’ councils in the country with 28,000members, and tens of thousands of localrevolutionary committees—far more thanpreviously known. Several hundred thou-sand persons participated in the demonstra-tions during and after the revolution, accord-ing to the work of M. János Rainer (Instituteof History, Institute for the History of the1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest).
Scholars interested in further infor-mation or conducting research onthe 1956 Hungarian Revolutionshould contact:György Litván, DirectorH-1014 BUDAPESTOrszaghdz u. 30. 11. 12Tel./Fax: 361-1564-967
One of the remaining blank spots of thehistory of the revolution concerns the activ-ity of the rebel groups fighting against theSoviet troops and Hungarian armed policeforce units in Budapest. The research in thisarea, begun just a year ago, requires a deli-cate approach, since there is much distortionin the memoirs of the fighters and in therecords of the police and court proceedings.Despite the discrepancies, sociological ex-amination of the records has shown that thefighters were not all criminals, as the Kadaristhistorians claimed; rather, those who foughtwere mostly young, unskilled workers, and,in some cases, students, soldiers and armyofficers. It is also clear that the politicalmotivation of the fighters was weakly de-fined and stemmed from a unanimous rejec-tion of the Stalinist regime; similarly, GáborKresalek (Budapest Municipal Archives) hasmaintained that their decision to take up armswas actually due to personal motives.
International Aspects of the Revolution
New archival discoveries have shed con-siderable light on the individuals respon-sible for the Soviet decision to intervene inHungary. Dr. Tibor Hajdu (Institute of His-tory, Budapest) recently uncovered a Czecho-slovak document in the party archives inPrague which reveals the decisive rolesplayed by Erno Gero, first secretary of theHungarian Workers Party, and Yuri An-dropov, then Soviet Ambassador in Budap-est, in encouraging Soviet intervention onOctober 23; their support was especiallysignificant in light of Khrushchev’s initialreluctance to provide armed support. Thedocument is the minutes of an October 24meeting of the Communist Bloc leaders inMoscow taken by Jan Svoboda, an aide tothe Czechoslovak Communist Party leader,Antonin Novotny; they includeKhrushchev’s account of the Polish situa-tion and, as an unplanned item on the agenda,a discussion of the events in Budapest on theprevious day, including Khrushchev’s tele-phone conversations with Gero, DefenseMinister Marshal G. Zhukov, and others.Until recently, it was uncertain when A.Mikoyan and M. Suslov, representatives of the Soviet party, came to Budapest; the re-search of Tibor Hajdu and V. Muszatov(former deputy head, International Depart-ment, CPSU Central Committee) now provesthat they arrived on October 24, right afterthe outbreak of the revolution, and left thecountry on October 31.The CPSU Central Committee madetwo important decisions at its meeting onOctober 30-31: (1) it adopted a declarationconcerning reformed relations between theSoviet Union and the socialist countries; and(2) it instructed Marshal Zhukov, the Minis-ter of Defense, to develop a plan for resolv-ing the Hungarian situation (V. Muszatov).As far as the declaration is concerned, Brit-ish sources strongly support the assertionthat the declaration was being prepared asearly as mid-October, and was only “up-dated” after the events in Poland and inHungary (Csaba Békés).Details of the Soviet plan to invadeHungary, “Operation Whirlwind,” have alsobeen uncovered. The plan was launched onNovember 1 by its commander-in-chief,Koniev, when he began the re-deploymentof the Soviet troops. While only five Sovietdivisions were stationed in the country dur-
 
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ing October 23-30, the campaign which be-gan on November 4 included three armycorps consisting of at least 60,000 Sovietsoldiers and officers. According to Sovietsources, 669 Soviet soldiers and officerswere killed in the fighting, 1,450 werewounded and 51 were declared missing.The same sources claim that there wereapproximately 4,000 Hungarian victims—anumber somewhat higher than had beenestimated by Hungarian scholars (V.Muszatov).Another clarification due to newly avail-able documentation concerns the role of theYugoslav leaders in the revolution, whichwas previously unclear. It now appears thatthe Yugoslavs cooperated with the Sovietsin eliminating Imre Nagy and his colleaguesfrom Hungarian political life by offeringthem asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy inBudapest (László Varga, Budapest Munici-pal Archives; Pierre Maurer, Lausanne,Switzerland).Recently opened Polish sources alsoprovide interesting new information. Theyshow that the Political Committee of thePolish United Workers Party condemnedthe use of Soviet troops in Hungary onNovember 1, but modified its position dur-ing subsequent days, presumably because of the Hungarian government’s unacceptabledecision to leave the Warsaw Pact and dec-laration of Hungary’s neutrality (JánosTischler, Institute for the History of the 1956Hungarian Revolution, Budapest).Western reaction to the revolution isnow understood more clearly because of therecent declassification of Western docu-ments. Among the most significant releasesis a July 1956 policy paper adopted by theU.S. National Security Council, in which theUnited States government disavowed anypolitical and military intervention in theSoviet satellites. This position was main-tained throughout the events in Poland andHungary in October-November of the sameyear (John C. Campbell, Columbia Univer-sity). Similarly, newly available documentsdisprove Communist allegations that theU.S., Great Britain, France, and NATO wereresponsible for instigating the revolution.On the contrary, the Western powers werecaught by surprise with news of the revolt inBudapest, and thereafter pursued a cautiouspolicy of non-intervention to avoid antago-nizing the Soviets.Recent scholarship has also elucidatedthe connection (or lack thereof) between theHungarian revolt and the Suez Crisis. Con-tradicting earlier assumptions, new sourceson Suez show that the Hungarian events
did not 
 
affect the timing of the secretly plannedAnglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.Similarly, scholars can now better un-derstand the dynamics of the debates overHungary in the United Nations. Surpris-ingly, a significant behind-the-scenes con-flict arose between the United States on oneside, and Great Britain and France on theother. The documents pertaining to thediscussions among the three Western statesprove that after the Suez action began, theBritish and the French—against Americanwishes—endeavored to divert attention fromtheir Middle East campaign by attempting tobring the Hungarian issue to the UN spot-light. Their plan was to transfer the Hungar-ian question from the UN Security Councilagenda to that of the General AssemblyEmergency Session which had convened todiscuss the Suez Crisis. However, the Ameri-cans, attempting to end the fighting in Egypt,blocked this plan by delaying the UN resolu-tion process concerning Hungary until No-vember 4 (Csaba Békés).
The Reprisals following the Revolution
Scholars have known for years that theretaliation following the uprising was mas-sive and brutal, but recent research has un-covered reliable data. Between 1956 and1959, 35,000 people were summoned fortheir activities during the revolution. Of those, 26,000 were brought to trial and 22,000were sentenced. From 1957 to 1960, 13,000people were interned. Between December1956 and the summer of 1961, 350-400death sentences were commuted in Hun-gary; 280-300 of those sentenced were ex-ecuted because of their involvement in therevolution. The retaliation was mainly aimedat three major groups: (1) the armed insur-gents; (2) the members of the revolutionaryand workers’ councils; and (3) the represen-tatives of the pre-1956 party opposition andintellectuals, including many writers (M.János Rainer).The exact role of the Soviets in thereprisals is slowly but gradually becomingmore clear. Recently published factual in-formation shows that the Soviet securityorgans operating in Hungary arrested andhanded over 1,326 individuals to the Hun-garian authorities by mid-November 1956(V. Muszatov). The new research leadsscholars to assign more blame to Hungarianleaders in this area, especially concerningthe fate of revolutionary prime minister ImreNagy. The decision to bring Nagy to trialwas made by the Central Committee of theHungarian Socialist Workers Party at its 21December 1957 session; the decision showsthat Hungarian leader János Kadar and hiscollaborators wanted to avoid assuming in-dividual responsibility for decisions involv-ing forthcoming trials. A few months later,on 14 February 1958, at the next meeting of the party’s Political Committee, it was notedthat the date set for Imre Nagy’s trial wasinconvenient for the Soviets because of ascheduled East-West summit meeting. Kadarthen offered two alternatives: either to havethe trial take place as scheduled and pass alight sentence, or to postpone the trial andpass severe sentences as originally planned.The Central Committee eventually voted, atKadar’s suggestion, for the latter option(Charles Gati, Union College; GyörgyLitván, M. János Rainer).
*Note:
Rather than provide bibliographical references,the author has indicated the
name
of the scholar(s) towhom particular information should be attributed.Scholars interested in more details on sources shouldconsult the forthcoming 1992
Yearbook 
of the Institutefor the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Inaddition to containing several papers on the aforemen-tioned topics, the
Yearbook 
will include a selectedbibliography of publications on 1956 in the last threeyears. The author thanks M. János Rainer and GyörgyLitván for their useful advise and comments on the draftof this article.
Csaba Békés, Ph.D., is a research fellow and research coordinator of the Institute for the His-tory of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budap-est and a lecturer in history at Szeged University. During the fall of 1992, he is conducting researchin the United States as a fellow of the Cold War  International History Project.
CWIHP Working Papers
#1: Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China'sEntry into the Korean War.”#2: P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the Cold WarEra: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw.”#3: James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy To-wards Germany during the Beria Interregnum.”#4: Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and theCold War: The "Small" Committee of Information,1952-53.” (
Forthcoming
)
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