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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withPeter Zalewski,
Air
Traffic
Control Specialist Area
C.
Type
of
event: InterviewDate: Monday, September
22,
2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared
by:
Geoffrey
BrownTeam Number:
8
Location:
FAA
Boston
Air
Route Center, Nashua,
New
HampshireParticipants
-
Non-Commission: John
R.
Donnelly,
FAA
Senior Attorney
[(781)
238
7045]
Participants
-
Commission:
John
Azzarello,
Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownNOTE: Please
refer
to the
recorded
interview
for a
complete account.Zilowski
has
been with
the FAA
since
1982. He has
been with
ZBW for his
entire career,butspent
a
short period
of
time with Area
E.On 9/11
Zilowski took
a
position
at
Hampton 31
at
about seven
o'clock,
he
then wentoverto R46 Boston High Sector (24k ft. and above).
AA11
was handed off to him, and heclimbed
the
flight
first to FL
280, then
to FL 290 for
normal spacing procedures.
He
turnedAA11twenty degrees right
to
expedite
the
climb,
andAA11
responded. Fairlysoon
thereafter
he
climbed them
to FL
350,
but
AA11
did not
respond.
He
tried calling
AA11
again, since
he
wanted
to
turn
AA11
back
on
course.
AA11
started
to
move intothe arrival route
for
Logan,
and
Zilowski became concerned. Zilowski changed
his
transmitters
and
receivers
to
check
his own
equipment,
and
when everything checked
out
he attempted
to
reach
AA11
on the 121.5
guard code.
He
checked previous sector
frequency,
and
tried
to
contact
the
flight's company
to
establish communication.Zilowski became even more concerned
as AA11
started
to
approach another sector'sairspace.As these
factors
persisted
and
Zilowski still
did not
hear
from
the
pilot
of
AA11,
he
notedthat
the
situation
was
highly unusual. When
the
transponder
had first
shut off, Zilowskihad told
his
supervisor, John Shippani, quietly.
He
then explained
to
Shippani what
he
had done
to
attempt
to
communicate with
AA11.
At
this point hijacking
had not
occurred
to
Zilowski.
He
kept track
ofAA11s
primary,
and
still
had no
reading
on its
altitude.
As
AA11 starts to turn Zilowski heard a strange voice over the
frequency.
He noted thatsincehe hadexperienceat airroute with heavy international
traffic,
anArabic pilot's
COMMISSION
SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIED
 
UNCLASSIFIED
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
voice
wasn't
unusual
to
him.
But in
this sector, Zilowski noted
that
most
pilots
are
American, so he
thought
the
Arabic voice
was out of
place. Zilowski could
not
distinguish
the
message
in the first
transmission.
It was the
second transmission that
he
heard clearly.
He
"screamed"
to his
supervisor,
and
told
him of the
hijack.
He put
AA11
on the
loudspeaker
for the
section.
He had no
RA
to
assist,
and
asked
for an
immediate
"D"
side. He concentrated on listening for communication from
AA11
and, once Greg
Tichini
became his RA, gave Tichini all the planes in his sector. Zilowski
firmly
believesthat the communication
from
the hijacker was meant for the passengers to hear, and isadamant that
it did not
come
from
the
American Airlines pilot keying
the
microphone,Zilowski also stated that UAL175 heard the transmission from
AA11
since they were on
the
samefrequency.
After
the
second
communication Zilowski thought
AA11
was
headed back to Logan
Airport,
and was
worried that
it
would turn
backintothe
departures.Hewantedto getanother supervisor sincehe did notthink
Shippani
wastaking the situation seriously, and stated that he requested Bob Jones pull tapes to check
the
transmission.When
AA11
continued on a southbound heading Zilowski thought it was headed toKennedy. He gave the
handoff
to Athens Area B put Athens hadn't cleared the airspace
yet,
Athens picked up
Zilowski's
point out, but Zilowski kept monitoring the frequency
in
case of a
further
transmission.Zilowski handed control of his airspace over to Tichini once Athens took over tracking
the
flight.
Zilowski then
left
the
building
for a
break. Zilowski
was
informed
of the firstWTC hit from his
parents,
and
stated
he
immediately knew
it wasAA11.
Tichini
told
Zilowski
of the second WTC hit of UAL175.
9/11 Personal Privacy
Zilowski
explained
to
Commission staff
that
"Nordo"
indicates
no
radio, whereas
"Norac"
indicates no radio communication. So AA11 was
officially
Norac. Zilowski also
explained
that
when
a
transponder
goes
off the
computer
will
automatically attribute
a
data
tag
with
a
call sign
to the
primary.
Post
9/11 Zilowski believes
the air
travel
is
safer,
and
believes supervisors
and the FAAtake
security much more seriously.
He
noted that pilots should
be
more involved
in
staying aware
of the
need
for
continued vigilance,
and is
worried
the
"system"
may
become complacent
as
time distances memory
from
the
attacks.
He
noted
that
the
rapportbetween pilots
and
ATCs
is
going away,
and
believes there should
be
more interactionbetween
the two
groups
to
better secure
air
traffic.
COMMISSION
SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIED
 
Commission Sensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withPeterZalewski,Air
Traffic
Control Specialist AreaC.Type of event: Recorded InterviewDate:Monday, September22,2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by:
Geoffrey
BrownTeamNumber:8Location:
FAA
Boston
Air
Route Center, Nashua,
New
HampshireParticipants
-
Non-Commission: John
R.
Donnelly,
FAA
Senior Attorney
[(781) 238
7045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara,
Geoffrey
BrownNOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please
refer
to the interview transcript for a complete account.
Background
Zalewski
has
been with
the FAA
since 1982.
He has
been with Boston CenterArea C (Boston Sector) for his entire career, but spent a short period of time with Area E.Because of
shift
swaps he had worked until 11pm the night
before
and then came back on
duty
on 9-11 as the Radar Controller, Boston High Sector (24,000
feet
and above), R46.
Morning
of
9-11
Zalewski started at the Hampton, R31, sector at about seven
o'clock
and thenwent over to R46. AAl 1 was handed off to him routinely
from
Bosox Sector (loweraltitude), and he climbed the flight
first
to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacingprocedures.
He
turned
AAl 1
twenty degrees right
to
expedite
the
climb,
and AAl 1
responded. Fairly soon
thereafter
he directed them to FL 350, but AAl 1 did not respond.
He
tried calling
AAl 1
again, since
he
wanted
to
turn
AAl 1
back
on
course.
AAl 1
started
to
move intothearrival routeforLogan,andZalewski became concerned. Zalewskichanged his transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everythingchecked
out he
attempted
to
reach
AAl 1 on the
121.5 guard code.
He
checked previoussector
frequency,
and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication.Zalewskibecame even more concerned
as AAl 1
started
to
approach another
sector's
airspace.These
factors
persisted and Zalewski
still
did not hear
from
the pilot of AAl 1.
He
told
Staff
that the situation was highly unusual. When the transponder shut off
of 00

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