EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997.]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr.,
father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N.
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,
respondents.
Erlinda S. Carolino for petitioners.
Del Rosario Lim Devera Vigilia & Panganiban for China Banking
Corporation.
SYNOPSIS
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen
Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein,
Greg detained Karen for four days and raped her several times. After
policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg was arrested
and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. A case for Serious Illegal
Detention and four counts of rape charges were filed against Greg
Bartelli. A Civil Case for damages with preliminary attachment was also
filed against him. On the scheduled day of hearing for Bartelli's petition
for bail the latter escaped from jail, thereby causing all criminal cases
filed against him to be archived pending his arrest. Meanwhile, the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was granted for the
petitioners and the writ was issued. However, China Banking
Corporation failed to honor Notice of Garnishment served by the Deputy
Sheriff of Makati. China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of the
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Meanwhile, the trial
court granted petitioner's motion for leave to serve summons by
publication in the civil case. Summons was published. Bartelli failed to
file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default. After
hearing ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said
notice was published in the Manila Bulletin. After the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and
the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to
execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation.
Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No.
960. Thus, petitioner seek relief from the Supreme Court.
According to the Supreme Court, petitioner deserved the damages
awarded to her by the court. This Court has no original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief; however, exceptions to
the rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-
reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it
may be treated as one for mandamus. The application of the law
depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if the Court rule that the
questioned Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or an order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Bartelli.
This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code, which provides that
"in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 were held to be
inapplicable to the case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents were required to comply with the writ of execution issued
in Civil Case No. 89-3214 and to release to the petitioners the dollar
deposits of Greg Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
caDTSE
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INSTANT
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF TREATED AS A PETITION
FOR MANDAMUS; THE SUPREME COURT HAS NO ORIGINAL AND
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF. — Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her
by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be
entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require
respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 89-3214. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have
been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one
for mandamus.
2. COMMERCIAL LAW; SECTION 113 OF CENTRAL BANK
CIRCULAR NO. 960, PROVIDING THAT FOREIGN CURRENCY
DEPOSITS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ATTACHMENT,
GARNISHMENT OR ANY OTHER ORDER OF ANY COURT OR ANY
GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR BODY; HELD INAPPLICABLE TO THIS
CASE BECAUSE OF ITS PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES. — The
application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result specially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest
like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil
Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla,
74 Phil. 377). It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113
of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg
Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the
expense of the innocent. Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of
legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and
executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular
protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar
deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and
victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have
served the ends of justice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of
Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs.
Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to
RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. DCHaTc
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J p:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts
become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that
statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our
way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may
already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued
restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960; prcd
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and
respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its
provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever"
i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit
of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil
liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a
foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account
with an authorized bank.
The antecedent facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist,
coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go
with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape
the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5,
6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living
nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the
following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-
1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-
108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear)
used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya
filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal
Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804 and 805 for four (4)
counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the
day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the
latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order.
Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal
cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated
February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave
Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of
100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial
court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of
Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13,
1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation
invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati
Armando De Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation
saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits
since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and
legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject
deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff
of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989,
invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that
the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever,
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the
Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of
CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has
been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory
the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
"May 26, 1989
"Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue
South Admiral Village
Parañaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:
"This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry
on Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
"The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any
exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
"The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the
country's banking system which would help in the development of the
economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a
person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh
as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore,
enjoined.
"Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director" 1
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioner's motion
for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-
3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott."
Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times once a
week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer
to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After
hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendant, ordering the latter:
"1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00
as moral damages;
"2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr.,
and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of
P300,000.00 for both of them;
"3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
"4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the
total amount of damages herein awarded; llcd
"5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
"6. Costs of the Suit.
"SO ORDERED."
The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the
award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as
follows:
"The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail
of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as
per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge,
Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and
Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly,
upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon
defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general
circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media
Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however,
failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period
of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the
plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and
plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
"In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor
Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain
Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following
testimony:
"Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay
City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her second
year.
"In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair
Makati Cinema, Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her
free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a
concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She
was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was
about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
"The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli.
He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math
teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His
sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and who was
with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp.
4-5)
"The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told
him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where
she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to
persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
"They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach
the defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
"When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that
defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told
her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged
niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was
upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
"Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen
became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a
piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he
undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He
took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it
around her head. (Id., p. 7)
"Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was
just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed
posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ.
She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out
because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdraw his
finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal
of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
"He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as
well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but
he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult
to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely
presumed that he was able to inset his sex organ a little, because she
could not see. Karen could not recall how long the defendant was in that
position. (Id. pp. 8-9)
"After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told
Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear
the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the
bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood
came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress
because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by
defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The
incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen has no way of determining
the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did
not care to giver her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at
about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
"The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of
biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen
while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke.
She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the
evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored
downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like
"lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night.
During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex
organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.
"Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant
did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but
she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the
windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help,
nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear
her and would be able to call the police, it was still possible that as she
was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the
defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for
help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-
14)
"On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in
the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the
afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that
there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until
defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let
some air in, and she found that the window was covered by styrofoam
and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and
he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
"That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although
defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and
saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small
hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole.
She cried: 'Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas
dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a
neighbor, but she got angry and said she was 'istorbo'. Karen pleaded
for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police.
She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp.
15-16)
"She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw
defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up.
When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door
locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day,
February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about
6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 - 9:00, and the third was
after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he
left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting
for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After
she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After
shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices
were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion.
After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the
police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from
the bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being
afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and the defendant
see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was
wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress.
(Id., p. 16) cdll
"Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if
she had asked for help because there were many policemen outside
and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did
change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to
tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs
but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she could
not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
"When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing
downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could.
She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened,
she saw a policeman. The policemen asked her name and the reason
why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he
saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to
them. 'Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis,' Karen added. "The policeman
told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front
of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy
together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom
she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to
sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about
2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her mother together with some
of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the
police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
"At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the
investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked
as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI,
a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was
already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they
reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the
medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
"She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time
of the incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini,
Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was
ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first
applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft
Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied
admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The
reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
"After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her
brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she
has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house.
(TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p.
11)The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this
shocking experience which probably, she would always recall until she
reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this
experience." (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said
notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three
consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial
court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar
deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil
down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original
jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court?
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the
grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the
bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy
the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive
due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign
currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe
haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott
since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by
merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in
a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank and 4.) The
Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took
away: a.) the plaintiff's substantive right to have the claim sought to be
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the
plaintiff's substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way
of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor
as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central bank, in its Comment alleges
that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960
did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is
copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D.
1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from
attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law
(R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive
due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based
on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced
according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all
members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other
order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore
Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage
the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions
thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country; that the
subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by
any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is
needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the
State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the
society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some
measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing
persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or
burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent
Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from
execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as
amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others,
that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. cdta
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving
reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that
respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings
experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the breastly hands of
Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of
Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioners has
undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426
and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular NO. 960; and that despite the
harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative
but to follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the
court. But this petitioner for declaratory relief can only be entertained
and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor
and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for
mandamus. 3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans
are good, and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece
the Filipino language requested by the American, trustingly went with
said stranger to his apartment, and that she was raped by said
American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was
detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to
escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the
child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for
damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount
could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she
had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and
knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could
not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable
law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated
by the trial court in its decision.
"Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it
was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had
undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere
recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had
been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the
Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she sought to
transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of
the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly
feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the
wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape
during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the
minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and
credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could
not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such a
heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident
happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every
forest there is a snake, . . ." 4
If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be
difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit
could be more important that his child's rights to said award of
damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien
who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he
is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a
time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why
said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show
that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may
be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
It has thus been said that —
"But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are
disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the
times . . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which
fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors."
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a
national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes
refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which
does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien.
More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection
against attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to
foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960
applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but
from a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the
deposit in the bank for long.
"The resolution of this question is important for the protection of
nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely
passing through.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the
Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank
Circular No. 960:
'Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.'
"Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6426:
'Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. — The Monetary Board of the
Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect
after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette
and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for
three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank promulgates new
rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and
regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.'
"The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
'Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign
currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as
and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon
the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or
legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided,
however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order a process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever,' prll
"The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment,
garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is
stated in its whereases, viz:
'WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches
of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
'WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034
authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in the
Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive foreign
currency deposits in certain cases;
'WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of
the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System
in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two
Systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions
and tax exemptions on the interest income of depositors who are
nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines;
'WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over
such foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and
guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would better encourage the
inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions
authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing
such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to
loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the
economic development of the country;'
"Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to
foreign currency deposits is 'to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore
Banking in the Philippines' (3rd Whereas).
"The Offshore Banking System was established by PD. No. 1034. In
turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
'WHEREAS, conditions conductive to the establishment of an offshore
banking system, such as political stability, a growing economy and
adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in the
Philippines;
'WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide
access as possible to the sources of capital funds for economic
development;
'WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be
advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with
foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the
Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in
international finance, and contributing to the national development
effort.
'WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources,
and other positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential
to develop as another financial center in Asia;'
"On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created
by PD No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows:
'WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the
Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree;
'WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank
under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the
resources and managerial competence to more actively engage in
foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of foreign
currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
'WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority
of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their
transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the
proposed offshore banking units;'
"It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide
second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is
these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection
and incentives by them.
"Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist
is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and
given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositors
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time.
"Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He
deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only
for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
"For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that
the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and P.D. No.
1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes." 6
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result specially to a citizen aggrieved by a
foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions
that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs.
Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar
against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower
court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor?
Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor
against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls
for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have
served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426
are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to
COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214,
"Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV,
RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
Padilla, J ., took no part.
Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "R", Petition.
2. Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) v. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1.
3. Nationalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; Aquino vs.
Comelec, 62 SCRA 275; and Alliance of Government Workers vs.
Minister of Labor and Employment, supra.
4. Decision, Regional Trial Court, Civil Case No. 89-3214, pp. 9 &
12; Rollo, pp. 66-69.
5. Thomas Jefferson, Democracy, ed. Saul K. Padover. (New York,
Penguin, 1946) p. 171.
6. Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128-129; 135-136.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996.]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner
The Solicitor General for respondents
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED
WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. —
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in
the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose
of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO
REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE
THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTION. — The
objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act
No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of
Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and other purposes, which was
approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as
amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for
obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the
Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand
and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias
name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED
(AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED.
— An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in
addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A
man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are
known as aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE
TRANSACTION WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS
NAME IN ADDITION TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION
THEREOF. — The use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to
his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — This is so in the case at bench. It
is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger
of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first
place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of
his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a
respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias
name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or
was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his
real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner
in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to
expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at
the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy
of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman
could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records
hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept
of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law
and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Indeed, our
mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be
convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE
COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY
AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. — As C.A.
No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the
State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A.
No 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases." 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989
the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the
Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising
the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the
illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the
area. 2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote
the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be
furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then
asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to
attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the
Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was
reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the
respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not
to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be
required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City
he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors'
logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name
"Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative
Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter
of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida
Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which
he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an
acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office.
They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the
person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner
Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station,
Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to
prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in
the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no
document from the local civil registry was presented to show the
registered name of accused which according to him was a condition
sine qua non for the validity of his conviction. llcd
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating
Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was
sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of
one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of
P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts
his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is
"Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which
connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also
known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and
that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the
express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an
essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended
by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution
failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered
name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was
charged under the wrong law. 5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in
the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose
of the lawmakers. 7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended,
which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding
circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent
provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein
cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate
the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened
or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name
shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply
for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be
had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original
name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such
authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be
recorded in the proper civil register. . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved
on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered
at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was
registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided,
That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil
registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for
an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the
name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his
original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired
alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the christian name and
the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his
original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the
proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in
Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of
Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was
approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The pertinent provisions of Act No.
3883 as amended follow —
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any
written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any
written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any
written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions,
any name used in connection with his business other than his true
name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place
where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any
sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first
registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or
style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that
of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such
contract agreement, business transaction, or business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,
rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names.
C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such
alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded
in the civil register. 9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the
meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview
of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias 'Kheng
Chiau Young' in addition to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau' would add
to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the
Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow
him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his
associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which
he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact
that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with
government offices which required him to explain why he bore two
names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid
said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name 'Yu
Cheng Chiau.'
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines,
as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of
the abovementioned court, argues the more against the grant of his
petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be
no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to
the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary
as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly
observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better
for him to write his name following the Occidental method, 'he can
easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name 'Yu
Kheng Chian,' he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt
the name 'Kheng Chiau Young.'
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner
has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the
aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of
Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at
birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they clearly penalize the act done by him.
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED
name or a different name belonging to another person in a single and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known crime charged.
by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not SO ORDERED.
fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
so in the case at bench. Footnotes
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the 1. Rollo, pp. 24-37.
Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger 2. Id., p. 26.
of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first 3. Records, p. 7.
place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of 4. Rollo, p. 26.
his lawyer to obtain the copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a 5. Id., p. 12.
respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias 6. People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86
name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or SCRA 524.
was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his 7. Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review,
real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No. L-14129, 31 July 1962, 5
in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to SCRA 684.
expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at 8. Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II,
the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy pp. 1008-1009.
of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman 9. Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954
could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, Guillermo B., Commentaries on the
hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., P. 359.
circumstances. 10. 106 Phil 762 (1959).
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, 11. Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing
such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 Co., p. 139.
as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in 12. See Note 6.
business transactions which the anti-alias law and is related statutes 13. People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil 679 (1957).
seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar 14. See Note 6.
and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A.
No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a c.
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which
will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of
the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the SECOND DIVISION
law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain [G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000.]
rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Ralph Lou I. Willkom for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation (VGHC) was engaged in rice
milling and trading. In the latter part of 1992, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) received reports that
illegally cut lumber was being delivered to VGHC's warehouse in
Valencia, Bukidnon. On the strength of a warrant, the DENR officers,
assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the
company's warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying
sizes cut by a chain saw. Thereafter, an information for illegal
possession of lumber in violation of Sec. 68 of Revised Forestry Code
(P.D. 705, as amended) was filed against petitioner Perfecto Pallada as
general manager, Noel Sy as assistant operations manager, and
Francisco Tankiko as president of VGHC. During the trial, the defense
presented several documents to establish that the possession of the
seized lumber was legal. However, the trial court did not give credence
to those documents and instead it convicted the petitioner and
Francisco Tankiko of the offense charged. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, but acquitted Tankiko.
EHcaAI
In this appeal, the Court ruled that even assuming that a Certificate of
Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber
Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in
convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and
defects found in the documents presented by the latter. These
irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are
found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court
in giving no credence to the same.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BFD CIRCULAR
NO. 10-83; REQUIRES DIFFERENT CERTIFICATES OF ORIGIN FOR
TIMBER, LUMBER AND NON-TIMBER FOREST PRODUCTS. — The
statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber
and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in
answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess
timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only
those who possess timber and forest products without the documents
required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber
are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether
separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.
Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and
non-timber forest products. As already noted, the opening paragraph of
BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate
certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have
uniformity in documenting the origin thereof." cSCTID
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS;
CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN; NOT CREDIBLE WHERE
NUMEROUS IRREGULARITIES AND DEFECTS WERE FOUND
THEREIN. — Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could
serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering
the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents
presented by the latter. Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of
Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the
certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the
receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover,
the four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold,
indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers,
thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought
the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and
they were cut into lumber by the company. These irregularities and
discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only
questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no
credence to the same.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CORPORATE
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF PURCHASE OF LUMBER SHOULD HAVE
TAKEN STEPS TO CORRECT PATENT IRREGULARITIES FOUND
ON DOCUMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — What render
these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found
on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such
irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge
of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such
obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them
corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he
is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.
4. ID.; ID.; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY; NEGATED BY PRESENCE OF GLARING
IRREGULARITIES. — The presence of such glaring irregularities
negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the
DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner
applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and
properly accomplished.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF SECTION 68 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705; PENALTY. — Art. 309 of the
Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705,
§68, provides: "ART. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall
be punished by: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000
pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . "As
the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed should be six
(6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal. CADSHI
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in
violation of §68 2 of the Revised Forestry Code 3 (P.D. No. 705, as
amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that
illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The
company is engaged in rice milling and trading. prcd
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police,
raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength
of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a
chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by
purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero
Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The
DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering
that R.L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been
suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chainsaw
and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all,
constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The
following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting
of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and
impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The seizure order 4 was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as
general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber.
Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza,
who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the
operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion
was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5,
1992, the motion was denied. 5 Accordingly, the remaining lumber was
confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had
been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for
the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with
Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as
president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias
Valdehueza, were charged with violation of §68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended. The Information alleged: 6
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality of
Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces
[of] lumber of different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299.25
board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value
of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency,
without any authority, license or legal documents from the government,
to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of
P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27,
1994, judgment was rendered as follows: 7
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto
Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
having in their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without
the legal documents as charged in the information in violation of Section
68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor
as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of
the government.
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence against them. prLL
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but
acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or
acquisition of the seized lumber. 8
Hence this petition which raises the following issues: 9
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
PALLADA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT
THE PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S
POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS
EVIDENCE.
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents,
as summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal: 10
1. Exh. 6 — Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated
December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to 12.23 cubic
meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken from the forest area of Wahab and
H.D. Pangcoga
Exh. 6-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 6-B — Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for short)
Exh. 6-C — Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463
pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet
Exh. 6-D — Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from
WHP Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the Corporation for the
lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F — Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP
Enterprises, dated December 16, 1991, for the 5,056.94 board feet of
lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 — [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
2. Exh. 7 — CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to
25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain Somira M.
Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM
Exh. 7-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 7-B — CTA
Exh. 7-C — Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces
of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to
Somira M. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991 LLphil
Exh. 7-F — Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the
Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for 10,758.02 board
feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992
3. Exh. 8 — CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an
equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of Wahab
Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992
Exh. 8-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 8-B — CTA
Exh. 8-C — Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber
Exh. 8-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by WHP Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 8-F — Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for
8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation payable to
WHP Enterprises
4. Exh. 9 — CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent
volume of 12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M. Ampuan of
Lama, Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned to the Corporation,
(undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92"
Exh. 9-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 9-B — CTA, dated March 20, 1992
 Exh. 9-C — Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-D — Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading Company
to the Corporation, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 9-F — Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189
board feet of lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 — Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates
of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the
company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. 11 For
indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 12 states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability
and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber
Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted
as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be
considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be
subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and
BFD implementing guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and,
therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should
have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's
possession of the lumber. 13 In support of his contention, petitioner
invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 14
The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that
lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber"
embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that
case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of
P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest
products without the documents required by law are criminally liable,
while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the
question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be
issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are
required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. 15 As
already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83
expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for
lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility
for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the
origin thereof." LLphil
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a
substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the
numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented
by the latter. According to the trial court: 16
Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the
supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from
the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber.
..
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of
log, respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest
product[s] as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces
of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of
lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber
in the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were
written down and enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de
Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the
back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in
fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the
consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon." In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A")
the blank space for the name and address of the consignee was
smudged with a typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was
originally typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon."
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A"
[were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]". 17
Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished:
the data required to be filled are left in blank. dctai
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7
bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were
"scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate
is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the
sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company
purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of
petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were
still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the
company. 18
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which
they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the
trial court in giving no credence to the same. 19
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not
be taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber
dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary
Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the presumption
of regularity in their execution. 20
This contention is untenable. What render these documents without
legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That
petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is
immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the
purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious
irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected.
He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is
concerned, the documents are regular and complete. 21
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that
the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.
The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public
documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished. 22
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the
Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705,
§68, provides:
ARTICLE 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but
does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of
the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . .
As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 23 the penalty to be imposed should
be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal. LLphil
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31,
1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is
sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Per Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now Associate Justice
of this Court), concurred in by Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and
Demetrio G. Demetria.
2. Renumbered §78 by Republic Act No. 7161.
3. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found. (As amended by PD No. 1559, and by EO
No. 277, prom. July 25, 1987, italics added).
4. Records, p. 28.
5. Id., p. 136-C.
6. Id., p. 1.
7. Id., p. 255.
8. CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 28.
9. Petition, p. 2; Id., p. 4.
10. RTC Decision, pp. 3-5; Records, pp. 249-251.
11. Id., p. 5; Id., p. 251.
12. Issued on February 28, 1983, now superseded by DENR
Administrative Order No. 07, issued on February 17, 1994.
13. Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 7-8.
14. 257 SCRA 430 (1996). contractions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt
15. DENR Administrative Circular No. 07, §§ 2&17 (series of 1994). on the culpability of the appellant and his guilt for the crime charged.
16. RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 251-252 (emphasis in the DECISION
original). NOCON, J p:
17. The original consignee's name, still legible, reads: Accused-appellant Elmer Maps y de Gula and Serapin de Gula y
"NORTHWEST FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, Tongco were both charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of
____________, TAGOLCAN, MIS. OR." Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act,
18. TSN, pp. 10, 13 & 22, March 12, 1994. under an information 1 which reads:
19. Compare DENR Administrative Order No. 59-93, series of 1993, "That on or about the 16th day of July 1986, in the Municipality of
§6 in relation to §2.8, which provides that certificates of origin with Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
erased or tampered vital entries, such as the name and address of Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of the
consignee, are void (now superseded by DENR Administrative Order law, conspiring with each other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
No. 07, series of 1994.) and feloniously possessed and sell and gave away twelve (12) sticks of
20. Petition, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 8-12. marijuana treated cigarettes, thereby violating Section 4, Article II, in
21. Id., pp. 8-10; Id., pp. 10-12. relation to Section 21, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended."
22. See Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 187 SCRA 504 (1990). Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
23. People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994). charged.
After a trial on the merits, Serapio de Gula was acquitted on reasonable
doubt while accused Elmer Mapa was found guilty of the crime charged
and was sentenced accordingly to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision 2 reads:
SECOND DIVISION "WHEREFORE, finding the accused Elmer Mapa y de Gula Guilty
[G.R. No. 91014. March 31, 1993.] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling and delivering
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER MAPA Y prohibited drug, consisting of twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes
DE GULA, accused-appellant. (Indian Hemp) as defined and penalized under Section 4, Article II of
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Republic Act 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
Jose T. Maghari for accused-appellant. penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed
SYLLABUS by law and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
IRRECONCILABLE AND UNEXPLAINED CONTRADICTION the costs of suit.
THEREIN; MAY CAST DOUBT ON THE CULPABILITY OF THE On ground of reasonable doubt, the Court hereby ACQUITS the
ACCUSED AND HIS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED; CASE AT accused Serapio de Gula y Tongco of the crime charged. Costs de
BAR. — The contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses on officio.
who brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination is The twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes are hereby confiscated in
significant. Is it police aid Carreon or Pat. Lucero? Carreon never favor of the Government to be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted to the NBI for Board for proper disposition. 3
examination was the same specimen allegedly taken from the accused. The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously, one Acting upon a confidential information that a certain "Elmer" was
of them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On such kind of engaged in drug pushing at T. de Gula St., Marulas Valenzuela, Major
shaky testimony conviction cannot be had. The inconsistencies were Elias Casimiro, Chief of the Valenzuela Police Anti-Narcotics Unit
never explained by the prosecution. Irreconcilable and unexplained dispatched a team composed of Valenzuela policemen, namely: Cpt.
Romeo Martin, Pfc. Pedro Protestante, Patrolmen Eduardo Pabalan,
Wilfredo Lucero and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct a surveillance
operation in the area.
On July 16, 1986, at around 8 o'clock in the evening, the team launched
a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant at T. de Gula St.,
Marulas Valenzuela using two (2) P10.00 marked bills. 4 Pat. Mario
Capangyarihan, who then acted as a poseur-buyer together with the
confidential informant proceeded to appellant's address at T. de Gula
Street. Upon reaching the place, the confidential informant introduced
Pat. Capangyarihan to accused-appellant as a "score" of "damo." Pat.
Capangyarihan asked for P20.00 worth of marijuana and then handed
to appellant the two (2) marked P10.00 bills. After receipt of the money,
appellant left for a while to get the "marijuana." Later, appellant entered
the yard of the house with a wooden fence and talked briefly to a certain
person (later identified as accused Serapio de Gula) who was seen by
Pat. Capangyarihan handing over something to appellant. Thereafter,
accused-appellant returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer a
plastic bag containing twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Pat.
Capangyarihan identified himself as a policeman and grabbed appellant
by the arms. Pat. Capangyarihan then signaled his companions to
come and help him subdue the suspect. At this juncture, Serapio de
Gula approached the police team and told them that appellant is his
nephew. The policemen told Serapio that appellant was placed under
arrest for selling "marijuana". Since Pat. Capangyarihan recognized
Serapio as the person with whom appellant talked after receiving the
marked bills, Serapio was also arrested. The two (2) marked bills were
retrieved from the accused-appellant. Appellant and Serapio were
brought to the Valenzuela Police headquarters for further investigation.
The plastic bag containing the twelve (12) sticks of suspected marijuana
were forwarded to the NBI for examination. Microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests was conducted on the seized articles and all
yielded "positive results" for "marijuana".
Accused-appellant Elmer Mapa however, disputes the foregoing facts.
Instead, the defense maintains that the facts are as follows:
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1986, while accused
Elmer Mapa was inside their house with his co-accused/uncle Serapio
de Gula and their chess club members playing chess, two men with
drawn guns entered the premises of the accused's house without
permission, calling for accused Elmer Mapa, prompting accused
Serapio de Gula to tell them, "pare, anong problema, trespassing kayo."
5 In answer, the men identified themselves as policemen and told
Serapio not to interfere. However, Serapio de Gula insisted that even if
they were police officers they should nevertheless ask permission from
the owner of the house before entering. In reply the police officers
allegedly manhandled him while one of them entered the house where
accused Elmer Mapa was, pulled him out and brought him to a waiting
jeep. Serapio further testified that the four police officers who
manhandled him were Patrolman Puchero, Patrolman Inciong,
Patrolman Capangyarihan and Patrolman Protestante. 6 Serapio
threatened to file charges against these police officers for mauling him
so much so that said officers likewise arrested him. Serapio's testimony
is as follows:
"Q Now, after Elmer was pulled outside, how about you, what was
done to you?
A The policemen left, I was left behind, then afterwards, the
person who manhandled me, when he was leaving, I was able to
remember him and I told him that I was going to file a case against him
with the Napolcom, then that said policeman returned and he told me,
"Kami pala ang isasabit mo, sama ka na rin'. That was what he told
me."' 7
This was corroborated by a defense witness, Antonio Trinidad. In his
testimony, Antonio revealed that one unidentified man entered the
house and when questioned by Serapio de Gula, the man hit the latter
with gun. He could not do anything, much less the other chess players
present because guns were poked at them. 8
Both the accused were brought to the sub-station where they were
mauled and forced to admit the charges against them.
Serapio remembered Patrolman Inciong going to his cell and showing
(14) tea bags and jestingly said, "Never will you be able to get out of
this jail because we will charge you with drug pushing and we will use
these as evidence against you." 9
Tarried in jail during the early months of their apprehension, Elmer
Mapa learned that a policeman talked to a certain Dueñas who was
earlier detained for illegal possession of marijuana, that if he wanted to
be released, he must give a substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo. That
upon his apprehension, he learned that Eduardo Dueñas was later
released by the police.
From the foregoing facts, We hold the accused-appellant innocent. The
conflicting and contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the
weakness of its case thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
We find several glaring inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to engender doubt on the
moral certainty of accused-appellant's guilt. LLpr
The prosecution presented only two of the members of the buy-bust
operation, whose testimonies unfortunately did not impress this Court.
On the contrary, it weakens the prosecution's case.
Take for instance the testimony of Pat. Capangyarihan who testified that
Serapio was arrested some 9 to 10 meters away from where Elmer
Mapa was standing and that he was not present during the arrest of
Serapio de Gula. Contrary to his testimony however, Pat. Lucero
testified that when Serapio was apprehended by him Pat.
Capangyarihan was present and saw him effect the arrest. Thus —
Pat. Capangyarihan:
"Q Do you know who was that person?
A Later on, I came to know the name of that person and it appears
that his name is Serapio de Gula.
Q And how far were you from them when they talked with each
other?
A From the witness stand up to that wall, sir (Which was estimated
to be 9 to 10 meters). 10
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Witness, when you accosted Elmer Mapa, you actually were
not aware what happened to Serapio de Gula since you were not
present when he was accosted by Pat. Lucero?
A It was Elmer Mapa who was first accosted and alter he was
arrested, my other police companions ran.
Q And they ran towards what direction?
A Towards the place where Serapio de Gula was standing.
Q And when you said the place where he was standing, it is the
place where he was talking with Elmer Mapa?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And when Pat. Lucero effected the arrest, you were not actually
present?
A I was not there, but I saw that it was, Pat. Lucero who first took
hold of Serapio do Gula.
Q Now, since you were not with the team who accosted de Gula,
you were not sure that the alleged marked money was recovered from
de Gula?
A I am sure about that, Ma'am. 11
Patrolman Lucero on the other hand, testified differently on this matter?
"Q After you approached Pat. Capangyarihan, what happen next?
A Subsequently a person pulled Elmer Mapa.
Q Who was this person who arrived and pulled Elmer Mapa?
A Serapio de Gula, Sir.
Q Did Serapio de Gula succeed in pulling out Elmer Mapa from the
hands of Pat. Capangyarihan?
A No, sir.
Q What happened alter that?
A We got hold of Serapio de Gula and asked him why be is
interfering."
Q Was, there any answer from him?
A He told us that Elmer Maps is his nephew.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you do after you were informed about that?
A We also got hold of Serapio de Gula and frisked him." 12
Another glaring inconsistency lies in the seized articles. Pat.
Capangyarihan testifies:
"Q And after Elmer had approached you, what did he do?
A He handed me a plastic container containing twelve (12)
handrolled suspected marijuana cigarettes.
Q And what did you do?
A After Elmer handed to me that suspected handrolled marijuana
cigarettes, I introduced myself to him and then I arrested him." 13
On the other hand, Pat. Lucero testified that what Elmer was holding is
a tea bag of marijuana and not a plastic container containing twelve
(12) handrolled marijuana cigarettes.
"Q When you saw Elmer Mapa being held by Pat. Capangyarihan,
did you see him holding the money, referring to accused Elmer Mapa?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
Q One tea beg of marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened to the tea bag being held by Elmer Mapa and
two peso bills found in possession of Serapio de Gula?
A The tea bag of marijuana was brought to the NBI for laboratory
examination. 14
Realizing probably his mistake, Pat. Capangyarihan later on changed
his testimony by stating that he could not remember whether it was a
plastic container that was given to him or not. Thus —
"Q Mr. Witness, it appears that this alleged marijuana handrolled
cigarettes is contained in an envelope with the marking DDM, etc. Is this
also the same container when you received the marijuana from the
accused?
A I cannot recall if this was the same thing wherein these 12 sticks
of marijuana were placed.
xxx xxx xxx
Q But you don't recall, Mr. witness, at the time you apprehended
the accused where was this marijuana cigarettes?
A After having taken these marijuana cigarettes from Mapa, I took
hold of them.
A Meaning this was not contained in any container?
A I cannot remember anymore if it was contained in any container
or not. 15
The trial court observed the strange testimony of Pat. Lucero on a
material point on cross examination wherein he admitted that a tea bag
cannot be cigarette sticks. This shows that the prosecution cannot even
determine what was really taken from accused-appellant, a tea bag or
cigarette sticks. Thus, the Court inquired:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, who was in custody of the alleged tea bag
which was recovered by the team from Elmer Mapa, who was in
possession from the time Elmer Mapa was already arrested up to the
time he was brought to the police station?
A It was Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, sir.
Q But you admitted that you have occasion to look at the tea bag?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the difference between the tea bag and the suspected
marijuana? What is the difference?
A Tea bag is like a tea bag, it is square contained like cigarette.
Q You will agree with me that as far as I know a roach is like what
we call "upos", a cigarette wrapped in a paper. I am referring to the
paper wrapper, rolling paper?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And also you will agree with me that a tea bag cannot be a
cigarette stick.
A Yes, Ma'am. 16
Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered but also on
who requested for the seized articles to be examined by the NBI. Pat.
Capangyarihan testified that it was police aide Carreon who brought the
seized articles to the NBI for examination, whereas Pat. Lucero testified
that it was he who forwarded the marijuana to the NBI. Thus —
Pat. Capangyarihan:
"Q By the way who submitted this alleged marijuana handrolled
cigarettes to the NBI?
A As far as I could remember, it was police aide Carreon who
brought it to the NBI. 17
Pat. Lucero however testified:
"Q You said you forwarded this to the NBI for laboratory
examination. Did you come to know the result of the examination?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you come to know the result?
A There was a request to bring to the NBI and I waited for the
result and upon reaching the headquarters, we submit them to the
investigating Fiscal. 18
The foregoing contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses on
who brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination is
significant. Is it police aide Carreon or Pat. Lucero?
Carreon never testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted to
the NBI for examination was the same specimen allegedly taken from
the accused.
Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously, one
of them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On such kind of
shaky testimony conviction cannot be had.
The inconsistencies were never explained by the prosecution.
Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the appellant and
his guilt for the crime charged. 19
As it is, the bungled testimonies of the police officers cannot be given
credence. We are more inclined to believe the testimony of accused-
appellant that he was a "target" to be arrested not for selling marijuana
but as a replacement for Eduardo Dueñas who was at the time detained
in the Municipal Jail, with accused-appellant as the substitute or "palit-
ulo" in jail lingo, so that the detainee could be released. LibLex
It would be noteworthy to mention though, that accused-appellant was
subjected to a drug test to find out whether he was likewise a drug user.
It is often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all the time is also
a drug user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support his being a
drug dependent. For whatever its worth, accused-appellant was found
to be drug free. In the NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646 20
blood and urine specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for
the presence of prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this report
was not presented during trial, such is made part of the records.
The evident falsehood spread on the records before Us creates a 20. Records, p. 19.
nagging doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant. It is sad to 21. People vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 64867-68, 172 SCRA 262 (1989).
state that many innocent people become victims of physical violence
and/or harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the
protectors of the citizenry. We cannot condone such practices to EN BANC
continue in a civilized society. [G.R. Nos. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953.]
While this Court commends the efforts of law enforcement agencies PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
who are engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of apprehending vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-
and prosecuting drug-traffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes nor appellant.
ignore the many reports of false arrests of innocent persons for Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for
extortion purposes and blackmail, or to satisfy some hidden personal appellant.
resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer against the accused. Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped up drug SYLLABUS
charges lest an innocent man, on the basis of planted evidence, be 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; INTERPRETATION OF
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. 21 LAWS, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — The Legislature cannot lawfully
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed herefrom is hereby REVERSED, declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
and the accused-appellant, Elmer Mapa y de Gula, is hereby specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Costs de Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. "Defining and
officio. interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may
SO ORDERED.. not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution."
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11 Am.
Footnotes Jur., 714- 715 and 905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any
1. Rollo, p. 1. part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
2. Rollo, pp. 149-163. established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
3. Id., at. p. 163. 2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — Under our system of
4. Exhibits "A", "A-1". constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the
5. T.S.N., February 17, 1988, p. 8. power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged
6. Id., at. p. 15. with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the
7. Id., at p. 13. interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
8. T.S.N., July 8, 1988, pp. 7-11. Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws
9. Id., at p. 17. extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a
10. T.S.N., January 23, 1987, pp. 9-10. law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
11. Id., at pp. 19-10. meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
12. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, pp. 5-6. Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the
13. T.S.N., January 23, 1987, pp. 10-11. two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
14. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, p. 7. declared invalid and unconstitutional.
15. T.SN., June 5, 1987, pp. 5-9. 3. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; TAXING SALARIES OF JUDICIAL
16. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, p. 13. OFFICERS, A DIMINUTION OF THEIR COMPENSATION AS FIXED
17. T.S.N., June 5, 1987, p. 7. BY LAW. — The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (85
18. T.S.N., February 9, 1987, p. 8. Phil., 552) to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of
19. People vs. Canela, G.R. No. 97086, 208 SCRA 842 (1992).
a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution,
is reiterated.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J p:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional,
and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal
Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45,
representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the
amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his
salary from January 1, 1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,
1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the
same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in
the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice
Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the
proposition and the arguments pro and con involved in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented
here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O'Malley vs.
Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in
the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the
Constitution. We shall now confine ourselves to a discussion and
determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act
No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he
considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No.
1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of
our Constitution:
"SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the
age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos."
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional
provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt
from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection
thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly
prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor
General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the
Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to
counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers.
We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
"SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution
of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law."
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting
the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial
officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries,
because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries,
specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature
and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a
judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and
proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution
of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the
Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of
a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary,
after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To
determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental
principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative
department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of
the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said
laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have
to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of
the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there
is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have
to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
"Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the
courts by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N. W., 2nd
341, 342.)
"When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the
act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating
their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution
as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and,
as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to
the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the
Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is
a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction
upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in
disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." 11 Am. Jur., 714-
715.)
"Under the American system of constitutional government, among the
most important functions intrusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of
Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of
whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions." (11 Am. Jur., 905.)
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
"The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a
judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis
supplied).
"The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in
the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate
the constitutional inhibition." (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied).
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government
is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to
interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially
after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being
clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system of government, particularly those governing the separation of
powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the
practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a
salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system
where the income tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime
thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the
official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to
do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his
income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in
full, and when he later pays his income tax, especially when the amount
of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully
realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of
said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the
income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax
corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into
equal portions corresponding to the number of paydays during the year
and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the
income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a
month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at P12,000 a year, that is to
say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, —
fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by
the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one
year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And
further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is
the income tax deducted from and collected on his salary each half
month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not
exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500
every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead
of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it
not therefore clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased
by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill
No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one
of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling
among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should
not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love
for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might
be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers
including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts.
The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the
President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the
Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax
Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges
of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compared to the number of all
these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively
insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the
exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107
Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices
of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court,
is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High
Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number
more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but
was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S.,
245):
"The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to
benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract
good and competent men to the bench and to promote that
independence of action and judgment which is essential to the
maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of
the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to
persons and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its
purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation
imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in
accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds."
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines
enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are
justices of the peace, many of them receiving, as low as P200 a month,
and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax
law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each
dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income
tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional
exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were
otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the
considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional
exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal
Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution)
regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
When a judicial officer assumes office, he does not exactly ask for
exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is
already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental
law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure
and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we
come to the members of the Supreme Court, this exemption to them is
relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this
High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience,
practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and
comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the average, around
his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that
he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a
position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the
justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They
are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they
receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its
diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real,
substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or
abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest.
While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the
commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of
Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the
peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of
the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any
speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in
making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity
and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this
exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on
their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively
for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI,
Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the
payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec.
29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the
Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the
United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of
the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United
States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to
the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income
tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines sent to
Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 815). New
and necessary industries are also exempted from taxation for a certain
number of years. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of
public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary
obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy
and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of
the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial
officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their
compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the
salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of
the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such
a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court
in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G«R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I
had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that
I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of
a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an
invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I
am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of
powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred.
But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide
that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947.]
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Pedro M. Recto and Que Tube C. Makalintal, for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALLEGIANCE
OF CITIZEN OR SUBJECT TO SOVEREIGN; NATURE OF. — A citizen
or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. — The
absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is
not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON, OF ENEMY
OCCUPATION. — The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
during a war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising
the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "TEMPORARY ALLEGIANCE" SIMILAR TO
ALLEGIANCE OF FOREIGNER TO GOVERNMENT OF HIS
RESIDENCE. — The words "temporary allegiance," repudiated by
Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by
the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the
military government established over them, may, at most, be considered
similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for
the protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country
owes to his own government or sovereign.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TREASON IN FOREIGN COUNTRY AND IN
TERRITORY UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION. — Just as a citizen or
subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
may commit treason against his own legitimate government or
sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid
and comfort.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 114 OF REVISED PENAL CODE,
APPLICABILITY OF. — Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was
applicable to treason committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory
were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF MILITARY OCCUPANT TO
CHANGE LAWS OR MAKE NEW ONES. — Although the military
occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order
and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his
pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the
exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and
the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MILITARY OCCUPANT CANNOT REPEAL OR
SUSPEND OPERATION OF LAW OF TREASON. — Since the
preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience
of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand
from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant
has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE, EFFECT OF
THEORY OF, ADOPTED. — Adoption of the petitioner's theory of
suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small
and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the
latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer
the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence
or sovereignty —such theory would sanction the action of invaders in
forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.
10. ID., SOVEREIGNTY, IN WHOM DOES IT RESIDE. —
Sovereignty resides in the people of the Philippines.
11. ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES A
SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. — The Commonwealth of the
Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but
subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL. —
The question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of
any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officer, citizens and subjects of the country."
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, RIGHT OF, TO
PROSECUTE TREASON COMMITTED DURING JAPANESE
OCCUPATION. — Just as treason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way
treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of
our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against
the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII
of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by this
Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines."
RESOLUTION
"In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court,
acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and
based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article
114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended;
and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon
the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
"(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in
the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign;
and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which of foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides,
so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives,
and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. United States, 21 Law. ed., 42g; Secretary of
State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case
of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
"Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the
cases of Co Kim Cham v~. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113)
and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic
or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the
exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended
because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without
putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended
is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily
to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from exercising
the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our
times'; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing
as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of
the petitioner's contention rests;
"Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United
States was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of
United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and
quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with
the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government
de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military
occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty, or on
the old theory that such occupation transfers the sovereignty to the
occupant; that, in the first case, the word 'sovereignty' used therein
should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty,
because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out
of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the
second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the
suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be
applied to the present case;
"Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,'
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance
may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein
he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described,
and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance
which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a
government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of
a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he
adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid comfort; and that
if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he
receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a
foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the
citizenship thereof since he has to obey, with certain exceptions, the
laws of that country which enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would,
on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be
bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign,
and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own;
"Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of
rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory
occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they
exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the
occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to
enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which
are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta
1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above
stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative as against the
ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the
preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114
of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance
to the latter during the enemy occupation;
"Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect
or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances,
those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a
de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the
existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military
service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the
occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of
humanity and the requirements of public conscience ( Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare
76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated
within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the
territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate
government which have not been adopted, as well and those which,
though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of
the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and
binding upon said inhabitants;
"Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action,
but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the
allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the
military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and
the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the
titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of
the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant,
through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the
former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;
"Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak
nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally
recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight
against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of
being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid
them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in
order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus
deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such
theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a
free and sovereign country to be a party i n the nefarious task of
depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other
words, to commit a political suicide;
"(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of
the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code,
though originally intended to be a crime against said government as
then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United
States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress
and the President of the United States, was made, upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935 , a crime
against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of
the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which
provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all
references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution;'
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations
imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance
appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving
the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the
Philippines, which contains the declaration that 'Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them' (section
1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States;
that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress
said, among others, 'As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States
in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a
government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of
complete and respected nationhood' (Congressional Record, Vol. 29,
part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is 'a purely political question, the determination
of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of the country.'
"Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States 'All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States', was one of the
few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the
United States, but these limitations do not do away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of
each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited
by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that
just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as
against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been
committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of
the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government
and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution
provides that 'The government established by this Constitution shall be
known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines';
"This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more
extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the
said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any.
Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion.
Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion."
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J ., concurring:
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be
committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors.
Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may
actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war
has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a
measure of self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an
emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises.
But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm
attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri.
All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be
sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country
out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly
be the case if the law cannot be enforced under the theory of
suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended
during enemy occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that,
since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy
occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory,
was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience
which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return
for the protection which he receives.
"'Allegiance,' as the term is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to
the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray
vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U. S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"'Allegiance' was said by Mr. Justice Story to be 'nothing more than the
tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose
protection he is.' United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 456, 461;
169 U. S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
"Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a
political duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the
Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government.
It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from
the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace
vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.
"By 'allegiance' is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which
the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his
sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an
absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and
temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent
allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some
open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject
of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a
country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his
residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U. S.(16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21
Law ed., 426.
"'Allegiance,' as defined by Blackstone, 'is the tie or ligament which
binds the subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King
affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two
sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being per actual, the
latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born
within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for
immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection.
Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded
on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject
upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords
protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects
have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born within
the King's allegiance, which can never be forfeited but by their own
misbehavior; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed,
being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an
alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an
allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be
inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that
thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and
feel many other inconveniences.' Indians w ithin the state are not aliens,
but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they
receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws.
They are born in allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs.
Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911." (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed.,
pp. 226-227.)
"Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person
is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to
the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of
the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in
return for the protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the
right of protection, arising from the political relations between the
government and the citizen.
"Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural
allegiance — that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired
allegiance — that arising through some circumstance or act other than
birth, namely, by denotation or naturalization; (3) local allegiance — the
arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a
time; and (4) legal allegiance — that arising from oath, taken usually at
the town or reed, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might
be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years." (3 C.
J. S., 'p. 885.)
"Allegiance. — The obligation of fidelity and obedience which the
individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his
sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R. C. L., 140."
(Ballantine Law Dictionary, p. 68.)
"'Allegiance,' as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which
binds the citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience and support
which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege
fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government.
The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistency. The
rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law, and
manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty."
(W. W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and
International Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.)
"The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are
reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria
vs. United States:
"Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of
allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the
part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a
compensation for the other." (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law,
1942 ed., p. 6.)
"Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in
return for the protection which the government affords him. The duty
which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection
received.
"It is a comparatively modern corruption of allegiance (ligeantia), which
is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It
signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and unqualified fealty. 18 L.
Q. Rev., 47.
xxx xxx xxx
"Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be
a qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to
his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces
it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local
allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States,
16 Wall. [U. S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 42G." (1 Rouvier's Law Dictionary, p.
179.)
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the
Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our
Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.' (Section 1,
Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists
define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere
else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves.
Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people
and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet
free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty
have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and
emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best
expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat
c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the
government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people
themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old
Greece, and modern democracies function on the assumption that
sovereignty resides in the people, nowhere is such principle more
imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law
of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and
not of the people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that
sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the
consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because
our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot
have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential
attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine
democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy
occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no
such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation
between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the
personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the
possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a
people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people
ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is
incompatible with our Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign
and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and
insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital
powers, functions, and duties, and the wife is thereby deprived of the
benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended
loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their
home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to
enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the
wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended
conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of
independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already
decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante)
that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the
Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of
changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the
United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the
Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino
people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional philosophy, has
existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by
the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President
Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevetl,
as spokeman of the American people, accepted and recognized the
principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine
sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before
the proclamation f independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of
the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of
a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the
same Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be
added — in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United
Nations, the unmistakable forunner of the future democratic constitution
of the would government envisioned by all those who adhere to the
principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is
anxiously desired all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and
disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative
nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the
Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election to the
President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for
strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but
it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the
power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it
has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended
any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be
included among the laws of ther Commonwealth which, by, his theory of
suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been
suspended during the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead going from
Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the
mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have
killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By
petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason
or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended.
Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the
fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the
Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in
time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation.
How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign
people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the
Constitution surely did not entertain even for a moment the absurdity
that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more
needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required
to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from
the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection is the consideration of
allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government having
been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the
latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The
proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable
bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has
to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of
the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that
organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive
power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to
the protection of their government, but whether or not that government
fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaining the loyalty and
fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of
attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should
continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the
most effective measures of personal protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes lad
during and under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the
Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government
they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta
vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases where
the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept
petitioner's theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were
null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized
society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws
governing, it, necessarily we have to conclude that the laws of the
Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the
only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation
we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and
disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our
allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's
proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring
absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based
on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect,
veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the
feelings or some foe feelings that bind us to our own people, and are
the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only
provokes repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation,
chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural
incompatibility of political social and ethical ideologies, between our
people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any
feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the
Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the
morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality
of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most
inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face,
offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely
charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human
nature. Political actions, legal rules, and judicial decisions deal with
human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the
enemy is not natural. As long as human psychology remains as it is, the
enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance
based on hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by
prevailing principles of international law, could not have established in
our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto.
They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry
and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary
one — from a decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere,
is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not
forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately
that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by
whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic
practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the
smaller will readily throw away their arms to rally behind palladium of
the invaders.
Two foot he three great departments of our Government have already
rejected petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when
Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the
People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national
security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2,
1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive have jointly declared
that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese
occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had reminded
in full effect an should be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said and
that no one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and
the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the useless of
creating a People's Court to try crimes which, as claimed by petitioner,
could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been
suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may the take
judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of
our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and
that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked
by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any
cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is
based n generally accepted principles of international law, although this
argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is
advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations,
thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept
at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of
suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on
generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms
part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the
Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the
theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially
those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the
Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of
the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under
petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was
suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy determining
agency of government, even since the Pacific war started on December
7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should
be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in
the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the
archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and
enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the
Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which
came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act,
we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect
during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of
authorizing the President "to continue in fore laws and appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]),
and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2 ), that "the
existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the
resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give more emphasis to the
intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be
in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines small otherwise
provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as
scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and
occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did
not have available the necessary means of repelling effectively the
enemy invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of
petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice
to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason
and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their
cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to re vindicate
themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which
appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminately classify them
with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our
conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go
down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of
having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the
opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free
from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such
during the critical period of test.
HILADO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that
during the so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was
nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific
regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the
Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their
legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as
well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of
sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed, to set
them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were
multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had
evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as
International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward
their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or in
civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which
preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no
realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man"
could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain
conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not
on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of
national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not
for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact.
Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it
actually was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely
different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and
methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to
involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or
areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and
destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties,
not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones,
no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan,
had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-
Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United
States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the
prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of
June 7, 1945:
"International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there
is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and
revisions in international law are brought about by the action of
governments designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as
did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in
adopting settled principles to new situations.
xxx xxx xxx
"After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a
marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international
law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly
established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by
treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no
longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high
time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is
illegal and criminal.
"The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in
many steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of
1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United
States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an
instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement
of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies.
"Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has
no meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932
Mr. Henry I,. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice
to the American concept of its effect. He said, 'war between nations was
renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means
that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world It is no
longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to the
principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations
revolve. It is an illegal thing . . .. By that very act we have made
obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the
task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.'
"This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is
legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common
sense of mankind — that justifiable war is a crime.
"Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the
Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments,
which declared that 'a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international
crime.'
"The Eighth Assembly of the league of Nations in 1927, on unanimous
resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member-nations,
including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an
international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the
twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution
stating that 'war of aggression constitutes an international crime against
the human species.'
xxx xxx xxx
"We therefore propose to charge that a war of aggression is a crime,
and that modern international law has abolished the defense that those
who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the
forces of the law be mobilized on the side of Peace." (U. S. A. — An
American Review," published by the United States Office of War
Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.)
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and
sounder doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the
principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine
taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a
distinction between the just and the unjust war — the war of defense
and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph
of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last
above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught
in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that
war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one
of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-
Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal
and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense
of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as
other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war of
aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the
League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression
constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American
Conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating
that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the
human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an
exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first,
against the United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other
allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More
aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its
attack; against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and
occupation of certain areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been
cited for petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended
allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the
history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by
Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in
the course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she
started the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a
seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 to the first week of
September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce
war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the
settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means.
Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then
existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter.
With that modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily
accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among
them the outlawing, proscription and renunciation of military occupation
of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed,
proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saying that the rules
and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of
military occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered
ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and
condemnation of the pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an
international crime; if such a war is an international crime against the
human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course
of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive
law, acquire or possess any legitimate power or right growing out or
incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the
Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the
Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only
in this sense should we speak here with respect this country and its
citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house
pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that
house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property.
To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of
the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the
burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a
justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It
would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to
prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of
Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any
lawfulness in their occupation of territories they have so barbarously
and feloniously invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is
a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the
so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further
fact that this government has a representative in the international
commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These
facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord
with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by
Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before
the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument
of national policy ( Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in
consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and
improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain
areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of
international law which might be applicable to a military occupation
occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court
recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own
government has sent a representative to said international commission
in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes
against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of
which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances
how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the
suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and
government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere
hypothesis — that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain
other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still
the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The
continuance of the allegiance owed to a nation by its citizens is one of
those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to
the occupant the power to interfere with.
" . . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his
power. He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be
able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions
imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the
enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his
allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic
relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or
residence in the occupied territory.
"The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to
compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . ." (III
Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp 1898-1899.)
". . .Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of
allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the
inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . ." (II Oppenheim,
International Law, pp. 341-344)
The occupant's lack of authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the
inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance
of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does
not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but
more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume
and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the
effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary
allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may
compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality'
— willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such
"legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said
occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the
inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since,
according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an
oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can
exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last
degree. To say that when one's country is unable to afford him its
protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance,
is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such
distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from that
loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting,
ending only in death; loyalty should be its worthy offspring. The outward
manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or
thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in
the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and prompting
of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's
irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and prompting of the spirit
of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think
a whit contrary to their Love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them,
indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was
overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence,
was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from
their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore
freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no
criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after
Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of
the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution;
after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with
them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said
Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be
known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines.' Under this provision the Government of the Philippines
immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical
government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be
changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the
people of the Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal
prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs.
(the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions
under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The
Government of the Philippines" spoke of in article 114 of said Code
merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was
continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the
Constitution, which constitutional provision further directs that "all
references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" — of
course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the
Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under
both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article
II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people
— they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has
never been any change in this respect.
If one committed treason against the people of the Philippines before
July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the
same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised
Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed
allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the
Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Articles XVI,
section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after
independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The
most that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became
complete and absolute after independence — that they became,
politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a
crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his
becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason
committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically
independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The
offended party continues to be the same — only his status has
changed.
PARAS, J ., dissenting:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of
the Philippines were suspended. This is in full harmony with the
generally accepted principles of international law adopted by our
Constitution (Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation.
Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that
"laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are
considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation"
(Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and
that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations
are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the
occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil.,
876,881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which
admits that the occupant will naturally suspend all laws of a political
nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command,
such action to be made known to the inhabitants. (United States Rules
of Land Warfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States
is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure
prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and
practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect
in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction followed
elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated
cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely
different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first,
in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the
effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the
sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has
completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military
Administration under martial law over the districts occupied by the
Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of
February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs
and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing
statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders provided
that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the
Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanations to
Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines
have been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the
application of "laws and regulations which are not proper to act under
the present situation the Japanese Military Administration," especially
those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of political laws during enemy occupation is logical,
wise and humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the
principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish
motives and purposes of a military occupant. It is tuns consoling to note
that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated
by the desire to serve . . . the interests of humanity and the over
progressive needs of civilization," and that "in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usage's established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the
inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before
the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate
affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for
himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard himself as clothed with
freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area
concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor
successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials
who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental
functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition,
1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to
the sole authority of the invading power, whose interests and
requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and
enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for
the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for
the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land
Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such
a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part
in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations,
article 52); and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the
inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the
occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to
recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant 'is totally
independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since
occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his
forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest
and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 29a), citing United States vs. Rice,
4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II,
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result
if the people in an occupied territory were required to obey two
antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would
adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following
passage:
"To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority
who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws,
regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet
governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright
illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible
condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile
governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative
enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to continue
owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth
Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to
Japan."
The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political
complexion and taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new
offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state
of war and necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs.
Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must be the preservation of the
nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is
unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is
suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure
government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that,
otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If
this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and
superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or
displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert
its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the
occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of
prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it.
If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to
accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted
with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in mind that "the
possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain
or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an
exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not
compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempts
interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to
weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the
occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus if the absent territorial
sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals
to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such
command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the
individual from prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law,
Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to
prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes,"
as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the
occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant,
against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot
obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand
how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted
and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but
already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense
committed against the belligerent occupant.
In Peralta is. Director of Prisons. 75 Phil., 286, 296), we held that "the
Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during
the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the
belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the
meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the
following passage (page 298):
"No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of
the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of
accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force
during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have
already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at
the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminium, because 'a constitution should operate prospectively
only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should
have a retrospective effect,' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note),
especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already
terminated completely."
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been
committed during the Japanese military occupation against the United
States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision
be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the
constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because,
under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a
retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we
refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code ni the aforesaid case of Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons if , as alleged by the majority, the suspension
was good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively
supports our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs.
Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States — the court of highest human authority on
that subject — and as the decision was against the United States, and
in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was
made shortly after the occurrence the war out of which it grew; and
while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the
rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there
can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the
conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the
court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the
war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared
that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of
Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and
that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States
subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties
to the United States. At the close of the war the place was by treaty
restored to the United States, and after that was done the Government
of the United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing
the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by
the laws of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of
the United States was that its laws were properly in force there,
although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility
to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be
enforced there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that
government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide.
But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the
court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great
luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in
delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods
imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to
the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the
United States. . . . We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot
be sustained. . . .. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory
was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants
who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the
inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British
Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose
to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws
could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this
period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign
port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such
duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods
were in no correct sense imported into the United States.' The court
then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of
Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States,
and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this
case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties
could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the
cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the
opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt,
be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid
from authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country
held as this was in armed belligerent occupation, is to be governed by
him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as
plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the
United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall
presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the
opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this
case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be
obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the
application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign
territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other
acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory of its
former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the
decision of the United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to
the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the
doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague
Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have
any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our
way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is
the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify,
vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the
laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or
be obligatory upon the inhabitant who remained and submitted to the
conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in
effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to,
that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control,
maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area
is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom
cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in
United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without
repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States,
allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature
and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of
fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact,
it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere
conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not
operate to annex such territory to the occupying State, but that the
inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of
their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being
under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that
power fealty and obedience. ( Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts
of Public Law [1931], p. 364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if
not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory
on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that
a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the
military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein
he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The
comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a
power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in
the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of
international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and
the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is
real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied
territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that
States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise
jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial
limits of such other States, should insist that those States should
provide system of la-v and of courts, and in actual practice, so
administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents.
This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within
its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges
which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or
should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are
granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined,
and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in foreign country or,
in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a
territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been
contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the
direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of
the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to
obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal
Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already
under occupation can no longer be "delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or
allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the
inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said
inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct,
because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying
with the Hague Regulation (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds
of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the
obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country."
Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a
passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if
compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any
imperfection in the present state of international law should be
corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organization.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation
imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed
or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese
Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the
Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any
Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire
population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as
guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American regular
fighting forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the
Japanese, considering the latter's military strength at the time and the
long period during which they were left militarily unmolested by America.
In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a
possible means of destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately
help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned
cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid
necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it
was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the
civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the
people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or
otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this
line of thought is that the Japanese are assumed to be so stupid and
dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation,
"the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition
between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military
force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with
each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the
inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the
safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse
its passions and cause it to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again,
even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of
attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military
necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions,
proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means
of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second
Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the
Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended
over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite
of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even
in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese
garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those
places." (Co Kim Clam vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon) 75 Phil., 371,
373. ) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be
reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde,
International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhered to will lead
to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of
the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such
after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial
decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos
are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is
cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died
during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were
undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a
thing as the treason law. The Filipino people, as a whole, passively
opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of the treason statute but
because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way
of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian
designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-
Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary
consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies
and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations,
likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas
and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war
spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who
committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese
army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this
group, even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are
included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to
person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits
tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact
that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or
injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were
prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war
against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged
spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to
vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty
granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the
furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the
penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and
by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos
were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and
occupation of the Philippines, when the r mere physical presence
implied force and pressure — and not after the American forces of
liberation had restored the Philippine Government — that we will come
to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary
to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense
indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such
cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise
cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their
names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however,
everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace
and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of
himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered
the laws of the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and
restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his
proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now
existing on the statute bolls of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . .
are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all
laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we
have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (76 Phil., 113,
133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was
acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the
President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of
the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the
law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from
the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United
States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any
pressure on the population to take oath to the hostile power," was
inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and
does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be
bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United
States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear,
by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all laws of a political
nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an
oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309),
and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law
that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native
state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the
control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty
and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by
the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not
altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only
strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of this authors of the
Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants
as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because
the people should be in a better position to know what will save them
during the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech
in which he warned against the use of the judicial process for non
judicial ends, and attached cynics who 'see no reason why courts, just
like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot
Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he but don't
hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in
any case there is no occasion for a trial; the world yields no respect for
courts that are merely organized to convict.' Mussolini may have got his
just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear
that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws
on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our
legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that
the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our
best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were
taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34,
and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and
obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most
— borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas —
errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not
as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or
sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their
outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience
to their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force
during the Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the
Philippines has no right to prosecute reason committed against the
former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government
which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This
court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the
provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as
treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority,
section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the
Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because
said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the
Philippines, was subservient to and controlled by the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its manly
provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is
expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the
Constitution had to mail said declaration of principle because the
document was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines.
Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the
purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their
posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will
dare allege that the Philippines was an independent county under the
Commonwealth Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous
than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status
nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the
exercise of sovereignty delegated by the United States whose
sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.
"The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been
seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a
State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the
Government. For practical political reasons which can be casually
appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be
formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation
and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is,
however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which
prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the
governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a
sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise
of its power to the governmental agencies of other States, those
governmental agencies thus becoming quad hoc parts of the
governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At
the same time these agencies do not cease to be instrumentalities for
the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally
created.
"By this delegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of
the delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State
possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise,
through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus,
States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of
government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and
so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable
occurrence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist,
and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a
grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the
sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they
are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and
not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a
later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the
cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of
almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their several
sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with
its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the
governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to
create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the
characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any
considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain
autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to particular
districts." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931],
pp. 74, 15.)
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth
Government and the States of the American Union which, it is alleged,
preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States.
This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent
States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers
as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by
the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the
sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the
individual States is no longer contested.
"It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of
their own, and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are
had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional
forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that, even when selecting members for the
national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed
amendments to the federal Constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as
agents of the National Government." (Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 250.)
"This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United
States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
[1931], pp. 251, 252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government
established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth
be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction
is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and
under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the
Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and
exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not
cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic
of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or
sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the
United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth
Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings McDuffie Law,
49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States
Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the
make the Constitution applicable to the Republic. sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President
that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative, unless Osmena who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the
inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was
the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender;
that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth
under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice
constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to President of the Philippines.
enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal
The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may
not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as
said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is
in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason against
United States or the Government of the Philippines, the latter being, as either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different
we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.
whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of Footnotes
the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the HILADO, J., concurring:
United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have 1. English case of De Jager vs. Attorney General of Naval; Belgian
been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is case of Auditeur Militaires vs. Van Dieren; cases of Petain, Laval
deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be and Quisling.
to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law. 2.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of
the United States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National
Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status,
though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be
taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in
Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U. S., 308), rendered in
May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United
States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that
the earlier case can only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of
sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the
United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President
Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice
regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of
other independent nations — in act all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having
accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of the