T8 B2 FAA NY Center Robert Felser Fdr- 12-15-03 MFR 734

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UNCLASSIFIED

COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE

RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center

(ZNY)

Type

of event: Interview with Robert FelserDate: Monday, December 15, 2003Special Access Issues: ID CheckPrepared by:

Geoffrey

Brown

Team

Number:

8

Location: Ronkonkoma, New YorkParticipants-Non-Commission: MaryM.McCarthy

(Office

ofRegional Counsel, EasternRegion,

FAA - One

Aviation Plaza,

RM

561, Jamaica,

NY

11434:

P

718-553-3259,

F

718-995-

5699),

Mark

Depalma(NATCA

representative)

Participants - Commission: JohnAzzarello,Miles Kara,

Geoffrey

Brown

Note: Please

refer to the interview

recording

for

further

details.

Background:

Felser

has

been with

the FAA for

over

30

years.

He has

worked

as an air

traffic

controller(ATC),

in

Quality Assurance,

in

Military Operations,

and in the

National Airspace

office.

Hebegan in

June

of

1970.Felser

had

been

the

Military Operations Specialist (MOS)

at ZNY for

roughly

four

years

by

Sepetmber 11, 2001

(9/11).

The MOS is responsible for fielding military requests for the use of

airspace.

The MOSprovidesandupdates restrictedandwarning area information

from

therequests made by the military to the

floor.

The MOS also touches base with the First Line

Supervisors

since

at times the military may have

"tremendous"

requests for airspace, and thusthe MOS takes on a negotiator role between the FAA and military.Felser works with Giant Killer and Huntress when they attempt to make contact with positions

on

the

operations

floor.

Felser facilitates this interplay.

Pre 9/11

relationship with military:

Felser noted

the

first

real world

aircraft

scramble

he was

involved with occurred

on 9/11.

Otherwise, mostof hisexperience with

fighter

scrambleswas to

facilitate

thepassageof the

fighters

through airspace (typically

six to

thirty-two thousand

feet)

forfightersto run

trainingexercises. Felser noted that NEADS

ran

exercises that practiced

for an

unidentified

aircraft

entering a warning area.

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NOPAR or Trusted Agent indicates that the MOS

office

has a little more knowledge of the

military

exercises. They also have the combination to the

safe

that holds SECRET leveldocuments related to air defense missions.Both James Dombrosky and Bill

Verderose

were on the evening watch (swing watch) for theMOS deskon

9/11,

accordingto

Felser.

Thedesk itselfis

staffed

sixteen hoursaday. When theyare not their calls that come into the MOS phone lines are picked up by the OMIC. The MOSdesk is contacted by the military to schedule activities on a day to day

basis.

Felser noted that the NOPAR practice requests are

often

made a week in advance. The

unidentified

aircraft

appears three miles or so outside the warning areas. Felser noted that thesetests could be for drug interdiction, mechanical

failure

or hijack scenarios. The NOPAR requestwould givethe MOS

desk

theinformationof theroute thatthe

aircraft

being exercised mighttake on its way to the warning airspace reserved for the military.

Hijack

exercise:

Felser noted that his understanding of the hijacking exercises is to receive reaction time, but thathis only role in these training exercises is to

facilitate

the blocking of the

airspace.

He noted hehad no notice that a hijacking terrorist event that would be like

9/11.

He was trained for hijackingscenarios as an ATC. The points that he recalled was to allow the hijacked

aircraft

to "do what itwants

to do"

once

the

supervisor

was

informed.

Scramble procedures

in

place

for the

MOS:

Felser would provide the OMIC with the appropriate numbers, but the OMIC is in charge ofactually making the decision to ask for a

fighter

scramble.

Felser

believed that

fighters

couldhave been scrambled

from

Atlantic City,but heknows that they were scrambled

from

OtisAirForce Base.Felser acknowledged that therearelettersofagreement regarding scrambles with militaryorganizations, but he is not directly

familiar

with them.Felser noted that on 9/11 it was extremely easy to contact NEADS to gain

fighter

assistance.Felser noted that he did not become involved with Fighter Control at all on 9/11.9/11:Felser was assigned to a seven AM to three PM

shaft

on

9/11.

His

office

is roughly thirty

feetfrom

the

Traffic

Management Unit (TMU) desk. Pete Mulligan asked Felser to get the number

for

NEADS to

facilitate

the possible need for a scramble.

Felser

spoke with NEADS, received

the

appropriate number, and continued to work

from

the MOS room. Bruce Barrett (OMIC) toldFelser to ask NEADS for a scramble, and he called them to do so. NEADS

informed

Felser thatBoston Center had already made that request, and Felser passed that information back to Barrett.Felser was aware that there were two southbound

aircraft

off course.

COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

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Felser received

the

information that

the

north tower

of the WTC was on

fire.

Felser stated that at roughly 1249 Z he was asked to contact NEADS, but was not aware thatNEADS had already contacted ZNY. He does not know if the

OMIC

desk had this

information.

Commission

staff

presented Felser with a transcript that displays some of his calls on

9/11.

Regarding

Felser's

second call

to

NEADS, roughly 9:03

or

9:04,

and his

third communicationwith NEADS, it was his second call in which he

definitively

tells NEADS that UAL

175

was thesecond plane to hit the WTC. Felser does not directly recall this call.

Felser

was

informed

from

CNN

that

an

aircraft,

a

small aircraft,

was the

cause

for the

fire

at the

World

Trade Center. But commented that

"nobody

really knew anything" about what hit thetower. Felser noted that

the ATC

community

did not

know definitively that

UAL

175

was the

aircraft

that

hit the

World Trade Center.

The

assumption

was

that they would eventually receivea request of a routing change.Felser noted

to

Commission

staff

that

for him to

communicate

to

NEADS that

UAL

175

had hitthe WTC

must indicate that

he was

told that

by

someone else.Depalma noted that since

so

many members

of ZNY

were watching

the CNN

broadcast, very

quickly

the Operations Floor knew of the second

aircraft

that struck the world trade center.Felser noted that he did not have any awareness that AA

11

was still airborne.

Post 9/11:

Felser noted that the MOS

office

since

9/11

has been locked.

Other:

Felser did not speak with anyone at Region or Tracon on 9/11, nor does he know if anyone elsedid. Felser has no knowledge of operations at Washington Headquarters or Operations Center orCommand Center.Depalma noted that

the

number called

by

Huntress

was

actually

the

Oceanic Sector.

The

warningareas make requests through

the MOS

desk

for

Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF).CARF coordinates with

the

facilities

for

airspace reservation. Most

of

Felser's

communications

was

with

the

CARF

at

Herndon

Command Center

in

Virginia.Felser has met Collin Scoggins (MOS ZBW), but does not know his counterpart at Herndon.

Recommendations:

Felser commended Bruce Barrett

for

shutting down

the

airspace over

ZNY on

9/11. Felser noted

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SENSITIVE

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