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-
BySarah Sewall
Thecentraltension 
is
betweenthe 
US
defaulttowardscounterterrorism 
and
 NATO
insistence 
on
gentle counterinsurgency 
N
ATION-BUILDING, counterin-surgency, and counterterrorismcoexist uneasily in Afghanistan,and the contradictions are beginning tochafe. As largenumbers of civilian casu-alties begin.to feel like terrorism to ordi-nary Afghans, the West could lose onevery count.Pressure has been building onAfghan President Hamid Karzai foryears, and it's not just from the Taliban.His domestic political friends and foesalike demand that he stop his Americanallies from killing the wrong people.The numbing pattern of "collateraldamage" incidents, most dramaticallyfrom airstrikes, fuels local perceptionsof a brutal ally and undermines NATO'sattempts to apply a softer approach to
A
heavy
haJ
Afghansecurity.It's tempting to attribute theproblem to the most visible culprit:airpower.But that isjust a symptomof deeper tensions among the West'smissions in Afghanistan.On the onehand,aninadequatelyresourcedUnitedNations-sponsored force seeks toenhance stability and strengthen thecentralgovernment.Simultaneously,anindependentUS force shares the same
goalbut
-
througha separatechainof 
command
-
focuses on capturing orkilling the terrorists. Echoes of Somalia,anyone?The central tensionis betweentheUS default towards counterterrorismand NATO insistence on gentlecounterinsurgency.As the new Armyand Marine Corps CounterinsurgencyField Manual explains,counterinsurgency centers onprotectingciviliansand enhancingthelegitimacy of the host nationgovernment. The doctrine stressesdefensive and stability operations inaddition to offensive actions. Whenconducting offensive operations, thedoctrine demands sensitivity tocontrolling physical violence andanticipatingits politicaleffects.Consequences still matter incounterterrorism,buttheyarecalculateddifferently.The civilian population isnot the centre of gravity
-
terroristcapabilityis. Counterterrorismstressesoffensive measures to prevent, deter,
and respond to terrorism. A focus oncapturing and killing terrorists mayconflict with the primacy of civilianprotection that marks successfulcounterinsurgency campaigns.This is complicated enough withinUS thinking and practice. But factoringin our allies' views regarding operationsin Afghanistan, the tensions becomemore acute. The NATO-led InternationalSecurity Assistance Force is avowedlynot a counterterror operation. NATO
shnUAf ondoin.fomaThovfor
Pressure has been building
I
the Taliban.His domesticphis Americanalliesfrom k 'collateral damage' incideperceptions
of 
a brutal allsofter:
even has its own modified approach to-counterinsurgency, relying heavily oncarrots and negotiations. A live-and-Iet-live philosophy can infuriate Americanswho fear some allies accommod8te localpower brokers at the expense of"Kabul.In turn, NATO officials wonder whenthey'll see the more fmessed approach.They shouldn't hold their breath.For one thing, there are not enoughground troops to properly implementcounterinsurgency. The NATO presencewas designed to help compensate for the
abcounSneThdoincmfolghbogr
 
lnd in Afghanistan
In fact,bothheavyandliteversions. scoresto settle.Nowthat the Westhas 'yvwill havetheirplacein the insurgency- ratcheted up its offensive against theridden decades ahead. But Taliban,the UnitedStateshas returned ccounterinsurgency-lite is better for - to emphasizingairstrikes,whichcango a,destroyingthanbuilding.Onecan clear spectacularly wrong without near-fromtheair,butitremainsimpossibleto perfectintelligence.hold and to build with airpower. Over the years, Karzai's gradualCounterinsurgency-lite will prove escalationof concern about coUatera]inadequatewhereindigenousforcesare damagehascometo seemfeckless.Thelackingandsecurityneedsloomlarge,as Afghan legislaturehas now begunitsin Afghanistantoday.And, particularly own campaign to constrain Westemwhen operatinghalf-blindin a poorly forces while advocating negotiations. with the Taliban.What happenswhen
0
H
'
d K
.
f d
'
t
't
'
t f 
Afghan politicians can no longer
[fig on amI arzal or years, an I s no Jus rom politicallyacquiesceto USmilitary
Cpolitical friends and foes alike demand that he stop
action? Where will the fight against
. , ,terrorists flowingfromPakistanbethen?
m kIlhng the wrong people. The numbIng pattern of ThestakesareashighinAfghanistanasidents most dramaticall
y
from airstrikes fuels local inIra9'butnooneseemstobepaying
, -, attentIOnexceptthe Afghans.Canwe
I
IIally and undermines NATO's attempts to apply a adj~~t.ourstrategy~forethehost
.
, preCipitouslydoesItforus?
rter approach to Afghan securIty
. .
One key is gradually increasing
I
the ~rooppresencein Afghanistanand Ibeefing up the training of Afghan'sec.urityforces. Equally importantis jadjusting planning procedures for,raidi'l).gsuspected Taliban or terrorist ~facilities. Recent incidents involving.ciyilian deaths suggest related Iweaknesses:FaultyinteUigencemeans'
ki11ing 
the.wrong
 people, insuffldent 
t
organic- direct fire support me1i1\'io:rdying primarilyon airpowerforforceprotec.tion, and poor informationoperations leaves villagers doubtfuland often able to contradict the US
 /shortage of US forces. Even so, the totalnumbers
-
including the effectiveAfghan security forces - are roughlyone- 10th the number prescribed by USdoctrine. This is where airpower comesin. It helps compensate for a smallfoolprint in a large country, providingmobility,and offensive strike capability.This is both necessary, given theoverstretched state of American groundforces, and deeply problematic.It also raises sensitive questions
sIJ
l-n
about the services' respective roles incounterinsurgency. The Air Force isunhappy with being relegated to asupporting role in an appendix of thenew Counterinsurgency Field Manual.The services have begun creating jointdoctrine: pairing airpower with
indigenous
forces and just a pinch of USinfantry presence, preferabJy special
forces. This is an appealing notiongivenpoliticalreticenceto resourcetheboots-heavy doctrine advocated by
ground forces.
~.hIteoeunderstood culture, relying too heavilyupon airpower can becomecounterproductive.Afghans initially seemed inured tocollateral damage, accepting it as theprice
qf 
freedom from Taliban rule.Over time, though, they expected morefrom their liberators. Repeated"wedding party incidents" blur~edtogether, but Americans were slow torecognize that their prized air assetswere being hijacked by unreliableAfghan "intelligence sources" with local
bIttEIt[
of 00

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