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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THEEASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Kristoffer J. Bonilla and John Thomas Wray,
PLAINTIFFS
v.Brenda Hurst, Director of the Orleans Parish Office of Marriage Licensing;Darlene W. Smith, State Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics; Dr. RonyFrancola, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Public Health; Alan Levine,Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals; and James D. Caldwell,Attorney General,
DEFENDANTS
Civil Action No. _____________ Number ____________ Section “____”, Mag. “_______”
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEFNOW COME PLAINTIFFS
, Kristoffer J. Bonilla and John Thomas Wray,both persons of the full age of majority, United States citizens, domiciled andresiding in the State of Louisiana, who, with respect, represent:1.Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, this Court has jurisdiction over the actionbecause it arises under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
 
United States Constitution and international treaties, including, but notlimited to, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2.On April 2, 2009, Petitioners applied for a marriage license at theOrleans Parish Marriage License Office and were denied. The clerk refusedto issue a marriage license because both applicants were male and thatLouisiana law (Article XII §15 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana CivilCode Articles 89 and 3520) denies an individual the right to marry if he orshe chooses a partner of the same sex.3.Respondents’ refusal to grant the Petitioners a marriage license violatesthe substantive due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (as applied toLouisiana by the Fourteenth Amendment) by infringing on a fundamentalliberty interest, the right to marry, without any compelling governmentinterest.4.Moreover, the supporting Louisiana provisions run afoul of theEstablishment Clause of the First Amendment by curtailing the right to marrybased upon a religious interpretation of the nature and purpose of marriageitself. By failing to articulate a legitimate, compelling and secular interest forthe restriction on marriage, the State has necessarily established a wholly
 
religious civil institution. Accordingly, Respondents’ appeal to the “sanctity”or religious tradition of marriage does not justify the State’s restriction; itunmasks an independent constitutional objection.5.Additionally, the Louisiana laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents issue marriage licenses in adiscriminatory fashion. First, the law discriminates on the basis of sex byrestricting men from marrying men and women from marrying women; theright to choose a partner, essential to a meaningful marriage, is encumberedbecause of the applicant’s sex. Second, it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation by affecting the class of persons not exclusively attractedto members of the opposite sex. Accordingly, the only individuals who enjoythe right to marry are those exclusively attracted to members of theopposite sex. Neither rational basis nor substantial or compelling interestsupports that limitation. Therefore, regardless of how the class affected isarticulated, Louisiana law fails requisite Constitutional scrutiny.6.Finally, international law, as expressed in the Preamble and Article I §3to the U.N. Charter, Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 16 and 22 of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and Articles 17, 23, 25 and 26 of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, proscribes the actionsand laws prompting the instant action. As treaties ratified by the United
of 00

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