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2013-9-18 Aligned Parties Pre-Trial Statement Doc 11411

2013-9-18 Aligned Parties Pre-Trial Statement Doc 11411

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Aligned Parties Pre-Trial Statement
Aligned Parties Pre-Trial Statement

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Published by: OSDocs2012 on Sep 18, 2013
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09/18/2013

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANAIn re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
Deepwater Horizon 
in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010This document applies to:
ALL CASES 
MDL No. 2179SECTION: JJUDGE BARBIER MAGISTRATE SHUSHANALIGNED PARTIES’ PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT
Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 11411 Filed 09/18/13 Page 1 of 41
 
54215946Sep 18 201311:12AM
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTSPage
iI.
 
INTRODUCTION: THE ALIGNED PARTIES’ PHASE 2 CLAIMS ............................. 1
 
II.
 
BP’S FRAUD, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ................................................................. 2
 
A.
 
BP MISREPRESENTED AND CONCEALED THE FLOW RATEFROM GOVERNMENT SOURCE CONTROL DECISION-MAKERS. ............. 2
 
1.
 
April 28: BP’s Doug Suttles Misrepresents BP’s Flow Rate RangeTo Admiral Landry................................................................................... 3
 
2.
 
May 10: Doug Suttles Writes To Admiral Landry And Other Federal Response Officials Labeling 5,000 BOPD The “MostLikely Model.” ......................................................................................... 4
 
3.
 
May 13-17: BP Fails To Disclose Its Concerns About The 5,000BOPD Estimate To Government Scientists ............................................... 6
 
4.
 
May 19: BP Sends The “Rainey Memo” To Admiral Landry AndAdmiral Allen. ......................................................................................... 7
 
5.
 
BP Intentionally Withheld Flow Rate Information. ................................... 8
 
B.
 
BP’S FRAUD DELAYED THE CAPPING OF THE WELL ............................. 10
 
1.
 
BP’s Misrepresentations About The Flow Rate MisledDecisionmakers About The Top Kill’s Likelihood Of Success. .............. 10
 
a.
 
BP Learned That The Top Kill Would Not Succeed If TheFlow Rate Was Above 15,000 BOPD And Thus WasDoomed To Fail. ......................................................................... 10
 
 b.
 
BP Misrepresented The Top Kill’s Likelihood Of Success. ......... 12
 
2.
 
After The Top Kill Failed, BP Misrepresented The Reasons For The Top Kill’s Lack Of Success, Which Further Delayed TheCapping Of The Well. ............................................................................ 14
 
a.
 
BP Claimed Rupture Disks Were the Only PlausibleExplanation For The Failure And That The BOP-on-BOPCould Cause Broaching. ............................................................. 14
 
 b.
 
BP’s Representation That The Rupture Disks Were TheOnly Plausible Explanation For Top Kill’s Failure WasFalse. .......................................................................................... 15
 
3.
 
But For BP’s Fraud, The Well Could Have Been Capped WeeksEarlier. ................................................................................................... 16
 
a.
 
The BOP-on-BOP Option Was Ready And Would HaveSuccessfully Capped The Well. ................................................... 16
 
Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 11411 Filed 09/18/13 Page 2 of 41
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS(continued)Page
ii b.
 
BP’s After the Fact Attempts To Justify Its Failure toImplement the BOP-On-BOP Are Inconsistent WithContemporaneous Evidence. ....................................................... 17
 
C.
 
BP’S FRAUD WAS A SUPERSEDING CAUSE OF OIL THATSPILLED AFTER THE WELL SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAPPED. .................. 18
 
III.
 
BP FAILED TO PREPARE FOR A DEEPWATER BLOWOUT, DESPITEKNOWING THE RISKS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A BLOWOUT. ....................... 19
 
A.
 
BP IGNORED DECADES OF WARNINGS AND REFUSED TOSPEND MONEY OR TIME TO PREPARE FOR THE KNOWN ANDFORESEEABLE RISKS .................................................................................... 23
 
B.
 
BP FAILED TO MEET THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS TOHAVE A SOURCE CONTROL PLAN DESIGNED TO IMMEDIATELYABATE THE SPILL .......................................................................................... 30
 
C.
 
BP FAILED TO MEET THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENT TO USEBEST AVAILABLE AND SAFEST TECHNOLOGY ...................................... 33
 
D.
 
BP VIOLATED ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF RISK MANAGEMENT ........ 34
 
Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 11411 Filed 09/18/13 Page 3 of 41

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