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T8 B2 FAA NY Center Evanna Dowins (Dowis) Fdr- Sep 03 Draft MFR- Minded by Mark DiPalmo- President NATCA ZNY 723

T8 B2 FAA NY Center Evanna Dowins (Dowis) Fdr- Sep 03 Draft MFR- Minded by Mark DiPalmo- President NATCA ZNY 723

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08/31/2010

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[Classification]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route CenterType of event: InterviewDate: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special
Access Issues: NonePrepared
by:
Geoffrey
BrownTeamNumber: 8Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New YorkParticipants - Non-Commission:
Alfred
, FAA General ConsulParticipants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara,
Geoffrey
BrownNOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please
refer
to the interview transcript for a complete account.EVANNA
DOWIS:
Minded by Mark A. DiPalmo,
President,
NATCA
ZNY
Certified
professional controller,
ZNYFAA
since
fall
of
1997. Trained
for 2.5
years, became certified controller, year latertrained as controller in charge. Prior to ZNY in us air
force
89 94 as ATC at Edwin's air
force
base
California,
after
that Department
of
Defense
at
tower Buckley
air
force
base.Trained controller since 1990.
Area
supervisor
full
time job with employees assigned to them to reprimand, giveawards,
and
oversee entire operation
in
their
specific
operation. Controller
in
charge
operational
only.
9/11
controller in charge of area b ZNY. Came in am assigned as certified controller, not
in
chargeofarea. Askedtotake overforsupervisor
before
eventsofmorning occurred.
Signed
on as CIC. To best of ability in recollection,
first
call remembered
from
sector 56
in
Kennedy
VOR (18k and up)
notified
from
Boston
center
of
aircraft hijacked
AAl
1.
No
radio
communications. No transponder, no altitude readout. Boston attempted to letcontroller sector56gainid onprimary target. Hardto besureofcorrectonprimary. Hardto
verify
ifactual
aircraft
ornot. CouldbeIk
feet
or30k, justablip. Boston attemptedto
point
out to ZNY, and relayed that information toOMIC- Pete mulligan and BruceBarret. Relayed information in entirety. They informed Boston Central had already called
 
them.
R56 was
mark
Merced.
At
that
point
looking
with
Mercedand
controller with
airspace west asked their
aircraft
to id
aircraft
at flight level 290. Some responses, (DaveBittiglia controller on west side). As responses gathered
aircraft
said had seen
aircraft
at
f!290,
TCAS
(traffic
collision avoidance system - pilots have that radar, not ATC).Relayed information to OMIC.
At
that point all recall of AA11. Advised adjacent sectors of
aircraft
headed their way atfl290. Mark advising them possible
hijack.
UAL
175 had checked on normal operations with r42 and
after
second transmission
advised
of hostile transmissions on Boston Central frequency. Seemed not to relay thatuntil he heard r42 asking about
AA11. UAL
175 was concerned because of transmissions.Very focused
on AA11.
Relaying
to
OMIC.Received an ELT signal. Happens as test or accident. As
CIC
required to report ELT toOMIC.Shortly
thereafter
saw R42 noticed
UAL
175 to enter coast track. Caused when
aircraft
does not show assigned code. Appeared UA 175 code changed. R42 relayed no contactwith
UAL175.
Relayed information. R42 and
Evonna
observed turn off course. Pointed
out
3321 code not assigned, no radio, turn off course. At that time initial moment
confusion
over if that was UAL 175 - especially because of
AA11.
Initially could have
confirmed
reset transponder. Even though believed it was UAL 175, not certain, but did
assume it was UAL 175.As
UAL 175 turned eastbound to city, recall OMIC say fighters had been scrambled. Keptobserving target, other ATCs attempting to turn their
crafts
out of the way. At that pointEvonna believes
the
fighters
were scrambled
for
UAL175.
Hijack
came into mind once no radio, and drastic turn off course.
Seemto
loose radio with
aircraft
on
regular basis. Even
if for
only
a few
minutes.Occasionally it seems we have a "blind
spot"
in certain areas. Sometimes need to go to
backup
frequency.
Not unusual. First step taken if an extended loss are a retrace of
aircraft
whereabouts. Fairly quickly keep calling
aircraft.
Ask for
IDENT.
Means they
hear
ATC,
but ATC
can't
hear
pilot.
IDENT
-
three
bars
and a
line
- a visual on
scope.
Ask
other
aircraft
of can hear
aircraft.
Ask OMIC to call company. Go to guard
frequency.
ATC
notifies
CIC or
area supervisor quickly.Transponder
off or
code change: Transponder changes
not
often.
Could happen
if
pilot
confused
and
hears code change meant
for
another plane. Equipment
failure
(loss
of
transponder)not
frequent.
Stretchto sayonceamonth.Deviation
from
course: very unusual. Very
infrequent.
What
wouldcom andtransponder loss indicate? Pilotmay becrashing.One of the first
 
thoughts over UAL
175.
Those factors
plus
course
change:
immediately now
hijack.
Prior
to
911,
quickly think
hijack.
UAL175:
two mode three code changes in short period of time: did not take long to think
he
was probably being hijacked. Recall telling OMIC I think hijacked. Showedtransponder
3321.
Had
already
heard
from
Boston
Central
that
AA11 was
hijacked.Because of infrequency of hijack, it was surreal and unbelievable that there could be asecond ongoing
hijack.
Awareness of
first
WTC collision was
definitely
AA11: don't think ZNY was sure
AA11.
Many
different
reports.
Don't
think confirmed until news reported correctly. Probably
not
aware until
in
cafeteria watching CNN.Awareness of second tower
definitely
uas!75:
assuming whole time it was united.Thought he was going to crash into the city. Didn't have confirmation that he did untilrelieved
of
duty. Thought process
that
it was
going
to
crash
in
city
-
many things thoughtin area. One person thought it was emergency and it was going to land. Point whenthought heard
from
talking - somebody yelled out I think
he's
going to crash in New
York
City, and then thought same way.Probably at
least
half hour or hour between when he was relieved and go to cafeteria.Because of past us experience assumption was that hijacked
aircraft
would land and makeits demands. Thought never entered mindof911 scenario.When controller determines
of
hijack situation what steps
are
taken?
In
general,
pre911,
first
to conclude actual
hijack.
No com, route change, 7500 transponder code - ATC
specifically
tells
CIC
know of possibilities. Those managers have contact responsibilities.
Specific
rule looking for 7500 code. Also told not to make obvious of knowledge of
hijack.
Taught to monitor and clear airplanes out of way. Just supposed to guard
aircraft
and
be
discreet with
pilot.
Assumption
before
911 that
pilot
is
flying
plane.Training: at ZNY, military and Department of Defense hijack training of minimum oncea year. Computer based instruction. Sit and review procedures and rules. Scenarios
involve
one airplane.Military notification: ATC does not get involved. Operation manager of center takes careof that. CIC responsible to
notify
OMIC.
During
years as military controller, training essentially the same.Recommendations: changes seen already at ZNY. Now have military blocks. Heard
rumor
that OMIC has direct line to call military. Memorandums issued on basisinstructed controllers to be constantly aware of current procedures.

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