The Enduring Unity of War 301 In 1862, two Union armies were advancing on Staunton in Virginia’s Shenandoah valley, while a third Union force under Irvin McDowell was marching from Fredericksburg to rein- force George McClellan, who was waiting on it to assault Rich- mond. Stonewall Jackson, instead of marching against any of the three armies, crossed to a rail junction east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Federal leaders, believing he might attack northward, stopped McDowell in place. Jackson, without firing a shot, had neutralized McDowell and delayed McClellan’s attack on Richmond. He now moved back into the Shenandoah Valley and forced one Union army to retreat into the Appala- chian Mountains, leaving the other army isolated and vulnera- ble to his attack. (See page 131.) When strong German forces attacked Holland and Belgium in 1940, British and French mobile forces rushed northward to block the advance. Erich von Manstein, knowing this would happen, had convinced Adolf Hitler to send most of his ar- mored or panzer strength through the supposedly impassable Ardennes to seize Sedan, which was defended only by second- rate troops. When this occurred, the German panzers had a nearly clear path westward to the English Channel, trapping the Allied armies that had rushed into Belgium and ensuring the defeat of France. (See page 219.) Maneuvering onto the Rear of the Enemy By demonstrating with part of his army at Valenza on the Po River in northem Italy in 1796, Napoleon convinced the Aus- trian commander this was the sole French target, drawing Aus- trian defenders to that point. Napoleon then marched the majority of his forces downstream to Piacenza, thereby turning all pos- sible enemy lines of defense, and forcing the Austrians to aban- don all of northern Italy except the fortress of Mantua. (See page 107.) Stonewall Jackson in 1862 convinced the Federal com- mander Nathaniel Banks he was driving directly on Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley, where Banks had concentrated most of his army. Instead, Jackson crossed Massanutten Mountain, seized Front Royal in the enemy rear, cut the direct rail link302 HOW GREAT GENERALS WIN with Washington, and forced the Union forces into disorderly retreat. (See page 133.) In September 1918, Britain’s General Allenby feinted against the eastern front of the Turkish and German army in Palestine but struck unexpectedly against the western flank near the Mediterranean, breaking a large gap in the enemy line. Cavalry and armored cars now rushed through, quickly traversed the Plain of Sharon, seized the passes in the Mount Carmel massif, and blocked all Turkish rail lines and routes of retreat north- ward. The Turkish-German army disintegrated as it tried to flee eastward into the Jordan Valley. British and Arab forces ad- vanced on Damascus, Syria, and beyond, inducing Turkey’s surrender on October 31. (See page 184.) In early 1941 a British force led by nineteen tanks got around the Italian army retreating along the coastal highway in Libya and formed a strategic barrage at Beda Fomm. There the British armor destroyed most Italian tanks attempting to withdraw. Without tank support and cut off from their retreat route, the remainder of the Italian army surrendered. (See page 242.) While almost the entire North Korean army was pressing United Nations forces into a narrow perimeter around Pusan in southern Korea in 1950, General Douglas MacArthur invaded Inchon far to the north by sea, severed the main highways and only double-tracked railway in Korea, and, by cutting off sup- plies and reinforcements, caused the North Korean army to disintegrate. (See page 284.) Occupying the Central Position In the opening act of the Italian campaign in 1796, Napo- leon drove his army between the Piedmontese and Austrian armies in the Apennines west of Genoa, thereby permitting him to defeat one enemy force before having to deal with the other. (See page 104.) Later at Castiglione he got his army be- tween two major Austrian attacking columns, driving back one, then defeating the other. (See page 110.) Stonewall Jackson marched to Port Republic in the Shen- andoah Valley in 1862, where his army kept the two Union armies pursuing him from uniting. Jackson then attacked oneThe Enduring Unity of War 303, of the armies and forced it to retreat, causing the other Union army to withdraw as well. (See page 138.) Following a “Plan with Branches” Although an eighteenth-century French officer, Pierre de Bourcet, coined this phrase, Subedei Bahudur used the princi- ple in 1241 in the Mongol invasion of Europe. One column of Mongol horsemen rushed westward into Poland and Germany north of the Carpathian Mountains, drawing off all forces in this region. Meanwhile, Subedei sent three columns toward Buda- pest, on the Danube River, one by a wide northern circuit, another through Transylvania to the south, and the third di- rectly on the city. These widely separated penetrations kept Austrian and other forces from uniting with the Hungarians. Even if one column had been stopped, the others could have reached Budapest. The Mongols destroyed the now-unsupported Hungarian army a few days later. (See page 87.) Napoleon, at the start of his Italian campaign in 1796, ad- vanced several columns at wide points along the front, knowing that the enemy could not be at all places at once and that if one French column was blocked, the others could continue to seize key enemy positions. (See page 104.) Once the main resistance had been broken, Napoleon used a variation of the principle by sending three columns, each within a day’s march of the other, against the Piedmontese capital of Turin. Each column, like an octopus’s waving tentacle, could grip any opponent in its path, while the othercolumns could close up on it. This threat caused the Piedmontese government to capitulate (see page 106). The Union’s General Sherman, after capturing Atlanta in 1864, advanced through Georgia in several columns. Confed- erate defenders did not know whether the columns were aim- ing at Augusta to the northeast or Macon to the southeast and divided their forces between both. Sherman burst between them and seized Savannah. When Sherman turned northward into South Carolina, the Confederates could not tell whether he was targeting Charleston or Augusta. Sherman went between both and captured Columbia, forcing the Rebels to abandon Augusta and Charleston. Again, the Confederates did not know whether