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the jury’s verdict because the evidence collected by MediaSentry should not have beenadmitted. If this Court does not wish to revisit this matter, which is confined to Part II of this motion, Mrs. Thomas respectfully requests this Court’s indulgence in her attempt toensure that all issues are fully preserved for appeal.
I. THE JURY’S AWARD OF STATUTORY DAMAGES IS GROSSLYEXCESSIVE AND MUST BE SET ASIDE
The statutory damages awarded in this case — which are nearly an order of magnitude greater than the statutory damages assessed in the first trial — bear noreasonable relation to the actual injury suffered by the plaintiffs. The damages awardedare grossly in excess of any reasonable estimate of that injury. The plaintiffs did not evenattempt to offer evidence of their actual injuries, seeking, instead, an award of statutorydamages entirely for purposes of punishment and deterrence. The closest they came wasin identifying, mainly in arguments by counsel, injuries to their industry as a wholecaused by illegal music sharing as a whole; when pressed, their witnesses — recall thetestimony of Mr. Leak — were not able to attribute any particular part of this injury toMrs. Thomas’s alleged actions. An award of statutory damages of $1.92M for 24 songsassessed as punishment, not compensation, shocks the conscience and must be set aside.This Court can set aside the award of statutory damages in at least three ways.First, Mrs. Thomas contends that the statutory-damages provision of the Copyright Act,as applied in her case, offends the Due Process Clause and is not law. If she is correct,then the statutory-damages portion of the verdict, which rests on this unconstitutionalprovision, must be set aside under Rule 59(e). Importantly, this would not be a remittitur,but the correction of an unconstitutional verdict: the plaintiffs are not entitled to elect anew trial, but, having declined to seek a jury finding on actual damages on which
Case 0:06-cv-01497-MJD-RLE Document 344 Filed 07/06/2009 Page 3 of 13
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