Report of the

Defense Science Board

Permanent Task Force on
Nuclear Weapons Surety

Independen t Assessment of

The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

April 2011

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to
the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in
this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of
Defense.
The Task Force completed its information gathering in November 2010. The report was
in security review from 17 Dec 2010 until 4 March 2011.
This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.

Contents
Tasking..........................................................................................................................................................7
SomeRootCausesandUnintendedConsequences.....................................................................................8
TheAirForceNuclearEnterprise..................................................................................................................9
Figure1:TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseBefore2008*.................................................................9
Figure2:TheCurrentAirForceNuclearEnterprise*.......................................................................10
BottomLines...............................................................................................................................................12
NewLeadershipAttention......................................................................................................................12
DividedAuthorityandAccountability.....................................................................................................13
OversightandInspection........................................................................................................................14
EnlistedPersonnelManagement............................................................................................................15
ThePersonnelReliabilityProgram..........................................................................................................15
NewSeniorLeadershipAttention...............................................................................................................16
Focus.......................................................................................................................................................16
ChangesinOrganization.........................................................................................................................16
AirForceGlobalStrikeCommand...........................................................................................................16
ImpactofOtherChangesinOrganization...............................................................................................17
Figure3:TheLogisticsIssueResolutionChainasSeenbytheWingCommander..........................19
OversightandInspection............................................................................................................................21
Table1:DaysofSpecialEffortatMinotAFB..................................................................................22
OperationsandMaintenance.....................................................................................................................26
LogisticsandMaintenance......................................................................................................................26
Table2:LogisticsSupportOrganizations........................................................................................26
Figure4:ReEntrySystem/ReEntryVehicle(RS/RV)EngineeringRequests...................................27
OperationsMissileWings.....................................................................................................................27
OperationsBombWings......................................................................................................................28
MaintenanceandSustainmentMissileWingsandMunitionsSupportSquadrons(Europe)..............29
Table3:MigrationofSeniorNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)NCOs...................................29
ICBMWarheadSustainment...............................................................................................................30
MunitionsSupportSquadron(MUNSS)...............................................................................................32
SomeCommonBottomLinesforICBMsandMUNSS........................................................................32
U.S.AirForcesinEurope.............................................................................................................................34
GuidanceversusDirection..........................................................................................................................36
EnlistedPersonnelManagement................................................................................................................37
ThePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)....................................................................................................38


SummaryofRecommendations..................................................................................................................42
Logistics...................................................................................................................................................42
OrganizationandGuidance.....................................................................................................................42
TheInspectionRegime............................................................................................................................43
Operations..............................................................................................................................................43
PersonnelandMorale.............................................................................................................................44
PersonnelReliabilityProgram.................................................................................................................44
AppendixA:TermsofReference................................................................................................................46
AppendixB:TaskForceMembers..............................................................................................................48
AppendixC:FindingsfromPriorReportsontheIncidents........................................................................49
U.S.AirForceBlueRibbonReview(BRR)onNuclearWeaponsPoliciesandProcedures(February
2008).......................................................................................................................................................49
DSBPermanentTaskForceReportontheUnauthorizedMovementofNuclearWeapons(February
2008).......................................................................................................................................................49
InvestigationintotheShipmentofSensitiveMissileComponentstoTaiwan(May2008)....................49
SecretaryofDefenseTaskForceonDoDNuclearWeaponsManagement(September2008).............50
AppendixD:Acronyms................................................................................................................................51

Tasking
SometwoyearsaftermajorchangestothestructureoftheAirForcenuclearenterpriseandthe
levelofattentiontotheAirForcetotheenterprise,theDeputyAssistanttotheSecretaryof
DefenseforNuclearMattersandtheSecretaryoftheAirForcetaskedthePermanentTask
Forcetoconductanindependentassessmentofprogresstowardsthegoalofreinvigoratingthe
AirForcenuclearenterpriseinsupportofthestrategicnucleardeterrentmission.TheTask
ForcebeganthetaskinAugust2010andcompletedthetaskinNovember2010.
Oneachvisittonuclearmissionrelatedactivities,itwascleartotheTaskForcethatthe
nuclearenterpriseleadershipateverylevelhadencouragedtheirpeopletobeopenandcandid
andtheirpeoplerespondedaccordingly.

SomeRootCausesandUnintendedConsequences
TheneedforincreasedattentiontotheAirForcenuclearenterprisewashighlightedbythe
August2007unauthorizedtransferfromMinotAFBtoBarksdaleAFBandtheinadvertent
shipmentofnuclearweaponcomponentstoTaiwanin2008.Whiletheseincidentsdemanded
urgentcorrectiveaction,anumberofearlierdecisionshadanimportantnegativeimpactonthe
overallenterprise.Dealingwiththeseimpactsrequiredandwillcontinuetorequireabroader
enterprisesystemsapproach.
Theearlierdecisionsimpactinglogisticssupportcontinuetohavesignificantnegativeimpacts
onthatsupport.Forexample,priortoexecutionofthe1995BRACrecommendations,expertise
andexperienceforAirForcenuclearlogisticssustainmenthadbeenvestedintheSpecial
WeaponsDirectorate(SWD)attheSanAntonioAirLogisticsCenter(SAALC).TheDirectorate
hadservedtheenterprisewithexperienceandexpertiseforseveraldecades.WithBRAC
implementationofthedecisiontoclosetheSAALC,theSWDfunctionswerespreadamongsix
AirForceorganizationsbasedonperceivedcompatibilitywiththeirothermissionassignments.
VerylittleofthespecialexpertiseintheSWDwaspreservedinthesystem.
ManagementandmaintenanceoftheICBMreentrysystemcomponentsweretransferredand
consolidatedwithothermissilesystemcomponentsattheAirLogisticsCenterinOgden,Utah.
Amongthecasualtieswasspecializedmanagementfornuclearweaponcomponents.
Othernuclearrelatedcomponentsfellundergeneralcommoditymanagementsystemsinthe
AirForceandintheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA).Again,eliminationoftheSWDandits
specialattentionledtoapplyingstandardsupplychainprocessestoNuclearWeaponsRelated
Materiel(NWRM).Thispracticeincludedeliminatingstocklistingsforspecialcomponents
basedonascopeofdemandcriteriabeingusedforothersupplyitems.Asaconsequence,
satisfyingtheneedforthesecomponentscannowrequireatwoyearacquisitionprocess.
Therewerealsosignificantimpactsonoperationsthatrequiredsystemwidecorrectiveaction.
WiththedisestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand,theoperatingforceswerefirstassigned
toAirCombatCommandandthentheICBMforcewasreassignedtoAirForceSpaceCommand.
Theendresultwastwomajoraircommandsresponsibleforsegmentsofthestrategicnuclear
operatingforces.
Toregaintheneededfocusonlogisticssupportforthenuclearenterprise,theAirForce
leadershipelectedtofocusactivityattheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandAFB.
TheCenter,createdinMarch2006,hasauthorityoverICBMandnuclearwarheadsupport
activitiesatHillAFBandALCMsustainmentsupportactivitiesatTinkerAFB.Theintended
functionsweretoencompassmuchoftheformerfunctionoftheSAALCsSWD.TheCenter
alsoinheritedarangeofotherresponsibilitiestoincludeAirForcenuclearweapons
modernizationandlifeextensionprograms.
TheAirForcedecisioninOctober2006toconsolidatecruisemissilesfurtherexacerbateda
strainedstorageandintegratedmaintenancefacility.
Toregainfocusonthestrategicnucleardeterrencemission,theAirForcestoodupGlobalStrike
CommandwithresponsibilityforAirForcestrategicnuclearforces.

TheAirForceNuclearEnterprise
TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseiscomposedoftheAirForcenuclearforces,supporting
logisticsstructure,commandandcontrolorganizations,weaponssustainmentand
modernizationactivities,andactivitiesofrelevantheadquarters,agencies,andcenters.The
enterpriseandtherecentchangesareillustratedinthefollowingfiguresandnarrative.
Figure1:TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseBefore2008*

Strategic Forces
Air Force
Secretary of the
PEO
Inspection Agency

Air Force

Chief of Staff
Air Force
A3 Operations
Safety
Center

US Air Forces
Air Force
Air Combat
Air Force

Europe
Space Command
Command
Materiel Command

3rd Air Force

20th Air Force
8th Air Force

Air Logistics Centers

Wings
ICBM Wings
Nuclear Bomb Wings
Air Force Nuclear

Engineering
Weapons Center
Support Group
Munitions Group
Weapons
Weapons

Storage Sites
Storage Sites
Weapons
Munitions Support

Depots
Squadrons

* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55th Wing, AF Global Logistics Support Center

Figure1aboveshowstheAirForcenuclearenterpriseasitevolvedfromthedisestablishment
ofStrategicAirCommandin1992to2008whentheAirForceleadershipinitiatedsignificant
organizationalchanges.Beforethechanges,nuclearforceswereassignedtothreemajorair
commandsandsupportinglogisticsresponsibilitieswereassignedtoAirForceMateriel
Command.TheprincipalstaffoversightinHeadquartersAirForcewasanelementwithinDCS
Operations(A3).
Inadditiontothenuclearbombermission,AirCombatCommandwasresponsiblefortwo
conventionalbomberwingsandsome20fighter,reconnaissance,commandandcontrol,
electronicwarfare,andotherwings.TheywerealsothegainingcommandforAirForceReserve
andAirNationalGuardunits.InadditiontothethreeICBMwings,AirForceSpaceCommand
wasresponsibleforacquiring,launching,andoperatingmilitaryspacesystems,andproviding
thesupportinggroundsystems.Consequently,intermsofpeopleandresources,nuclear
operationswerenotpredominantineithercommand.Further,inadditiontothethreenuclear
bombwings,8thAirForcewasresponsibleforconventionalbomberoperationsandcyber
operations.
ThreeCONUSmajoraircommandshadresponsibilitiesforweaponsstorageandmaintenance
onoperatingbases.Withintheoperatingwings,thewingcommanderwasresponsibleand
accountableforallactivityontheoperatingbaserequiredtomeetmissionrequirements.Inthe

caseofthedualwingbase(Minot),thebombwingcommanderwasresponsibleforstorage
andmaintenanceforboththeICBMandbomberassets.
Twologisticscentersprovidedtheprincipalsupportoftheenterprise.TheOgdenALC
supportedICBMforcesandtheOklahomaCityALCsupportedbomberforces.TheAirForce
NuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandwasestablishedin2006toprovidemorefocusedoversight
oftheCONUSweaponsstoragesitesalongwithothernuclearsystemssupportresponsibilities.
InEurope,themunitionssupportsquadronsprovidedmaintenanceinsupportofNATO.Fighter
WingsalsosupportedtheNATOmission.
ThesupportingairrefuelingforcesweretransferredtoAirMobilityCommandon
disestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand.Therewereandareotherelementsofthenuclear
enterprisenotshownonthechartsuchasthe55thWingatOffuttAFB,butthoselistedwere
principalelementsofthestructurethathaddaytodaynuclearforcesandsupport
responsibilities.
Figure2:TheCurrentAirForceNuclearEnterprise*

Air Force
Inspection Agency
Air Force
Safety Center

US Air Forces
Europe

A10-ACS for Strategic

Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration

Air Force
Global Strike Command

Air Force
Materiel Command

3rd Air Force

20th Air Force

8th Air Force

Wings

ICBM Wings

Nuclear Bomb Wings

Munitions Group
Munitions
Wing/Group/
Squadrons

Munitions Support
Squadrons

Strategic Forces
PEO

Secretary of the
Air Force
Chief of Staff

Air Logistics Centers

Air Force Nuclear
Weapons Center
Weapons
Storage Sites

Engineering
Support Group

* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55th Wing, AF Global Logistics Support Center

Figure2aboveshowsthecurrentAirForcenuclearenterprise.Neworganizationsareshownin
red.Inaddition,A10staffagenciesfocusingonnuclearmattershavebeencreatedatAirForce
MaterielCommandandAirEducationandTrainingCommandheadquarters.Themost
significantchangeincommandofforcesisthecreationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand
(AFGSC)andassigningallAirForcestrategicnuclearforcestothatcommand.
Thetwoprincipallogisticschangesaretheassignmentofweaponsstorageandmaintenance
responsibilitiesattheoperatingbasesforCONUSnuclearforcestotheAirForceNuclear
WeaponsCenter(AFNWC).Otheradditionalresponsibilitieshavealsobeenassignedtothe
AFNWC.Theconventionalbomberforces(B1B)remainassignedtoAirCombatCommand.

10

Requirementsfordualcapableaircraft(DCA)havebeenadjustedinthenuclearenterprise
structureinEurope,buttheU.S.DCAmissionandrelationshiptoNATOhasnotchanged.
Theimpactandconsequencesofthisstructurearediscussedinsubsequentsectionsofthis
report.

11

BottomLines
NewLeadershipAttention
TheTaskForcevisitedthethreemajoraircommandheadquarters,theNuclearWeapons
CenterandotheractivitiesatKirtland,activitiesatHillAFBincludingtheOgdenAirLogistics
Center(OOALC),fourofthesixstrategicnuclearmissionwingsandhaddiscussionswiththe
commandersoftheothertwowings.TheTaskForcealsovisitedaMunitionsSupportSquadron
(MUNSS)andtheDCAFighterWing.Afterextensivediscussionsandobservingoperationsand
logistics,theTaskForcebelievestheAirForceleadershipcanhavehighconfidencethat,with
fewexceptions,theoperatinganddirectsupportforcesunderstandtheirmissionandthe
demandsoftheirmission,andareaprofessional,disciplined,andcommittedforce.
TheAirForceleadershipinstitutedandhastodatesustainedasetofextraordinarymeasuresto
dealwiththeissueshighlightedbythe2007unauthorizedtransferofnuclearweaponsandthe
2008accidentalshipmentofnuclearweaponsrelatedmaterials.Whiletherearecontinuing
challenges,theextraordinarymeasureshavebeeneffectiveincorrectingmanyofthe
deficienciesintheoperatingforcesandinrebuildingthecultureappropriatetothenuclear
weaponsenterprise.
However,someofthesemeasures,appropriatetothesituationoverthepasttwoyears,are
notsustainableforthelongtermandarebecomingcounterproductiveinthattheycreatean
extraordinaryburdenontheoperatingforcesratherthanfocusingsharplyonareasstill
requiringadditionalattention.Thecurrentinspectionregimeisaprimeexample.Thereare
areasstillrequiringspecialattentionandtheinspectionregimeshouldbefocusedonthese
areas.Theseareasincludelogisticssupportandpersonnelsupportappropriatetothepriorityof
thenucleardeterrencemission.
AccountingforNuclearWeaponsRelatedMateriel(NWRM)isgreatlyimproved,butremains
challenging.ConsolidationofNWRM,adaptingtheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)datasystem
forAirForceNWRM,andextraordinaryvigilanceattheoperatinglevelhasgreatlyimproved
thesituation.Thecurrentstateofprogressistheresultofwhathasbeenproperly
characterizedasaheroiceffort.Withtheprogresstodate,theleadershipcanhavehigh
confidenceinaccountingforandcontrollingtheNWRMthatareinthesystem.However,given
thestateofaccountabilityin2008andthemagnitudeofNWRM,theAirForceleadership
shouldnotyetassumethatNWRMaccountingisflawless.
Recommendation:TheAirForceleadershipshouldmaintainrealisticexpectationsregarding
thestateofaccountingforNWRM.
TheAirForceleadershiphasstatedclearlythatsustaininganeffectivenucleardeterrentforceis
firstpriorityandseveraltangibleactionsreinforcethatdeclaration.Giventhiscommitment,
theTaskForcehadextensivediscussionsatmultiplelocationstodiscovertheimpactof
reinvigorationontheoperatingforces.Thefollowingisawidelyheldsetofviewsatthe
operatingforceanddirectsupportlevelsregardingthecurrentstate.

Reinvigorationhasproduced:

12

Increasedattentiontothenuclearenterpriseatseniorlevels.
Areturntohighstandardsofprofessionalisminthenuclearoperatingforces.
Morecoherentoperationalfocusunderasinglemajoraircommand.
Neworganizationsdirectingmoreandmorefocusedattentiontothenuclear
mission.
Thepriorityonedeclarationbytheseniorleadershipisyettobereflectedin:
o Anenvironmentoftrustonthepartoftheleadershipappropriatetothededication
andprofessionalismoftheoperatingforces.
o Budgetandprogrampriorityimpactingthefieldedforces.
o Replacementorupgradeofoldsupportequipmentcentraltothemission.
o Directivesandtechnicalordersprovidingthelevelofdetailappropriatetonuclear
operations.
o Personnelpoliciesandactionsmoretailoredtothespecialdemandsofthenuclear
mission.
o
o
o
o

Eachoftheitemslistedasyettobereflectedisdiscussedinthisreportwithspecific
recommendations.Oneoftheissuesimpactingperceptionsintheoperatingforcesisthegap
betweenthesenseoftimeurgencyinhigherheadquartersandthatinboththeoperating
forcesandthesupportingworkforceattheairlogisticscenters.Theperceivedbusinessasusual
approachinplanningandacquisitionisinconsistentwiththestateoflongtermneglectof
logisticalsupportforthenuclearweaponsenterpriseasexperiencedintheoperatingforces.
Thisisimportantfortheeffectivenessofthemissionandforthemoraleoftheworkforce.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthechoices
forcorrectiveactionareorientedtolongtermsustainmentratherthanthelowestnear
termcostpath.
TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandshouldgive:
Fundingandprogramprioritytologisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrence
missioncommensuratewiththepriorityofthenucleardeterrencemission.
Urgentattentiontoreplacing40+yearoldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupportand
testequipmentattheoperatingwingsandtheairlogisticscentersandtoreplacingthe
WeaponsMaintenanceTrucksattheMunitionsSupportSquadron(MUNSS)sites(Europe).
DividedAuthorityandAccountability
Thecomplexityofthelogisticschaincanimpedethepaceofresolvingemergingorlong
standinglogisticslimitationsonsupportingtheoperatingwingsabilitytoperformtheirmission.
Auniquelogisticsandmaintenanceorganizationwasintroducedatthewinglevelinthe
strategicforcesaspartoftheincreasedfocusonthenuclearenterprise.Thisstructure,
centralizedundertheNuclearWeaponsCenter,wasappropriatewhentheoperatingforces
wereassignedasadditionalmissionstotwomajoraircommands.WiththeformationofGlobal

13

StrikeCommand,thisstructureisnowaddingcomplexityandconfusionwithoutcommensurate
addedvalue.
Thebifurcationattheoperatingbaselevelofresponsibilityforthemissionbetweenthe
operationalwingandthemunitionsorganizationiscontrarytoimportantprinciplesofAirForce
organizationwhichassignsmissionresponsibilitieswithinaclearchainofcommand.This
bifurcationiscreatingunintendedcomplexityandnegativeperceptions.
Recommendation:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat
actionbeinitiatedtoassignallbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategic
MissileandBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForceGlobal
StrikeCommand.
OversightandInspection
Arigorousinspectionprogramremainsessentialtosafe,secure,andeffectiveoperations.
However,excesseshavedevelopedthatarebecomingcounterproductive.Theinspection
programneedstobemoresharplyfocusedonareaswhereissuespersist.Thecontinuing
intenseandacrosstheboardlevelofinspectionandexerciseactivityisperceivedbysomein
higherheadquarterstobeacontinuingneeduntilazerodefectculturecanbereestablished.
Whenoverdone,thelevelofinspectionandexercisesarecounterproductiveandleadtoan
unrealisticzeroriskmindset.
Thecontinuedlevelofoversightandthebroadlyappliedinspectionregimeiscreatinga
perceptionthatthehigherheadquartersleadershipbelievestheycanandmustinspectin
quality.Italsocreatesaclimateofdistrust.Itleadstoaperceptionintheoperatingforcesthat
theleadershipdoesnottrustthemtoperformprofessionally.Thisleadsthemtoquestionthe
motivesofthehigherheadquartersleadership.Furtheritiscreatingaleadershipmindset
wheresatisfyingaNuclearSuretyInspectionteam,forexample,cansupplant,oratleast
competewith,focusonreadinesstoperformtheassignednuclearmission.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcernrather
thanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipandmanagement.
Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforcesasingle
NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18monthsandaNuclearOperationalReadiness
Inspection(NORI)each18months.DNSIsasneededtomeettheChairman,JointChiefsof
Staffdirection,conductedwithNSIs.
TheCommandersofGlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommandshoulddirect
thatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspectionsareconductedonlytoaddress
unsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forotherdiscrepancies,thewing
commanderorthemunitionssquadron(MUNS)commanderisaccountableforclosingoutthe
discrepancies.

14

TheCommanderofUSAFEshoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspections
areconductedonlytoaddressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forall
otherdiscrepanciesthewingcommanderortheMUNSScommanderisaccountablefor
closingoutthediscrepanciesincommunicationwiththeappropriateinspectionagency.
EnlistedPersonnelManagement
Theintersectionofmultipleissuesimpactingmunitions,missilemaintenance,andbomber
maintenancecareerfieldscallsforincreasedattentionandflexibilitytomeettheneedsofthe
operatingforces.
Thecareerfieldswhicharecriticaltomaintainingthestrategicnucleardeterrentseemtobe
largelymanagedinabusinessasusualfashionwithassignmentpoliciesthatdonottakefull
advantageofspecialexperienceidentifiersinmeetingthespecialneedsofthenuclear
enterprise.
OfspecialinterestarethenumbersandassignmentofMasterSergeants(MSgtE7)andSenior
MasterSergeants(SMgtE8)incriticalcareerfields.Onaverage,ittakesabout16yearsto
produceaqualifiedMSgtand19yearstoproduceaqualifiedSMSgt.Hence,therearelong
termconsequencesrelatedtothemanagementofthisresource.
Recommendation:TheHeadquartersAirForceA1shoulddirectspecialattentiontoproviding
theneededqualifiedpeopletotheoperatingforcesinthecareerfieldsthatarebothfragile
andcriticaltothenuclearmission.
ThePersonnelReliabilityProgram
TheDoDguidanceonthePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)hasimprovedsignificantlysince
2004.Incontrast,thepracticeintheAirForcehascontinuedtodeteriorate.
Recommendation:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectan
immediateadjustmenttoAirForceguidance/practicestoremovePRPbasedrestrictionsand
monitoringdemandsthatexceedthoserequiredbyDoDdirection.

15

NewSeniorLeadershipAttention
Focus
TheAirForceleadershipatmultiplelevelshastakendecisiveactiontocorrectdeficiencies,
reinvigorate,andfurtherstrengthentheAirForcenuclearenterprise.Theseactionsinclude
changesinpriorities,organization,authorities,andprocesses.Thereisaclearmessagefromthe
SecretaryoftheAirForceandtheChiefofStaffthattheyconsidernucleardeterrencetobethe
AirForcesfirstprioritymission.ThisisreflectedintheAirForcestatementofprioritieswith
ContinuetostrengthentheNuclearEnterpriseasthefirstpriority.Itisalsoreflectedinthe
AirForceCoreFunctionswithNuclearDeterrenceOpsasthefirstlistedfunction.These
actionshavegenerallyproducedtheintendedresultsintheoperatingforces.Theyhavebeen
lesssuccessfulinprovidinglogisticsandpersonnelsupportcommensuratewiththemission
priority.
ChangesinOrganization
Threeorganizationalchangeswereintendedtobolsterboththefactandperceptionof
restoringthepriorityaccordedthenuclearenterprise:

CreatinganAssistantChiefofStaffforStrategicDeterrenceandNuclearIntegration
(A10)inHeadquartersAirForce(HAF),
TheformationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandasamajoraircommandresponsible
forAirForcestrategicnuclearforces,and
CreatingandstrengtheningtheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandAFB,New
Mexico,andasetofsubordinateorganizations,responsiblefornuclearsustainmentto
includeactivitiesinsideCONUSweaponsstorageareas(WSAs)andforabroadrangeof
additionalnuclearenterpriseresponsibilities.

AirForceGlobalStrikeCommand
TheformationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandhasproducedanearlyuniversallypositive
responseinthenuclearoperatingforces.Thepotentialnegativeaspectisthefactthatwhile
themissionresponsibilitiesofthecommandaredeclaredfirstpriority,ithasbeencommanded
byalieutenantgeneralwhileallbutoneoftheotheroperationalandsupportcommandsare
commandedbyfourstarofficers.Thisiswidelynotedinthestrategicoperatingforces.
TheAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandcommanderandstaffhaveaclearunderstandingoftheir
responsibilitiesandaretakingabroadrangeofstepstoinclude:

Clarifyingandexpandingdirectiontomakeitmoreappropriatetothedemandsofthe
nuclearmission,
Dailyoversightofoperationsandmaintenancetoensurethereadinessoftheforce,and
Addressinglongneglectedlogisticsissues.

Thecommandistransmittingaclearsetofvalues:

Individualresponsibilityformissionsuccess,
Criticalselfassessmentofperformance,

16

Uncompromisingadherencetodirectives,
Superiortechnicalandweaponssystemexpertise,
Prideinnuclearheritageandmission,
Respectfortheworthanddignityofeveryairman,
Safetyinallthingslarge...andsmall.

TheTaskForceliststhissetofvaluesasacontrasttotheimplicationsofsomeotherapproaches
tostrengtheningthenuclearenterprisediscussedinthisreport.
Incontrasttotheskipechelonorganizationthatbrokechainofcommandresponsibilityfor
operationsandtraininginthebomberforceupto2008,8thAirForceandAirForceGlobalStrike
CommandareclearlyresponsiblefordailyoperationsandtrainingintheB2andB52forces.
TheAFGSCCommandCenterinterfaceswith8thAirForceand20thAirForceandtheirunitsona
24/7basis.Thephilosophyismicroinformed,notmicromanagement.Authoritiesand
accountabilityareclear.
ImpactofOtherChangesinOrganization
Thechangesinorganizationhavecontributedsignificantlytotheintendedincreasedemphasis
onthenuclearenterpriseandthesewerevaluableinaddressingtheurgentissues.Atthesame
time,somehavethepotentialfornegativeimpactswhencontinuedbeyondtheperiodof
urgentneed.Extraordinarymeasuresappropriatetoanurgentsituationmaynotbe
appropriateorsustainableforlongtermmissionaccomplishment.
TheHeadquarters,AirForceA10organizationwasstooduponNovember1,2008toprovidea
singularfocusonnuclearmattersintheAirForceheadquarters.Thisorganizationhasserved
theintendedpurposeandhasbeeneffectiveinincreasedfocusonthenuclearenterprise.The
potentialnegativeimpactisthepossibilitythatkeyDeputyChiefsofStaffwithnuclear
enterpriseresponsibilitiescouldfeellessobligatedtoplacetheneededemphasisonthose
responsibilities.TheTaskForcemetwiththeAirForceA1,A3/5,A4/7,A8,andpeoplefromthe
A9anddiscussedthisissue.Anysuchtendencyiscurrentlycounteredbythecontinuing
attentionoftheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaff.Itisnotclearthatthiswillcontinuetobethe
caseorthattheA10shouldbeapermanentfixture.Thecontinuedsuccessofthisoverlapping
arrangementisdependentonpersonalattentionandisnotanormalAirForceinstitutional
arrangement.Inanycase,itcreatesconfusioninsubordinateorganizationsastowhohasthe
responsibilitiesandauthoritiestoaddresstheirissues.
AsecondconsequenceismajoraircommandmirrorimagingofHAFasreflectedintheA10
functionsatAFMCandAirEducationandTrainingCommand(AETC).ThisisnotthecaseatAir
ForceGlobalStrikeCommandwhereallaspectsofthestaffarefocusedonthenuclear
enterprise.ThereisalongstandingarrangementinUSAFEthatconcentratesnuclearexpertise
andattentioninadirectorateintheUSAFEA3.Again,supportofthenuclearenterprise
requirestheattentionofthemajorstaffagencies.Thisissueisfurthercomplicatedby
responsibilitiesassignedtheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter(AFNWC)withthestatedintent
toclearuppreviouslyambiguouschainsofcommand.TheadvertisedfunctionoftheAFNWCis
sustainment,thatis,logisticssupportoftheoperatingwings.Thatisalsoakeyroleofthe

17

AFMC/A4.OurdiscussionswiththeA4andstaffandwiththeAFNWCleadershipmadeitclear
thatbothunderstandtheirresponsibilitiesforsustainingthenuclearenterprise.
InadditiontotheroleandauthoritiesoftheAFMC/A4andtheAFNWCCommander,thereis
theroleoftheAFMCA10.GiventhattheA10isacolonel,theA4isamajorgeneralandthe
Commander,AFNWCisabrigadiergeneral,theroleandauthorityoftheA10mustdepend
heavilyontheAFMCCommander.Again,thisisnotanormalinstitutionalarrangement.Atthis
level,theA10positioncouldaddconfusionratherthanvalueinspiteofthequalityand
experienceofthepeopleintheA10.Thisisalsoqualityandexperiencethatisneeded
elsewhereinthenuclearenterprise.
TheAFNWChasbeenstaffedwithqualitypeoplewithimportantandrelevantobjectivesand
hasmadesignificantcontributionstorestoringanappropriatelevelofprofessionalisminthe
operatingforces.TheissuefortheAFNWC,theAFMC/A10,andtheAFMC/A4regardingthe
nuclearenterpriseisclarityinroles.Relatedtothatissueisthescopeofresponsibilitiesthat
AFMCI90204ascribestotheAFNWC.Itcouldbeinterpretedasdevolvingresponsibilitiesto
AFNWCthatwouldlogicallybeassignedtothemajoraircommandheadquartersAirForce
GlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommand.Thedescribedscopeofthose
responsibilitiesiswellbeyondareasonableexpectationforthecenter.Beforethe
disestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand,manyoftheseresponsibilitieswereshared
betweenStrategicAirCommandHeadquartersandAirForceLogisticsCommandHeadquarters
requiringasignificantpartoftheattentionofbothcommandersandkeystaff.
Arelatedissueisthecomplexchainofcommandfromthemaintenanceunitsinthefieldtothe
authorityandcapabilitytoaddresstheirneeds.Thechainofcommandfortheworkforceinthe
munitionssquadron(MUNS)keyplayersinthereadinessofthenuclearforcespasses
throughfourlevelsenroutetoaccesstheauthorityandresourcestoprovidesupportneeded
toperformitsmission.Thechainisfromthemunitionssquadrontothegrouptothewingto
theAFNWCtotheSystemProgramOffice(SPO).Evenbeyondthatchain,itislikelythataction
byAFMC/A4willberequiredtoresourcesolutions.Inaddition,theStrategicForcesProgram
ExecutiveOfficehasyetanotherreportingchain.Thislongandcomplexchainofcommand
wouldbelessofaconcernifthemaintenanceoperationshadbeenwellsupportedbeforethe
neworganizationswerecreated.Asubsequentsectionofthereportwillprovideevidencethat
thishasnotbeenthecase.Hence,thereisaneedforrapidresponse.
Theorganizationalchangeshavehadtheintendedeffectofincreasedattentioninmanyofthe
rightplaces.Longstandingneglectinimportantareasisbeingaddressed.However,the
operatingforceshaveseenonlylimitedpositiveimpacttodateandsignificantnegativeimpact.
TheTaskForceheardexpressionsofdisappointmentfrommultiplelevelsmostnotably
amongtheenlistedforcemaintainingthenuclearweapons.Partoftheproblemistheapparent
differenceintimelinessexpectations.Ithasbeentwotofouryearssinceorganizationalchanges
wereputinplace.Thefactsarethathigherheadquartershavebeenworkingtoaddressthe
issuesthatconcerntheworkforcewhosemissionissustainingtheweapons.Further,peopleat
thehigherheadquartersbelievetheyhavemadeimportantstridesinaddressingtheproblems.
Sincethesolutionstomanyoftheproblemsrequiredevelopment,amultiyeartimeframe
seemsreasonabletohigherheadquarters.Itseemslessreasonabletotheworkforcebecause

18

theyhavebeendealingwiththeproblemsforalongertime.OneSeniorMasterSergeant
expressedwhattheTaskForceperceivedtobeaviewheldbymanywhenhesaid:Theyhave
beenadmiringproblemsfortwoyearsthatwehavebeenlivingwithfortenyears.
Thedivisionofresponsibilityatthewinglevelisnotattherootoftheshortfallsinlogistics
support.Theseissueshavedevelopedoveraperiodofatleastadecadeandahalf.Further,the
TaskForcefoundnoevidencethatthecurrentdivisionofresponsibilitybetweenAFGSCand
AFMCattheoperatingbaseiscreatingconflictortensionintheoperatingwings.Inpractice,
thewingcommanderandthemunitionssquadroncommanderrelateasthoughtheMUNSis
partofthewing.
Still,thecomplexityoftheorganizationandconfusionaboutrolesandrelationshipscan
complicateanddelayactiontoaddresstheissues.Figure3belowisoneviewofthe
organizationandrelationships.
Figure3:TheLogisticsIssueResolutionChainasSeenbytheWingCommander

Thisisnottheonlyviewsincetheactualflowofinformationandauthoritydependson
individualpersonalitiesandrelationships.Forexample,wingcommanderstreatthemunitions
squadronasanintegralpartofthewing.Theyseektoensurethatthesameinformationmoves
throughboththeoperationalcommandchaintoAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandandthe
logisticschaintotheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter.Further,itisnotclearthatthereare
separatechainstotheAFMC/A4andtheAFNWC.Still,theoperationalandlogisticschainsare
separatechainofcommandstructures.Bypassinganypartofthestructurewouldrequirea
subordinatecommandertobypasshisimmediatecommanderwhichisnotanormalmilitary
process.Inanycase,theICBMorbomberSPOisoftenthelocusoftheexpertiseneededto
addressissues.Hence,thesimplest,shortestpathtoinvolvetheSPOwouldseemtobe
desirable.
Amorecentralissueisthatthearrangementiscontrarytoatleasttwoprinciplesthatgovern
AirForceoperationalunitorganizationelsewhereintheAirForce.Thefirstisunityofcommand
atmultiplelevelsmaintenancegroup,missileandbombwing,andmajoraircommand.The
secondisclearaccountability.TheAirForcecultureisthatthewingcommanderhasbuck
stopshereaccountabilityfortheperformanceofallmissionassetsonhisorherbase.Thisis
nottrueofthecurrentorganizationinthestrategicnuclearwings.Thewingcommanderisnot

19

accountableforthemaintenanceandstorageoftheweaponsthatarecentraltothemission.
Withoutthataccountability,itisdifficulttoseehowthewingcommanderisaccountablefor
themostbasicdemandofhismissionmeetingnuclearalertandresponserequirements.
Thearrangementalsocreatesunintendedperceptionissues.AFGSCandthewingcommander
canbeperceivedasinferiorinscopeandresponsibilitytootheroperationalmajorair
commandsandwings.Forthemunitionssquadron,thechainofcommandmovesthemfrom
beinganintegralpartoftheoperationalunittoanappendedsupportorganization.These
perceptionsarenotdesirableinwhatisdeclaredtobethefirstpriorityoperationalmissionof
theAirForce.
Recommendations:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirect:
AnactiontoassignbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategicMissile
andBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForceGlobalStrike
Command.
Areexaminationofthecontinuedutilityofthesetofspecialheadquartersorganizations.
ArevisionofthesetofresponsibilitiesascribedtoAFNWCinAFMCI90204tosharplyfocus
onthesustainabilityofthenuclearenterprisewithotherresponsibilitiesassignedto
HeadquartersAirForce,HeadquartersAirForceMaterielCommand,andAirForceGlobal
StrikeCommand.

20

OversightandInspection
Regardingthetwoincidentsthathighlightedtheneedforintenseattentiontothenuclear
enterprise,asstatedearlierinthereport,thechangesinpriorityandprocessesarehavingthe
desiredeffect.Theriskofanunauthorizedtransferofanuclearweaponisnownearzeroand
willremainsoaslongasthereisleadershipattentionandcleardirection.Thesolutionhas
been,forthemostpart,areturntotheprocesses,discipline,andculturethatservedthenation
wellformorethanhalfacentury.
ThereisalsointenseattentiontotheissueofaccountabilityandcontrolofNuclearWeapons
RelatedMateriel.IncreasedattentionhasimprovedtheNWRMsituationgreatly,butthe
conditionofthesystemin2008andthescope,magnitude,anddistributionofNWRMmakethis
acontinuingworkinprogress.Theleadershipcanhaveconfidenceintheorganizationand
attentiontoNWRM.Theleadershipcanalsohaveconfidenceinaccountingandcontrolof
NWRMthathasbeenidentifiedasNWRM.
Thisprogressisevidenceofthevalueofanextraordinarylevelofoversightandinspection
activityappropriatetoaddresstheurgentneedidentifiedfromthe2007and2008incidents.
Thetypesofinspectionsinclude:

NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)
DefenseNuclearSuretyInspection(DNSI)
JointNuclearSuretyInspection(JNSI)
LimitedNuclearSuretyInspection(LNSI)
NuclearOperationalReadinessInspection(NORI)
MaintenanceStandardizationEvaluation(MSE)
OperationsStandardizationEvaluation
LogisticsCapabilityAssessmentProgram(LCAP)orTeam(LCAT)evaluation/inspection
NuclearStaffAssistanceVisit(NSAV)
NuclearSuretyStaffAssistanceVisit(NSSAV)

NSAVs/NSSAVswerenotintendedasinspections.Theyarelistedherebecausetheyhave
evolvedintoinspectionsbyanydefinition.Theonlydistinctionisthattheunitisnotgivena
formalgrade.Ingeneral,theSAVteamisnot,asintended,charteredtorespondtotheunit
commandersstatedneed.Instead,itassessesareasidentifiedbytheSAVteamorhigher
headquarters.AnNSAVoccurssixmonthspriortoaunitsscheduledNSI.InbothAirForce
GlobalStrikeCommandandUSAFE,theresultsarereportedtohigherheadquartersandunit
commandersarerequiredtorespondtowriteupsjustastheydowithanNSI.Several
commandersexpressedtheviewthatNSAVshavebecomethehigherheadquartersstaff
defenseagainstthepossibleembarrassmentofaunitintheircommandfailinganNSI.
Asnoted,theTaskForcesawandheardconvincingevidencethatthelevelofoversightand
inspectionshasbeensuccessfulandhasservedtheintendedpurposeintheoperatingforces.
Further,thereisnoquestionabouttheimportanceofarigorousinspectionprogram.But,the
currentintenseandpervasiveregimeseemstohavebeeninstitutionalizedastheaccepted
approachtoproducingqualitywork.Anunintendedconsequenceoftheincreasedoversightis

21

theworkloadinthewingsboththeoperatingandlogisticswings.Aparticularlycompelling
exampleisMinotwithtwooperationalwings.Table1belowportraystheimpactonthe
leadershipandpeopleperformingthemissionatMinot.
Table1:DaysofSpecialEffortatMinotAFB
Year

High Level of
Special EffortMajor Inspection,
Congressional Visit

Significant Level of
Special Effort Major Exercise,
Higher
Headquarters Visit

Medium Level of
Special Effort

White Space
Including Weekends & Holidays

2008

190*

98

72

69 total

2009

204

192

73

65 total

2010
thru
Aug

168

114

75

25 total

*Forallcategories,therearemultipleactivities,sometimesthreeorfouronmanyofthedays.
Thewhitespacesituation(thelastcolumn)atBarksdaleandinUSAFEunitsissimilarinimpact
tothatportrayedinTable1.Therearefewdays,toincludeweekendsandholidays,whenthe
wingcommanderscanfocusonjusttheirmissions.TheTaskForcenotedasimilarlevelof
inspectionandexerciseactivityatthe2ndBombWingatBarksdaleandinthe748thSupply
ChainManagementGroup(SCMG)atHillAFB.Therearemultiplecausesofthisexcessive
activity:

Multipleheadquartersandcenterswithoverlappingresponsibilitiesandlackofclarity,
Continuedfocusonpastproblems,and
Wingandgroupcommanderspreoccupationwithdealingwithinspections.

TheTaskForcedidnotattempttorankorderthecauses.Inthecaseofthethirdcause,theTask
Forcenotedthat,atonewing,thecommanderexpressedthegoalofagenerationexercisea
month.Totheextentthereisexcessiveunitgeneratedexercises,theunitcommandersreceive
asteadydrumbeatofexhortationstodomoreselfinspection.Selfinspectionisclearly
importanttoquality.Still,selfinspectionshouldreducetheneedforhigherheadquarters
inspectionratherthanbecominganothersubjectforevaluationandexhortationduring
inspections.
Acommoncomplaintinboththeoperationalandlogisticsunitsisthattheinspectionsareso
frequentthattheunithasneitherenoughtimenorresourcestocorrectdeficiencies.Inthis
casetheresourceissueispeople.Thesamepeoplewhoprepareforinspectionsareoccupied
bytheinspectionandmustcarryoutthecorrectiveactionaftertheinspection.Theirperception
isthattheyareonanactivitywheeldrivenbyinspections,notbythedemandsoftheirmission.
TheTaskForcesawevidencethatthisperceptionisjustified.
Aperception(andfrustration)amongUSAFEunitsisthatLCAPinspectionsareunnecessarily
duplicativesincenuclearmaintenanceisthoroughlyinspectedduringanNSI.USAFEmunitions

22

supportsquadronscannotunderstandtherequirementforaseparatenuclearlogistics
inspectiongiventheextentoftheNSI.
Furthermore,thelevelofinspectionandexerciseintensityishavinganadverseeffectonthe
readinessoftheB52wingsastheyinterferewithaircraftmaintenanceactivityatthesame
timethewingsareexperiencingsignificantshortagesinexperiencedcrewchiefsandrapid
turnoverinotherexperiencedmaintenancepeople.
Itisusefultonote,onceagain,thattherigorouscorrectiveactiontodealwiththeunauthorized
transferhasbeeneffectiveandthecurrentsituationisnotinneedofanythinglikethelevelof
oversightindicatedinTable1.Also,asnoted,effectiveactiontoprecludearepeatofthe
Taiwanshipmenterrorisunderwayandmakingimpressiveprogressfromwhatiscorrectly
characterizedasasuperhumaneffort.Theyneedbetterdatasystemsandresources,notmore
inspections.
Thiscontinuedintenseandbroadscopesystemofinspectionsandhigherheadquartersvisits
canbeinterpretedasaphilosophyofinspectinginquality.Infact,theTaskForceheard
commentsfromsomehigherheadquartersflagofficersindicatingtheviewthatinspectingin
qualitywillbenecessaryuntilthecultureofspecialattentiontonuclearoperationsis
reestablishedattheoperatingwings.TheTaskForcesawandheardevidencethatthisculture
hasbeenlargelyreestablishedintheoperatingforces.Incontrast,thesupportingsystemhas
notyetfullyrecoveredthecapabilitiesandculturethatexistedintheSpecialWeapons
DirectorateattheSanAntonioAirLogisticsCenternorhasasatisfactoryleveloflogistics
supportbeenreestablished.Further,theTaskForcedidnotdetectasenseofurgency
commensuratewiththeoversightactivityshowninTable1anddescribedforotherunits.
Themostpositiveinterpretationofthecontinuedbroadandpervasivelevelofspecialoversight
andinspectionoftheoperatingforcesisthattheleadershipdoesnotyettrusttheoperating
forcestoperformeffectivelyundertheauthorityofanormalAirForcechainofcommand.The
mostnegativeinterpretationwouldbethatsomelevelsoftheleadershiparemoreconcerned
withtherisktotheirprofessionalcareersthanwithsupportingtheoperatingforces.TheTask
ForceheardbothinterpretationsfromNCOsofallranksandfromcompanygradeofficers.
Regardlessoftheinterpretation,theTaskForceconcludesthatcontinuingthebroad,pervasive
levelofinspectionandexerciseshasbecomecounterproductive.Thepervasivenessofthe
inspectionactivitystandsinthewayofthewingsestablishingtheoperatingrhythmessentialto
aneffectiveoperation.Theoperatingforcesunderstandthedemandsofthemission.Theydo
notunderstandthedemandsoftheinspectionandexerciseregimes.Theyalsounderstandthey
mustdoeverythingpossibletoensurethattheydonotfailanNSIregardlessoftheimpactof
suchafocusontheoperationalmissionandsometimesregardlessoftheimpactontheunits
people.
Oneoftheconsequencesofthepervasiveinspectionimpactonunitoperationswas
characterizedattwolocationsasnuclearparanoia,theperceptionbeingthatgoodpeople
(particularlycivilianemployees)areavoidingassignmentsthatsubjectthemtotheinspection
andoversightregimethathasbecomeinstitutionalizedinnuclearoperationsandlogistics
activities.Nuclearparanoiamayalsobeimpactingtheattitudetowardsbeingidentifiedas
havingnuclearexpertisethoughtheevidenceofthiswasanecdotalandlimited.

23

TheTaskForcealsohearddiscussionoftheroleoftheAirForceInspectionAgency(AFIA).That
rolehasevolvedtobothacoreaugmentationtomajorcommandinspectionteamsandan
oversightandqualitycontrolroleonvirtuallyeveryNSI/DNSI.TheAFIAroleseemsappropriate
anduseful.Still,thecombinationofmajorcommandinspectors,AFIAinspectorsandobservers,
DTRAinspectorsandobservers,AFSafetyCenterobservers,combatantcommandobservers,
and,inEurope,NATOobserversgrowstheinspectionteams.Itisnotunusualtohaveeightor
teninspectorsfromthemultipleagenciesobservingatechnicaloperationcarriedoutbytwo
technicians.InthecaseofaNSI/DNSIforaMunitionsSupportSquadroninEurope,itisnot
uncommontohave80to90inspectorsexaminingaunitwithatotalunitmanningoflessthan
150.
Further,thelevelofdetailintheinspection,thejudgmentaboutwhatismajorandwhatis
minor,andanumberofnewandseeminglyillogicalrulesraisecredibilityissues.Fourexamples
illustratethetrendtowardsexcess.

ArecentnewsafetyruledemandsthatnotechnicianinaWMTbecloserthanoneinch
fromawallwhenthefiresetcablesareexposedonanassetlestanunknownsourceof
electricalcurrentleaptothefiringset.ThisruleappliestoaWMTwhich,itself,isa
faradaycage,enclosedinalightningprotectedaircraftshelter.Thisisparticularly
difficulttocomplywithinaworkareadesignedforfourpeoplewhentheyarebeing
observedbymultipleinspectors,alldeclaringthattheymustactuallyseethetechnician
performeachstepoftheprocedure.
ThereisanAirForcerequirementfortheSupplyChainManagementGroupattheALC
tomaintaintwoyearsofpaperprintoutsofusagefactors.Sinceallthisinformationis
availableelectronically,theprintoutshavenopracticaluse.Thisrequirementproduces
about400,000pagesofprintouteachquarterdemandingstoragecabinetsforeight
quartersworthofvirtuallyworthlesspaper.StilltheLogisticsComplianceAssessment
Teamreligiouslycheckstobecertainthatthefulleightquartersofprintoutsare
properlymaintained.Missingpaperdatacanbeamajorwriteup.Theunitsanswerto
whytheinspectorsdothatisbecausetheycan.
InspectionsoftechnicaloperationsinUSAFEareconductedontrainingassets(notwar
reserveassets).Theseassetshaveseenheavyuseandhavenumerousnicksand
scratches.Theinspectionteamtypicallyrequiresthatthetechniciangothroughthe
processofinspecting,assessingwithreferencetotechdata,andrecordingeachofthe
defects.Thisalonecanconsumemorethananhourattheoutsetofanoperationwhere
thetotaltaskexecutiontimeisnormallyabout30minutes.Itisdifficulttoexplaintothe
technicianwhyhehastorepeatedlydemonstrateduringasingleoperationthathe
knowshowtocorrectlyidentifyandcharacterizedefectsonaworntrainingmunition.
ThisisanissueatthenuclearbomberbasesinCONUSaswell.
Thereisalsothematterofthemostbasictrust.Thecomplaintofseveraltechniciansis
thatiftheinspectorsdonotactuallyseethetechnicianperformaparticularstep
becausetheinspectorsareconversingamongthemselvesorotherwisedistracted,
inspectorswillnotacceptthatthetechnicianperformedthestep.Inatleastonecase,it
causedthefailureofanNSI.Thissortofattitudeisinterpretedbytheworking
technicianasevidencethattheofficialdirectiongiventheinspectoristoassumethat

24

thosetheyareobservingarenotdoingthetaskproperlyuntilproventotheinspector.
Sincethesearenuclearoperations,therearealwaysatleasttwotechniciansatwork
andthereisnoreasonablebasisforinspectorsautomaticdiscountingofthewordofa
trustedtechnicianteam.
Anadditionalpriceofthenumbersofobservers/inspectorsthatinsistonphysically
observingtechnicaloperationsisalevelofinterferenceandartificialitythatcallsinto
questionthevalidlyoftheentireinspectionprocess.Asanexample,forUSAFE
operationsitcantakeanhourandahalfwhenusingtheproperproceduretoclearan
inspectionandobserverpartyintoanaircraftsheltertoobserveatechnicalorloading
operation.
Theissueofgroupsofinspectorsalsoappliestonontechnicaloperations.Inthecaseof
arecentNSIataMUNSSinEurope,therewerenineinspectorsexaminingthePRP
recordsofaunitwith142peopleonPRPwithonePRPmonitorintheunit.

Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcernrather
thanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipandmanagement.
Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforcesasingle
NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18monthsandaNuclearOperationalReadiness
Inspection(NORI)each18months.DNSIsasneededtomeettheChairman,JointChiefsof
Staffdirection,conductedwithNSIs.ForthelogisticsunitssubjecttoLogisticsCapability
AssessmentTeaminspections,thenormalfrequencyshouldbe18months.
Thenumbersofinspectorsfrommultipleorganizationsistailoredtothesizeand
complexityoftheoperationsoftheunit.
Thenumbersofinspectorsphysicallyobservingtechnicalandloadingoperationsin
controlledfacilitiesistheminimumrequiredtoverifytheproperperformanceofthetask.
TheCommandersofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommand
shoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspectionsareconductedonlyto
addressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forotherdiscrepancies,the
wingcommanderorAFMCMUNScommanderisaccountableforclosingdiscrepancies.
TheCommanderofUSAirForcesinEuropeshouldrestrictthetotalsizeandcomplexityofan
inspectionteamtothatwhichisappropriatetothesizeandcomplexityofthenuclear
operationsoftheinspectedunit.

25

OperationsandMaintenance
LogisticsandMaintenance
TheTaskForceelectedtovisittheOgdenALCsincemanyofthelogisticsissuesidentifiedon
visitstootherorganizationswerefocusedonthesupportforballisticmissilesandballistic
missilewarheads.Thereareanumberoforganizationsrelevanttothesupportofballistic
missilesustainment.SomearelocatedatHillAFBandsomeatKirtlandAFB.Thereisavarietyof
reportingchannelsdirectlytotheOOALC,totheAFNWC,ortoAFMCsAirForceGlobal
LogisticsSupportCenter.Table2listssomeoftherelevantorganizations.
Table2:LogisticsSupportOrganizations
Organization

Reports to

Location

Function

ICBM Systems Division

AF Nuclear Weapons
Center

Hill AFB

System Program Office

Engineering Support

498th Nuclear Systems

Wing (NSW)

AF Nuclear Weapons
Center

Kirtland AFB

KUMMSC Support
Munitions Sqds

708th Nuclear Sustainment

Sqd (NSUS)

498th NSW

Kirtland AFB

Stockpile management of
DOE support to DoD

309th Missile Mx Group

(MMXG)

Ogden Air Logistics Ctr

Hill AFB

Depot repair for RS/RV

Minuteman III Mk12/Mk21

748th Supply Chain

Management Group

AF Global Logistics
Support Center

Hill AFB
component

Supply Support
NWRM management

Withtheexceptionofthe708thNSUS,theissueswiththemaintenanceandlogistics
organizationsimpactingeitherthestrategicforcesorthoseinEuropeweresimilar:

Agingequipmentcentraltotheirmissionwithlittleornourgencyinplanstoreplacethe
equipment.
Lowpriorityinspiteofthedeclarationoftheprimacyofthenuclearmission.Plansto
providetheneededsupporttoincludesuchseeminglymundaneneedsasconnecting
cablesrepeatedlyfrustratedbydemandstofindcheapersolutions.Hencetheusual
responseisstretchedordelayedprogramssuchasthereplacementfortheReentry
SystemTestSet(RSTS),a40+yearoldpieceofessentialtestgearwithacurrently
plannedreplacementdateof2017.TheTaskForcenotedthatittookonlyaboutthis
lengthoftimetodevelopandfieldtheF15andF16fighteraircraft.
Reductionsinmanpoweratthesametimeasincreasesinworkload.Figure4offersone
illustrationoftheincreaseinworkload.

26


Figure4:ReEntrySystem/ReEntryVehicle(RS/RV)EngineeringRequests

Therearemultiplereasonsfortheescalatinggrowthindemandforengineeringsupportfrom
theICBMSystemsDivision:

Continuedagingofsystemsbeingsupportedandsupportequipment.
Reducedexperienceintheunitsmaintainingtheequipment.
Inadequateandoutdatedtechnicaldatawithmanpowerasaprimereasonfortechnical
databacklog.
Anenvironmentofriskavoidanceleadingtoreferralsforengineeringjudgments
formerlymadebymaintenancesupervisors.

Virtuallyallofthesecausesofincreasedworkloadandreducedefficiencyareevidentacrossthe
maintenanceandlogisticsactivitiesintheoperatingwingsandthelogisticswingsandgroups.
Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shoulddirectazerobaseassessmentofthelogistics
centerandoperatingunitengineeringandmaintenancemanpowerrequirementsconsidering
theagingoftheequipment.
Additionalrecommendationsrelevanttothisdiscussionarefoundinthefollowingsectionson
operatingwings.
OperationsMissileWings
Missileoperationscrewsarecommittedtotheirmission,butmostwerenotvolunteersfor
missileduty.Theyperceivealackofknowledgeofandrespectfortheirmissionfromwithinthe
largerAirForce.Thisperceptionisreinforcedbybothlargeandsmallsignals.Manyofthe
currentcrewsexperiencedthetraumaofhavingtheirStrategicMissileWingrenamedSpace
Wingandreplacingthedistinctivemissilebadgewithaspacebadge.Further,astheyattend
professionalmilitaryeducationatalllevels,theynotethatthereislittleinthecurriculumabout

27

theirmissionandtheyperceivethattheirclassmatesattachlittlevaluetothatmission.Asa
seeminglysmallbutstillirritatingmatter,asamissilecrewwatchesthecomputerdisplayfor
theirmissionbriefingbeforestartingeachperiodofduty,theyseetheofficialclassifiedAir
ForcescreensaverwhichfeaturesasingleweaponssystemanF22.TheyalsonotethatAir
Forcerecruitingadsandposters,defenseindustryadvertising,andotherformsofAirForce
publicrelationsactivityseemtoignoretheballisticmissilemission.Thiscombinationmakesit
difficultfortheleadershipintheoperationalforcestoconvincethecrewsthattheirserviceis
valuedcommensuratewiththedeclaredpriorityoftheirmission.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthatAirForcepublic
relationsandpromotionalmessagesincludethenuclearforcesinportrayingtheAirForce
missionandfocus.
TheSecretaryoftheAirForce,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatalllevelsshould
frequentlyreinforcetheprimacyofthenucleardeterrencemissionwithcommunicationsto
HeadquartersAirForce,theMajorAirCommands,andthenuclearoperationalforcesand
logisticssupportorganizations.
OperationsBombWings
TheattitudeintheBombWingsisgenerallypositive.Theirmissiondemandsahighopstempo,
buttheyseemtodealwithiteffectively.Still,theefforttorefocusthewingsonthenuclear
missionischallengingitremainsdifficultforaircrewstobetrulyimmersedinthenuclear
mission.Nosinglewingcanmeettherapidreactionnuclearrequirement.Consequently,the
commitmentissharedonanadhocandpiecemealbasisbetweenBombWings.Thismaybe
thebestapproachgiventhecurrentforcedistribution,butitmakesitdifficultinaselectedpart
oftheunittomaintainahighdegreeoffocusonoperationalreadinesstoperformthestrategic
nuclearmission.
Inordertobereadytoassumethenuclearcommitment,crewsmustretainsomeleveloffocus
onthenuclearmissionwhiledeployedelsewhereforcommitmenttocontinuouspresence.In
spiteofseniorleadershipfocus,manycrewsvaluethesedeploymentsandtheconventional
missionabovethenuclearmission.Again,partofthisattitudestemsfromwhattheyperceive
asthewiderAirForceattitudetowardsthenuclearbombermission.Thisisexacerbatedbythe
widelyreportedinternaldebatesinthePentagonaboutthefutureofthebomberlegofthe
nucleartriad.TheinternalPentagondebateiswellknownintheoperationalbomberunits.As
inthecaseoftheMissileWings,B52crewsaresubjectedonadailybasistotheF22AirForce
classifiedscreensaverwhichreinforcestheirperceptionthatthefighteraircraftmission
dominatesAirForceattentionandpriorities.And,thereisageneralperceptionthatthenuclear
missionisancillarytothecrewsotherdemandingmissions.Thiscombinationoffactorsisa
continuingobstacletoconvincingtheB52forcethatthenuclearmissionisfirstpriority.
Recommendation:TheCommander,AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandshoulddirectmoving
fromtheadhocapproachtomeetingthenuclearbombercommitmenttoaformalprogram
thatisinsulatedfromotherdemands.

28

MaintenanceandSustainmentMissileWingsandMunitionsSupportSquadrons
(Europe)
Theworkloadformissileandweaponsmaintenancehasincreasedsignificantlywiththe
reductionsinmanpower,reductionsinexperiencedNCOsupervisors,failuresofsupport
equipment,andinadequatetechnicaldata.Theseconditionsarenottheresultof
reorganizationnorwillfurtherreorganizationbethesolutiontotheneed.
Withtheformationofnewhigherheadquartersorganizations,nearly48%oftheMSgtsand
SMSgtsintheNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)careerfield(nuclearmunitions
maintenance)areathigherheadquarterscreatingpoliciesfororinspectingthe52%that
provideNCOleadershipintheoperatingwings.Thisnumberiswellknownamongthe52%.
Table3showsthestaffpositionsmannedfromfieldresourcesasofAugust2010.Dueto
reducedoverallnumbers,thisisafragilecareerfieldandrequiresspecialattentiontoensure
theneededlevelofexpertiseandquantityofqualifiedpeopleintheoperatingforce.
Table3:MigrationofSeniorNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)NCOs

Organization

CurrentAuthorization

HAF/A10

1SMSgt

AFIA

2MSgt

AFGSC

1SMSgt;4MSgt

AFSC

2MSgt

DTRA

2MSgt

EUCOM

1MSgt

STRATCOM

2MSgt

USAFE/A3NM

1MSgt

USAFE/IG

1MSgt

AFMC/IG

3MSgt

AFMC/A10

1SMSgt;1MSgt

AFMC/A4

3MSgt

AFNWC/LG

1MSgt

ICBMSYSTEMSDIVISION(HILL) 2MSgt
49THT&ESqd

2MSgt

708NSUS

1SMSgt;6MSgt

709NSS

1MSgt

710NSS

1MSgt

Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shouldinitiateaprogramtoensureaprioritybalance
suchthattheoperatingforceshavetheneededseniorNCOleadershipfromthe2W2career
fieldtoincludeimmediateactiontoaddressthemismatchbetweenseniorNCOssupervising

29

workintheunitsandseniorNCOsoverseeingandinspectingtheperformanceofoperational
andlogisticsunits.
ICBMWarheadSustainment
TheslowresponsetoinadequatetechnicaldataincreasedtheICBMnuclearmunitions
maintenanceworkload.Munitionscomponentsarereceivedatthemissilewingsfromthe
weaponsdepotandfromothersites.Beforeassemblingcomponentsforloadingona
Minutemanmissile,thetechnicianmustinspecttheconditionofthecomponent.The
inspectionfrequentlyrevealssmalldefects(nicksandscratches,mostlycosmeticinnature)that
arenotaddressedinthetechnicaldata.Ondiscoveringthesedefects,themunitions
maintenanceorganizationhasnochoicebuttodocumentthedefects,returntheassetto
storage,andsendthepaperworktotheICBMSystemsDivisionforanengineeringjudgment.
Sinceittakesaboutahalfdaytoprepareanitemforinspectionandanotherhalfdayto
documentthedefectsandreturntheitemtostorage,eachsuchincidentcostsadays
productivityforacrew.Thishadoccurred55timesMay2010throughAugust2010atthe15th
MUNS.In52ofthosecases,theengineeringjudgmentultimatelyrenderedwasthattheitem
wasserviceable.Thismeans52daysofneedlesslostproductivityinasinglemissilewinginthe
periodnoted.
TheAFNWChasbeenworkingthissituationfortwoyears.Whiletheoptionsforcorrectingthis
deficiencyarewellunderstoodpreinspectionanddocumentationbeforeshipment,rapidly
changingthetechorders,and/oronsitejudgmentthereseemedtobetimeconsuming
obstaclestoanyofthesolutions.Withthisconditionasacontributor,munitionsmaintenance
peopleworkexcessiveshiftsandweekendstomeettheneedforwarheadsfordeployed
missiles.
Recently,theAFNWCidentifiedfourtechnicalorders(techorders)thatcovertheareasmaking
upovertwothirdsofthecaseswhereinadequatetechdatanecessitatedengineering
assessment.Twoofthesetechordershavebeenexpandedandreissued.Atthetimeofthis
report,theothertwowerestillinwork.Thisactionshouldsignificantlyreducethisparticular
obstacletoefficientmunitionsmaintenanceinthemissilewings.
Analltoocommonresponsefromjuniorairmentoseniormastersergeantstoquestionsabout
theirfutureplanswasthattheyhadenoughoftheworkingconditionsandstateoflogistics
supportandtheywereleavingeitherthecareerfieldortheAirForce.Severaldeclaredthatit
wasntthelonghoursofworkthatbotheredthem;itwasthelonghourswhentheycouldnot
dotheirworkbecauseoftechorders,supportequipmentissues,andinspections.
Thereisamorefundamentalcauseofthissituation.Inthepast,thejudgmentsregardingthe
cosmeticdefectscausingsomeofthisproblemwererenderedbyexperiencedmunitions
maintenancepeopleintheWSA.Withthedriveforzerodefects,thisbecameunacceptableto
somelevelsofnuclearenterpriseleadership.Thefallacyisthegoalofzerocosmeticdefectsin
30yearoldweapons.Thisisneitherachievablenornecessary.Ifthestandardispeerreviewed
engineeringassessmentforcosmeticdefects,thenthesystemhascrossedthethresholdtozero
risk.Intheworstcase,therecouldbesomeslightriskthatafaultyjudgmentregardingasmall

30

nickorscratchcouldcauseawarheadtofailonreentry.Again,thisissuecontributestothe
perceptionofdistrustoftheprofessionalqualificationoftheworkforce.
Recommendations:TheCommander,AirForceNuclearWeaponsCentershould:
Directimmediateactiontoreestablishriskmanagementandtrustinthetechnicians
judgmentversusriskavoidanceoncosmeticdefectswiththeneededtechnicaldataand
trainingprogramtosupportthatjudgment.
Provideonsiteengineeringsupportuntilprocessesareinplacetoseparatethecosmetic
defectsinRVcomponentsrequiringengineeringanalysis.
SupportequipmentforICBMmunitionsandmissilemaintenanceisoldandattheendofits
usefullife.TheReentrySystemTestSet(RSTS)wasdeliveredinthe1960sandincludes1950s
technology.ThereareplanstoreplaceitwithaFullOperationalCapabilitybutnotuntil2017.
GivenalltheotherneedsacrosstheAirForce,thedecisionhasbeenthatthisistheright
priority.However,thisisthetestsetthatverifiesMMIIIreentrysystems(Mk12,Mk12A,and
Mk21)andreentryvehicleintegrity.Maintenancetechniciansperceivethis2017replacement
dateasamismatchbetweenstatedmissionprioritiesandlogisticssupportpriorities.

Failuretoreplaceseeminglysimplepiecesofsupportequipmentsuchasconnectingcablesisa
majorirritantandobstacletoproductivity.Thesameistrueofsupportequipmentformissile
maintenance.Again,overthepasttwoyearsthishasreceivedattentionwithacontractthat
wastodelivernewcablesinlate2010.WhiletheTaskForceheardcomplaintsaboutthis
problemfromeachofthemissilewings,therewasnoindicationthattheworkforceknewthat
helpisontheway.Thisillustratestheneedforamoreproactiveapproachtoinformingthe
troops.

Vehiclesessentialtotransportingandremoving/installingmissilesandpostboostvehiclesin
thesilosprovideanexampleofacquisitiondecisionsthatseemtolackmeaningfulconsultation
withthepeoplewhoperformthemission.Atleastthisisaperceptionamongpeoplewhouse
thisvitalequipment.Thetractorsaremodern2003and2009models.Sincecabovertractors
arenolongerproducedintheU.S.forcommercialtruckinguse,thedecisionwastochangenew
procurementtotheindustrystandardtractors.Theproblemisthattheadditionallengthofthe
industrystandardtractorreducesmaneuverabilitymakingthemdifficulttoimpossibleto
maneuveronsomeofthelaunchsites.Thenewtractorswereprocuredasacommodityitem
withnoconsiderationofspecialdemandsofthenuclearsupportmission.

Further,whilethetransportererectortrailershavebeenupgraded,themostessentialpieceof
equipment,acomplexhoist,is40yearsoldwithnoknownplansforreplacement.Whenthe
transportererectorswererefurbishedsome20yearsago,theenvisionedrefurbishment
includedanewhoist.Theaddedexpenseofthenewhoistledtodirectionthatacheaper
programbedeveloped.Thisisanotherexampleofalowestcost,stopgapapproachtosupport
equipmentessentialtotheAirForcesfirstprioritymission.Thereisstillnoprogramtoreplace
thehoists.

31

MunitionsSupportSquadron(MUNSS)
AttheMUNSSsites,weaponsmaintenancemustbeperformedinsidetheprotectiveaircraft
shelter.Thecentralpieceofsupportequipmenttoprovidethismaintenancecapabilityisthe
WeaponsMaintenanceTruck(WMT).Thesetrucksweredesignedfora20yearlifemorethan
20yearsago.Whileitiscommonforsystemstobeusedbeyondtheirdesignlife,thewearand
tearonthesetruckshasfarexceededthedesignoperatingenvironment.Forexample,they
weredesignedtodelivertheneededcapabilityintheaircraftshelter,notforextensiveroad
travel.Inpractice,thesetrucksmusttravelsomedistancetoamainoperatingbaseforroutine
maintenance.Further,theWMTswereprocuredanddeliveredwithnoplannedsustainment
package.TheMUNSSsitesoftendependontemporaryWMTloansfromothersites.
TheTaskForceheardmostlypositivecommentsabouttheperformanceoftheengineering
detachment,Det1,responsibleformaintenance/sustainmentoftheweaponsvaultsand
portionsoftheWMT(hoist,electricalsystems).However,theoperatingunitsalsodescribed
howDet1wasundermannedforthesustainmentdemandsplaceduponit.Det1,underthe
498thMunitionsMaintenanceGroupatRamstein,comprises21personnel,mostlyengineers,to
servicealloftheseagingsystems.
Themaintenanceissueisfurtherexacerbatedbythefailuretoplanforandprocurea
sustainmentpackageforthesesystems.Hence,partsandsupportcantakeanextendedperiod
forroutineneeds.Asanexample,aWMTfromoneofthesiteshasbeenunderrepairat
Ramsteinformorethanayear.Atthetimeofourvisit,itwasawaitingtirestocompletethe
work.Thesearestandardheavytrucktires.
ThecurrentplanistoreplacetheWMTswiththeSecureTransportableMaintenanceSystemin
2014.Aprototypehasbeeninexistenceforsometwoyears.WhenMUNSSpeopletaketheir
20yearoldessentialequipmenttoamainoperatingbaseforrepair,theynoticethefleetof
relativelynewfueltruckspopulatingtheflightlinesupportingtheconventionaltacticalfighter
mission.
Anissuecommontoothernuclearoperationsisthelackofsupplypriority.Partoftheissueis
infrequentdemandforsomepartsandthefailuretoplanforasustainmentpackage.Butpart
oftheissueispriority.Itisnotdifficulttounderstandthatwhenthereiscompetitionforassets
betweentheforcesincombatandeveryoneelse,theprioritywillproperlygotoforcesin
combat.Stillthereshouldbeatleastsensitivitytotheneedsofthenuclearenterprisewhich
areoftensmallcomparedtoothers.Forexample,aninquiryaboutthestatusofanorderfora
smallnumberofnightvisiongogglesforthesecurityforcesassignedtothenuclearmissionwas
answeredbytheitemmanagerwiththeinformationthattheunitsneedwaspriority2with
morethan200priority2ordersaheadofthesesecurityforces.
SomeCommonBottomLinesforICBMsandMUNSS
Thereareotherexamples,buttheexamplesabovedemonstratethreekeypoints:

Slowresponsetotechorderandequipmentissuessendsanegativemessageandaddsto
theworkloadofmunitionsmaintenancepersonnel,requiringextraordinaryeffortsto
sustainthemission.

32

Thelackofanailsyndromeisreal.Payingattentiontoallthebitsandpiecesofsupport
equipmentneededtosustainthemissionisasimportantasmajorpiecesofequipment.
Theprocessofdesigningandprocuringnewsupportequipmentwhetheritbelarge
tractorsortheneedforconnectingcablesshouldbemadeonthebasisoflongterm
effectivenessratherthantheimmediatecost.Decisionsshouldalsoincludeconsultingthe
peoplewhousetheequipmenttosupportthemissionattheoperatingunits.Consulting
peopleintheheadquartersisnotasubstitute.

Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthechoices
forcorrectiveactionareorientedtolongtermsustainmentratherthanthelowestnear
termcostpath.
TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandgivefundingandprogrampriorityto
logisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrencemissioncommensuratewiththe
priorityofthenucleardeterrencemission.
TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandgiveurgentattentiontoreplacing40+year
oldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupportandtestequipmentattheoperatingwings
andtheairlogisticscenterandtoreplacingtheWeaponsMaintenanceTrucksatthe
MUNSSsites.
TheCommander,AFGSCandCommander,AFNWCshoulddirectagreatlyincreased
communicationsefforttokeeptheoperatingforcesinformedaboutactionsunderwayto
addresstheirsupportissues.
TheCommander,AFGSCshouldensurethatequipmentpeculiartosupportofnuclear
operationsistreatedasspecializedequipmentbeforerevertingtoacommodityapproach.

33

U.S.AirForcesinEurope
USAFEnuclearforceshaveasetofspecialchallengestoinclude:

Theoperationsareunique.
o TheMunitionsSupportSquadronseachsupportandaresupportedbyadifferent
alliedairforce.
o ThereisakeyUSNATODualCapableAircraft(DCA)tasking.
TheunitsaresubjecttobothUSAFandNATOdirectives.Thesedirectivesaresometimes
inconflictduetovariedupdatecyclesorduetounresolvedconflicts.
TheunitsaresubjecttoUSAF,DTRA,andNATOinspectionsandinspectioncriteria.
Thereishighturnoverinessentialpersonnel,sometimeswithmostofthesenior
leadershipchangingoverashortperiod.

TheuniquenatureoftheNATODCAtaskingraisessomeissueswithreadinesscriteriaandwith
inspectionteams.TherequirementistobecapableofbringingarequiredDCAsquadrontothe
requiredreadinesswithinaspecifiedtime.Tomeetthisrequirement,itisclearthatthewing
mustsustaincertaincapabilitiesatconstantreadiness,e.g.,securityforces,systems
maintenanceandcontrol,andcommandandcontrolsystemsandcapabilities.Atthesametime
thereistimetobringothercapabilitiesfromalowerstateofreadinesstotherequiredlevel.
Theissueistheneedforcleardefinitionofwhatisrequiredonadailybasis.Thisleadsto
concernsaboutthedifferencebetweenwhatthewingcommanderbelievesisrequiredtomeet
theNATODCAcapabilityandtimingrequirement,andthedesireofanNSIteamtoassess
capabilitiesthatthewingdoesnotneedtokeepataconstantstateofreadiness.Additionally,
thewingmustcontinuouslymeetitsongoingcombatoperationsrequirementsleadingto
constantchangeinforcesassignedtomeettheNATOrequirement.
ThemismatchbetweenUSAFandNATOdirectivesandinspectionrequirementscanhavean
adverseimpactonNATOstrikeevaluation(STRIKEVAL)operations.Forexample,USAF
directivespermittowinganuclearloadedaircraftonlyasalastresortinanemergencywhile
NATOrulespermitsuchtowingasneededtomeetthegenerationrequirements.Giventhe
distributionofaircraftandmunitionsatsomelocations,thiscanresultinNATOSTRIKEVAL
scenariosthataredifficultifnotimpossibletomeetwithUSAFdirectedlimitation.Insuch
cases,thewingcommandermustcomplyfirstwithUSAFdirectives.
TheimpactoftherapidturnoverinEuropeisexacerbatedbyatleasttwopersonnelpoliciesor
practices.Theneedistomaintainahighlevelofnuclearoperationsandmaintenance
experienceandcompetence.However,itatleastappearsthatassignmentstothekeyDCA
FighterWingaremadewithattentiontofactorsthancanoverrideattentiontonuclear
experience.ThereisareluctancetoallowpeopletoextendinEuropewhentheyvolunteerand
theirexperienceisimportanttoDCAoperations.Partofthereasonforthereluctanceisthat
manyassignedtoanunaccompaniedtourataspecificbaseoverseasarepromisedthatatthe
endofthisunaccompaniedtourtheywillbeassignedtofighterunitsinUSAFE.Theendresultis
aflowofpeoplewhohavenonuclearexperienceintothekeyDCAwinginEurope.Thissame
setofpoliciesimpactstheMUNSSsites.Thisisparticularlyimportantatthesesitessincethey

34

aresmall(typicallylessthan150totalassigned)andsometimesareonedeepincritical
experience.
Recommendations:
TheCommander,USAirForcesinEuropeshould:
DirecttheUSAFEA3toprovideclarityontheelementsoftheDCAmissionthatrequire
continuousreadinessandthosethatcanbebroughttotheneededlevelwithinthe
prescribedtime.
IdentifythedisconnectsbetweenNATOandUSAFdirectivesthatimpactnuclearoperations
andestablishaworkingbodywithNATOtoresolvethedifferences.
TheAirForceA1shoulddirectareexaminationorclarificationofthepolicyorpractice
opposingvoluntaryextensionsfornuclearexperiencedpeopleinEuropeandthecriteriafor
assignmentsfromnonnuclearmissionstotheDCAmissionunits.

35

GuidanceversusDirection
Acontinuingissueinthenuclearforcesistheadequacyofdirection.TheAirForcemovetothe
philosophyoftheAirForceInstructionversustheAirForceRegulationprobablyachievesits
intendedpurposeinotheractivities.Thephilosophyseemstobetodescribewhatistobe
done,togiveguidance,andtoleveragetheexperienceandtalentsofAirForcepeopletodothe
jobmoreeffectivelyandefficiently.Itwouldbedifficulttofaultthatpropositionwereitnot
contrarytothedemandsofthenuclearmissionwherethepremiumisondoingthingsexactly
rightandasprescribedeverytime.Thereislittleroomforadhocinnovationinthenuclear
operationsandmaintenancebusiness.
AcommonanswerbyseniorNCOsinthenuclearenterprisetoaquestionaboutthedifference
betweenaninstructionandaregulationisthatthefirstprovidesguidance(somesay
suggestionsorphilosophy),thesecondprovidesdirection.Oneofthedifficultieswithguidance
versusdirectionisdifferentinterpretationsbyunitsupervisors,staffassistanceteams,and
inspectors.Inthenuclearbusiness,roomforinterpretation,innovation,andincreased
efficiencyismorelikelytobeanobstaclethananenabler.Onesuchinnovation,simultaneously
inventoryingthestoragefacilitywhilepreparingtheloadfortransporttotheflightline,wasa
factorintheunauthorizedtransferincidentin2007.Anotherfactorwasadifferent
interpretationofwhatconstitutedverificationofthepayloadinthecruisemissilesbeing
transported.Intheseareastheconceptofguidancehasnowbeenreplacedwithcleardirection
toincludeprocessesthatneitherrequirenorallowinterpretation.Inotherareas,clearer
directionisstillneeded.
GlobalStrikeCommandisintheprocessofprovidingthatdirection.Thecommandisnearing
completionofworktobringsome190documentsthatprovideguidanceanddirectionupto
thestandardneededinthenuclearenterprise.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectreviewoftheapproachto
guidingnuclearoperationstoensureitisdirectionwithadequatedetailviceguidancethat
leavesthedetailsopentointerpretation.
TheCommander,AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandshouldcompletetheongoingAFGSCwork
tosupplementAFIsasneededtoprovidecleardirectionfornuclearweaponsoperations.

36

EnlistedPersonnelManagement
ThereareanumberofintersectingissuesthatcouldleadtoaperfectstormincriticalNCO
leadershipandsupervisioninthemaintenancefields.Specifically,therearefourissues:

ThedrawonexperiencedMSgtsandSMSgtstomanoversightorganizations,
Highyeartenure(HYT),
InflexibleenlistedassignmentpoliciesandpracticesforallranksbelowE9,and
SomeMSgtsandSMSgtsdepartingforgreenerpastures.

ThedrawonexperiencedseniorNCOsisaddressedelsewhereinthisreport.Theissueinthe
operationalunitswithhighyeartenureisinflexibility.ThepurposeofHYTtopreventstagnation
intheseniorNCOpopulationisunderstoodandisnot,initself,anissue.Theissueisthatthe
operatingforcesassumetherewillbenowaiversandarereluctanttoaskforthem.Inasmall
careerfieldlikethe2W2field,asingle,experiencedMSgtorSMSgtmaybeunusuallyimportant
tothemissionforsomeperiodoftimeuntilareplacementisonboardanduptospeed.The
issueonenlistedassignmentpoliciesistheperceptionandperhapsthefactthatthesystem
doesnotpayadequateattentiontospecialexperienceidentifiers.Hence,baseofpreferenceor
someotherassignmentpolicyfactormaysendaC17crewchieftoaB52wingwithout
appreciationfortheverydifferentdemandsfortheB52crewchief.Thegreenerpastureinthe
fourthbulletaboveisalmostanywhereexceptthecurrentworkingconditionsanddemands.
TheendresultoftheseniorNCOassignmentissuesisthatinoneofthebomberwings,the
turnoverrateforMSgtsinthenuclearmaintenancecareerfieldinasingleyearwas70%.For
SMSgts,itwas100%.
Atthesamewing,turnoverrateinweaponsloaderswas30%.Crewchiefmanningwasat75%.
TheNuclearIssueResolutionandIntegration(NIRI)Boardisawareoftheconsequencesof
theseintersectingissuesandprovidesthefollowingassessmentofcriticalskills:

NuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)atacriticalpoint
MissileandSpaceMaintenance(2M0)atalevelofconcern
AerospaceMaintenance/HeavyCrewChiefs(2A5)atalevelofconcern
Munitions,MissileMaintenance(21M)(amunitionsofficerAFSC)atalevelofconcern

ThemostoptimisticassumptionexpressedtotheTaskForcewasthat,overtime,thesecareer
fieldswillbemannedintheoperatingforcestothesamelevelastherestoftheAirForce
(85%).
Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shoulddevelopandimplementaprocessforspecial
managementofnuclearcareerfieldsthoseinwhichsmallnumberscreatespecial
challenges.

37

ThePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)
Thefollowingdiscussion,findings,andrecommendationsaresimilartothoseincludedinthe
2004PermanentTaskForce(thencalledtheJointAdvisoryCommittee)reportonAirForce
NuclearSuretyInspections(NSI).TheDoDguidanceonPRPhasimprovedsignificantlysince
2004.Incontrast,thepracticeintheAirForcehasnotimproved.Theimportanceofthis
programdictatesthatitbecoherent,wellmanaged,andreasonablyattainable.Theprogram
continuestosuffer,insomecasesincreasinglyso,fromfundamentaldeficienciesthatwork
againsttheprogramspurposeandimportance.
AccordingtotheDoD5210.42RegulationandAirForceManual103902,thepurposeofthe
PRPistoensurethateachpersonselectedandretainedforperformingdutiesassociatedwith
nuclearweaponsornuclearcommandandcontrolsystemsandequipmentisemotionallystable
andphysicallycapable,andhasdemonstratedreliabilityandprofessionalcapability. 1 In
identifyingpotentiallydisqualifyingordecertifyinginformationtheguidancestatesthatin
evaluatingcertaintraitsorconduct(suchasalcoholuse,druguse,medicalcondition,poor
attitude,lackofmotivation),certifyingandreviewingofficialsshallensurethereisno
reasonabledoubtofanindividualsreliability... 2 Thisisahighbutattainablestandard.Earlier
languagecalledforreliabilitybeyondanydoubtanunattainablestandard.
DiscussionswithcommandersandPRPmonitorsmakeitclearthattherehasbeencontinuing
escalationinpursuitofabsolutegoals.Infact,whencommanderswereaskedspecificallyabout
theDoDdescribedstandardforPRPreliability,nonequotedtheDoDguidance.Thiscontinued
focusonabsoluteassuranceofreliabilityhasproducedimportantdysfunctionalaspectsinthe
programtoincludetheuseofsuspensionanddecertificationactionsasriskavoidance
measures.Riskavoidancepermeatesthestructureandpracticeoftheprogram.
Currentpracticesproduceanenvironmentofdistrust,implyingthatthepeopleselectedand
qualifiedfordemandingnucleardutiesandwhoarecriticallyimportanttothemissionarenot
sufficientlytrustworthytoliveanacceptabledailylife.Itthenfollowsthattheymustconstantly
reestablishreliability.EventhepossibilityofPotentiallyDisqualifyingInformation(PDI)leadsto
temporarydecertificationuntilitisestablishedthattherehasbeennocompromiseof
reliability.Basedonthisfundamentallyflawedassumption,thePRPrepeatedlyreexaminesthe
historyofeachindividual.
Asoneexampleoftheconsequencesofthisattitude,personnelareautomaticallysuspended
fromPRPdutieswhenreferredbyAirForcemedicalauthoritiestooffbasemedicaltreatment
regardlessofthenatureofthereferral.Theindividualmustthenreporttobasemedical
authoritiestobereinstated.TheDoDguidancedoesnotrequireautomaticsuspensionbut
insteadrequiresfollowupaftertreatment.Individualsshouldbesuspendedonlyforcause,not
forthepossibilityofcause.Hence,foroffbasemedicalreferralsandothersituationswhere
thereisthepossibilityofcompromiseofreliability,suspensionshouldcomeonlyaftera
determinationthatthereisareasonablelikelihoodofsuchcompromise.

DoD521042Regulation/AFMAN103902,incorporatingthroughChange2,2November2010,NuclearWeapons
PersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP),Chapter1,C1.1.PURPOSE
2
Ibid.,Chapter5,C5.1.POTENTIALLYDISQUALIFYINGORDECERTIFYINGCRITERIA

38

ThisautomaticsuspensionpracticeisanexampleofthezeroriskapproachpracticedinAir
Forceimplementationoftheguidance.Thispracticeisacleardemonstrationofdistrust,is
costlyinproductivity,andgeneratesanenormousamountofadditionalandunproductivework
fortheunit,formedicalpersonnel,andforinspectors.Giventhatmaintainingournuclear
capabilitiesistotallydependentonthecommitmentofindividualsinthePRP,thisapproachis
wastefulandcounterproductive.

Theoverallimpactofunnecessarysuspensionsisaddedtootherfactorsimpactingavailability
ofqualifiedpeople.Forexample,thetypicalunitismannedat90%orlessthoughthereare
exceptions.Addedtothis,itisnotunusualtohaveanother10%suspendedforPRPwitha
significantpartofthat10%duetosuspensionsforauthorizedoffbasemedicalcare.Theend
resultissecurityforcesandmaintenancepeopleworkingextendedandaddedshiftsto
compensate.Thismeansthattheriskofoverworkedpeople,includingsecurityforces,making
animportanterrorinjudgmentorperformanceisacceptedwhiletheriskofsomething
disablingtakingplaceduringadentalappointmentforatoothfillingisnot.

Afallacyofthezeroriskapproachisthatitplacesafartooheavyandunnecessaryburdenon
PRP.TherearesupervisorswhoobservepeopleinPRPpositionseveryday.Everynuclear
operationrequiresthepresenceoftwoPRPcertifiedindividuals.PRPshouldbeanaddedaidto
thecommandertoensurereliabilitybeyondareasonabledoubt.Itshouldnotandcannotbe
theguarantorofzerorisk.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryoftheAirForce,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatalllevelsshouldprovide:
Cleardirectionthatensuresunderstandinginallrelevantcommunitiesthatcommanders
areleadingandmanagingavaluablehumanresourcethatisdedicatedtoperformingthe
firstprioritymissionoftheAirForceandshouldbetreatedaccordingly.
CleardirectionthatreinforcesPRPisacommandersprogramintendedtoassistthe
commanderinensuringthatpeopleinPRPpositionsarecapableofreliablyandsafely
performingtheirduties.
Educationanddirectionthattheproperstandardistoensurereliabilitythatleavesno
reasonabledoubtandthatthePRPisoneoftheseveraltoolsavailabletothecommander
tomeetthatstandard.
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectanimmediateadjustmentto
AirForceguidance/practicetoremovePRPbasedrestrictionsandmonitoringdemandsthat
exceedthoserequiredbyDoDdirection.
Somemedicalpersonnelwhomustprovideadvicetocommandersstatethattheguidanceis
toovagueleadingtoworstcaseassumptionsinprovidingthatadvice.Incontrast,theguidance
onwhatconstitutesamedicallydisqualifyingconditionforapilotisclear,requiresminimum
interpretation,andservestheforcewell.

39

Thevaguenessofthemedicallydisqualifyingconditionguidance(fortemporarysuspensionor
decertification)leavesPRPopentocontinuinginterpretationbyNSIinspectorsandmedical
authorities,resultinginratchetingofstandardsasinformationininspectionreportspassesfrom
unittounitbecomingdefactoadditionstostandards.Thispracticehasprogressedtothepoint
thattheenormouseffortrequiredtomeetstandardshasbecomecounterproductiveto
ensuringareliableworkforce.Literallythousandsofmanhoursareexpendedtogobeyondno
reasonabledoubttoseekingtomeetastandardoftotalconfidence,particularlytotal
confidencethattherecordsareperfectasdemandedbytheevolutioninNSIstandards.
Itisunlikelythatthisconsumptionofadditionalmanhoursmakesacommensurate
contributiontosafety,security,andreliabilityofnuclearweaponsoperations.Still,
commandersbelieveitisneededforconfidencethatNSIinspectorswillgivethePRPa
satisfactoryrating.Further,thepersonnelauthorizationstoperformthisworkarenot
consistentwiththedemandsoftheuncontrolledescalationofPRPstandards.
Asnotedearlier,thestatedstandardforPRPreliabilityjudgmentisahighstandardestablishing
reliabilityofanindividualbeyondreasonabledoubt.Thepracticestillseeksabsolute
confidence.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectataskforcebeconvened,
madeupofwing,group,andsquadroncommanders,seniorenlistedsupervisors,and
competentmedicalauthorities,toexaminethecurrentstateofthePRPguidanceandpolicies
oncriteriaforsuspensionanddecertification.Thepurposeistoprovideasetofguidelinesless
subjecttointerpretationthatsupportthestandardofnoreasonabledoubtversusnodoubt.
TheAirForceA1shouldprovideazerobaseassessmentofthePRPworkloadandprovidethe
neededmanning.
PRPwasconceivedandisrepeatedlydescribedasaprogramtohelpcommandersensurethe
continuedreliabilityoftheworkforce.Henceitisacommandersprogram.InpracticethePRP
programhasbecomedominatedbymedicalconsiderations.Thisapproachindicatesanimplicit
assumptionthatpersonnelreliabilityisprimarilyamedicalissue.Thisattitudeispeculiartothe
PRPandisclearlymisguided.Medicalconsiderationsdonotplaythiskindofdominantrole
anywhereelseintheworldofsecurityandreliability.Further,thedirectionofmedical
orientationisoftenriskavoidanceratherthanintendedtoimprovethequalityofcommanders
judgments.
Forexample,guidance(bothDoDandAirForce)directsthatuseofauthorizedoverthecounter
drugsbeyondthemanufacturersrecommendedsafedosagecouldbeconsidereddrugabuse.
Withcurrentdirection,ifthecommanderascertifyingofficialsuspectssuchimproperuse,he
mustsuspendtheindividualfromPRPdutiesandmustconsulttheCompetentMedical
Authority(CMA).Inresponsetothatdirection,anindividualcouldbepermanentlydecertified
fortakingthreeoverthecounterpillswhenthedirectiononthepackagespecifiestwo.

Atpresent,disparatepiecesofinformationthatcouldimpactreliabilityarealltreatedas
medicalmattersfromthedeterminationofalcoholdependence,tothedistinctionbetween

40

juvenilemarijuanaexperimentationandabuse,totherelationoftrafficticketstorespectfor
authority.
Atthewingandgeographicallyseparatedunit,medicalpersonnelareinvolvedwithmuchmore
thanthemedicalaspectsoftheprogram.WhilePDIincludesmental,physical,financial,legal,
traffic,anddomesticviolenceinformation,mostPDIpassesthroughthemedicalauthorities.
Whilenonmedicalrecordsaremaintainedinthepersonnelworld,themajorburdenforPRP
recordsmanagementresidesinthemedicalfunction.Thiscreatesaburdenforthebase
medicalstaffforwhichthereisnomanningandthathaslittlerelationtomedicalmatters.
Further,itreplacestheresponsibilityofsupervisorsandcommanderswhoseexperienceand
knowledgemakethemthemostqualifiedtomakethosejudgments.
Recommendation:TheSecretaryoftheAirForce,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatall
levelsshouldprovidecleardirectionthattheroleofmedicalsupportistoprovidemedical
advicewhenappropriate.Thecommanderbearsfinalresponsibilityandaccountabilityforthe
reliabilityofpeopleinhisorhercommand.
ThepracticeofrepeatedreviewsofPRPcandidateshistorybydifferentindividualsusing
differentstandardscontributestothecontinuingescalationofstandardsandcriteria.Italso
placesPRPcoveredpersonnelatcontinuingriskofarbitraryjudgmentsbasedonlongpast
history.TheTaskForcehasheardenoughanecdotesovermorethanadecadefromreliable
peopletoconsiderthisacriticalproblem.Incontrast,foreventhemostsensitivesecurity
clearances,thereviewreachesbacktothelastreviewor,insomeexceptionalcircumstancesas
muchas10years.ThePRPrecertificationexaminationcanandhasreachedbacktoahigh
schoolfootballinjury.Further,inspectorsquizunitcommandersabouttherecordsofpeople
clearedunderapreviouscommander,criticizingthemfornothavingpersonallyvalidatedpast
certifications.

Recommendation:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthatthe
guidanceforPRPrecertificationspecifythatlookbackislimitedtotheperiodsincethelast
certificationunlessthereisspecificanddocumentedreasontosuspectanindividualproblem.

41

SummaryofRecommendations
TheAirForceleadershipshouldmaintainrealisticexpectationsregardingthestateof
accountingforNWRM.
Logistics
TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffshoulddirectthat:

Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthe
choicesforcorrectiveactionareorientedtolongtermsustainmentratherthanthe
lowestneartermcostpath.

TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandshouldgive:

Fundingandprogramprioritytologisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrence
missioncommensuratewiththepriorityofthenucleardeterrencemission.

Urgentattentiontoreplacing40+yearoldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupport
andtestequipmentattheoperatingwingsandtheairlogisticscenterandtoreplacing
theWeaponsMaintenanceTrucksattheMUNSSsites(Europe).

TheCommanders,AFGCSandAFNWCshoulddirectagreatlyincreasedcommunicationseffort
tokeeptheoperatingforcesinformedaboutactionsunderwaytoaddresstheirsupport
issues.
TheCommander,AFGSCshouldensurethatequipmentpeculiartosupportofnuclear
operationsistreatedasspecializedequipmentbeforerevertingtoacommodityapproach.
TheCommander,AFNWCshould:

Directimmediateactiontoreestablishriskmanagementandtrustinthetechnicians
judgmentversusriskavoidanceoncosmeticdefectswiththeneededtechnicaldata
andtrainingprogramtosupportthatjudgment.

Provideonsiteengineeringsupportuntilprocessesareinplacetoseparatethe
cosmeticdefectsinRVcomponentsrequiringengineeringanalysis.

OrganizationandGuidance
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffshoulddirect:

Anactiontoassignallbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategic
MissileandBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForce
GlobalStrikeCommand.

Areexaminationofthecontinuedutilityofthesetofspecialheadquarters
organizations.

ArevisionofthesetofresponsibilitiesascribedtoAFNWCinAFMCI90204tosharply
focusonthesustainabilityofthenuclearenterprisewithotherresponsibilities
assignedtoHeadquartersAirForce,HeadquartersAirForceMaterielCommand,and
AirForceGlobalStrikeCommand.

42

Areviewoftheapproachtoguidingnuclearoperationstoensureitisdirectionwith
adequatedetailviceguidancethatleavesthedetailsopentointerpretation.

TheCommander,AFGSCshouldcompletetheongoingAFGSCworktosupplementAFIsas
neededtoprovidecleardirectionfornuclearweaponsoperations.
TheInspectionRegime
TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffshoulddirectthat:

Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcern
ratherthanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipand
management.

Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforces:
AsingleNuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18months.
ANuclearOperationalReadinessInspection(NORI)each18months.
DNSIsasneededtomeettheCJCSdirectionconductedwithNSIs.
LogisticsCapabilityAssessmentTeamorPrograminspectionseach18months.

Thenumbersofinspectorsfrommultipleorganizationsistailoredtothesizeand
complexityoftheoperationsoftheunit.

Thenumbersofinspectorsphysicallyobservingtechnicalandloadingoperationsin
controlledfacilitiesistheminimumrequiredtoverifytheproperperformanceofthe
task.

TheCommandersofAFGSCandAFMCshoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecial
inspectionsareconductedonlytoaddressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegative
trends.Forotherdiscrepancies,thewingcommanderortheMunitionsSquadron(MUNS)
commanderisaccountableforclosingdiscrepancies.
TheCommanderofUSAFEshould:

Directthatfollowupreinspectionsareconductedonlytoaddressunsatisfactory
ratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forallotherdiscrepanciesthewingcommander
ortheMUNSSCommanderisaccountableforclosingoutthediscrepanciesin
communicationwiththeappropriateinspectionagency.

Restrictthetotalsizeandcomplexityofaninspectionteamtothatwhichis
appropriatetothesizeandcomplexityofthenuclearoperationsoftheinspectedunit.

Operations
TheCommander,USAFEshould:

DirecttheUSAFEA3toprovideclarityontheelementsoftheDCAmissionthatrequire
continuousreadinessandthosethatcanbebroughttotheneededlevelwithinthe
prescribedtime.

43

IdentifythedisconnectsbetweenNATOandUSAFdirectivesthatimpactnuclear
operationsandestablishaworkingbodywithNATOtoresolvethedifferences.

TheCommander,AFGSCshoulddirectmovingfromtheadhocapproachtomeetingthe
nuclearbombercommitmenttoaformalprogramthatisinsulatedfromotherdemands.
PersonnelandMorale
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffshoulddirectthatAirForcepublicrelationsand
promotionalmessagesincludethenuclearforcesinportrayingtheAirForcemissionand
focus.
TheSecretaryoftheAirForce,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatalllevelsshould
frequentlyreinforcetheprimacyofthenucleardeterrencemissionwithcommunicationsto
HeadquartersAirForce,theMajorAirCommands,andthenuclearoperationalforcesand
logisticssupportorganizations.
TheHeadquarters,AirForceA1should:

Directspecialattentiontoprovidingtheneededqualifiedpeopletotheoperating
forcesinthecareerfieldsthatarebothfragileandcriticaltothenuclearmission.

Directareexaminationorclarificationofthepolicyorpracticeopposingvoluntary
extensionsfornuclearexperiencedpeopleinEuropeandthecriteriaforassignments
fromnonnuclearmissionstotheDCAmissionunits.

Directazerobaseassessmentofthelogisticscenterandoperatingunitengineering
andmaintenancemanpowerrequirementsconsideringtheagingoftheequipment.

Initiateaprogramtoensureaprioritybalancesuchthattheoperatingforceshavethe
neededseniorNCOleadershipfromthe2W2careerfieldtoincludeimmediateaction
toaddressthemismatchbetweenseniorNCOssupervisingworkintheunitsandsenior
NCOsoverseeingandinspectingtheperformanceofoperationalandlogisticsunits.

Developandimplementaprocessforspecialmanagementofnuclearcareerfields
thoseinwhichsmallnumberscreatespecialchallenges.

ProvideazerobaseassessmentofthePRPworkloadandprovidetheneeded
manning.

PersonnelReliabilityProgram
TheSecretary,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatalllevelsshouldprovide

Cleardirectionthat:
Ensuresunderstandinginallrelevantcommunitiesthatcommandersare
leadingandmanagingavaluablehumanresourcethatisdedicatedto
performingthefirstprioritymissionoftheAirForceandshouldbetreated
accordingly.

44

ReinforcesthatPRPisacommandersprogramintendedtoassistthe
commanderinensuringthatpeopleinPRPpositionsarecapableofreliablyand
safelyperformingtheirduties.
Theroleofmedicalsupportistoprovidemedicaladvicewhenappropriate.The
commanderbearsfinalresponsibilityandaccountabilityforthereliabilityof
peopleinhisorhercommand.

Educationanddirectionthattheproperstandardistoensurereliabilitythatleavesno
reasonabledoubtandthatthePRPisoneoftheseveraltoolsavailabletothe
commandertomeetthatstandard.

TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffshoulddirectthat:

AnimmediateadjustmenttoAirForceguidance/practicetoremovePRPbased
restrictionsandmonitoringdemandsthatexceedthoserequiredbyDoDdirection.

Ataskforceisconvened,madeupofwing,group,andsquadroncommanders,senior
enlistedsupervisors,andcompetentmedicalauthorities,toexaminethecurrentstate
ofthePRPguidanceandpoliciesoncriteriaforsuspensionanddecertification.The
purposeistoprovideasetofguidelineslesssubjecttointerpretationthatsupportthe
standardofnoreasonabledoubtversusnodoubt.

TheguidanceforPRPrecertificationspecifythatlookbackislimitedtotheperiod
sincethelastcertificationunlessthereisspecificanddocumentedreasontosuspectan
individualproblem.

45

AppendixA:TermsofReference

46

47

AppendixB:TaskForceMembers

CHAIRMAN
GeneralLarryD.Welch,USAF(Ret.),InstituteforDefenseAnalyses

MEMBERS
Dr.TedGold,InstituteforDefenseAnalyses
Mr.JamesGosler,SandiaNationalLaboratories
Dr.JamesTegnelia,SandiaNationalLaboratories

SPECIALGOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES
Dr.G.PeterNanos,JohnsHopkinsAppliedPhysicsLaboratory
Dr.RobertL.Selden,IndependentConsultant

DESIGNATEDFEDERALOFFICIAL
Mr.DavidB.McDarby,DefenseThreatReductionAgency

DSBREPRESENTATIVE
Mr.BrianHughes,OUSD(AT&L)/DefenseScienceBoard

48

AppendixC:FindingsfromPriorReportsontheIncidents
U.S.AirForceBlueRibbonReview(BRR)onNuclearWeaponsPoliciesand
Procedures(February2008).
TheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceestablishedtheBRRanditsobservationsledtothefollowing
generalconclusions:

NuclearsuretyintheUSAFissound,butneedsstrengthening,
USAFfocusonthenuclearmissionhasdiminishedsince1991,
ThenuclearenterpriseintheUSAFworksdespitebeingfragmented;decliningUSAF
nuclearexperiencehasledtowaningexpertise,and
USAFnuclearsuretyinspectionprogramsneedstandardization.

DSBPermanentTaskForceReportontheUnauthorizedMovementofNuclear
Weapons(February2008).
TaskedbytheUSD(AT&L)andtheCommander,U.S.StrategicCommand.TheDSBPTF
articulatedtheneedfor:

Uncompromisingadherencetoprocessesandprocedures,
Clearfocusontheuniquedemandsofthenuclearenterpriseatmultiplelevels,and
Anenvironmentthatattracts,nurtures,andguidestherightnumbersofthebestand
brightestpeopleasstewardsofnuclearforces.

InvestigationintotheShipmentofSensitiveMissileComponentstoTaiwan(May
2008).
ThisSecretaryofDefensedirectedinvestigationfoundthatthespecificcauseoftheeventwas
theAirForceandDefenseLogisticsAgencyssolerelianceon,andlackofcompliancewith,
existingsupplysystemprocedurestoprovidepositivecontrolofthefourMk12forwardsection
reentryvehicleassemblies.Othercriticalfindingswere:

TheICBMengineeringcommunitylackedaclearmajorcommandownerresultinginthe
deteriorationintheexerciseoftechnicalauthority,
ChangestoAirForcepoliciesandprocesseshaddegradedthelevelofcontrolforsensitive
missilecomponents,
Dispersedauthorityandresponsibilitieshadcreatedanenvironmentillsuitedforsetting
andmaintainingstandardsnecessaryfornuclearweapons,
Lackofaculturethatisinternallydriventoaddresssystemicweaknesseshadresultedin
degradedperformance,and
ThedecliningtrendofAirForcenuclearexpertisehadnotbeeneffectivelyaddressed.

Inresponse,theSecretaryofDefensedirectedtheAirForce,Navy,andDefenseLogistics
Agencytoconductacomprehensiveinventoryofallnuclearweaponsandrelatedmaterials,
andtocompleteacomprehensivereviewofmaterielmanagementproceduresandprocessesin
ordertoreestablishpositivecontrolofsensitiveclassifiedcomponents.

49

SecretaryofDefenseTaskForceonDoDNuclearWeaponsManagement(September
2008).
Thefindingsofthistaskforceincluded:

TheAirForcehadfailedtoestablishadequateproceduresandtechnicalordersrelatedto
nuclearoperationsandsupport,and
AirForcestreamliningeffortsalongwithpersonnelreductionsandallocationdecisionhad
ledtosignificantdegradationinthenuclearmission.

TheTaskForcecalledfor:

AnoverhaulandstandardizationintheAirForcesnuclearinspectionprocess,
Stepstoensurethatthestaffassistanceprogramisadequatelyresourced,realistic,and
staffed,
Afocusondevelopingandmanagingnuclearexperiencedpersonnel,particularlyin
maintenanceandsecurity,and
OrganizationalchangeswithintheAirForcetorestoreattentionandreadinessforthe
nuclearmission.

TheseindependentandAirForcegeneratedreviews/reportsechoedcommonthemesand
systemicissues:

Declineoverthedecadeinattentiontothenuclearmissionatmultiplelevels,toinclude
themostseniorleaders,
Waningnuclearexperience,leadingtolackofexpertiseinnuclearleadershippositions,
IssueswithAirForceproceduresandtechnicalorders,
Lackofstandardizationacrosstheinspectionprocess,and
Failurestoattract,nurture,andtrackthoseinnuclearrelatedcareerfields.

SomeoftheseissueswereaddressedquicklybythenewlyappointedSecretaryoftheAirForce
andChiefofStaff.Actionstoaddresstheothershavebeenunderwayforthesucceedingtwo
years.However,thepaceofprogressinsomeareasisslowerthanshouldbeexpectedgiven
thestatedpriorityofthemission.

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AppendixD:Acronyms

2M0MissileandSpaceMaintenanceTechnician
2W2NuclearWeaponsMaintenanceTechnician
A1DeputyChiefofStaffforManpowerandPersonnel
A2DeputyChiefofStaffforIntelligence
A3/5DeputyChiefofStaffforOperationsandPlans
A4/7DeputyChiefofStaffforLogisticsandInstallationsandMissionSupport
A6DeputyChiefofStaffforCommunications
A8DeputyChiefofStaffforStrategicPlansandPrograms
A9DeputyChiefofStaffforAnalyses,Assessments,andLessonsLearned
A10AssistantChiefofStaffforStrategicDeterrenceandNuclearIntegration
AFGSCAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand
AFIAAirForceInspectionAgency
AFMCAirForceMaterielCommand
AFNWCAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter
ALCAirLogisticsCenter
ALCMAirLaunchedCruiseMissile
BRACBaseRealignmentandClosure
CMACompetentMedicalAuthority
DCADualCapableAircraft
DLADefenseLogisticsAgency
DNSIDefenseNuclearSuretyInspection
DoDDepartmentofDefense
DSBPTFDefenseScienceBoardPermanentTaskForceonNuclearWeaponsSurety
DTRADefenseThreatReductionAgency
HAFHeadquartersAirForce
Hq.Headquarters
HYTHighYearTenure
ICBMIntercontinentalBallisticMissile

51

ICBMSDICBMSystemsDivision
KUMMSCKirtlandUndergroundMunitionsMaintenanceandStorageComplex
LCAPLogisticsComplianceAssessmentProgram(USAFE)Inspection
LCATLogisticsComplianceAssessmentTeam(AFMC)Inspection
Mk12MinutemanIIIReEntryVehiclewiththeW78Warhead
Mk21MinutemanIIIReEntryVehiclewiththeW87Warhead
MMXGMunitionsMaintenanceGroup
MSEMaintenanceStandardizationEvaluation
MSgtMasterSergeantE7
MUNSMunitionsSquadron(CONUS)
MUNSSMunitionsSupportSquadron(Europe)
MXMaintenance
NCONonCommissionedOfficer
NORINuclearOperationalReadinessInspection
NSAVNuclearStaffAssistanceVisit
NSINuclearSuretyInspection
NSSNuclearSupportSquadron
NSSAVNuclearSuretyStaffAssistanceVisit
NSUSNuclearSustainmentSquadron
NSWNuclearSupportWing
NWCNuclearWeaponsCenter
NWRMNuclearWeaponsRelatedMaterielorNuclearWeaponRelatedMateriel
PDIPotentiallyDisqualifyingInformation
PRPPersonnelReliabilityProgram
RSTSReEntrySystemTestSet
RVReEntryVehicle
SAVStaffAssistanceVisit
SCMGSupplyChainManagementGroup
SecDefSecretaryofDefense
SMSgtSeniorMasterSergeantE8
SPOSystemsProgramOffice

52

STRIKEVALNATOStrikeEvaluation
SWDSpecialWeaponsDirectorate
USAFUnitedStatesAirForce
USAFEUnitedStatesAirForcesinEurope
USD(AT&L)UndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,Technology&Logistics
WSVWeaponsStorageVaults

53