Page 1 of 24 G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents. D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent. NARVASA, J.: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise: 1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959; 2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l'); 3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities; 4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962; 5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel; 6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial. 7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain; 8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982; 9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason

Page 2 of 24 thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to. Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply. In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that: ..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein, The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that: It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ... That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi: .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6 Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence. Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11 .... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. .... xxx xxx xxx As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Page 3 of 24 Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands. Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. xxx xxx xxx The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78). xxx xxx xxx In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15 The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco: 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao) The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco. While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring

Page 4 of 24 opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance. SO ORDERED. Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAO MANALO as Corporate Sole Respondent. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Republic of the Philippines assails the October 11, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348, which affirmed the April 26, 2005 Decision2 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in Land Registration Case No. 762-C for Application for Registration of Title, entitled Iglesia Ni Cristo, Trustee and Applicant with its Executive Minister Erao Manalo as Corporate Sole v. Republic of the Philippines as oppositor. The Facts Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre, particularly described as follows: A parcel of land (Plan Swo-I-001047, L.R.C. Rec. No. ______) situated in the Barrio of Baramban, Municipality of Currimao, Province of Ilocos Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by the National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the SW. & NW., along lines 2-3-4 by lot 3946, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching, Bernardo Badanguio; on the NE., along line 4-1 by lot 3947, portion, Cads-562-D; (Pacita B. Lazaro) and lot 3948, Pacita B. Lazaro, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching x x x containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND ONE (4201) SQUARE METERS. x x x On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were thesepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lot,3 the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,4 Tax Declaration No. (TD) 5080265 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale6executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application. The Ruling of the Cadastral Court After the required jurisdictional publication, notification, and posting, hearing ensued where the INC presented three testimonial witnesses,7 the MCTC, acting as cadastral court, rendered its Decision on April 26, 2005, granting INCs application. The decretal portion reads: Wherefore, the application for registration is hereby granted. Upon finality of this decision, let an Order be issued directing the Land Registration Authority to register and issue an Original Certificate of Title to the applicant Iglesia Ni Cristo, as Corporation Sole, with official address at No. 1 Central Avenue, New Era, Diliman Quezon City. SO ORDERED. The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject lot have been complied with. It was established during trial that the subject lot formed part of a bigger lot owned by one Dionisio Sabuco. On February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC in 1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built. Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114.8 In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale9 was executed on January 8, 1959. Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of INC, testified to the purchases constituting the subject lot and the issuance of TDs covering it as declared by INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two purchases by INC of a small portion of the bigger lot originally owned by Sabuco, who inherited it from his parents and later sold it to Badanguio, constituted the subject lot. On September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was executed by Badanguio in favor of INC formally ceding and conveying to INC the subject lot which still formed part of the TD of the bigger lot under his name. This was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the bigger lot in 1965 and continued to be its tenant under Badanguio. Tulali testified further that the ownership and possession of Sabuco and Badanguio of the bigger lot were never disturbed.

Page 5 of 24 Subsequently, TD 648510 was issued in 1970 in the name of INC pursuant to the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale. This was subsequently replaced by TD No. 40605611 in 1974, TD 508026 in 1980, and TD 605153 in 1985. For the processing of its application for judicial confirmation of title, subject Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4,201 square meters. With the presentation of the requisite sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, technical description of the subject lot, Geodetic Engineers Certificate, and Report given by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office special investigator showing that the subject lot is within alienable and disposable public zone, the MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. Besides, it noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of INC, were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot. Aggrieved, the Republic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85348. The Ruling of the CA On October 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the April 26, 2005 MCTC Decision. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. In denying the Republics appeal, the CA found that the documentary and testimonial evidence on record sufficiently establish ed the continuous, open, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject lot in the concept of an owner by INC of more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-interest prior to the conveyance of the lot to INC. Hence, we have this petition. The Issue THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC] DECISION GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT THE LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MAY 16, 1993, OR FIVE (5) YEARS BEFORE THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION ON NOVEMBER 19, 1998.12 The Courts Ruling May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945? This is the sole issue to be resolved. The petition is bereft of merit. The sole issue raised is not novel. The Republics Contention The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was certified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v. Herbieto,13 it argues that prior to said date, the subject lot remained to be of the public dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of private appropriation, and, consequently, INC and its predecessors-ininterests possession and occupation cannot confer ownership or possessory rights and "any period of possession prior to the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession." 14 The Republic maintains further that since the application was filed only on November 19, 1998 or a scant five years from the declaration of the subject lot to be alienable and disposable land on May 16, 1993, INCs possession fell short of the 30-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Argument of INC Respondent INC counters that the Court has already clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Naguitcase), in which we held that what is merely required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is that the "property sought to be registered [is] already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed."15 Moreover, INC asserts that the Herbietopronouncement quoted by the Republic cannot be considered doctrinal in that it is merely an obiter dictum, stated only after the case was dismissed for the applicants failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication. Necessity of declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 16 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC. Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the parties contradictory positions. Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable, and possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of possession. This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for there can be no perfection of title when the declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made after June 12, 1945, since the reckoning of the period of possession cannot comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.

Page 6 of 24 In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed. A review of subsequent and recent rulings by this Court shows that the pronouncement in Herbieto has been applied to Buenaventura v. Republic,17 Republic v. Diloy,18 Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,19 and Preciosa v. Pascual.20 This Courts ruling in Naguit, on the other hand, has been applied toRepublic v. Bibonia.21 Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic (Malabanan),22 the Court upheld Naguit and abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto. Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides: SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that "the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed." The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073, and PD 1529. The Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same, with the latter law specifically operationalizing the registration of lands of the public domain and codifying the various laws relative to the registration of property. We cited Naguit and ratiocinated: Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.lavvphi1.net Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all l ands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained: [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date. Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter. Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with the States policy Moreover, we wish to emphasize that our affirmation of Naguit in Malabananas regards the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to the reckoning of possession vis-vis the declaration of the property of the public domain as alienable and disposableis indeed more in keeping with the spirit of the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD 1529. These statutes were enacted to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public land s to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice.23 The statutes requirements, as couched and amended, are stringent enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for reg istration of title over alienable and disposable public land. The application of the more stringent pronouncement in Herbieto would indeed stifle and repress the States policy.

Page 7 of 24 Finally, the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized the doctrine that the period of possession required under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time of the declaration of the property as alienable and disposable, thus: We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC had indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject lot. As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.24 This is applicable to the instant case. The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INChad been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondents witnesses. WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant. Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant. Monico R. Mercado for appellee. VILLA-REAL, J.: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs. For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law. After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands. The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the

Page 8 of 24 purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action. With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it. For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., took no part. G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2granting the application for land registration of the respondents. Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents: (a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;4 (b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5 (c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6 (d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7 (e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;8 (f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;9 and (g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10

Page 9 of 24 On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.11 The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. 13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16 During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, 17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days. On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18 Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals. 19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus: In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith." As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water. As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20 The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments: First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it. I Jurisdiction Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic. A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration. Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,22 to wit:

Page 10 of 24 . . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots. The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province.25 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names. Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient." Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.26 They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties). The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court. B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court. Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.29 Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner: 1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31 In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.

Page 11 of 24 The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction. II Period of Possession Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land. Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.32 Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963. As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.35 The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37 Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode. 38 Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots. Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, 40 may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073]. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

Page 12 of 24 The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42 The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. 43 As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act. However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.44 Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree. Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law 45 that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.46 WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Tinga, J., out of the country. G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September 20023 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) amended comp laint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Facts On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

Page 13 of 24 The investigating team reported that: A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994. B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.8 Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.10 Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents.12 On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared: The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.14 (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: 1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available; 2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction; 3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss; 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; 5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land; 6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and 7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

Page 14 of 24 The Ruling of the Court While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.15 We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated: 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution. xxxx 15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the groun d of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable. Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled: In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.18 Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege t hat the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in nature and should be thres hed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19 Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21 Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,22we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x23 (Emphasis supplied)

Page 15 of 24 Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.25 The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,26 which provides: SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable (b) Timber and (c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition. Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled: We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review. The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which pro vides: SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." 29 When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

Page 16 of 24 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz. Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land 1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain. Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void. Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision5 dated July 1, 1981. The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision 6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioners case as it involved the same property. The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Gar cias right to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto. During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.81avvphi1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution9 upholding petitioners right to recall the records of the case. Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same. The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.10 On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.11 On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.12 However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation. On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read: ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to: (1) x x x x x x (2) x x x x x x (3) x x x x x x (4) x x x x x x

Page 17 of 24 (5) x x x x x x (6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;] (7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect; (8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently,SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999; (9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and (10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz registration herein. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CAs amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion was denied.14 Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this Court. It was denied for raising factual issues.16 She moved for reconsideration.17 This motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then orde red that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.18 Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to thebanc was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed. 22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course. Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety: This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.] I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review. Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A". The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio. It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case. In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice. In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which he had lost. If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza. I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves. I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday. I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

Page 18 of 24 Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original). The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Cour t into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public. This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners letter/third motion for reconsideration. APPLICABILITY OF REYES The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this case. To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24 The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.25 This contention is erroneous. The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of Lands.26 In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintins successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res judicataas against his successors-in-interest. We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.27 We also declared in Aquino that: From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28 Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. T hus, petitioners argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Courts ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around. However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man. By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion. 29 Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.30 All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings." 31 ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be." By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus: Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32 Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141.

Page 19 of 24 [E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33 However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) 34coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.35 This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.37 Coming now to petitioners contention that her "private rights" to the property, meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established . To reiterate: Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership. But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted: Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. xxx During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x xxx A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.38 xxx Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39 thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for registration. NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the same was null and void. An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with her.40 The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the Philippines.41 In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires "special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients.

Page 20 of 24 Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied). Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied) Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in considera tion of petitioners withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of man. PETITIONERS CONTEMPT OF COURT This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack. That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating: This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.] It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted: I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review. Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A". The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio. It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied). Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that: If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. But she hastens to add in the same breath that: I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza. Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task: . . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system. When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered: xxx The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.

Page 21 of 24 Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court. xxx Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat. The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court. It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions. As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not issue a fullblown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.42 Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defianc e of this Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone of petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court. In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held: A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification. A FEW OBSERVATIONS If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that: It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcias successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied). The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel. WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit. Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely. Treble costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

Page 22 of 24 Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner. Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without merit. 1 The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant. The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 196 l. 2 The defendants filed their respective answers. 3 The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases 4 which were granted. 5 The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is within the intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. 6 The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. 7 The said amended joint answer was admitted in an order dated September 10, 1972. 8 Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3) criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases. After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents. In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction of the three (3) accused. 9 Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the subject matter in litigation. 10 The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because: After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the same. The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall squarely under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. 11 They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. 12 Both motion for reconsideration were denied by the trial court. 13 Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant petition. The petitioner assigns the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. II

Page 23 of 24 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 14 Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide: Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted. Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible. In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said, On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to dispose of the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act No. 3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states: A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent application, he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law. The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This provision of law, certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and could very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads: 'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from their ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and imprisonment. The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the Public Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain' ... It is for this reason that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government policy on liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities, which our courts of justice must uphold. 15 The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads: SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows: SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twentysix or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has, not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

Page 24 of 24 A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law. There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free patents thereon. It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 16 In Director of lands vs. Abanzado 17 this Court said: 4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muoz, a 1968 decision. After a review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law thus: 'If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for i what Portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court takes of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation. protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives, ...' The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case. There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands. WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.