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Nachura Digests-1st Batch Friendly)

Nachura Digests-1st Batch Friendly)



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Published by: BAROPS on Jul 06, 2009
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Xerxes Abadiano v. Spouses Martir
31, 2008)
Subject: Property, Evidence
Facts: Inocentes Banares and the heirs of his wife, Feliciana Villanueva executed anAgreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitionedand distributed to the following: (1)Demetrio Banares (Lot No. 1318-A), (2)Ramon and David Abadiano –grandchildrenof Inocentes and Feliciana (Lot No. 1318-B)and (3) Amando Banares (Lot No. 1318-C). The partition is embodied in a notarizedDeed of Partition. In 1923, an OriginalCertificate of Title (OCT) No. 20641 wasissued in the name of the spouses. In 1939,David Abadiano, who was absent during theexecution of the Agreement of Partition,executed a Deed of Confirmationacknowledging and ratifying the documentof partition. OCT No. 20641 wasadministratively reconstituted in 1962 and inlieu thereof, OCT No. RO-8211 was issuedover Lot No. 1318, still in the name of thespouses. The Agreement of Partition and theDeed of Confirmation were annotated at theback of the OCT. In 1957, Demetrio sold hisshare to his son Leopoldo. The latter thenfiled a petition praying for confirmation of the Agreement and the Deed of Confirmationand the Deed of Sale between him and hisfather, and for the issuance of a new titleover the property. The Court ordered theissuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) in the name of Leopoldo, Amando, andRamon and David. Petitioner insists that thisis the valid and subsisting title over theproperty and there was no other sale toanyone.Respondents allege however that prior tothe issuance of the TCT, Ramon for himself and on behalf of David, had already soldtheir rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-
I won’t be discussing evidence. Wala akongkarapatan. The case touches on Rule 130,Section 3
C to Victor Garde, as evidenced by anotarized document of sale (Compra YVenta) dated June 3, 1922. They furtherallege that from the time of sale, VictorGarde and his heirs were in continuous,public, peaceful and uninterruptedpossession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the Lot. Victor’s heirs sold thesame to Jose Garde who in turn sold it toLolita Martir in 1979. Alleging that theAbadianos entered the property andharvested sugarcane from it, the spousesfiled an Action to Quiet Title and/or Recoveryof Possession with Damages in 1982. Thetrial court ruled for the Martirs, holding thatthe spouses and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of theproperty for 60 years and the Abadianostherefore were guilty of laches. CA affirmed.Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of lachesHeld: No. Under the Property RegistrationDecree, no title to registered land inderogation of the title of the registeredowner shall be acquired by prescription oradverse possession. Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible andimprescriptible, the registered landownermay lose his right to recover the possessionof his registered property by reason of laches.
Laches has been defined asneglect or omission to assert a right,taken in conjunction with lapse of timeand other circumstances causingprejudice to an adverse party.
fourbasic elements are
: 1) conduct on the partof the defendant, or of one under whom heclaims, giving rise to the situation of whichcomplaint is made and for which thecomplaint seeks a remedy; 2) delay inasserting the complainant’s rights, thecomplainant having had knowledge or noticeof the defendant’s conduct and having beenafforded an opportunity to institute suit; 3)lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant wouldassert the right on which he bases his suit;
and 4) injury or prejudice to the defendant inthe event relief is accorded to thecomplainant or the suit is not held to bebarred.Petitioner had reasonable ground to believethat the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to betheirs, especially considering that theannotation of the purported sale was doneonly in 1982. That the petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando to tryand occupy the land is understandable sinceany action may sow dissent within thefamily.
In determining whether a delayin seeking to enforce a rightconstitutes laches, the existence of aconfidential relationship between theparties is an important circumstancefor consideration, a delay under suchcircumstances not being so strictlyregarded as where the parties arestrangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied betweennear relatives, and the fact that partiesare connected by ties of blood ormarriage tends to excuse an otherwiseunreasonable delay.
In addition, severalother factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the petitioner: a) noannotation was made of Compra Y Venta onthe OCT or the TCT; b)neither respondentsnor any of their predecessors in interestparticipated in any of the proceedings forthe issuance of the OCT or the TCT; and c)the TCT bears out that the fact that thepurported Compra Y Venta was annotatedthereon only in 1982. It is most telling thatrespondents, have themselves failed to havethe same property transferred in their nameor even only to have the sale annotated onthe title of the property.
Accessories Specialist Inc., a.k.a. Arts21 Corporation vs. Alabanza
 July 23, 2008Nachura, J.Labor Law. Promissory estoppel may arisefrom the making of a promise, even thoughwithout consideration, if it was intended thatthe promise should be relied upon, as in factit was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforceit would virtually sanction the perpetrationof fraud or would result in other injustice. The principle of promissory estoppel is arecognized exception to the three-yearprescriptive period enunciated in Article 291of the Labor Code.Labor Law. The posting of a bond isindispensable to the perfection of an appealin cases involving monetary awards from thedecision of the Labor Arbiter. The filing of thebond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must becomplied with in order to confer jurisdictionupon the NLRC.Facts:On September 27, 2002, respondentAlabanza filed a complaint againstpetitioners Arts 21 and Hashimoto for and inbehalf of her husband for non-payment of salaries, separation pay and 13
month pay.Respondent’s husband was the Vice-President, Manager and Director of Arts 21and had been with the company from 1975to 1997. He was compelled by the owner,Hashimoto, to file his involuntary resignationon October 17, 1997 on the ground that Arts21 allegedly suffered losses. Respondent’shusband demanded payment of his moneyclaims upon resignation but was told thatrank and file employees will be paid first andthus waited for his turn. Respondent’shusband made several demands but Arts 21 just kept on assuring him that he will be paidhis money claims. Respondent’s husbanddied on August 5, 2002 with his claims stillunpaid.Petitioners invoke Art. 291 of theLabor Code and contend that respondent’shusband voluntarily resigned in October,1997, thus the cause of action has already
prescribed since the case was filed in 2002only, beyond the three-year-period withinwhich money claims should be filed. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decisionordering petitioner to pay respondent overP4M. Petitioners filed an appeal along with amotion to reduce bond, attaching receiptsfor cash bond amounting to P290K andappeal fee for P170.00. The motion wasdenied and petitioners were given 10 dayswithin which to file the required bond.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsiderationwhich the NLRC denied ordering thedismissal of the appeal for non-perfectionthereof due to non-compliance with the bondrequirement. The resolution became finaland executory and a writ of execution wasissued by the Labor Arbiter upon motion byrespondent. Petitioners filed a petition forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals prayingfor the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition wasdismissed.Issue No. 1:WON the cause of action of respondent has already prescribed/Held: NO.Ratio:Based on the findings of facts of theLabor Arbiter, it was petitioner Arts 21 whichwas responsible for the delay in theinstitution of the complaint. Whenpetitioner’s husband filed his resignation heimmediately asked for the payment of hismoney claims. However, the management of Arts 21 promised him that he would be paidimmediately after the claim of the rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones reliedon this representation.Promissory estoppel may arise fromthe making of a promise, even thoughwithout consideration, if it was intended thatthe promise should be relied upon, as in factit was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforceit would virtually sanction the perpetrationof fraud or would result in other injustice. The principle of promissory estoppel is arecognized exception to the three-yearprescriptive period enunciated in Article 291of the Labor Code.In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears theburden of establishing the followingelements: (1) a promise was reasonablyexpected to induce action or forbearance;(2) such promise did, in fact, induce suchaction or forbearance; and (3) the partysuffered detriment as a result. All therequisites are present in this case. TheCourt, therefore, finds ample justification notto follow the prescriptive period imposedunder Art. 291 of the Labor Code. Greatinjustice will be committed if respondent’sclaims will be brushed aside on a meretechnicality, especially when it waspetitioner’s own action that preventedrespondent from interposing the claimswithin the required period.Issue No. 2:WON the posting of the completeamount of the bond in an appeal from thedecision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC isan indispensable requirement for theperfection of the appeal despite the filing of a motion to reduce the amount of the appealbond.Held: YES.Ratio:Article 223 of the Labor Codemandates that in case of a judgment of theLabor Arbiter involving a monetary award,an appeal by the employer to the NLRC maybe perfected only upon the posting of a cashor surety bond issued by a reputablebonding company duly accredited by theCommission, in the amount equivalent to themonetary award in the judgment appealedfrom.

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