MAPI 2 ER-681
and growth, and normally argues that a rise in thesavings rate is necessary in order to finance risingdomestic investment and thus support economic
“takeoff
.
” What has been surprising is the extent of
the increase in both the savings and investmentrates in China, which even surpassed what itsneighbors in East Asia had experienced at thepeak of their era of rapid industrialization(Figure 2).
1
Only in recent years has it become moreobvious that the industry-led, capital-intensivegrowth model characterized by high saving and
1
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) have showna common pattern of rising saving rates during theirtake-off periods.
investment rates, comes at a price. First,with investment booming, excess capacityand overinvestment emerged in a numberof important industries.
2
The resultingoverproduction has not only driven downproduct prices and eroded industrial profitmargins, but has also made Chineseproducers more vulnerable to externalshocks as they become increasinglydependent on international markets. Takethe steel industry as an example. Chinabecame the world's largest steel maker in1996, and at the end of 2008, its excesscapacity in crude steel production reached160 million tons, exceeding the 118 millionmetric tons of annual output in Japan, thesecond largest steel producer in the world.After the global financial crisis intensifiedin September 2008, however, the averagesteel price contracted by more than 30percent, and exports dropped from 20percent of total output in August 2008 toonly 5 percent in February 2009. As aresult, annual profits in 2008 for theindustry as a whole declined by 13.7percent, while in 2007 a 45 percentincrease had been observed. Someresearchers believe that this excesscapacity has contributed at least partly to
the slowdown in China’s Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) growth,
3
a critical factor
in explaining China’s fast growth. TFP
slowed from nearly 4 percent per annumduring the first 15 years (1978-1993) of
China’s rapid industrialization period to
only 3 percent thereafter.
4
Second, the industry-led growth patternis particularly intensive in the use of energyand raw materials, which will not only
threaten China’s energy security but also
contribute to harming domestic and globalenvironmental sustainability and publichealth
. China’s energy consumption growth rate
jumped from an average 3.5 percent in the 1990s
2
According to the most recent estimate from China'sindustry ministry, about 30 percent of the nation'saluminum production capacity, 20 percent of cementand plate-glass capacity, and 70 percent ofsemiconductor capacity is in idle.
3
Growth in TFP represents output growth that is notaccounted for by the growth in inputs, such as capitaland labor.
4
Jianwu He and Louis Kuijs,
“Rebalancing China’s
Economy
—
Modeling A Policy Package,
” World Bank
China Research Paper No. 6, September 2007.
30405060
1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 P e r c e n t o f G D P
Gross National SavingsGross Capital FormationHousehold Consumption
Sources: United Nations and MAPI Calculations
Figure 1Evolvement
of China’s Domestic Savings, Investment and
Household Consumption
ER-681June 2009
Figure 2Gross Capital Formationin East Asia
Sources: United Nations and IHS Global Insight
Household ConsumptionIn East Asia
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1 9 7 1 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 7
P e r c e n t o f G D P
Hong KongSouth KoreaJapanSingapore
1020304050607080
1 9 7 1 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 7
P e r c e n t o f G D P
Hong KongSouthKoreaSingaporeTaiwan
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